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This PhD thesis focusses on British railway companies in Colombia during 1902-30. It explores 
the impact of instability, insecure property rights, business culture, civil conflict, regionalism, 
national politics, and contractual instability on British overseas investment. It also evaluates 
whether British railway companies represented economic imperialism. The first chapter 
introduces the research question and evaluates the present state of the historiography. The 
second chapter explores attitudes towards foreign investment within national politics, 
focussing on the dominant verdad de la deuda doctrine, concluding that the loss of Panama led 
to national sovereignty taking precedent over economic development within public policy. The 
third chapter explores the history of what are termed the ‘Northern Railways’: a group of 
companies conceived to connect the north-east of the interior with the capital city Bogotá. The 
fourth chapter explores the Colombian National Railway Company, which connected Bogotá 
with the Magdalena River. The fifth chapter investigates the railways of the Caribbean coast, 
which linked the ports of Barranquilla and Santa Marta with the Magdalena River. The sixth 
chapter focusses on the Dorada Railway Company, which bridged the Lower and Upper 
Magdalena river valleys, monopolising a vital trade route linking the Caribbean railways and 
those of the interior. The thesis illustrates that rather than geography, it was principally 
institutional and political factors which inhibited British investment. This is accomplished 
through detailed empirical analysis of primary source material, which sheds light on the 
everyday experiences of British railway companies operating in the country for the first time. 
Furthermore, the organisation and experiences of British railways, both in terms of their 
shareholders and administrators, closely parallels the concept of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’. As 
such, the thesis presents a hitherto unknown intersection of imperialism within Britain’s Latin 
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Note on Translation 
Many of the sources used throughout this thesis are written in Spanish. This includes both 
primary source material and secondary sources. Throughout the thesis, the Spanish has been 
translated to English in the most literal way possible. However, where language used was 
archaic, or implicit meaning could not be conveyed with a literal translation, slight 
modifications have been made. The rationale throughout has been to convey the original 
meaning to the reader as accurately as possible. Where a word has been used in Spanish which 
has meaning attached to it is difficult to convey accurately in English, the Spanish word has 





























CNRC   Colombian National Railway Company  
CNoRC  Colombian Northern Railway Company 
SMRC  Santa Marta Railway Company 
BRPC   Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company 
DRC   Dorada Railway Company 
GNCRC  Great Northern Central Railway of Colombia 
UFC   United Fruit Company 
TNA   The National Archives, Kew 
AGN   Archivo General de la Nación, Bogotá 








Chapter 1. – Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
My concession was well supported in London, but when the parties interested in it, become 
acquainted with the gross breach of faith, both of the national and state government to me, they 
will lose all faith in the honesty of such a country, and it will be impossible to float any enterprise 
connected therewith.1   W.J. Kelly, British Railway Entrepreneur, 1865. 
Kelly’s proposed railway project on the Colombian Caribbean coast was the first attempted 
British investment in Colombia’s terrestrial transportation network. Until now it has been 
hidden in the Foreign Office archives, completely ignored by Colombian historiography. The 
concession was awarded to Kelly’s consortium of London financiers by the Colombian 
government. It was subsequently transferred, without justification or compensation, to a local 
partnership consisting of the vice-president of the state government, and ‘one of the warmest 
partisans of the government’.2 That a single failed British concession contract has been missed 
by historians is understandable. The complete silence on British railway investment in the 
country is less so. In 1910, the British Foreign Office carried out a survey of Colombian 
railways, finding that 60% of the route mileage was controlled by British companies.3 The 
majority were floated in London as what have been termed ‘free standing companies’.4 
However, Table 1.1 and Fig. 1.1 demonstrate that the track constructed was insignificant 
compared to other countries in the region. To a modern scholar of Colombian railways, Kelly’s 
warning seems prophetic: Colombia was largely overlooked by the flood of British capital 




                                                             
1  TNA, FO135/88, ‘Albany Fonblanque’s despatch No. 12’, 24 November 1865. 
2  Ibid. 
3  ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, p. 3. 
4  Mira Wilkins, 'Conduits for Long-Term Foreign Investment in the Gold Standard Era', in International 
Financial History in the Twentieth Century, ed. by Marc Flandreau, Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich and Harold 
James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 51-76. 
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Table 1.1 – Normalized extension of railways in service in Latin America, 1913 





Km of Track 
per 1,000 
People 
Argentina 31,186 7,917 3.94 
Chile 8,147 3,509 2.32 
Uruguay 2,592 1,316 1.97 
Costa Rica 619 387 1.60 
Cuba 3,846 2,507 1.53 
Mexico 20,447 14,855 1.38 
Brazil 26,062 24,161 1.08 
Guatemala 987 1,180 0.84 
Peru 3,317 4,347 0.76 
Bolivia 1,440 2,025 0.71 
Paraguay 373 657 0.57 
Nicaragua 322 581 0.55 
Honduras 341 588 0.41 
Ecuador 587 1,469 0.40 
Venezuela 858 2,633 0.33 
El Salvador 328 1,058 0.31 
Colombia 1,166 5,318 0.22 
Panama 76 378 0.20 
Source: Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 107. 
Fig. 1.1 - Kilometres of Latin America Railway Lines per 1,000 people, 1913 
 









Fig. 1.2 – ‘Colombian Rail and Export Routes before WWI’ 
 
Source: Hernan Horna, Transport Modernisation and Entrepreneurship in Nineteenth Century Colombia, 





Fig. 1.3. demonstrates levels of railway sector investment in nine Latin American countries in 
1913.5 Eight separate British railway companies operated in Colombia, almost as many as 
found in Chile. However, the Chilean railway network had almost eight times the route miles 
of the Colombian system. As such, the problem in Colombia was not a lack of railways, it was 
attracting capital to expand existing ones. In other countries, initial investments were followed 
by expansion, whilst in Colombia companies maintained their operations on the initial route. 
Until this thesis, nobody has attempted to explain why: there is almost a complete 
historiographical silence on British railway investment. The diminutive size of the network has 
led scholars of British relations with Colombia to dismiss the relevance of British railways.6 
However, Colombia’s diminutive network was not indicative of historical irrelevance. 
Colombia’s system simply resembled those of other countries before British investment 
expanded after initial successes. Furthermore, as Miller points out, ‘what looked marginal to 
the British could be central to a small Latin American country’.7 In Argentina, The Great 
Southern Railway, which by 1914 had laid 3,655 miles of track, originated as a 70 mile long 
railway established with £800,000 of British capital in 1865.8 At the turn of the twentieth 
century, the railways surveyed in this thesis represented an embryonic regional network, 
similar to the Mexican, Brazilian, or Argentine railways of the 1860s and 1870s. The scale of 
the £4,775,000 invested in the BRPC, the DRC, the CNoRC, and the CNRC, is therefore 
unimportant.9 To address this lacuna, the thesis asks the following question: what impeded the 
                                                             
5  The point at which investment reached its peak in terms of number of companies and total nominal 
investment, varies for each country. 
6  Malcolm Deas, ‘'Weapons of the Weak'? Colombia and Foreign Powers in the Nineteenth Century’, in 
Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital, ed. by Matthew Brown (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2008), pp. 173-86. 
7  Rory Miller, Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London: Longman, 
1993), p. 19. 
8  Colin Lewis, British Railways in Argentina 1857-1914: A Case Study of Foreign Investment (London: 
Athlone, 1983), p. 16. 
9  See tables 3.1, 4.2, 5.1 and 6.2. 
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expansion of British railway companies in Colombia? It explains why British railways did not 
follow the pattern of rapid expansion seen elsewhere in Latin America.  
Fig. 1.3 – British Railway Investment in Latin America in 1913 
 
Source: Irving Stone, The Composition and Distribution of British Investment in Latin America, 1865-1913 
(New York: Garland Publishing, 1987), pp. 73A-74A (Tables 18 and 19). 
Flandreau demonstrates nineteenth century European capital markets displayed a greater 
degree of sophistication than previously acknowledged: an ability to discriminate between 
potential recipients of capital based on sovereign debt maintenance, public finances and 
economic prospects, long before a formal international rating system existed.10 Flandreau 
focuses on the financial studies unit within Crédit Lyonnais, but argues that the Council of 
Foreign Bondholders performed a similar role for the London capital market.11 This level of 
sophistication is opposed to the thesis of dependency theory, which argues sovereign debt in 
                                                             
10  Marc Flandreau, ‘Caveat Emptor: Coping with Sovereign Risk under the International Gold Standard, 
1871-1913’, in International Financial History in the Twentieth Century, ed. by Marc Flandreau, Carl-
Ludwig Holtfrerich and Harold James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 17-50. 














































Number of Companies Average Investment Per Company (Million £)
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Latin America was a political tool used to subdue, exploit and victimise the region.12 It also 
rejects the idea that sovereign debt remained dictated by imperial politics. Recent scholarship 
suggests flows of British and French capital were determined by the behaviour of recipient 
nations, rather than by the politics of imperial powers.13 As such, national political economy 
represents a far more important factor in the economic development of capital deficient 
countries. Cain and Hopkins demonstrate that adherence to the institutions of British 
imperialism, or what Lewis describes as the ‘rules of the game’, was a determinant of capital 
investment in Latin America.14 Within the study of Latin American transportation 
infrastructure, Summerhill similarly argues that: ‘political factors reigned supreme in the 
process of infrastructure concession, subsidy and regulation. Yet these remain poorly 
understood.’15 This literature represents a strong justification for a focus on politics within 
Latin American transportation infrastructure development. 
Edelstein argued that the migration of British capital overseas was unprecedented. Investments 
represented a larger percentage of national GDP than any migration of capital in history.16 
According to Davis and Huttenback British investments represented 75% of all international 
movements of capital at the turn of the century.17 These flows fundamentally shaped the world 
economy during this period. Any Latin American nation which sought to receive large-scale 
investment, had to engage with the market on its terms. As can be seen in fig. 1.4, Latin 
American railways experienced two separate periods of substantial capital inflow from Britain. 
                                                             
12  Carlos Marichal, A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America: From Independence to the Great 
Depression, 1820-1930 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
13  Rui Esteves and João Tovar Jalles, ‘Like Father Like Sons? The Cost of Sovereign Defaults in Reduced 
Credit to the Private Sector’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 48 (2016), 1515–1545. 
14  P.J. Cain, and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688 – 1914 (London: 
Longman, 1993); Lewis, British Railways p. 98. 
15  William Summerhill, 'The Development of Infrastructure', in The Cambridge Economic History of Latin 
America, Volume II: The Long Twentieth Century, ed. by Victor Bulmer-Thomas, John H. Coatsworth 
and Roberto Cortés Conde (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 295. 
16  Michael Edelstein, Overseas Investment in the Age of High Imperialism The United Kingdom, 1850-1914 
(London: Methuen, 1982), p. 3. 
17  Lance E. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy 
of British Imperialism, 1860-1912 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 38. 
7 
 
The first ended with the Baring crisis, perpetuated by a speculative bubble in Argentine railway 
securities. Levels of capital investment in the sector did not return to similar levels until a 
second period of large-scale investment began around 1905. This period was ended by the 
outbreak of the First World War. As Marichal demonstrates, cyclical changes in the outflow of 
capital from the London capital market were the major determinant of the availability of capital 
in the capital-poor countries of Latin America.18 However, the distribution of this capital was 
determined by competition between countries. Within this vein Summerhill argues: ‘worries 
on the part of investors over the prospect of excessive regulation or expropriation mean that 
infrastructure investment may languish at levels much lower than are warranted by prevailing 
conditions, and less than necessary for future growth’.19 Adjusting public policy to mirror 
British institutions mitigated the perceived risk; government guarantees ensured sufficient 













                                                             
18  Marichal, A Century. 
19  Summerhill, ‘Development of Infrastructure’, p. 295. 
20  Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Pres, 1990). 
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Fig. 1.4 – Annual British Investments in Latin American Railways, 1865-1914. 
 
Source: Irving Stone, The Global Export of Capital from Great Britain, 1865-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1999). 
pp. 342-51. 
Fig. 1.5. – Cumulative British Railway Investment in Latin America, 1865-1914. 
 










































As fig. 1.5 demonstrates, the flow of British capital to Latin America between 1905 and 1914 
was greater than the sum of all previous investments. In Colombia this coincided with the first 
sustained period of political stability since independence. The country’s network looked 
primed for a new era of expansion. Yet by the beginning of the First World War, when large-
scale British investment in Latin American effectively ended, investment in the railway sector 
was not much greater than it had been in 1890.21 Why did the country miss out on this bonanza? 
Across Latin America economic historians have demonstrated that railways were a net positive 
for the economy.22 The experience is summarised well by Coatsworth, who notes that ‘the 
promise and the reality came much closer together … than it did in many other backward 
regions of the world’.23 From a comparative perspective, Herranz demonstrates that the impact 
of the railway was dictated by the length of the railway network constructed.24 Railways 
provided great advantages, and the competition for British railway investment had a profound 
impact on Latin American economies. Areas which attracted British investment were at a 
significant competitive advantage to those that did not. Defining why British railway 
investment in Colombia was lacking, is thus paramount to understanding its economic history.  
In 1904, just as the period of the greatest flows of British capital to Latin America was about 
to start, Rafael Reyes was elected as President of Colombia. Railway development with British 
capital was a central component of Reyes’s political platform. As this thesis shall demonstrate, 
in the short-term, his project was highly successful at attracting British capital. The first chapter 
                                                             
21  J. Fred Rippy, British Investments in Latin America, 1822-1949: A Case Study in the Operations of 
Private Enterprise in Retarded Regions (Hamden: Archon, 1966), pp. 39, 68. 
22  Summerhill, ‘Development of Infrastructure’; William Summerhill, Order against Progress 
Government, Foreign Investment, and Railroads in Brazil, 1854-1913 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003); John H. Coatsworth, Growth against Development: The Economic Impact of Railroads in 
Porfirian Mexico (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981); Lewis, British Railways; Colin 
Lewis, Public Policy and Private Initiative Railway Building in Sao Paolo 1860-1889 (London: Institute 
of Latin American Studies, 1991); Alfonso Herranz, ‘Transport Techonology and Economic Expansion: 
The Growth Contribution of Railways in Latin America before 1914’, Journal of Iberian and Latin 
American Economic History, 32 (2013), 13-45. 
23  Coatsworth, Growth, pp. 78-9. 
24  Herranz, ‘Transport technology’. 
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demonstrates that the Reyes administration revolutionised Colombia’s relationship with 
foreign capital markets. The central focus of the thesis is Reyes’s Quinquenio (1904-09) and 
the period between the fall of the Quinquenio and the outbreak of the First World War (1909-
14). This period is largely overlooked within the scant national literature on railways. The 
thesis demonstrates that this period fundamentally shaped the railway development policy 
enacted in subsequent decades, which determined the economic trajectory of the country. The 
thesis also summarises events during 1914-30, to demonstrate that the policy formulated and 
solidified within national politics during 1909-14, was implemented increasingly aggressively 
in the interwar period. The thesis argues that the Quinquenio, and the policies implemented 
within it, were the last chance for Colombia to develop its railway network with British capital. 
More specifically, it argues that the end of the Quinquenio coincides with a sharp contraction 
in flows of capital to Colombia. This contraction – caused by hostile public policy – continued 
until 1914, when large-scale British investment in Latin American railway ceased. The thesis 
argues that the failure of Reyes to consolidate power, and emulate the continuity of the 
Porfiriato, inhibited the Quinquenian project of railway expansion. As a result, Colombia had 
to wait for large-scale North American investment in the 1920s to expand the embryonic 
railway network. The thesis argues the construction of this network in the 1920s was heavily 
influenced by public policy developed in the period 1909-14. This policy – which sought 
national ownership above all else – led to significant financial resources being expended on 
nationalising existing British railways, instead of expanding the existing route mileage.  
1.3      The Central Problem 
The experience of British railway companies is explored through five chapters which follow 
this introductory chapter. Chapter two focusses on the evolution of Colombian politics towards 
foreign investment. Chapter three focusses on the CNoRC and GNCRC which are termed as 
the ‘northern railways’, conceived to link the departments of Cundinamarca and Santander. 
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Chapter four focusses on the CNRC, which linked the capital Bogotá with the Upper 
Magdalena River valley. Chapter five explored the BRPC and SMRC, serving the Caribbean 
ports of Barranquilla and Santa Marta. Chapter six focusses on the DRC, which linked the 
upper and lower Magdalena River, providing a link between the CNRC and the Caribbean 
coast. A final seventh chapter presents the central conclusions of the thesis. 
This thesis addresses the following question: Why did British railways in Colombia not expand 
as they did in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, or Mexico? The thesis argues that the causes were 
multifaceted, and quite different to those posited within the historiography to date. The first 
factor identified, is the negative relationship of Colombia with international capital markets. 
This is a major focus of attention within the second chapter. The chapter argues that Reyes’s 
Quinquenio succeeded in improving relations on a macro-level, but ultimately failed in 
maintaining this relationship on a micro-level. This argument is further developed in 
subsequent chapters. The second factor is the evolution of national politics. The second chapter 
demonstrates how the Quinquenio (1904-09) represents a single period of political policy, 
within the wider development of national politics towards railways. Subsequent chapters 
demonstrate that a second period, from the fall of the Quinquenio to the outbreak of the First 
World War (1909-14), was dominated by developing nationalism towards British railways and 
foreign capital. The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters demonstrate how this nationalism 
materialised on a local basis, ending continued expansion. The second chapter demonstrates 
that the transition between the two periods of national policy is symptomatic of a political 
struggle between the ideology of two political actors: Santiago Pérez Triana and Jorge Holguín. 
The third factor is the impact of the War of a Thousand Days. This is a major focus of the 
fourth chapter, but it also shown to have been a less influential but relevant factor for the other 
railway companies surveyed. Chapter four demonstrates how the financial costs of the war 
financially crippled the CNRC from the outset, and ultimately caused its bankruptcy and forced 
12 
 
nationalisation. The fourth factor is the struggle for influence between local elites, national and 
local governments, and international capitalists. This is a central factor explored in the third, 
fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters. These demonstrate that the power dynamics in Colombia, were 
not conducive for the stable environment necessary for expansion of foreign railway 
companies. Moreover, the thesis demonstrates that this was a systemic problem, pervasive 
within the Colombian context. The fifth factor is corruption. The second chapter demonstrates 
corruption was a significant problem which paralysed early attempts to attract British 
investment. Subsequent chapters demonstrate that corruption remained a persistent problem 
for British railways. Santiago Pérez Triana, who played a pivotal role in the development of 
national railway policy, is shown to have repeatedly engaged in corrupt activities relating to 
railway projects. The final factor is contractual instability. This is a common thread running 
through each chapter, affecting every surveyed railway company. This contractual instability 
was caused or accentuated by each of the preceding five factors: relationship with foreign 
capital markets, growth of nationalism within national politics, civil conflict, corruption and 
complex political power dynamics. 
1.4 The Historiography 
1.4.1 Colombia 
Ocampo demonstrated the central dilemma which defined nineteenth century Colombian 
history: finding a commodity which could be produced in the interior was simple, trading 
commodities successfully was an altogether different matter.25 Before the development of 
railways, export industries were limited not by a lack of commodities, but by the inaccessibility 
of the interior. As Safford demonstrates, the cost of freight was prohibitive for all but the most 
                                                             
25  José Antonio Ocampo, Colombia y la Economía Mundial, 1830-1910 (Bogotá: Siglo Vientiuno, 1984). 
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valuable of cargoes.26 Throughout the nineteenth century, local elites engaged in a series of 
short-lived speculative booms, aiming to find a commercially viable product for international 
trade. Until the development of the coffee economy, the only commodity which saw a modicum 
of success, and a sustained period of consistent trade, was the tobacco farmed on the banks of 
the Magdalena River, which offered a natural highway to the Caribbean ports.27 Outside of the 
Magdalena River valley, the mining of gold remained fundamental to the economy until the 
take-off of coffee cultivation.28 The country was thus blessed and cursed in equal measure by 
geography. Colombia’s mountainous terrain and equatorial latitude enabled a plethora of 
agricultural commodities to thrive, but these same characteristics dislocated markets and 
isolated the interior.  
The lack of transport infrastructure played a key role in nineteenth century Colombian history. 
Contemporary British observers such as landowner Robert Haldane, his neighbour and 
compatriot William Wills, or the British Foreign Office consistently identified it as a major 
cause of Colombia’s lacklustre commerce and economy.29 It is also almost universally 
acknowledged as a major factor within the nation’s economic historiography.30 It would seem 
logical, in a region in which the lack of transportation infrastructure had such a defining impact 
on its history, that explaining the lack of railways would have been a key topic within the 
national historiography. However, quite the opposite is true. Until relatively recently there was 
                                                             
26  Frank Safford, ‘El Problema de los Transportes en Colombia en el Siglo XIX’, in Economía Colombiana 
del Siglo XIX, ed. by Adolfo Meisel Roca and María Teresa Ramírez (Bogota: Banco de la Republica, 
2010). 
27  Luis Sierra, El Tabaco en la Economía Colombiana del Siglo XIX (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional, 1971). 
28  William McGreevy, An Economic History of Colombia 1845-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1971). 
29  Letter from Robert Haldane to John D. Powles, dated  9 October 1862, in John D. Powles, New Granada: 
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1962); Frank Safford, and Marco Palacios, Colombia Fragmented Land, Divided Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002); Anthony McFarlane, Colombia Before Independence: Economy, 
Society, and Politics Under Bourbon Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Safford, ‘El 
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almost a complete silence on the subject. Specific studies of railways are almost entirely absent. 
Where they exist, they tend to focus on the subject from their operational and engineering 
history, or else provide a simple narrative on the construction of the network.31 It is only 
recently that analytical studies have been carried out examining the economic impact of the 
railways. These studies have shown that the impact was important, but limited by the 
diminutive size of the constructed network.32 More specifically, from a local perspective, where 
railways were built, they have been shown to have had an equally important impact on the 
economy as was the case elsewhere in the region.33 New industries emerged as a direct result 
of railways.34 The internal commerce in agricultural commodities expanded greatly as a result 
of their development.35 Mining activities likewise increased in scale due to the expanding 
potential market created by a lower cost of freight.36 Moreover, recently the construction of the 
nationalised railway network in the 1920s has been shown to have been operationally 
profitable.37 Whilst the nationalised railway network constructed in the 1920s has received 
close attention in recent years, there is a complete silence on the British network which 
preceded it. 
The explanation for this lack of focus lies with the central thesis of the two strongest currents 
running throughout the country’s economic history. The first is dependency theory. The 
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development of railways has often been portrayed as a means of better facilitating the 
exploitation of Latin America’s resources by foreign powers.38 Dependistas thus link the 
railway with the idea of foreign domination and Latin American victimhood. They do not view 
railways as having benefitted the economy. On the contrary, they believe that these tied the 
country to a repeated boom and bust cycle, created by the fluctuating international demand for 
agricultural commodities.39 The trailblazing study of McGreevy, which was the first to apply 
the New Economic History to the Colombian case, as well as more recent studies, demonstrate 
that railways were in fact a net positive for the Colombian economy.40 The second strand 
focusses on geographical factor endowments, mirroring the argument made in Is Geography 
Destiny.41 They have argued that railways were not suited to Colombian terrain, and that 
geographical challenges explain the lack of foreign investment.42 A major flaw in this argument 
is the fact that geographical challenges failed to deter British investors elsewhere. The period 
which saw Colombia unable to compete for British capital with countries such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and Uruguay saw the construction of the Sao Paolo and Imperial Mexican 
railways.43 Both represented equally daunting engineering challenges and received much 
greater capital investment than any Colombian railway company. Neither of these currents 
provide their adherents incentive to investigate railway development. The first views the 
development of railways through the lens of victimhood, and the second argues Colombia was 
doomed to failure because of its factor endowments. Both currents are influenced by a wider 
trend identified by Brown, in which Latin America is understood historically as either a victim 
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or a failure, lacking the necessary agency to shape its own destiny.44 Hernán Horna’s work on 
railways establishes a middle ground between these two currents.45 His revisionist study of the 
railways of Javier Cisneros (the country’s first regional railways built in the 1880s) 
demonstrates that Latin American engineers and national capital played a far more important 
role in the development of Colombian railways than had previously been acknowledged. Rather 
than conform to the predominant ideas of geographical impracticality, or political and 
economic dependency, Horna argued in favour of Latin American shaping its own destiny. 
This thesis develops this same argument by demonstrating how Colombian elites determined 
their relationship with British capital on their own terms, ultimately deciding to forgo the 
benefits of British railway investment to avoid a loss of national sovereignty. 
The national historiography has hitherto focussed on two periods of railway development. The 
first is the 1880s in which the Cuban engineer Javier Cisneros built the first railways.46 At the 
end of the 1880s, during a boom of British investment, most railroads were transferred to 
companies registered in London. As was true throughout Latin America, during the 1890s 
further investment was inhibited by the Baring banking crisis of 1890, caused by speculation 
in Argentine railway securities. Without access to foreign capital, national attempts to develop 
the network were largely ineffective. According to Rippy, during this period North American 
engineers failed in their railway endeavours because accumulations of capital in the United 
States for foreign investments ‘were comparatively small until after 1910’.47 The second period 
of focus is the 1920s.48 During this decade the Ministry of Public Works used North American 
capital to build new and nationalize existing railways. The intervening period has been 
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(London: Reaktion, 2014), pp. 8-9. 
45  Horna, Transport Modernization. 
46  Ibid. 
47  J. Fred Rippy, ‘Dawn of the Railway Age in Colombia’, Hispanic American Historical Review, 33 
(1943), 650-63. 
48  Ramírez, ‘Los ferrocarriles y su impacto’. 
17 
 
completely overlooked by historians. The lack of a study of British railways which represented 
the ‘dominant’ influence within the nations’ transport infrastructure is striking.49 Upwards of 
60% of the diminutive network was British. Between the capital city Bogotá and the port city 
of Barranquilla, a chain of small British railways connected central Colombia with the outside 
world. British railway companies thus controlled the interior’s link with the world economy. 
The export/import trade was monopolised by these British railway companies, helping to 
foment national political opposition and even affect diplomatic relations.50 The infamy of the 
railways was such that the defeat of British railway workers in an impromptu game of football 
in 1927 was announced with jubilation by the national newspaper.51 The period between 1902 
and 1914 witnessed the greatest flow of British capital to the Latin American railway sector in 
history. This being the case, why did they not expand? This question is not only unanswered; 
until this thesis, it has never even been asked. This thesis shows conclusively that in Colombia 
– in stark contrast to countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico – avoiding, rather than 
ensuring the expansion of British railways was central to public policy. 
1.4.2 Latin America 
Compared with Colombia, railways have featured far more prominently in the historiography 
of other Latin American countries. They have been engaged on both the left and right as a 
standalone object of study throughout the region. Both proponents of dependency theory and 
neo-classical analysis agree on the profound impact the railways had on the region. Whether in 
the now classic work of the Cuban school of dependency Caminos para el azucar, or the works 
of Summerhill and Coatsworth stemming from the New Economic History of North America, 
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the railways are acknowledged to have gone hand-in-hand with the currents of export-based 
economic development which swept through the region in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.52 Indeed, within Mexican economic historiography, historians across the 
ideological spectrum can agree on one thing: that railway development ‘stimulated economic 
activity’ and was the most important event of the late nineteenth century.53 Railways have been 
shown to have been both products and progenitors of export-led development. The synergy 
between the two created a market for commodities produced in the hinterlands, whilst the ever-
expanding radius of international commerce created demand for railways in those areas not 
already linked directly with the world economy.54 
Many authors have documented how Latin American politicians went to considerable lengths 
to attract British capital.55 Accessing British capital and railways was paramount to Argentine 
elites: ensuring the continuity of their link to British capital markets was a priority of public 
policy. As such, in 1870, when an economic crisis threatened the capacity to service its 
sovereign debt, President Nicolás Avellaneda promised Argentina would ‘willingly suffer 
privations and even hunger to sustain the international credit and reputation of the national 
government’.56 Argentina’s positive relationship with the British capital market meant it was 
particularly successful attracting investment. Indeed, British investors were so confident, that 
a speculative boom in Argentine railway securities nearly crashed the entire financial system 
with the Baring crisis of 1890.57 Latin American success in attracting railway investment 
correlates strongly with their relationship to the British capital market, which depended on 
compliance to British institutions. Lewis argues that in Argentina the central requirement for 
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investment was local elites following ‘the rules of the game’ of the emerging international 
financial system.58 Wright demonstrates that Argentina’s first example of serious nationalism 
occurred with the Andino Railway in 1907, and subsequently ‘British-owned railways 
precipitated … antiforeign economic nationalism between 1909 and 1914’.59 Similar 
developments occurred during this period in Uruguay.60 In Mexico this period coincides with 
the nationalist revolution. By this point Argentine, Uruguayan, and Mexican railways were 
mature, and companies had laid hundreds or thousands of kilometres of track. The thesis 
demonstrates that this same reaction occurred in Colombia, but at a much earlier stage of 
railway development. In the case of the GNCRC, this was before the railway had completed its 
first 20km of line. The thesis argues that this can be partly explained by the Panamanian 
experience, and that Colombia was caught in the wider political currents of anti-imperialism. 
However, the thesis demonstrates that over and above the regional patterns, there was 
something fundamentally different about the Colombian elites’ relationship with foreign 
capital. This thesis demonstrates that a significant factor in the lacklustre railway expansion 
performance in Colombia was that Colombian elites – in contrast to their regional counterparts 
– were determined to forge links with British capital on their own terms, refusing to cede their 
destiny to external economic influences. 
1.5 Methodology 
1.5.1 Sources 
The sources used by this thesis have five main origins. The first is the Foreign Office section 
of the National Archives. Railway companies were afforded diplomatic assistance in disputes 
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with local government and political actors. Documentation for these was collected by Foreign 
Office officials in Colombia. The great advantage of these sources is that they contain 
correspondence from both the Colombian and British sides. These illustrate the Foreign 
Office’s public position, and through their correspondence with Whitehall, their private 
position. The second is the railway section of the Ministry of Public Works archive held by the 
National Archive of Colombia in Bogotá. These provide much of the same documentation 
contained in the Foreign Office archive: official correspondence with British diplomats. 
However, the internal correspondence relating to these disputes gives a clearer perspective of 
the private position of Colombian officials. The Ministry of Foreign Relations section of the 
same archive provides correspondence of important Colombian political actors, whilst 
exercising roles in the Colombian consular offices in London. The third is the Guildhall Library 
stock exchange section. Annual Reports for railways provide operational and financial 
information which is used to reconstruct the financial and operational history of the railway 
companies. The daily newspaper course of the exchange held by the library, is used to create 
price series for Colombian sovereign debt bonds during the period 1822-1860. Investor 
Monthly Manual is used for the period 1870-1909. These sources are used to provide price 
series for other nations in Latin America providing a comparative perspective. The fourth is 
the British Board of Trade ‘files of dissolved companies’ section of the National Archive, and 
the Companies House archive. These provide shareholder lists by year and were used to analyse 
changes in ownership. The fifth is the Luis Ángel Arango library in Bogotá. This library holds 
many pamphlets, contemporary books, and manuscripts relating to the railway companies used 
throughout the thesis. The main drawbacks of the sources are the gaps in the records, and the 
overwhelming volume of material. Narrating and analysing all the relevant experiences of the 
railways contained within the archives would have been impossible within the word limit. This 
problem is addressed by focussing on the most important and influential experiences of each 
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company. These vary, but each chapter generally focusses on one influential legal dispute, 
contractual and operational issues during expansion projects, and disputes with local political 
actors. 
Where gaps in the archival record exist within the National Archives Foreign Office section, 
they have generally been filled with company annual reports. Gaps in the Ministry of Public 
Works archive have been filled with contemporary pamphlets and official serialised 
governmental publications. Chapter four presented the greatest problem in this regard. Gaps 
exist on both the British and Colombian side. Coverage was good within the Foreign Office 
archive for the first years of construction. This allowed an important analysis of British 
financier Henry Jenks’s involvement. Contemporary Colombian literature provided a counter 
perspective on his role. Within the Ministry of Public Works archive, the papers for the CNRC 
have been misclassified, meaning it was impossible to access most of the material. By chance, 
one volume was located whilst researching the GNCRC. But this was the only archival material 
relating to the company available. Coverage of the railway within contemporary pamphlets and 
newspapers helped to better ascertain how the company was viewed within Colombia, but did 
not solve the problem entirely. Likewise, the material in the archive of the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations provided information for the actions of Colombian political actors connected to the 
CNRC in London. With the available material, determining the CNRC’s perspective was 
difficult. Lacking sources for detailed qualitative analysis, chapter four implements 
quantitative analysis which includes a counterfactual projection. Sources existed in abundance 
for the experience of the railway during the War of a Thousand Days, allowing an initial 
qualitative analysis of the impact of the war. This analysis was combined with data for company 
finances, to demonstrate the long term financial impact of the conflict. The projection 
demonstrates that the costs of the war set the company on a path to bankruptcy from its 
inception. The chapters for which the best records exist, are Chapters three and six. A mix of 
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Foreign Office and Ministry of Public Works archival material, as well as pamphlets and 
newspapers, provide an uninterrupted record for both the Colombian and British perspective. 
This was also the case for the SMRC in chapter five. The record for the BRPC was complete 
on the Colombian side. However, on the British side sources were almost entirely absent, other 
than for the legal case of 1909. Gaps were addressed using company annual reports. The 
problems were less acute for the BRPC than the CNRC, because the lack of sources on the 
British side was not a result of misclassification. To summarise, within the thesis, where 
records are more extensive, a more detailed qualitative analysis of politics and everyday 
experiences has been utilised. Where records are scanter, analysis focusses more on company 
finances and shareholding patterns. 
1.5.2 Quantitative and Qualitative Methods: 
The thesis applies a mixed method incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analysis. As 
previously discussed, this mixed method has been adapted to address gaps in the source 
material. In chapter two, price series for sovereign debt bonds are created from monthly price 
data to demonstrate the evolution of Latin American country’s politics towards foreign capital. 
These are analysed comparatively to demonstrate how Colombia differed from Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile. In chapter three, a counterfactual projection of company finances is realised 
to illustrate the impact of the War of a Thousand Days. In chapter six, a detailed graphical 
analysis of debt levels and profitability of the Manizales-Ambalema ropeway is included, to 
demonstrate the financial viability of expansion. In addition, chapters three, four, five, and six, 
all include a detailed analysis of company finances. These illustrate that given the required 
motivation, the companies could expand, illustrating the impact of institutional failure. In 
chapters three, five, and six, qualitative analysis of Company correspondence is utilised to 
demonstrate the everyday experiences of operating in the Colombian environment. These 
demonstrate that the development of nationalism, the government policy of railway 
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nationalisation, associated legal disputes, corruption, and the complex nature of political power 
dynamics were the major factors precluding further expansion of the railways with British 
capital. 
1.5.3 Chronology: 
Fig. 1.6 – Lifespan of British railway companies (incorporation to nationalisation) 
 
 
Sources: See footnote.61 
As is evident in fig. 1.6, the dates of incorporation as British companies and nationalisation 
varied significantly. To accommodate these differences, the chronology implemented in the 
thesis is flexible. The general limits of the thesis are the end of the War of a Thousand Days, 
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1990) (Bogotá: CESA, 2012), p. 81. 
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and the beginning of the Great Depression (1902-1930). However, since the central question 
of the thesis relates to railway expansion using British capital, which ended on a large scale by 
1914, the central focus of the thesis is the period 1904-1914. The total period surveyed for each 
railway varies depending on its experience. Each chapter aims to analyse the most important 
events for each railway under British ownership, to explain the expansion policy. In each case, 
the aim is to demonstrate how the railway arrived at a point at which further expansion with 
British capital was highly unlikely. This varied for each railway. To give sufficient context for 
the central analysis which follows, each chapter contains an origins section with a different 
start point reflecting the date of incorporation (often before 1902). The GNCRC – the railway 
with the shortest lifespan – was established as a British railway company in 1906. The bond 
dispute in 1909 made the chance of subsequent British investment effectively nil. However, 
negotiations between the company, the British Foreign Office, and local and national 
governments continued for many years. For this reason, the analysis of the GNCRC in Chapter 
three focusses overwhelmingly on the bond dispute and subsequent national propaganda 
campaign against the company. Subsequent negotiations and eventual nationalisation are 
covered briefly, but only to demonstrate that the railway followed a similar pattern to others 
surveyed in the thesis. The DRC, with the longest lifespan, was established as a British 
company in 1888, and was not nationalised until 1956. The DRC also continued expanding 
with British capital into the 1920s, unique within the Colombian context. It went through a 
protracted legal case termed the ‘Tolima tax’ from 1923 to 1936, the origins of which date back 
to the 1880s. In order to establish context, cover the ropeway expansion of 1913-22, and the 
legal dispute of 1923-36, a much wider chronological focus was necessary than implemented 
in other chapters. The chronology for the other railway companies falls somewhere between 
the concise focus of the GNCRC, and expanded view of the DRC. In general, each chapter 
focusses on the expansion of the railway company during the period 1904-09, before detailing 
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how the change of government policy during 1909-14 ended prospects of future expansion. 
This is followed by a brief rundown of the path towards eventual nationalisation after 1914. As 
is evident in fig. 6, the date of nationalisation differed substantially, meaning a different cut-
off point for each chapter. The GNCRC was nationalised in 1918, the CNRC in 1922, the 
CNoRC 1925, the BPRC in 1933, the SMRC in 1936, and the DRC in 1956.62 As such the 
differing start and end points for British investment are reflected throughout the analysis 
implemented in the thesis. 
1.6      Contextual and Theoretical Framework 
1.6.1 Local Elites 
The concept of local elites is ubiquitous within the study of Colombian history, and that of the 
Latin American region more broadly. Throughout this thesis, where the term ‘local elites’ is 
used, it refers to this concept. In the Colombian context, especially in areas of the country with 
large indigenous and slave populations, the term has a strong racial component. As Peter Wade 
argues, ‘the political and economic elite [of Colombia] prided itself on its limpieza de sangre, 
clean blood, supposedly free from the “taint” of black or indian blood’.63 However, ethnicity 
was but one factor which defined the small political and economic elite of Colombia. 
Whiteness, whilst helpful to social mobility, was not in of itself a marker of elite membership. 
In places with substantial Spanish descended populations, such as Boyacá, Cundinamarca, or 
Antioquia, whites occupied positions throughout the social strata. As Victor Uribe-Urán 
demonstrates, this white criollo elite intermarried to form clan like social formations, which 
monopolised administrative positions within the colonial government.64 By the independence 
                                                             
62  DRC: ‘Britain gets poor price for a railway’ Daily Mail, 17 July 1956; SMRC: Posada, Colombian 
Caribbean, p. 171; BRPC: Posada, Colombian Caribbean, p. 170; CNRC: Hoffman, p. 157; CNoRC: 
Hoffman, p. 233; GNCRC: Correa, Café y ferrocarriles, p. 81. 
63  Peter Wade, Blackness and Race Mixture: The Dynamics of Racial Identity in Colombia (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 9. 
64  Victor Uribe-Uran, Honorable Lives: Lawyers, Family, and Politics in Colombia, 1780–1850 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), pp. 20-44. 
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era, these colonial families had been intermarrying for many generations, and a small, strong, 
and insular group had formed at the top of Colombian society. Entry to this small group was 
delimited by barriers such as whiteness, wealth, education, membership of a profession, 
politics, and religion. Examples of entry to the inner circle of the criollo elite were few. One 
such example is immigration of British and European gentleman of social pedigree such as 
William Wills, or foreign mercenaries such as Daniel O’Leary, who were accepted for the 
valour and honour they showed in in the revolutionary war. There were also examples of white 
Colombians such as Pepe Sierra or Marco Fidel Suárez from lower social classes, who achieved 
social mobility by amassing great wealth, or through national politics. The most important 
information in the context of this study is that ‘local elites’ held membership to a small group 
of intermarried family clans, who enjoyed an incredibly strong grip on economic and political 
power. As the thesis demonstrates, these were largely unwilling to cede power to foreign 
interests. 
1.6.2 Imperialism 
Latin America had to bow to British institutions to access its capital market. As such, Latin 
American countries were compelled to accept a subservient commercial relationship to benefit 
from the advantages of British capital. In the analysis of Latin American history, dependency 
theory has rightly classified this economic relationship as unequal.65 However, rather than 
focussing on subservience or exploitation, Knight prefers to ask cui bono: who benefited from 
this flow of capital? This approach is appropriate for British railways in Latin America.66 
Quantitative studies of Latin American railways suggest foreign railways were a net economic 
benefit. British capital commanded significantly lower interest than native capital markets (if 
they were available at all), which represents a net gain. Secondly, social savings calculations 
                                                             
65  Marichal, A Century. 
66  Alan Knight, ‘Rethinking British Informal Empire’ in Informal Empire ed. by Brown, p. 46. 
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demonstrate that the benefits of railways in the region were generally high.67 The question 
should therefore be: which factors were decisive in the allocation of British capital to Latin 
American infrastructure works? 
The thesis focusses on the agency of local elites in the face of British capital, and its impact on 
investment.  Gallagher and Robinson identify ‘collaborating elites’ as a key component of 
British Imperialism, and a particularly important factor in informal imperialism.68 Cain and 
Hopkins argue that the driving force of British imperialism was a group of wealthy private 
investors termed ‘gentlemanly capitalists’.69 Based on the theoretical frameworks of Cain and 
Hopkins, and Gallagher and Robinson, within the Colombian context, the relationship between 
foreign investors and local elites represents the foundational basis of British imperialism. 
Combined, the concepts of ‘informal imperialism’ and ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ provide a 
theoretical framework for analysing railways as a transnational intersection of imperialism. But 
the Colombian case does not fit the ‘colonizing, immigrative railway imperialism’ model of 
Robinson et al.70 The lack of immigration connected to the railway, enabled significant local 
agency in areas dominated by foreign interests.71 The relationship between local ‘collaborating’ 
elites and ‘gentlemanly capitalists’, is the clearest and most important intersection of British 
imperialism in Colombia. Studying their relationship within railways as the most significant 
British investment, is the most efficient manner of observing Cain and Hopkins’s ‘British 
imperialism’ in action. The thesis argues that fundamentally, it was the agency of Colombian 
                                                             
67  Summerhill, Order; Coatsworth, Growth; Herranz, Alfonso, ‘Transport Technology’. 
68  John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, The Economic History Review, 
6, 1 (1953), 1-15. 
69  Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, I. 
70   Railway Imperialism, ed. by Clarence B. Davis, Kenneth E. Wilburn and Ronald E. Robinson (Westport: 
Greenwood, 1991), p. 187. 
71  Catherine C. LeGrand ‘Living in Macondo Economy and Culture in a United Fruit Banana Enclave in 
Colombia’ in Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American 
Relations ed. by Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore (London: Duke 
University Press, 1998), pp. 333-368 (pp. 354-5). 
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elites in the face of British capital, inspired by a determination to maintain sovereignty and 
shape their own destiny, which inhibited investment. 
1.6.2 Transnational Capitalists and Middle-Class Capitalists 
In addition to the idea of ‘gentlemanly capitalists’, the concept of ‘transnational capitalists’ is 
applied within the thesis to explain the patterns evident within the shareholding of the railways. 
Sklair has argued that the current process of globalisation is connected to what he terms the 
‘transnational capitalist class’. The economic interests of this social class depend on economic 
processes which operate across borders, and they cannot be understood as a standard national 
capitalist class.72 Sklair’s analysis is Marxist, but the delineation of the social group he 
identifies applies equally to the shareholding patterns presented within the thesis. As such, even 
though the wider Marxist conceptual framework is counterintuitive to that of the thesis, his 
classification of a social class based on transnational economic interests is highly appropriate.  
                                                             
72  Lesley Sklair, ‘The transnational capitalist class and the discourse of globalisation’, Cambridge Review 




Fig. 1.7 – Conceptual Framework for the delineation of Social Classes with interests within 
the Shareholding of British Railway Companies 
 
Fig. 1.7 illustrates the conceptual framework applied to interests in the railways. Colombian 
‘local elites’, or what is termed throughout as the ‘emergent national capitalist class’, represent 
a standard national capitalist class. Skair’s ‘transnational capitalist class’ is referred to 
throughout as ‘transnational capitalists’. The thesis argues that ‘transnational capitalists’ held 
sway over ownership of certain railways, and that pursuit of their interests – over those of the 
region – was detrimental to railway development. The thesis illustrates that ‘gentlemanly 
capitalists’ held a dominant role within British railways, but a separate social class which does 
not fit Cain and Hopkins’s definition also features. On one layer this group was comprised of 
professionals such as accountants, clerks, banking clerks, lawyers, doctors, etc. On another it 
included the proprietors of small businesses such as butchers, grocers, drapers, chemists, 
ironmongers, etc. This group is referred to as middle-class capitalists. Through the Colombian 











in Latin America. For the ‘transnational capitalist’, the railways directly served transnational 
economic processes such as banana exportation, from which their economic power was 
derived. Conversely, the interests of the emerging national capitalist class, the middle-class 
capitalists, and the ‘gentlemanly capitalists’, was dependent on the railway’s operational 
profitability, which protected or supplemented their wealth. In all three cases, the strong 
connection of economic interests to their respective national economies means they cannot be 
considered as ‘transnational capitalists’. The positions of authority ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ 
held within the London capital markets, allowed them to connect the other groups together. 
Within this context, the thesis provides a close view of the internal workings of international 
capitalism and British informal imperialism in Latin America in the early twentieth century. 
1.6.3 Political Economy 
According to North, ‘Institutions are “the rules of the game” in a society or, more formally, are 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.’73 These rules vary between 
societies. Companies, as vessels for the mobility of capital, need to adapt to or else shape or 
bend these rules to operate efficiently. Within this vein, Lewis argued that ‘in order to establish 
a modern means of communication, Argentina was obliged to accept the rules of the game’.74 
Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, which saw large-scale overseas capital 
investment, demonstrated sustained efforts to provide an attractive environment for foreign 
investment. Cain and Hopkins argue that the ‘central requirement of the commercial pact 
between Britain and Argentina, was that sovereign debt should be honoured.’75 Whilst these 
countries represented model debtors, as Deas argues, nineteenth century Colombia represented 
a model repudiator, especially under Nuñez.76 Whereas the Argentine President would allow 
                                                             
73  North, Institutions, p. 3. 
74  Lewis, British Railways, p. 98. 
75  Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 291. 
76  Deas, ‘Weapons of the Weak’, pp. 173-86. 
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his nation to suffer ‘hunger’ to placate British investors, Colombian president Rafael Nuñez 
believed Colombia ‘should only think of their debts after everything else that the country 
required had been amply provided for’.77 The country spent most of the nineteenth century in 
default, and this was reflected in their standing in foreign capital markets. 
North argues that an entrepreneur is an agent of change within a society, ‘responding to the 
incentives embodied within the institutional framework’.78 Investors in railway companies 
react to these same incentives. Change ‘typically consists of marginal adjustments to the 
complex rules, norms, and enforcement that constitute the institutional framework’.79 By 
focussing on the political economy of Colombia with respect to railway companies, this thesis 
illustrates how these marginal adjustments affected investment. The common application of a 
government guarantee of interest on railway bonds, is the most important example of marginal 
adjustments to national political economy which positively impacted investment. Rory Miller 
argues that in Latin America governments ‘normally had to guarantee returns’ to attract 
investment.80 Guarantees were necessary to mitigate the perceived risk of investing in the 
region. Lewis and Summerhill demonstrated how guarantees were a determinant of British 
investment in both Argentina and Brazil.81 For these reasons, the implementation of guarantees 
in railway financing during the Quinquenio is a key area of analysis throughout the thesis. The 
thesis illustrates that just as was the case elsewhere, the application of these policies 
significantly increased the availability of capital, mirroring the conclusions of Summerhill and 
Lewis.82 North identifies how changes in the institutional framework modifies transactional 
and transformational costs.83 On the macro-level these changes are embodied by the 
                                                             
77  Deas, ‘Weapons of the Weak’, p. 178; Marichal, A Century, p. 105. 
78  North, Institutions, p. 83. 
79  North, Institutions. 
80  Miller, Britain and Latin America, p. 133. 
81  Summerhill, Order; Lewis, British Railways, pp. 97-123; Lewis, Public Policy, pp.35-8. 
82  Summerhill, Order; Lewis, British Railways, pp. 97-123; Lewis, Public Policy, pp.35-8. 
83  North, Institutions, pp. 61-9. 
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development of the wider anti-imperialist political movement followed throughout the thesis. 
On the micro-level, the focus is specific issues emanating from the wider macro-level political 
changes, such as legal cases, levies on income, contractual renegotiations, expropriation, and 
bond disputes. The thesis illustrates that in accordance with North’s theoretical framework, all 
these issues fundamentally influenced the cost and risk of doing business in Colombia, and as 
such, precluded further investment in the sector. Throughout this thesis, reference to ‘political 




Chapter 2. – The Politics of Foreign Investment 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the city of London … [until] a few years ago … [Colombia] was looked upon merely as a 
misgoverned state, in a perpetual state of revolution, and as a place to be avoided, as the grave 
of all capital which anyone was foolish enough to invest in.1 Francis Loraine Petre, Colombian 
National Railway Company Director, 1906. 
 
Colombia spent the nineteenth century in default to British bondholders. Recent scholarship 
indicates nineteenth century European capital markets were sophisticated mechanisms, within 
which bodies such as the Council of Foreign Bondholders played integral roles.2 Furthermore, 
Esteves and Tovar have shown that sovereign default had significant and long-lasting negative 
effects for private sector investment in the Latin American region.3 However, within the 
Colombian context, the long-term impact of continued default remains unknown, because the 
national historiography largely overlooks how sovereign debt management influenced the 
perception of Colombia in international capital markets.4 Junguito provides a comprehensive 
history of the country’s fiscal mismanagement, and its role in Colombian underdevelopment, 
but the focus is internal.5 Ocampo’s ‘speculative production’ model, or Palacios’s study of 
coffee, provide more external perspectives, but their focus is on Colombia’s insertion into the 
world economy through export agriculture, and do not address how Colombia was perceived 
in Europe.6 Thus whilst Colombian historiography acknowledges that repeated fiscal crises 
shaped the country’s economic history, Colombia’s image overseas is largely unknown.  7 This 
                                                             
1  F. Loraine Petre, The Republic of Colombia, an Account of Its People, Its Institutions and Its Resources 
(London: Edward Stanford, 1906) p. 2. 
2  Flandreau, ‘Caveat Emptor’. 
3  Esteves and Tovar, ‘Like Father Like Sons?’. 
4  From a general perspective, the national historiography focusses on internal finances and the export 
sector, rather than how financial mismanagement helped to mould Colombia’s relationship with the 
world economy: Roberto Junguito, La deuda externa en el siglo xix: cien años de incumplimiento 
(Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1995); Mauricio Avella Gómez, 'El financiamento externo’, in 
Economía Colombiana, ed. by Meisel and Ramírez; Ocampo, Colombia y la Economía Mundial. 
5  Junguito, La Deuda Externa. 
6  Ocampo, Colombia y la Economía Mundial; Marco Palacios, Coffee in Colombia, 1850-1970: An 
Economic, Social and Political History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).  
7  Ocampo, Colombia y la Economía Mundial. 
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creates a problem. To understand British investment, we need to understand how Colombia 
was perceived in London. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide this contextual base. The chapter establishes the following 
questions. First, how was Colombia’s sovereign debt managed during 1822-1900, and what 
image did this cultivate in London? Secondly, to what extent was sovereign debt management 
dictated by politics, and if so, in what form? Thirdly, how did Colombia’s sovereign debt 
management compare to regional counterparts? Fourthly, how did Colombia’s sovereign debt 
management during the Quinquenio (1904-1909) differ, and how did this influence the image 
of the country in London? Finally, how can we best define the contrasting viewpoints on 
foreign investment in nineteenth and early twentieth century Colombia? The chapter argues 
that sovereign debt management was poor during the nineteenth century and cultivated a 
negative image of the country in London. It demonstrates that by the end of the century, 
repeated defaults were a result of a deliberate policy of repudiation of debt, indicative of the 
Colombian elite’s misunderstanding of the long-term consequences for subsequent foreign 
investment. The chapter demonstrates that Colombia compares poorly with major competitors 
such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. It also shows that Mexican and Colombian bonds 
performed similarly during the first five decades of independence, but that Mexico diverged 
from the pattern of repeated defaults during the Porfiriato. This left Colombia as the only major 
Latin American nation still exhibiting the pattern of repeated defaults characteristic of the 
region in the 1820s and 1830s. Loraine Petre’s comment which opened the chapter, illustrates 
the effect of Colombia’s repeated default: at the dawn of the railway age in Colombia, the 
country’s sovereign debt record represented an impermeable barrier to foreign investment.8 
This chapter argues that this barrier was removed by Rafael Reyes’s rehabilitation of 
Colombia’s relationship with European capital markets. Colombian politics following the loss 
                                                             
8  Petre, The Republic of Colombia, p. 2. 
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of the department of Panama are presented as a crossroads, dominated by the question of 
national sovereignty. The path the country would take regarding this question would 
fundamentally shape the fate of British railway companies. 
2.2 A Century of Default - “La verdad de la deuda” 
2.2.1 Early nineteenth century experiences 
Rippy established that the first few decades of the nineteenth century were characterised by a 
near universal collapse of the credit of Latin American countries, which is evident in fig. 2.1.9 
Brazil was the only country to stay solvent during this period. As such, Colombia’s experience 
mirrored that of the wider region. Ultimately, default was a result of wider systemic problems 
caused by the speculative boom of the 1820s, which created unserviceable levels of debt. 
However, by the 1840s a divergence occurred within relationships with the British capital 
market. Sovereign debt still relied on diplomatic intervention, since British investors were yet 
to establish a formal system to manage their relationships with foreign governments. 
Correspondence between British and Latin American diplomats illustrates the emerging gulf 
between Colombia, and what Cain and Hopkins term ‘compliant satellites’ of British 
imperialism.10 Throughout correspondence, Colombian officials argued that repudiation was 
justified and a sovereign right, with Minister of State Manuel María Mosquera commenting 
that this was ‘a condition tacitly comprised in all contracts that a nation concludes with private 




                                                             
9  Rippy, British Investments, pp. 17-21. 
10  Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, I, p. 58. 
11  Mosquera to Palmerston, 27 March 1840, ‘Correspondence with Foreign Powers relative to Loans by 
British Subjects, 1823-47’1847 Vol. LXIX, [839], p. 609. 
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Fig. 2.1 – Latin American sovereign debt bond prices, 1822-39 (Per cent of par value) 
 
Sources: Course of the Exchange, 1822-1838.12 
The contrast between communications made by Colombian and Chilean officials at this time, 
is indicative of the divergence in national political economy. When Chile was unable to pay 
interest due to internal armed conflict, Chilean officials wrote that they hoped the 
circumstances would: 
                                                             
12  The price series throughout the chapter are constructed using the last available price for each month. 
Where a price was not available for the last trading day of the month, prices were taken for the last price 
quoted. Where no price was available for the whole month, a price was provided taking the mean for the 
previous and subsequent months. This only occurred sporadically. Where a security was suspended, the 
last price before suspension was used. Where a country had two bond issuances traded concurrently (such 
as the 1820s bonds for Colombia and Mexico), the mean average of the prices of each was used. Where 
a country had more than two bonds trading concurrently (such as Argentina in the late nineteenth century) 
the bond considered to be the most representative and important to the country’s credit has been used. 
This was invariably the bond issuance with the largest total nominal value. This last case only became 
an issue with the data taken from Investors Monthly Manual, (1870-1929). The details of the bonds used 
are the following: Argentina: 1824-60 and 1869-71, ‘Buenos Ayres 1824’, 1872-89 ‘Argentine 6% 1871 
Public Works’, 1890-99, ‘Argentina 5% 1889’; Brazil: 1824-60, ‘Brazil 5% 1824’, 1869-1889, ‘Brazil 
5% 1865’, 1890-99, ‘Brazil 4% 1889’; Colombia: 1822-24, ‘Colombia 1822’, 1824-1841, Average of 
‘Colombia 1822’ and ‘Colombia 1824’, 1841-45, ‘Colombia (ex. Venezuela)’, 1845-51, ‘New Granada’, 
1852-60, ‘New Granada 1849’, 1869-74, ‘New Granada 1849’, 1874-97, ‘New Granada 4.5% debt 
converted’, 1898-1930, ‘Colombia 1.5%-3% 1896’; Chile: 1822-60, ‘Chile 1822’, 1869-90, ‘ Chile 1869 
6%’, 1891-99, ‘Chile 1886 4%’; Peru: 1822-49, ‘Peru 1822’, 1849-60, ‘Peru 1849’, 1869-72, ‘Peru 
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Induce the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, so distinguished for the impartial justice of its 
counsels, to consider the matter anew, and to view under a less unfavourable aspect, the conduct 
of the Chilean government.13 
The Colombian officials made no such attempts to provide excuses for their conduct; they 
simply justified their default by arguing debts were always ‘subordinate’ to expenses. Viscount 
Palmerston retorted that had ‘this doctrine had been made known beforehand to British 
capitalists … all parties concerned would have been saved from the necessity of carrying on 
the present discussions [as the British would not have provided the loan]’.  14 The contrast is 
clear, whilst the Chilean officials prioritised their relationship with British investors, 
Colombian officials prioritised national sovereignty. 
Fig. 2.2 – Latin American sovereign debt bond prices, 1840-60 (Per cent of par value) 
Source: Course of the Exchange, 1840-1860. 
                                                             
13  Tocornal to Walpole, 20 September 1838, ‘Correspondence with Foreign Powers relative to Loans by 
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These differing attitudes were reflected in price movement on the London Stock Exchange. As 
fig. 2.2 illustrates, between 1838 and 1844 Chile’s bonds rose consistently from 24.5% of par 
to 5% above par value. As such, £1,000 of bonds which in September 1838 were trading at 
£245, were worth £1050 in June 1844. Chile’s bonds remained over par value for much of the 
1850s, and the country was the most reliable Latin American debtor throughout the nineteenth 
century. In contrast, Colombian bonds maintained their junk status throughout the 1840s and 
1850s, seldom rising above 20 per cent of par, meaning that £1,000 of bonds could be traded 
on the capital market for £200 or less. Fig. 2.2 reveals Argentina and Peru both made similar 
(albeit slower) process re-establishing their creditworthiness in London. By 1860 they were in 
much the same position as Chile: their bonds were on the cusp of regaining their nominal value, 
three decades after independence. So, by 1860, of the large and historically influential countries 
of the Latin American region, all but Colombia and Mexico restored their standing in London. 
This led to greater availability of credit in these countries. Argentina and Chile, raised only 
£1,000,000 in the 1820s, and Brazil raised £3,200,000. By 1890, Argentina had raised 
£72,000,000, Chile £9,535,852, and Brazil £37,009,593 of sovereign debt. In contrast, 
Colombia, which raised £6,750,000 in the 1820s, had raised no additional capital at all.15 As 
the next subsection will demonstrate, investment in the Colombian private sector was just as 
scarce. 
2.2.2 1868-99 Renegotiations with the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders 
The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders was formed in 1868 to provide a formal framework 
for the London capital market to interact with debtor countries. By this point, Colombia had 
spent forty years in default. As fig. 2.3 demonstrates, during this whole period, its sovereign 
debt bonds had traded at around 20% of par, meaning Bondholders who purchased bonds in 
                                                             
15  Rippy, British Investments, p. 20, 37. 
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the 1820’s, had lost upwards of 80% of their investment. Fig. 2.4 illustrates how different the 
experience of investors who invested in the bonds ‘compliant satellites’ such as Argentina, 
Chile and Brazil had been, which traded at or above par value. Sovereign bond prices 
represented a form of nineteenth century ‘credit rating’. It should thus not be surprising there 
was a similar disparity in private sector investment as in government securities. By 1890 private 
sector investment stood at £84,978,788 in Argentina, £31,660,026 in Brazil, £14,812,795 in 
Chile, and £3,485,883 in Colombia.16  
Fig. 2.3 – Colombian Sovereign Debt Bond Prices on London Stock Exchange, 1822-1899 
(per cent of par value) 
 






                                                             
































































Fig. 2.4 – Colombian, Argentine, Brazilian and Chilean sovereign debt bond prices, 1869-
1899 (Per cent of par value) 
 
Sources: Course of the Exchange, 1869; Investors Monthly Manual, 1870-1899. 
 
The role of Colombia’s repeated default and repudiation in this disparity was significant. Public 
utilities and railways have a long gestation period, and the stable environment offered by Chile, 
Brazil, and Argentina, attracted British investment in these sectors. Colombia’s increased risk 
profile chased away investors seeking a long-term stable investment (from which the majority 
of British capital flows originated).17 In Colombia, British investment was concentrated in the 
high-risk mining industry, which attracted a different kind of investor. In 1890, £2,912,449 had 
been invested in Colombia’s mining sector, representing 83.5% of all British investment in the 
country, as opposed to 0.6% (£567,108) of British investment in Argentina, 7.6% (£1,131,748) 
                                                             
17  In subsequent chapters, the thesis demonstrates investment in the railway sector came largely from 
‘gentlemanly capitalists’: very wealthy shareholders from London and the home counties. Additionally, 
the CNRC’s guarantee is shown to have attracted a large amount of capital from a long list of small and 
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in Chile, and 2.4% (£770,027) in Brazil.18 Correspondence presented by Costello, suggests 
early nineteenth century investors in Mexican mining companies were often overwhelmed by 
the adventure and excitement experienced through their investment. The promise of great 
rewards, which rarely materialised, led many to lose large sums.19 The experience in the 
Colombian mining sector was much the same. Railways were too boring for these would-be 
adventurers, who flirted with the exoticism of Latin America through the periodic operational 
reports of the mining companies they were invested in.20 Thus in essence, the perception of 
Colombia which was cultivated in London, resigned the country to the status of target de jure 
for British rainbow chasing. 
Latin American countries utilised the formal framework established by the Corporation of 
Foreign Bondholders to renegotiate their debts, leading to the Peruvian ‘Grace Contract’ and 
Porfirio Díaz’s renegotiation of the Mexican sovereign debt, both completed in 1886.21 Peru 
and Mexico rehabilitated their credit to attract subsequent investment in the railway sector. In 
1899, the sovereign debt of Ecuador was cancelled out in exchange for railway bonds to ensure 
completion of what Clark describes as the ‘redemptive work’ of the national railway expansion 
project.22 Similarly, Colombia used the framework provided by the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders to renegotiate its debt in 1873, and again in 1889. But these renegotiations did not 
result in a long-term rehabilitation of it credit as had been the case for Peru or Mexico. 
                                                             
18  Rippy, British Investments, p. 40. 
19  Michael P. Costeloe, Bubbles and Bonanzas: British Investors and Investments in Mexico, 1821-1860 
(Lexington: Lanham, 2011) p. 169-90. 
20  A good example of shareholders investing in Colombian mining endeavours can be found in the 
shareholder records of Contractors Ltd, a company formed to drain Guatavita Lake in search of El 
Dorado. The company succeeded in draining the lake, but when they got to the bottom they found little 
of the gold they were expecting. Investors which included: a princess, spinsters, a reverend, stockbrokers, 
accountants, army majors, an ironmonger and a tobacconist, lost every penny of the £40,000 invested in 
the project. ‘El Dorado’s Other Deposits’ Financial Times, 1 December 1908; ‘The Sacred Lake’, The 
Financial Times, 3 March 1911; TNA, BT31/16346/65119. 
21  Rory Miller, ‘The Making of the Grace Contract: British Bondholders and the Peruvian Government, 
1885-1890’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 8 (1976), 73-100 (p. 169). 
22  ‘External Debt of Ecuador’, Morning Post, 15 March 1899; Kim A. Clark, The Redemptive Work: 
Railway and Nation in Ecuador, 1895-1930 (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1997). 
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Renegotiation was followed by initial optimism and upward price movements. Fig. 2.5 
illustrates how the management of sovereign debt in Colombia and Mexico was analogous until 
the mid-1880s. Under Díaz Mexico became a dependable ‘compliant satellite’, whilst Nuñez 
maintained Colombia as an unrepentant repudiator. Nuñez’s failure to rehabilitate Colombia’s 
credit is covered in more detail later. 
Fig. 2.5 – Comparison of nineteenth century price movements in Mexican and Colombian 
sovereign debt bonds, 1822-99 (Per cent of par value) 
 
Sources: Course of the Exchange, 1822-1869; Investors Monthly Manual, 1870-1899. 
The 1873 renegotiation awarded extremely advantageous terms to Colombia. Before 
renegotiation, the debt totalled £6,630,000. It was converted into £2,000,000 of new bonds, 
representing a write-off of almost 70% of the Colombian sovereign debt. In return, the 
Colombian government released 2,000,000 hectares of baldíos to bondholders.23 Following 
renegotiation, the capital market viewed the country with a new sense of optimism, evident in 
                                                             
23  Baldios refers to unsettled frontier lands in the interior of Colombia. Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders, Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders for 





































































fig. 2.3. The new bonds began trading at between 50-60 per cent of par throughout the last five 
months of 1874, but in July of 1876 civil war erupted, severely limiting the capacity to service 
the debt.24 The war continued for another six months, during which the price of bonds dropped 
from roughly 40 to 25. After the end of hostilities payments of interest briefly resumed, before 
returning to full default on the 1 October 1879.25 By 1886, at the dawn of Rafael Nuñez’s 
poltical Regeneración, a bondholder holding £100 of the original £6,630,000 debt had an 
investment worth £6: a 94% loss. What caused this consistent default? Were politics of 
repudiation a conscious decision, or could things have been different? 
2.2.3 The Nuñez Regime – Opportunity Lost? 
Nuñez has been portrayed by Palacios as a zealot with a personal obsession for developing the 
Colombian railway network, exemplified by a personal motto: ‘peace and railways – the rest 
is quackery’.26 His protectionist policies supporting state-led import substitution have garnered 
favourable interpretations from national historians.27 The revisionist account of his presidency 
presented here parallels the analysis of Deas.28 But Deas is not alone in questioning the wisdom 
of the political and economic policy of the Regeneración.29 The Regeneración led to 
fundamental changes in the political organisation of Colombia, which influenced subsequent 
experiences of British railways. The most notable of these changes was the end of federal 
‘sovereign states’. The aim of this subsection is to demonstrate that in addition to the drastic 
changes to the organisation of the Colombian state, the policies of the regeneracíon on foreign 
investment and the sovereign debt, were extremely detrimental to railway development. 
                                                             
24  ‘Money-Market and City Intelligence’, The Times, 14 Nov 1876. 
25  Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, Twenty-Sixth Annual Report 1898-9, p. 83. 
26  Marco Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875–2002 (London: Duke 
University Press, 2006), p. 16. 
27  Luis Ospina Vásquez, Industria y protección en Colombia 1810-1930 (Medellín: FAES, 1979). 
28  Malcolm Deas, ‘“Weapons of the Weak”?’. 




Nuñez’s policy on sovereign debt repayment is summed up by his affirmation that ‘[Colombia] 
should only think of debts after everything else the country required [was] amply provided 
for’.30 
Fig. 2.6 – Difference between Colombian bond prices and regional average, 1870-99 (Per 
cent of par value)
Sources: Investors Monthly Manual, 1870-1899. (The graph is computed by subtracting the equally weighted 
mean for the bonds of Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Argentina and Peru from the price of Colombian bonds.) 
 
Fig. 2.6 quantifies the difference between the price of the Colombian debt and the average of 
its regional rivals. These data demonstrate clearly that the Regeneración of Rafael Nuñez was 
decidedly negative for Colombia’s standing overseas. The improvement seen in the 1870s with 
the renegotiation of the debt, was completely undermined. Prior to default in 1879, the 
performance of the sovereign debt had moved above the regional average for the first time 
since the first years of independence. Nuñez’s first ascent to power in April 1880, was followed 
by an immediate collapse in the price of Colombian bonds. Prices stabilised during 1882-84 
whilst he was out of power, before collapsing again in 1884 when he returned. By the time he 
left office in 1892, the performance of Colombian bonds had fallen to the same level as prior 
                                                             

















































































to the renegotiation of 1873. Before the 1873 renegotiation, the debt was three times greater.31 
The country’s fiscal revenues were also almost three times smaller.32 
During the 1880s, Nuñez renegotiated the debt with the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, 
coming to an agreement in June 1889. In August 1884, during the first stage of negotiations, 
the chairman of the annual meeting of the Colombian Bondholders was sceptical of Colombia’s 
claim of being unable to pay interest: 
The chairman [asked] whether they were spending their money unwisely and extravagantly rather 
than meeting the claims of their creditors. … He thought the Colombian Government came to 
them now because they wanted to have credit. They … wished to stand well in … [the] markets 
[of] Europe … One feature of this agreement was that there was no proposal for a fresh loan. 
(Laughter, and a bondholder: “that comes afterwards.”).33 
 
The minutes illustrate the committee’s negative view of Colombia. The Corporation acted as 
the British capital market’s principal gatherer of information and were tantamount to a 
nineteenth century ‘credit rating’ agency, and greatly influenced the likelihood of future 
investment.34 The bondholders were doubtful of Colombia’s sincerity, and the price 
movements in fig. 2.3 illustrate the market held the same view. President Rafael Nuñez’s 
interpretation of events was different than the bondholders’, calling Colombia’s management 
of the debt an ‘act of civic heroism’.35 Nuñez’s motivation for repudiation was political, based 
on the protection of national sovereignty over foreign interests. But the following comments 
illustrate, that just like Manuel Maria Mosquera in 1840, he did not comprehend the full 
ramifications for the country’s credit worthiness in London.36 
We heard from Paris, May 25 that: “The Colombian bonds after rising to 45 and 46 [per cent of 
par] have declined to 35 and 37.” Well these ups and downs represent only a game … neither the 
46 meant, then, good credit, or 35 poor credit. … In 1874 we were paying good dividends of 
                                                             
31  Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, Twenty-Sixth Annual Report 1898-9, p. 83. 
32  Roberto Junguito, ‘Las Finanzas Públicas’ in Economía Colombiana ed. by Mesiel and Ramírez, p. 106. 
33  ‘The Colombian Bondholders’, Leeds Mercury, 16 August 1884. 
34  Flandreau, ‘Caveat Emptor’, pp. 17-50. 
35  ‘Credito Exterior’ El Porvenir, 21 July 1889. 
36  Mosquera to Palmerston, 27 March 1840, ‘Correspondence with Foreign Powers relative to Loans by 
British Subjects, 1823-47’1847 Vol. LXIX, [839], p. 610. 
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foreign debt, yet it was not possible to negotiate an additional loan. In 1880 we were no longer 
paying interest (suspended since 1876), yet additional borrowing was achieved because income 
was mortgaged on a railroad. What is therefore preferred [by creditors] is not the willingness to 
pay, but rather the capacity to pay.37  
 
This idea expressed by Nuñez, that financiers were more concerned with an asset provided as 
security for a loan, than the history of payment of the debtor, was a common and enduring 
misconception within Colombian politics. It certainly outlasted his presidency. The same idea 
was presented by Marco Fidel Suárez, president of Colombia during 1918-21, regarding the 
construction of the Pacific Railway. Suárez believed that by investing sovereign loans in the 
railway, Colombia would have a sufficiently valuable asset to mortgage on future loans, solving 
Colombia’s problem accessing foreign capital once and for all.38 The reality was that for the 
British financier, mortgaging an asset within the debtor country was largely an irrelevance, 
because if the country decided to repudiate the debt, it was no easier to seize the asset than it 
was to enforce payment of the loan. Each would require military force. In part, this 
misconception was caused by the Colombian elite’s belief in the interconnectivity of private 
interests and imperial politics, which meant they believed imperial powers were willing to 
utilise naval power to support the interests of British financiers at a moment’s notice. Financiers 
were keen to encourage and benefit from these misconceptions: in Brazil, the Rothschilds 
allegedly threatened a British invasion if payments on the national debt ceased.39 British 
financiers ultimately lacked the influence to make good on these threats, but Colombian (and 
Brazilian) elites were none the wiser. Despite their efforts to convince debtors otherwise, the 
                                                             
37  ‘Credito Exterior’ El Porvenir, 21 July 1889. 
38  The chapter ‘El sueño del ferrocarril’ sets out a vision of railway development in 1920s Colombia. The 
chapter was was dated the 13 June 1923. The piece presents a fictional conversation on the politics of 
railway construction between the protagonist Luciano Pulgar and Justino, a young and inquisitive 
Colombian with limited understanding of the political scene. Marco Fidel Suárez, Obras. Suenos de 
Luciano Pulgar, 3 Vols (Bogotá: Instituto Caro y Cuervo, 1966), II, pp. 536-49. 
39  Steven Topik ‘State Interventionism in a Liberal Regime: Brazil, 1889-1930’, Hispanic American 
Historical Review, 60 (1980), 593-613 (p. 611). 
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reality was that foreign investors were largely powerless to enforce payment, hence why the 
record of repayment was so fundamental in the process of capital allocation. 
On the 14 November 1890, just over a year after an agreement with the bondholders was 
completed, Nuñez and the Colombian congress passed legislation to modify the terms of 
payment. The bondholders who had already ceded so much, were visibly infuriated:  
The chambers in Colombia … [have] made very considerable and serious changes in the 
arrangement … For the first six years the Government proposed … [interest at] 1.5% instead of 
3% … During the next four years … 2% instead of 3%, and in the ensuing four years … 3% 
instead of 4%. … (A voice, “disgraceful”) In article 5 the amount of assigned customs was 
reduced from 20% to 7%. … What was proposed now by the government was virtually … a new 
agreement.40 
 
The minutes of the meeting are indicative of the despair the bondholders felt towards Colombia. 
One bondholder’s comment of ‘disgraceful’ in the midst of the chairman’s speech, is 
particularly illustrative (as is the fact The Times felt it worthy of reporting). 
It was becoming clear to Bondholders, and by extension the London capital market, that the 
Nuñez administration had no real intention of taking their obligations seriously. Negotiations 
were viewed as a means of improving the terms of payment and decreasing liability. In this 
instance, the agreement lasted only a few months. Nuñez argued that due to the low market 
value of the bonds, Colombia could easily negotiate yet another reduction of 50% of the capital 
outstanding.41 Nuñez felt since the bonds were trading below par, Colombia could not be 
expected to pay interest on their nominal value. This argument, subsequently paralleled by 
Santiago Pérez Triana in Desde lejos, was based on a doctrine referred to by contemporaries as 
‘la verdad de la deuda’ (the true debt). 42 Pérez Triana’s views are explored in more detail later 
in the chapter, but the important factor is that despite being political adversaries, Nuñez and 
                                                             
40  ‘The External Debt Of Colombia’ The Times 16 January 1891. 
41  ‘Credito Exterior’ El Porvenir, 21 July 1889. 
42  ‘Credito Exterior’ El Porvenir, 21 July 1889; Santiago Pérez Triana, Desde Lejos (Asuntos Colombianos) 
(London: Wertheimer, 1907). 
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Pérez Triana’s views on Colombia’s sovereign debt were identical.43 As such, their views were 
indicative of a wider and dominant current within nineteenth century Colombian politics 
regarding the merits of repudiation of sovereign debt. The doctrine maintained nominal liability 
should be modified to reflect the current market value of outstanding bonds, as a repeated and 
ongoing process. The naivety of this doctrine is clear to see. If implemented, any debtor could 
gradually wipe out its debt, simply by ceasing repayments on the loan, which would lead to an 
immediate halt to all capital migration. Jorge Holguín argued the naivety exemplified by the 
verdad de la deuda doctrine was an endemic problem which had ‘seriously compromised’ the 
future of the continent.44 In a biting critique, Holguín lamented that many believed that raising 
capital was as simple as walking through the streets of London, to find one of the many bankers 
and capitalists offering credit to anyone ‘willing to pay 3% annual interest’.45 The 
predominance of the verdad de la deuda doctrine throughout the nineteenth century, is 
illustrative of the Colombian political elite’s rudimentary understanding of the emerging world 






                                                             
43  Peréz Triana was designated hombre detestable oficialmente and exiled by Nuñez’ government for his 
role in the Antioquia Railway project. The similarities between their views on foreign investment 
demonstrate that repudiation and the ‘verdad de la deuda’ doctrine were bipartisan in Colombia. Jane 
Rausch, Santiago Pérez Triana (1858-1916): Colombian Man of Letters and Crusader for Hemispheric 
Unity, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2017), p. 65. Rausch incorrectly states his arrest was a 
result of his involvement in the ‘Northern Railway’, an unconnected railway north of Bogotá, which was 
listed as the British company CNoRC. The railway is covered in detail in chapter 3. It is quite clear that 
Rausch simply made a mistake in this part of the text, since elsewhere she narrates that the episode 
occurred in Medellín. 
44  Jorge Holguín was Colombia’s chief financial agent in London during the Quinquenio and was 
responsible for the rehabilitation of Colombia’s relationship with the capital markets of Europe. This 
rehabilitation will be covered in more detail in subsequent sections of the chapter. Jorge Holguín, Desde 
Cerca (Asuntos Colombianos) (Paris: Libraire Generale et Internationale, 1908), p. 77. 
45  Holguín, Desde cerca, p. 72. 
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Fig. 2.7 – Movement in Colombian and Mexican bond prices during and after renegotiations 
during Díaz’s Porfiriatio and Nuñez’s Regeneración, 1885-99 (Per cent of par value) 
 
Sources: Investor Monthly Manual, 1885-99 
The impact of the continuation this doctrine in Colombia as opposed to the pro-foreign 
investment policies enacted by Díaz in Mexico is evident in fig. 2.7. Following Díaz’s 
renegotiation, Mexican bonds moved rapidly towards par value, reminiscent of the 
rehabilitation of Chile’s credit in the 1840s.46 This willingness to abide by ‘the rules of the 
game’ of the capital market, led to a flood of capital into its railway sector. When the Porfirian 
renegotiation occurred, Mexico had 5,942km of railways. By 1910, when the regime ended, 
Mexico had 19,250km.47 Because of the nascent state of Colombian railway historiography, it 
is not possible to give an exact figure for kilometres of railway constructed by 1889 when 
Nuñez’s renegotiation of the sovereign debt occurred. What we can say, is that in 1885, just 
before the dawn of the Regeneración, Colombia had constructed 286km of track.48 In 1904, 
                                                             
46  Tocornal to Walpole, 20 September 1838, ‘Correspondence with Foreign Powers relative to Loans by 
British Subjects, 1823-47’1847 Vol. LXIX, [839], p. 722. 
47  Coatsworth, Growth, pp. 36-7. 
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when Reyes took power this had increased to 565km, and in 1909, at the end of the Quinquenio, 
there were 909km.49 This represents an average of 14.7 km per year whilst the verdad de la 
deuda doctrine was dominant (1885-1904), and 68.8km per year whilst Rafael Reyes and Jorge 
Holguín’s opposing public policy was applied to foreign investment. Whilst modest in 
comparison to the gains made in Mexico, Reyes’s performance was impressive compared with 
what had come before. Moreover, as the subsequent chapters demonstrate, but for resistance 
within his own administration and the about turn in policy after 1909, these gains would have 
continued and likely accelerated. What we can say with certainty, is that the public policy of 
the Porfiriato emulated by Reyes, was highly successful in attracting railway investment, 
whilst the verdad de la deuda doctrine espoused by Pérez Triana and Nuñez, was detrimental 
to foreign investment. 
2.2.4 Politics of Repudiation: Necessity or Choice? 
Clearly repudiation sullied Colombia’s image in London, but was it a political choice or a result 
of harsh economic realities? The consensus within national historiography argues in favour of 
the latter, and views Colombia’s sovereign debt management as doomed to failure because of 
what Deas describes as generalised fiscal weakness and ‘feeble export performance’.50 This 
view is itself influenced by a wider trend which attributes economic success in Latin America 
to exportation.51 Colombian historiography’s focus on internal fiscal administration is 
indicative of an implicit intention: supporting this historiographical consensus. Illustrating 
Colombia’s repeated fiscal deficits supports the view that default was not caused by a policy 
of repudiation, but was a reaction to economic circumstances.52 Where Colombian 
                                                             
49  República de Colombia, Informe que rinde el Ministerio de Obras Públicas ante el exelentisimo senor 
designado encargado del Poder Ejecutivo (Bogotá: Imprenta Eléctrica, 1909), p. 148. 
50  Malcolm Deas, ‘The Fiscal Problems of Nineteenth-century Colombia’, Journal of Latin American 
Studies, 14 (1982), 287–328, (p. 294). 
51  Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History. 
52  Junguito, La deuda externa; Avella Gómez, 'El Financiamento Externo’. 
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historiography focusses on the impact of public policy on the economy, it is within banking 
and the evolution of the Colombian peso.53 In a recent edited volume on the political economy 
of nineteenth century Colombia, three separate chapters addressed these topics, yet only 
passing reference was made to the sovereign debt, and no chapter specifically addressed the 
attitude towards foreign investment or debt repudiation.54 Considering how influential it was 
in determining capital allocation, the silence on the ‘verdad de la deuda’ doctrine within 
Colombian historiography is problematic. Where Junguito addresses Nuñez’s attitudes toward 
debt repudiation, he argues these were a result of government deficit, rather than an intentional 
policy.55 In this subsection, I overturn this historiographical consensus, by illustrating 
quantitatively that default during the Regeneración was no longer an economic necessity, but 
an intentional political policy. 
Fig. 2.8 shows that at mid-century, the Colombia’s 1820s bond issuances were significantly 
greater in relation to population and exports than elsewhere. In 1850, the nominal value of the 
Colombian bonds represented almost four times annual exports, and almost £2.00 per capita of 
population, as opposed to under 50% in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. As such, following 
independence persistent default was understandable, since Colombia’s debt was proportionally 




                                                             
53  Andres Álvarez, ‘Banca Libre, Federalismo y soberanía monetaria regional en el siglo xix en Colombia’ 
in Ideas y políticas económicas en Colombia durante el primer siglo republicano, ed. by Andres Álvarez 
and Juan Santiago Correa (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 2017), pp. 155-81; Juan Santiago Correa, 
‘Moneda y nación’, in Ideas y políticas, ed. by Álvarez and Correa; Juan Carlos Acosta, ‘Sobre la 
discusión en torno’ in Ideas y políticas, ed. by Álvarez and Correa. 
54  Álvarez and Correa, Ideas y políticas. 
55  Junguito, La deuda externa, p. 214. 
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Fig. 2.8 – The 1820s Latin American sovereign debt bond issuances in comparison with 
national population and annual exports c. 1850. (current prices) 
 
Sources: Rippy, British Investments, p. 20; Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History, pp. 432-3. 
 
However, by 1890, a combination of population growth, debt renegotiation, and a burgeoning 
coffee export trade, had reversed this pattern. Following the 1889 renegotiation, Rafael Nuñez 
and congress justified repudiation in January 1890 on the basis that Colombia did not have 
sufficient revenues to comply. Nuñez even claimed compliance would ‘endanger’ the country’s 
very existence.56 Fig. 2.9 demonstrates that at this point the sovereign debt had dropped to 
approx. 50% of annual exports, in contrast to approx. 300%, 130%, 90% and 200% in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.  In addition, Colombia’s debt only represented £0.53 per 
capita, compared to £21.39, £2.58, £3.67 and £1.83 in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. 
As such, these regional counterparts were servicing debts which were proportionally much 
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greater burdens on national income, yet none resorted to a long-term policy of debt repudiation 
as Colombia did during the Regeneración. 
Fig. 2.9 – Latin American sovereign debt in comparison with national population and annual 
exports c. 1890 (current prices) 
 
Sources: Rippy, British Investments, p. 37; Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History, pp. 432-3. 
Fig. 2.10 illustrates how the Regeneración and Nuñez’s 1890 repudiation coincided with an 
unprecedented rise in government revenues. Annual revenues following the 1889 renegotiation 
were three times greater than following the 1873 debt write off. Junguito argues that despite 
unprecedented levels of revenue, the Regeneración was characterised by consistent fiscal 
mismanagement and deficit spending.57 Budget deficits were a result of his political priorities: 
statist intervention through the ‘paper money’ regime, which was used as a means of 
‘stimulating economic development’.58 Essentially, Nuñez chose a different model of 
economic development. Rather than focus on placating foreign investors to attain capital for 
railway construction as Díaz did in Mexico, Nuñez chose protectionism to stimulate a nascent 
                                                             
57  Roberto Junguito, ‘Las finanzas públicas’, p. 119. 
58  Helen Delpar, Red Against Blue: The Liberal Party in Colombian Politics 1863-1899 (Tuscaloosa: 
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iron and steel industry in places like La Pradera, and a system of railway subventions and 
private concessions, both financed by the ‘paper money’ regime (fundamentally deficit 
spending enabled by printing fiat money).59 As such, by this point repudiation had become a 
political choice. Paying interest on the debt was viewed as subordinate to these internal statist 
economic projects. This did not all go unnoticed by the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. 
Following the 1890 repudiation, a member commented that ‘within the last ten years the 
revenue of Colombia had been nearly doubled, … [and] if the republic was in a position 
seventeen years ago to undertake the payment of £95,000 or £100,000 in interest annually, she 
could bear now a heavier interest charge than £36,000.’60 
Fig. 2.10 – Nominal Colombian fiscal revenues 1870-99 (COP current prices) 
 
 
Source: Junguito, ‘Las Finanzas Públicas’, p. 106. 
By any means of analysis, whether qualitative (based on the writings of president Nuñez and 
the views of the bondholders), quantitative (regional and chronographic comparisons of the 
                                                             
59  Junguito, La deuda externa, pp. 194-202; Alberto Mayor Mora, ‘Historia de la Industria Colombiana. 
1886-1930’ in Nueva historia de Colombia ed. by Álvaro Tirado Mejía Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, Jorge 
Orlando Melo, Jesús Antonio Bejarano, Gloria Zea de Uribe (Bogotá: Planeta, 1989), V, pp. 313-332. 



































































































































































































debt levels and fiscal income of Colombia), the idea that Colombia was unable to service its 
foreign debt if it chose to do so is spurious. By this point – in contrast to the early history of 
the country – repudiation had become a political policy, rather than a reaction to internal 
economic realities. Returning to the quotation which opened this chapter, as a result of these 
policies, the country was understood by international investors ‘as the grave of all capital which 
anyone was foolish enough to invest in’.61 
2.2.5 The Punchard McTaggart & Lowther Affair, 1892-93 – ‘verdad de la deuda’ in practice 
In October 1892, the British firm Punchard, Taggart & Lowther were awarded a concession to 
build a railway between the Antioquian capital of Medellín, and Puerto Berrio.62 The proposed 
£1,650,000 loan dwarfed previous British investments in the Colombian railway sector, and 
the subsequent collapse of the project illustrates the impact of the verdad de la deuda doctrine 
on private sector investment during the Regeneración. The legal case which came to be known 
as the ‘Punchard-McTaggart affair’, framed interaction with British capital in a particularly 
negative manner, and fundamentally influenced the long-term perspective towards foreign 
railways. For British diplomats, the project was a continuous reminder of the perils of 
Colombian contracts.63 For Colombian elites, the case was infamous and viewed as a national 
humiliation perpetrated by foreign interests backed by powerful imperial diplomatic 
machinery.64 This subsection argues these experiences were a catalyst for subsequent mistrust 
of foreign railway companies.  
One year after the concession was granted, Punchard, McTaggart & Lowther argued that the 
Antioquian departmental government had ‘illegally torn the contract to pieces’ by refusing to 
                                                             
61  Petre, The Republic of Colombia, p. 1. 
62  Puerto Berrio was the closest point on the Magdalena River to the Antioquenian capital Medellín. The 
railways would provide direct fluvial access to the sea. In this regard it was a representative of attempts 
to connect each regional capital with the Magdalena River to enable export agriculture and the 
importation of manufactured goods. 
63  Stronge (Minister Resident) to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 24 April 1911, TNA, FO 371/1101, f. 35. 
64  ‘El Emprestito de los tres millones’, El Tiempo, 21 May 1919. 
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make payments stipulated within it.65 The government’s justification was that the firm had 
charged for drawing up plans and carrying out surveys, arguing they would only reimburse 
construction costs, seemingly unaware these were considered as integral to the process of 
construction.66 In addition, the national government’s ‘official engineer’ Rafael Torres Mariño 
argued the breach of contract was justified because a previous £10,000 payment had been 
allocated to expenses incurred ‘two years before the contract was signed’.67 Torres Mariño also 
objected that the certificates had been ‘signed by Francisco J. Cisneros in his role as agent’ 
who resided in Barranquilla, whilst according to the contract, ‘the agent should reside in 
London’.68 Taken in isolation, this could be viewed as a pedantic and antagonistic application 
of minutiae within the terms of the contract. However, elsewhere Torres Mariño openly 
acknowledged his personal animosity for Cisneros: ‘I have fought against him wherever our 
paths have crossed’.69 Cisneros had argued that Torres Mariño’s motivations were financial, 
commenting that under national administration the project provided ‘a wage he would be 
unable to attain anywhere else’.70 This politicisation of appointments was common throughout 
the Latin American railway sector. For example, in Argentina Winthrop Wright argued that 
‘from top to bottom’ employees of the Central Northern and Northern Argentine railways ‘held 
                                                             
65  Cisneros, as the original holder of the concession, was using his significant contacts in London to act as 
mediator between the two parties. Javier Cisneros was an important figure in the early development of 
railways in Colombia with national capital. The majority of the British railway companies were created 
when Cisneros transferred his interests to London registered companies. Cisneros’ role is explored in 
more detail in subsequent chapters. Punchard, McTaggard & Lowther to Cisneros, 29th September 1893, 
AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 312, f. 205. 
66  Spencer to Cisneros, 10 July 1893, AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 312, f. 127. 
67  The Colombian National Government through the Ministry of Public works assigned a national engineer 
to each foreign railway project to ensure works were proceeding to satisfaction. Rafael Torres Mariño, 
Ferrocarril de Antioquia: situación actual de la empresa (Medellín: Imprenta del Departamento de 
Antioquia, 1893), p. 1. 
68  Ibid. 
69  Rafael Torres Mariño, Ferrocarril de Antioquia el gerente se defiende del señor F. J. Cisneros, 
(Medellín: Imprenta de El Telegrama, 1894), p. 1. 
70  Ibid. 
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their jobs as rewards for political services’, and Cisneros had similar experiences elsewhere in 
Colombia.71 
The two sides also clashed over the implementation of the “Abt” system, which British 
engineers argued would reduce costs and allow the railway to deal with greater inclines.  72 The 
Abt system could function with wood fuel on steep inclines, the two factors Safford argued 
precluded large-scale railway development in Colombia, which led the consulting engineers to 
comment that ‘if ever there was a country where … the “Abt” system is pre-eminently suited 
it is Columbia (sic)’.73 Torres Mariño argued against implementation not from an engineering 
perspective, but because it would not follow the specifications of the contract relating to 
inclines and curvature of the line.74 Punchard, McTaggart & Lowther argued objections to the 
implementation of the system were politicised, and dismissively referred to Torres Mariño as 
an ‘incompetent youth’.75 The dispute resulted in the railway returning to local administration 
with Torres Mariño as the general manager.76 The subsequent history of construction suggests 
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Departamento de Antioquia, 1894).  
58 
 
the firm was justified in its criticisms of local engineers, since the relatively short railway was 
not completed until 1929, thirty six years after the contract with the British engineers was 
rescinded.77 
In addition to the factors listed above, the project’s failure was a consequence of the policies 
explored previously. Persistent default on sovereign debt meant raising a £1,650,000 loan for 
a Colombian railway project was impractical. As was discussed in previous subsections, 
Colombian officials mistakenly believed that mortgages on government revenues were 
sufficient to attract investment. It seems improbable that Punchard, McTaggart & Lowther had 
no idea of the potential risks of the project. The Colombians therefore had a legitimate reason 
to feel aggrieved. But whether the firm only took on the project to extort damages from the 
national government as Colombians insinuated, is less clear. When it proved impossible to float 
the loan, local and national authorities proceeded to blame Punchard, McTaggart & Lowther, 
who were certainly not blameless. But ultimately, culpability rested with the Colombian 
administration, which as previous subsections detailed, had engaged in wilful repudiation of 
the sovereign debt, prejudicing subsequent private sector investment. Disputes over the breach 
of contract rumbled on for several years, before finally ending in the court of arbitration in 
Lausanne, Switzerland.78 The Swiss court of arbitration eventually found in favour of the 
British, a painful decision for Colombia, and one which framed relations with British engineers, 
financiers and railway administrators in a particularly negative light. 
Santiago Pérez Triana, a man who subsequently became influential in the development of 
economic nationalism towards foreign railways in the wake of the Quinquenio, was an 
important figure in the negotiations.79 His influential role in Colombian railway history is 
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woven throughout this and the next two chapters. He was the son of radical liberal ex-president 
Santiago Pérez de Manosalbas, and in 1892, acted as a mediator between the departmental 
government and the British firm.80 The following year Pérez Triana was accused of financial 
improprieties which led to his arrest, escape, and exile in Europe.81 The British firm and 
Nuñez’s national government accused Pérez Triana of negotiating a bribe for 3% of the 
proposed loan (£49,500) for his service in the ‘corruption of Colombian functionaries’ to 
ensure the award of the concession to the firm.82 This was an astonishingly large amount of 
money in nineteenth century Colombia. 
When in September 1893 the departmental government became aware of Pérez Triana’s 
actions, he attempted to flee Colombia. Whilst awaiting a river steamer in Honda to take him 
to Barranquilla and onwards to Europe, he was ‘detained by the mayor on the orders of the 
national government.’83 Pérez Triana acquired US citizenship whilst running an agency for 
Colombian exports in New York from August 1880 to February 1890, and Rausch describes 
how he used this as a ‘trump card’ to enlist American diplomatic assistance.84 Throughout her 
study, Rausch is sympathetic to Pérez Triana as a proto left-liberal anti-imperialist, and in this 
case seems to take the American consular sources – which paint him as a persecuted political 
prisoner – at face value.85 The evidence presented throughout this thesis, which chronicles the 
inconsistencies of Pérez Triana’s political position, and subsequent accusations of financial 
improprieties, suggest he was not as innocent as American diplomats argued. After the 
American intervention, Pérez Triana was released on bail in Bogotá, but the national 
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government intended to send him to Medellin ‘to be tried for bribery’.86 He used this 
opportunity to escape to Europe through an arduous four-month journey across the Colombian 
and Venezuelan llanos frontier.87 The intervention of two imperial powers in the case, 
highlighted the extent to which foreign business interests could compromise sovereignty. 
Colombia was ultimately unable to enforce its laws on bribery, because of the American 
intervention. 
Punchard, McTaggart & Lowther claimed innocence in the scandal, arguing their local agent 
had entered into this agreement without their knowledge. This seems hard to believe. 
Nevertheless, they made some interesting claims regarding Pérez Triana’s character. They 
argued their representative Mr Ripley fell ‘prey to the constant attempts of an insinuating, clever 
and unscrupulous man’.88 We should perhaps be cautious in regards to the objectivity of these 
company documents, since contemporary observers considered their claims for compensation 
as exaggerated.89 These included not only cash outlays, but also a £310,000 discount on a 
proposed loan (which was never floated), and £300,000 of ‘imaginary’ profits they may have 
made but for the breach of contract.90 These claims for compensation created a negative 
association with British railway interests within the Colombian national consciousness. In 1919 
the national press still considered the affair to have been one of the most ‘major economic 
setbacks’ and ‘worst entanglements' the country had ever experienced.91 Likewise, when the 
British legation was dealing with the fallout from the subsequent GNCRC project in 1911, the 
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issue was fresh enough in their minds for internal papers to nervously state they were eager to 
avoid ‘another Punchard-McTaggart claim’.92 Gustavo Pérez Ángel attempted to quantify the 
financial impact of these incidences of corruption in three railway projects, arriving at the 
figure of over 75% of all expenditure. The analysis demonstrates serious inconsistencies 
regarding construction costs, and his figure seems highly exaggerated.93 He also principally 
blames what he views as exploitative foreign investors and financiers for these problems, 
paralleling the standard dependista argument. Despite the failings of his counterfactual 
analysis, Pérez Ángel’s observation that the Punchard-McTaggart ‘adventure’ cost $200,000 
(Approximately £41,000) and many years of work ‘without a single meter of line to show for 
it’ recapitulates Colombia’s experience perfectly.94 
2.3 Crises 
2.3.1 War of a Thousand Days 
Colombia fought a protracted civil war during 1899-1902, representing the most destructive in 
the country’s history. The commonly cited figure for the dead is 100,000: 20% of the fighting 
age male population.95 As subsequent chapters detail, the war impacted British railway 
companies both directly and indirectly. Companies suffered physical damage to infrastructure 
and rolling stock. The anarchy and power vacuum bred local political hostility and cut off lines 
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of communications with London. The war began in October 1899. Seven months later in May 
1900 the liberal army was effectively defeated at the two week long bloody battle of Palonegro, 
after which the liberals carried out a guerrilla warfare campaign. Applebaum argues the war 
represented the ‘consolidation of partisan identities and hatreds’, whilst Delpar blames the 
closed nature of ideological distinctions, and conflict between families and social strata.96 In 
Colombia, the liberal and conservative parties grew out of ideological debates dating back to 
the ‘constitutional convention at Cucuta’ of 1821, in which the delegates discussed whether 
‘the government should be centralized or more loosely federative’.97 The centrist camp was 
subsequently led by Simón Bolívar, the federalist one by Francisco de Paula Santander. The 
Liberal party with Santander’s federalist vision dominated Colombian politics during the 
period 1845-76, accompanied by a burgeoning export trade spurred on by laissez-faire 
economics. Yet conservatives largely had the ‘same economic vision’: the main contrast was 
religiosity.98 The Liberal party used this hegemony to radically reform Colombia’s institutions 
through the 1863 Rionegro Constitution, which created what were in effect nine sovereign 
countries connected in a loose coalition. Some argue the origins of this federalist impulse can 
be traced back to colonial regionalism.99 In 1886, Rafael Nuñez began the Regeneración, which 
reorganised Colombia as a single centralist state composed of departments. Jorge Orlando Melo 
describes the Regeneración as the ‘República de los blancos’ (the white republic), since in his 
view it reformulated national identity on the basis of Spanish heritage and whiteness.100 The 
Regeneración was a coalition of conservatives and renegade ‘independent’ liberals united 
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under the banner of the ‘national’ party. The Regeneración thus pitted moderate ‘independent’ 
liberals and conservatives against radical liberals. The radicals, shut out of power, and betrayed 
by the moderate wing of their party, became increasingly agitated. By the onset of the War of 
a Thousand Days, these circumstances had led to an extreme polarisation of the political arena.  
As Correa, Torres, and Meisel argue, and the Foreign Office discussed in despatches, financing 
the war created an inflationary crisis.101 As has been mentioned previously, Nuñez’s political 
project was financed by the ‘papel moneda’ fiat currency. Lacking reserves, the government 
printed currency to finance the war, and by the end a billion pesos were in circulation.102 The 
view of British consular official Spencer Dickson was the bills were effectively worthless.103 
Fig. 2.11. demonstrates that in six years the COP$/£ exchange rate increased exponentially 
from 11.8 to 800. Torres and Meisel argue this hyperinflationary crisis had lasting effects for 
Colombian economic development, and subsequent chapters illustrate the significant impact 
on railway companies.104  
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Fig. 2.11 – Exchange rate of the Colombian peso against pounds sterling, 1897-1902 
 
Source: TNA, FO 55/409, f. 221. 
2.3.2 Panama 
Historically Panama represented a bastion of liberal idealism, and as Correa argues, it acted as 
‘an important laboratory for liberalism’.105 The fact that moving the national capital to Panama 
City was a topic of debate at the 1863 Rionegro convention, is illustrative of Panama’s 
importance to Colombian liberalism.106 In the context of the isthmus, liberalism was expressed 
in large part through calls for regional sovereignty. The extent to which this desire for self-
determination was defined by ideology is questionable, since as McGuiness observes: ‘Long 
before the gold rush, elite Panamanian desires for self-rule had been linked to their 
determination to rebuild Panama’s transit economy.’107 Whether the Panamanians were 
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motivated primarily by economics or ideology, is largely irrelevant from our perspective, 
because Colombian liberal elites encouraged expression of these local desires through the lens 
of liberalism. Separatist sentiments were encouraged by the radical liberals, to exploit them for 
political gain. Constructing a canal through Central America was ‘a major strategic issue’ for 
the United States, and two potential routes had been identified, one through the Isthmus of 
Panama, and the other through Nicaragua.108 As McGuinness’s study demonstrates, a struggle 
of sovereignty on the isthmus had been ongoing since the mid-nineteenth century.109 In 
addition, culturally, socially, and economically, Panama had been distinct from the rest of 
Colombia since this time.110 Local liberals had also begun diverging from the wider Colombian 
liberal elite during the gold rush.111 This political rupture and distinctness, provided all the 
prerequisites for the construction of a sovereign country, long before the canal crisis. All that 
was required were the right circumstances for the rupture with the rest of Colombia to become 
formal. 
These circumstances were provided in the midst of the civil war, when the Hay-Herrán treaty 
was signed in September 1902, which ‘clearly compromised Colombia’s sovereignty’ by 
granting the United States control of the canal zone.112 The perceived loss of sovereignty 
caused significant political opposition in Colombia. As head of this opposition against the 
canal, ex-president Miguel Antonio Caro successfully lobbied the senate to vote down the 
treaty in 1903. For Caro et. al. the loss of sovereignty of a part of Colombian territory was 
unacceptable. The pro-canal lobby was headed by Rafael Reyes, who felt ‘the question of 
infringements on Colombian sovereignty was subordinate to the issue of economic 
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reconstruction’.113 Reyes ‘worked for approval of the canal and served as informal liaison 
between [president] Marroquin and the United States legation in Bogotá’ in the run up to the 
senate vote. On the 5 August, 1903, United States Secretary of State John Hay received a 
telegram from the American legation in Bogotá, informing him that rejection of the canal treaty 
by the Colombian senate was imminent.114 Two months later ‘demonstrations calling for 
independence from Colombia erupted in the province’.115 On the pretext of the 1846 US-
Colombian treaty, which required the US to ‘maintain order’, the Americans used the navy to 
prevent ‘Colombian troops from putting down the revolt’.116 With US protection assured, the 
Panamanian’s desires for self-determination, forged through decades of radical liberal 
agitation, were finally realised. Paradoxically, Panama’s ‘laboratory of liberalism’, had lost 
Colombian liberals their most prized asset.117 
There were two necessary components for what transpired. The first was a power vacuum 
created by anarchic conditions provided by the civil war. The second was the polit ical support 
of a world power. The key perspective in the context of this study, is that Panama sets Colombia 
apart from the rest of Latin America with the exception of Mexico. Colombia was unique in 
losing a part of its territory to an imperial power. This resulted in an understandable 
nationalistic reaction which was intensified by the brazen attitude of the United States: 
President Roosevelt boasted in 1911 that he had ‘taken’ the canal zone in 1903.118 This caused 
‘deep resentment against the United States … among Colombians’.119  The reaction was 
particularly acute against foreign railway companies: Reyes’s and the Panama Railroad 
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Company’s respective roles in the crisis created an indelible association between the railway 
contracts of the Quinquenio, and a threat to national sovereignty. The rationale was clear. The 
support of a world power had been fundamental to the loss of Panama, and any dispute over a 
British railway company would be supported by the world’s preeminent naval power. An 
article published in El Republicano in 1911, is indicative of these fears. The newspaper argued 
that ‘separatism started to germinate in Panama under the shadow of the [American] railway 
company’ and ‘became the lynchpin of the succession movement’ and Colombia must nullify 
the threat by nationalising the railways.120 Reyes’s role in the pro-canal lobby cast him in the 
eyes of many as a collaborator to foreign capital, resulting in resistance against railway 
companies in receipt of Quinquenian contracts which were viewed as scandalous relics of his 
collaboration.  
The loss of Panama demonstrated that pure ideological liberalism was incompatible with the 
everyday realities in Colombia. Two central strands of Colombian liberalism (mobility of 
capital and regional sovereignty) had combined to rob Colombia of its most prized asset. 
Liberals placed the blame on the centralising policies of the Regeneración, which had alienated 
the Panamanians. The whole of Colombia would blame the ‘yankees’ for their role. But it had 
been the mid-nineteenth century radical liberal project that had agitated the desire for self-
determination. Within this context, the American Panama Railroad Company became a 
convenient scapegoat. Colombian historians continue arguing its decisive role in what 
transpired.121 Men like Santiago Pérez Triana, who this thesis argues was influential in the 
development of a nationalistic perspective towards railway companies, blamed the interests of 
foreign capital for the Panamanian crisis, projecting this belief onto current relationships with 
foreign railway companies operating in the country. Pérez Triana was not willing to betray his 
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liberal ideals on some issues, but was more flexible on others. As Delpar put it, liberals would 
not go so far as to ‘embrace authoritarian political doctrines’.122 The Panamanian disaster 
forced liberals to give up on federalism and mobility of capital, and from a wider perspective 
liberals increasingly spurned economic liberalism. This change was expressed through an 
economic pivot towards the left, advocating national ownership of railway companies. 
2.4 The Quinquenio, 1904-09 
2.4.1 Desde lejos, A Macro Perspective 
Marco Palacios’s scathing summation of Rafael Reyes as a ‘failed businessman who had 
roamed half of Colombia in search of fortune’, is representative of the general historiographical 
representation of a particularly divisive president.123 Biographies of the President either portray 
him as a hero who fought to modernise Colombia, or a dictator who sold out his country to 
foreign capitalists.124 Palacios presents Reyes as local collaborator, and an agent of the interests 
of foreign capital, describing the end of his rule in the following terms: ‘he slipped aboard a 
United Fruit Company boat and sailed off into exile’.125 Kalmanovitz provides a more nuanced 
analysis, arguing that the administration ‘was extremely controversial’ but ult imately 
modernised important aspects of the economy, and provided a cohesive ‘plan for infrastructure 
construction’.126 Rausch comments that historians have found the ‘Quinquenio a difficult 
period to evaluate’, but concedes that regarding abandoning the verdad de la deuda doctrine, 
‘succeeding developments suggest [the] policy was appropriate’.127  Was Reyes as Palacios 
infers, an agent of imperialism, who betrayed his country in support of the interests of foreign 
capital? Or was he, as Kalmanovitz suggests, an economic pragmatist? In early twentieth 
                                                             
122  Delpar, Red Against Blue, p. 189. 
123  Palacios, Between Legitimacy, p. 61. 
124  Palacios, Between Legitimacy; Lemaitre, Rafael Reyes, biografía de un gran colombiano (Bogotá, 
Ediciones espiral, 1967); Mario H. Perico Ramírez, Reyes, de cauchero a dictador (Tunja: UPT, 1974).  
125  Palacios, Between Legitimacy, p. 63. 
126  Salomón Kalmanovitz, Nueva historia económica de Colombia (Bogotá: Taurus, 2010), p. 118. 
127  Rausch, Santiago Pérez Triana, pp. 67, 72. 
69 
 
century Latin America, were the two even mutually exclusive? Could a weak country such as 
Colombia realistically expect to develop its economy without some compromise with foreign 
interests? The work of Miller and Lewis would suggest not.128  
When Coatsworth described Mexico on the eve of the Porfiriato as ‘a backward, war scarred, 
wreck of a nation’, he could easily have been describing Colombia at the start of the 
Quinquenio.129 After years of guerrilla warfare which converted a war ‘of principles into a 
theatre of pillage’, Colombia’s economy was in tatters.130 Its territory had also been recently 
mutilated by the US. The comparison with Mexico and the Porfiriato is therefore highly 
appropriate. Garner argues that Porfirio Díaz’s success in consolidating power in Mexico, was 
achieved by combining the archetype of a nineteenth century caudillo, with a brand of ‘radical 
“jacobin” liberalism’ tempered by ‘pragmatism and a good degree of cynicism’.131 A key tenant 
of the Mexican Porfiriato was a commitment to the ‘free and sovereign states’.132 In Colombia 
this same liberal federalism had been reversed by Rafael Nuñez’s centralist Regeneración. 
When Reyes came to power and initiated the Quinquenio, his coalition of renegade liberals and 
conservatives precluded the application of this same liberal organisational model. The 
Quinquenian project was one based on economic ‘progress’ though the application of the 
railway, mobility of capital, and international trade. In this regard Reyes mirrored the economic 
liberalism of the Porfiriato. The caveat to the liberal economics, was a strong caudilloesque 
regime to impose order on the country, attract capital, allowing international trade to flourish. 
That Colombian conservatives and moderate liberals went along with this programme is 
unsurprising, since as Delpar, Safford, and Palacios all contend, there was little difference in 
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economic ideology between the parties.133 Palacios described the post-civil war ‘conservative 
hegemony’ as ‘liberal economics, conservative politics’, and Delpar argues many liberals had 
abandoned their commitment to federalism.134 The loss of Panama had created a political 
atmosphere in which the dividing line between Reyes and his detractors was not economic or 
political ideology, but views on national sovereignty.  
Fig. 2.12 – Cumulative civil war battle dead and cumulative months of conflict, c. 1914 
 
Source: Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms International and Civil Wars 1816-1980 (London: 
Sage, 1982) p. 223-240. 
Previous subsections illustrated that historically Mexico and Colombia had similar records 
managing their sovereign debt. Fig 2.12 demonstrates similar experiences with regards to 
internal conflict.  Whilst this was a systemic problem throughout the region, it was more intense 
and persistent in Colombia than elsewhere. The common estimate of 100,000 for the deaths in 
just one conflict, the Colombian War of a Thousand Days (1899-1902), dwarfs cumulative war 
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dead for Argentina, Brazil and Chile c. 1914.135 More significantly, for Colombia and Mexico 
the majority of these casualties occurred during the period of greatest British investment in the 
region.136 Argentina was also blighted by conflict as a result of its ‘perennial constitutional 
problem’, which inhibited initial railway expansion in the country.137 But these problems, and 
the barrier to investment they represented, were resolved by 1880 when the federalisation of 
Buenos Aires established ‘internal order … until 1929’.138 In Mexico Díaz provided similar 
stability until 1910. Thus, Argentina and Mexico were open to British investment throughout 
the period of greatest capital migration from Britain (1880-1914). The Quinquenio sought to 
impose a similar level of order in Colombia. 
The authoritarian regimes of the Porfiriato and the Quinquenio improved relations with foreign 
capital markets, and addressed the contractual instability, repeated civil conflict, and complex 
power dynamics which had represented barriers to investment. In Mexico, Garner argues Díaz 
used his influence to implement ‘legislative protection of property rights’ to enable foreign 
investment.139 Likewise, in Colombia Reyes resolved to ‘disregard the interference of congress 
and other bodies, which consider[ed] themselves as the authorised mouthpieces of public 
opinion’.140 Reyes’s solution to contractual instability, which had been aggravated by the 
requirement to pass concession contracts through the congress and the senate, was to suspend 
the function of both bodies. This newfound institutional predictability allowed British railway 
companies to flourish, leading to their rapid expansion. Only Reyes’s opinion mattered in this 
new reality, meaning companies no longer needed to placate multiple political actors. These 
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measures, as well as the repression of the free press, were predictably unpopular. Liberals were 
willing to abandon federalism, but under no circumstances would they ‘embrace authoritarian 
political doctrines’.141 Within the Colombian context, these measures were necessary for Reyes 
to achieve his goals, but they further alienated his opponents. After the horror of war, during 
the first years of the administration liberals were generally willing to accept Reyes’s ‘program 
of concordia nacional’ (national unity), but this goodwill did not continue indefinitely.142 The 
loss of Panama led to economic nationalism steadily replacing economic liberalism as the 
dominant ideology. This increasingly weakened Reyes’s position, because of the central 
position of economic liberalism within his political project. Whereas in Mexico Díaz combined 
the most popular aspects of liberalism with Caudillismo, in Colombia Reyes formed his 
programme around aspects of liberalism which were becoming increasingly unpopular.143  
Under Reyes, national sovereignty was subordinate to ensuring foreign investment by 
following what Lewis termed the ‘rules of the game’ of the emerging world financial system.144 
The type of political economy implemented by Reyes, has been identified by Cain and 
Hopkins, Lewis, Miller, Garner, and Summerhill as indispensable for railway investment 
elsewhere in Latin America.145 One integral policy was implementation of the gold standard, 
which imbued would-be investors with confidence, because it was associated with orthodox 
fiscal policy.146 In contrast to fiat currency, with a gold backed currency, deficit spending could 
(in theory) only occur by issuing sovereign bonds in the capital market.147 
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Cain and Hopkins argue that these orthodox fiscal policies and receptiveness to foreign 
investment enabled the construction of ‘compliant satellites’ of British imperialism elsewhere 
in Latin America.148 Reyes was certainly perceived as a conduit for British interests by 
contemporaries in the city of London. When news of the end of the Quinquenio was received, 
it was met with ‘severe disappointment’, since it had been ‘hoped that he would do the same 
for Colombia what has been done for Mexico by Porfirio Díaz’.149 In previous subsections, the 
evolution of Mexican bond prices provided a visual representation of exactly what Díaz ‘had 
done for Mexico’, and Reyes sought to emulate the Mexican leader. As Bergquist argues, his 
speech at the 1901 Pan American conference revealed both admiration for Díaz, and reverence 
of railways as the universal harbinger of ‘civilisation’ and ‘progress’.150 In a similar speech 
given by Reyes in 1911 at a banquet of the Pan-American society, Reyes commented on his 
admiration for what he referred to as the ABC: Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, where the policies 
he promoted had already been implemented, resulting in rapid economic development.151 
Reyes believed ‘railways could only be built with foreign capital’ which could only be attracted 
with the right ‘climate’ and ‘necessary guarantees’.152 As such, Reyes recognised successful 
railway development depended on adopting the brand of political economy described by Cain 
and Hopkins.153  
Unlike many of his predecessors, Reyes and his administration seemed to understand both the 
importance of the perception of Colombia in foreign capital markets, and the workings of these 
same financial markets. It is unclear why this was the case. Reyes and Holguín had spent time 
outside of Colombia on diplomatic missions, yet so had Nuñez, and when Pérez Triana wrote 
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Desde lejos, he had lived in Europe for over a decade. But one factor which sets Reyes and 
Holguín apart from their contemporaries was their willingness to trade sovereignty for material 
progress. Another was their receptiveness to the capital market’s criticisms of Colombia’s prior 
conduct, and disposition to take responsibility for this conduct, instead of justifying it on budget 
deficits and economic crises. As such, the central policy of the regime was resumption and 
maintenance of payments on the sovereign debt, which British diplomats recognised as a 
seismic shift of national political economy.154 This shift depended on Jorge Holguín’s 
negotiations with the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, which culminated with the Holguín-
Avebury agreement in 1905. These negotiations were covered in detail by Holguín in Desde 
cerca, which demonstrated an impressive knowledge of international financial markets and 
classical economics. A critique was published by Santiago Pérez Triana, which is 
representative of a wider pivot towards left-wing economics and anti-imperialism.155 As has 
been mentioned in previous subsections, these theses led to a national debate, of which Junguito 
provides a modern interpretation, arguing that the agreement’s perceived generosity to external 
creditors led to widespread criticism.156 Reyes’s policies meant that by the 30 June 1908, half 
of interest arrears accumulated during previous defaults had been liquidated.157 Subsequent 
interest payments had also been made punctually, with interest even having been paid on bonds 
in advance. All of this had been achieved amid the worst fiscal crisis in Colombia’s history.158 
But this had not come without costs, prioritising external obligations meant the salaries of many 
‘minor officials’ had not been paid.159  
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Fig. 2.13 – Price of Colombian sovereign debt bonds 1904-09 (Percent of par value, box 
represents the Quinquenio) 
 
Source: Investor Monthly Manual, 1904-09. 
In the city of London the administration made a concerted effort to appear finally ready to take 
its place (in the words of Cain and Hopkins) as a another ‘compliant satellite’ of British 
imperialism in Latin America.160 An article in The Times from September 1905, demonstrates 
how the London capital market viewed Reyes: ‘what the president has already done for this 
country is shown in the price of Colombian bonds’ which as a result of his policies now traded  
‘thirty points higher’.161 As is illustrated in fig 2.13, in the short-term Reyes had successfully 
emulated the Porfiriato’s restoration of the relationship with the London capital market. The 
Times argued Reyes did not share the views of his ‘ignorant’ countrymen, who presented 
‘foolish obstruction’ to foreign capital by raising ‘the cry that foreigners are fleecing the 
country’. They described Reyes as ‘the best hope, politically for Colombia’, who was ‘fully 
alive to the fact’ that transportation infrastructure works ‘can be carried through only by foreign 
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capital’. Reyes responded with a telegram to the editor, underlining his intent to adhere to the 
rules of the game of British economic imperialism: ‘Colombia is grateful for the defence of 
“The Times” … and will know how to guarantee foreign capital and win and maintain a place 
among earnest and civilised nations’.162 Reyes may well have been, as Palacios put it, a ‘failed 
businessman’ and an agent of imperialism, but his willingness to cede the national will to the 
desires of the British capital market produced an upsurge in the availability of capital.163 Only 
one year into his presidency, positive interactions with the capital market and their mouthpiece 
The Times had allowed Reyes to raise Colombian bonds to the highest level they had traded at 
since the renegotiation of 1873. According to the Foreign Office, Jorge Holguín had also made 
similar inroads in the French capital market.164 
This subsection has demonstrated that Reyes’s Quinquenio was highly successful in emulating 
Díaz’s rehabilitation of the national debt. As subsequent chapters demonstrate, Reyes’s success 
led to significant British investment flowing into Colombia’s railway sector. The next 
subsection will investigate to what extent the regime successfully emulated the consolidation 
of power of the Porfiriato, which overcame another barrier to investment: political instability. 
It will argue that the London capital market’s rosy view of Reyes and Colombia was not entirely 
congruent with the reality on the ground in Bogotá, and that the regime was fundamentally 
unstable on a local basis.  
2.4.2 Desde cerca, A local perspective 
To consolidate power, Reyes needed to monopolise force, and as such, his first action was to 
confiscate 65,505 weapons.165 Reyes also wished to break the link between popular politics 
and fiscal and monetary policy, by creating an independent central bank with a share capital of 
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£1,600,000, and adopting the gold standard.166 Guillermo Torres argues how influential these 
policies were to the history of the Colombian peso and the economy.167 In adopting the gold 
standard, Reyes was rejecting ‘paper money’, a key ideological tenant of the Regeneración, 
which had been a long term aim of the radical liberals.168 As Meisel argues, financing the War 
of a Thousand Days created a hyperinflationary crisis, resulting in huge emissions of bills.169 
In order to reinstate the gold standard, all the bills in circulation would need to be substituted 
for gold backed currency. Reyes’s administration needed to find capital abroad equal to the 
totality of the Colombian currency in circulation, which was not an easy task. British consular 
official Spencer Dickson argued Reyes had the support of Colombia’s comerciantes (merchant 
class), whose business was increasingly difficult because a ‘worthless paper currency’ was 
their only means of exchange.170 
Reyes made mistakes implementing the policy. He appointed José María Sierra (better known 
as Pepe Sierra) as the head of the fiscal division of the central bank.171 Sierra had become the 
richest man in the country by building up huge tracts of land speculating in agrarian property. 
Sierra’s business strategy, relayed throughout the biography written by his grandson Bernardo 
Jaramillo Sierra, was quite simple: he reinvested all his profits purchasing additional land.172 
In some places such as the area surrounding the capital Bogotá, he had created a virtual 
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monopoly on the rents on agricultural land, and potable water.173  This led him to be considered 
the most ‘hated man in Colombia’, especially among the peasantry.174 Sierra’s ascent to wealth 
and social status illustrates that race represented a greater barrier to social mobility than social 
background. Like the ‘illegitimate son of a washerwoman’ President Marco Fidel Suárez 
(1918-21), Sierra came from a white peasant family.175 Yet these origins did not preclude either 
from rising right to the top of Colombian society. This is a sharp contrast with the experience 
of left-liberal populist leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, who despite coming from the middle class, 
as a mestizo, was disparagingly referred to as ‘el negro Gaitan’, and barred from entry into 
elite social clubs.176 Sierra cemented his place in the Colombian elite by marrying his children 
into elite criollo families, not unlike Gabriel García Márquez’s character Lorenzo Daza in Amor 
en los tiempos de cólera.177 One such marriage between Sierra’s daughter and Reyes’s son 
made the men consuegros, and stoked further public discontent: Sierra’s lack of education or 
knowledge of international finance, and the family ties to Reyes led to claims of nepotism.178  
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Fig. 2.14 – The Consuegros Don Pepe Sierra and Rafael Reyes 
 
Source: Luis Fernando Molina Londoño, ‘Don Pepe Sierra : prototipo del empresario antioqueño ; el arriero 
más rico del país’ Revista Credencial Historia, vol. 16 April 1991, 
http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/revistas/credencial/abril1991/abril2.htm accessed 06/02/2016 
A significant proportion of government revenues were required for Reyes’s plan to take the 
large emissions of paper currency out of circulation. Sierra was tasked with creating new state 
monopolies and taxes, to fund the creation of a central bank, and move to the gold standard.179 
This gave Sierra economic power ‘surpassing that of president Reyes’, upon which the ‘fiscal 
stability of the polemic regime depended’.180 The new monopolies and taxes were created in 
‘industries which form[ed] the livelihood of a large portion of the population’.181 One of these 
was a levy on each hide from a slaughtered cow.182 British consular official Spencer Dickson 
argued these benefitted ‘a few capitalists’, yet alienated the peasantry who were already obliged 
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to pay Sierra for access to agricultural land and potable water.183 Many had lost livelihoods 
from the creation of state tax monopolies, most notably on cigarettes and matches. These 
circumstances created hostility across Colombia.184 As a result, only eleven months into the 
administration, discontent was at boiling point. 
Reyes and his administration were skilled at cultivating a positive view in London, managing 
to create the perception of political stability where none existed. British consular official 
Spencer Dickson was concerned by this inconsistency, and warned the British Foreign 
secretary Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice of ‘a possible rising on the part of the famine-stricken lower 
classes’. Dickson felt race was an important dynamic within the brewing rebellion: ‘the “indio” 
class has been regarded as quite unimportant factor in the programmes of past governments’, 
which the white elite had historically considered to be without agency: ‘incapable of resistance 
and devoid of initiative’.185 This case illustrates several important points. Firstly, we see the 
London capital market remained reliant on formal signals of sovereign respect of the ‘rules of 
the game’ in the process of foreign capital investment allocation. Prompt payment of sovereign 
debt remained the most important factor. Signalling willingness to engage on investors’ terms 
could override the reality of internal instability as a barrier to investment, at least in the short-
term. Even more political turmoil followed. At the end of 1905, Reyes uncovered a plot 
involving major shareholders of the CNoRC to remove him from power.186 Shortly afterwards, 
in January 1906 he ‘miraculously’ survived an assassination attempt, in which ‘no less than 
eight shots were fired at him from three directions, five of which hit the vehicle’.187  
As the previous subsection demonstrated, in the short-term the Quinquenio was ultimately 
successful in its attempts to remould Colombia’s relationship with the British capital market. 
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This subsection has demonstrated that this was achieved despite major failings maintaining a 
stable internal environment. Subsequent chapters will continue documenting this failure, 
focussing specifically on the impact on railway companies. Reyes was highly successful in 
emulating the Porfiriato with regards to relations with international capital. He was less 
successful emulating Díaz’s consolidation of power and imposition of order internally. This 
subsection has demonstrated the reasons for this were two-fold. First, the different political 
environment of Colombia made it impossible for Reyes to fully placate calls for ideological 
purity from liberals, especially on the radical fringe. Reyes’s inability to commit to liberal 
social principles to the same extent as Díaz, explains the greater degree of resistance to his 
administration and economic project. Reyes’s abandonment of liberal principles in the social 
sphere, led to resistance from liberals of his economically liberal programme. Some of his 
social policies, even inspired resistance from conservatives.188 The following subsection 
illustrates that the liberals’ critiques of his economic policy, were inspired by systemic 
contradictions within the liberal capitalist system. Advocates of liberalism valued sovereignty, 
both at the national and federal level. They also valued progress, international mobility of 
capital, and international trade. Panama had demonstrated these two ideals were fundamentally 
incompatible. As the work of LeGrand and McGuiness demonstrate, Colombia could not play 
host to foreign railway companies, or act as a conduit of international trade, without a loss of 
sovereignty.189 Colombian national politics were experiencing a crisis of liberalism. The 
inconsistencies and contradictions in the liberal international capitalist system, were forcing a 
necessary pivot towards left-wing economics, leading to the birth of a new movement: left-
liberalism. As the next subsection will demonstrate, the resistance against the excesses of 
global capitalism in Latin America, were increasingly expressed through the lens of social 
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justice, a central foundation of left-liberalism. This focus on social justice, had a decidedly 
outward perspective, linked to anti-imperialism and sovereignty. This divide in Colombian 
politics over sovereignty, and anti-imperialism versus collaboration, was initiated in large part 
by the loss of Panama, and further polarised by the controversial Quinquenio. The polemic 
solidified within national political discourse with theses published by Santiago Pérez Triana 
and Reyes’s minister of finance Jorge Holguín. I argue throughout this thesis that the struggle 
between these contrasting viewpoints fundamentally influenced Colombian economic 
development in the pre-war period. The result of the debate would decide the fate of British 
railway companies. The central question which developed was: should Colombia implement 
the policies countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, or Mexico had implemented 
historically? Or, should it mirror the current nationalistic policies being implemented by these 
countries against their extensive foreign owned railway networks? 
2.4.3 Desde lejos and Desde cerca 
When Santiago Pérez Triana fled to Europe in 1893, Rafael Nuñez’s government labelled him 
as hombre detestable oficialmente, and forbade his return to Colombia.190 When Reyes came 
to power in 1904, his exile had lasted a decade and he was settled in London. On the 20 April 
1905 Reyes’s chief financial agent in London Jorge Holguín signed the Holguín-Avebury 
agreement, which resumed payments of the Colombian sovereign debt, and opened up 
Colombia to large-scale British investment for the first time since independence. Colombia’s 
sovereign debt remained at a nominal value of £2,700,000, and Holguín agreed to pay interest 
accumulated whilst in default using 15% of customs revenue.191 In addition, the bonds would 
carry 3% interest moving forwards. The long-term impact of this policy is clear to see in fig. 
2.15: the agreement revolutionised Colombia’s relationship with the British capital market. 
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Opponents of the regime such as Pérez Triana, argued the agreement was overly generous to 
British bondholders, and advocated application of the verdad de la deuda doctrine, which had 
dominated Colombian politics throughout the nineteenth century, and maintained – largely 
from a moral standpoint – that debtors should not be tied to pay interest on the nominal value 
of debts which were heavily devaluated in the market.192 As such, Reyes’s and Holguín’s 
policies were truly revolutionary in the Colombian context. When Reyes took office in August 
1904, Colombian bonds were trading at 22 per cent of par value (£100 of bonds worth £22).193 
Pérez Triana felt the national government should have negotiated a discount. But in truth, from 
a Latin American perspective, the terms of the Holguín-Avebury agreement were highly 
favourable to Colombia, since interest was set at 3%, far below the rate of interest on 
outstanding sovereign loans for Argentina, Brazil, and Chile at that time, which varied between 
4% and 6%.194 Holguín responded to Pérez Triana’s critique by publishing his own thesis: 
Desde cerca. These theses stimulated a national public debate which Abel Cruz Santos argued 
represented ‘one of the most interesting polemics in the economic history of Colombia’.195 
Lamentably Cruz Santos’s astute observation has not been acted upon by the wider national 
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Fig. 2.15 – Long term impact of the Quinquenio and Holguín-Avebury agreement on 
sovereign debt bonds, 1900-29 (per cent of par value) 
 
Source: Investor Monthly Manual, 1900-29. 
Holguín’s thesis was surprisingly objective and pragmatic regarding the question of foreign 
debt and imperialism in Latin America. It is easy to see why the analysis presented was viewed 
as so controversial. Regarding the loss of Panama, Holguín blamed the actions of previous 
Colombian governments repudiating the debt owed in London. He noted that if Colombia had 
‘fulfilled its obligations … Britain would not have recognised … the independence and 
sovereignty of Panama.’196 He subsequently argued that coming to terms with British investors 
was paramount, because had the country continued in its repudiating ways, the next time civil 
strife was to blight another Colombian province, Britain would be sure to quickly recognise its 
independence as punishment.197 Holguín made a cutting critique of the application of the 
verdad de la deuda to Colombia’s financial affairs. He argued that during the 1870 Franco-
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Prussian war ‘the income of the French dropped more than 50%, yet it never occurred to the 
French to use the quotation of their national debt’ as a justification for a renegotiation of the 
debt outstanding. He continued in this same manner, commenting that during the Napoleonic 
wars it ‘never occurred to the Whigs or Tories to take advantage of the devaluation of their 
consolidated debt’, and that during the Spanish-American war, it had never occurred to Spain 
to use it as an excuse to avoid payment.198 Holguín never used the word, but his implicit 
meaning is clear: Holguín felt Colombia was not acting as a ‘civilised’ country in dealing with 
its financial affairs in this manner. Holguín also accused Colombians, and indeed South 
Americans more generally, of being embarrassingly ignorant of the workings of financial 
markets. He argued that many believed in the capitals of Europe, there were ‘powerful bankers 
and rich businessmen, with no idea what to do with their millions, … walking through the 
streets … looking for anyone willing to accept capital at 3% annual interest, with a mortgage 
on customs duties’.199 
Desde lejos contrasts strongly with Holguín’s study, and its pragmatic vision of how to attract 
foreign investment. This is unsurprising, since in Desde lejos Pérez Triana made it clear 
attracting foreign investment was not his aim, because he believed ‘borrowing from abroad 
would bring not only economic slavery but also endanger national sovereignty’.200 Pérez Triana 
acknowledged the need to overcome the ‘medieval backwardness’ of Colombian 
transportation, but argued allowing foreign railways to do so presented a ‘mortal danger for 
our existence as a sovereign and independent people’.201 McGreevy argues that it was the mid-
century radical liberal project which first opened Colombia to the world economy.202 Pérez 
Triana was the son  of President Santiago Pérez de Manosalbas, an influential radical liberal 
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figure. The fact that a political figure with this background now viewed foreign investment and 
mobility of capital in this manner, illustrates the profundity of the crisis of liberalism evident 
in early twentieth century Colombia, since the views espoused in Desde lejos, were the opposite 
of economic liberalism. Pérez Triana left the reader in no doubt as to why this ideological 
change was necessary: ‘the painful experience [of Panama] demonstrates we cannot continue 
as before. Our territory has been mutilated’.203 He warned imperial powers may have designs 
on other parts of Latin America: 
The European powers have spent the nineteenth century dividing the rest of the globe amongst 
themselves: there is no place where they have not launched their armies. … [these] Imperialists 
would no doubt have done to Latin America, as they did to Africa, Asia, and Oceania… [had it 
not been for] the Munroe doctrine.204 
 
As such, the politics of foreign investment had transcended party politics and ideology, with 
national sovereignty becoming the dominant question within Colombian politics. 
Pérez Triana’s views were becoming increasingly anti-imperialist, although it is unlikely he 
would have viewed himself in this manner. He carried out several significant actions in this 
regard. He penned an open letter to President Taft of the United States, published as a pamphlet 
in London and circulated among elite circles in Colombia.205 He created the cultural periodical 
Hispania, which Rausch argues aimed to inspire the ‘solidarity of the Hispanic world as a 
buffer’ against imperial powers.206 He also served as Colombia’s representative at The Hague 
conference of 1907, in support of the Drago Doctrine, which sought to outlaw military action 
enforcing debt repayments. This was a reaction to the 1902-3 Venezuelan crisis, where British, 
Italian, and German navies bombarded the repudiating Venezuelan government into 
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submission. At The Hague, in a speech which drew many plaudits for its eloquence, Pérez 
Triana argued that the weak and defenceless nations of Latin America were being victimised 
and exploited by the imperial powers: ‘the principle of coercion depends on a strong creditor 
and weak debtor … the attack on our integrity and independence can never be justified’.207 
Pérez Triana’s critique of international capitalists in his speech at The Hague, carries uncanny 
similarities to J.A. Hobson’s Imperialism albeit with the theatrical twist representative of his 
political discourse: ‘the spirit of Shylock is omnipotent in our modern civilisation … [and] 
Shylock will continue demanding his pound of flesh’.208  
Pérez Triana’s transformation from a liberal export merchant, into a proto-anti-imperialist, is 
representative of the pivot towards social justice and left-wing economics within early 
twentieth century Colombian liberalism. But his disdain for international capitalism and 
foreign railway companies should not be misunderstood as opposition to railways themselves. 
Pérez Triana was as supportive of railways as any other late nineteenth century Colombian 
political elite. The review he posited was over the form of ownership. In the final chapter of 
Desde lejos, Pérez Triana laid out an alternative system of railway expansion based on national 
ownership.209 In 1909, he republished the chapter under the title De ferrocarriles through a 
Colombian publisher for a much wider audience.210 This advocated the nationalisation of 
existing railways and was mirrored by public policy in subsequent decades. Pérez Triana 
argued that since the government had to guarantee bonds on railway bonds to entice investors, 
it may as well raise the bonds itself and build the railway under governmental administration.211 
This was on the face of things a sound and reasonable argument. It was a model which had 
been employed elsewhere, most notably in Peru. However, the model brought additional 
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complications and risks. In Peru, a collapse of government revenues at the end of the guano 
boom led to default on the government bonds used to finance the railway network, meaning 
the insolvent national government was forced to hand over ownership to the Peruvian 
Corporation. The result was a single British company dominating the country instead of many 
smaller foreign railway companies.212 This model had also been put into practice for the 
Antioquia railway, which collapsed spectacularly with the Punchard-McTaggart litigation, 
within which Pérez Triana was a central figure.  
As the similarities between Pérez Triana’s political discourse and Hobson’s Imperialism 
demonstrate, his ideas did not develop within a political vacuum. During this period, a 
nationalistic perspective towards foreign railway companies was developing throughout Latin 
America. In Uruguay during his second term as President (1911-15), José Batlle y Ordóñez 
instituted batllismo, a brand of economic nationalism which ‘faced off against British 
companies in Uruguay instituting measures which would impede their businesses’.213 
Likewise, in Argentina, British owned railways experienced ‘a new wave of anti-foreign 
economic nationalism between 1909 and 1914’.214 This period also coincides with the fall of 
Porfirio Díaz and the subsequent Mexican nationalist revolution. Rausch was correct in arguing 
Pérez Triana was an important but hitherto unrecognised figure within a wider Latin American 
anti-imperialist movement.215 But Rausch herself overlooked Pérez Triana’s most influential 
anti-imperialist activity: formulating the nationalistic railway policy which was implemented 
in post -1909 Colombian public policy, a link which is also absent within the scant literature 
on Colombian railways.  This change in public policy has never been recognised as the defining 
historical moment it represents. This thesis argues that between the loss of Panama and 1914, 
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there is no comparable event in national politics with such long-term effects for the country’s 
economic development. 
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has set out the foundations for the following chapters. It has illustrated that up 
until the Quinquenio, the attitude towards sovereign debt and foreign investment was a 
consistent political choice based on the application of the verdad de la deuda doctrine. It 
created an insurmountable obstacle to investment. The Quinquenio represents a revolutionary 
period in which almost a century of politics dominated by this doctrine was overturned. The 
chapter has indicated that this revolutionary rehabilitation of national credit was enduring: 
Colombia did not return to repudiate the national debt in the following decades. Throughout 
the 1910s and 1920s, Colombia prioritised sovereign debt over other expenses, and by 1929 
Colombian sovereign bonds had risen to just under 70 per cent of par, permanently removing 
this barrier to foreign investment. Poor credit was no longer a significant factor in railway 
development.  In this regard, we can categorise politics of Colombian sovereign debt 
management into two periods: before and after the beginning of the Quinquenio (1904). With 
regards to wider foreign investment, the picture is more complex. The loss of the department 
of Panama created a nationalistic reaction. The chapter demonstrated that at the start of the 
twentieth century, Colombia was at a major political crossroads. Colombia had to decide 
whether to risk further incursions on national sovereignty assuring modernisation of its 
transportation system, or risk forgoing the economic advantages of railway development by 
going its own way with a policy of national ownership. The chapter has illustrated this political 
crossroads was defined by the contrast between Holguín’s, Reyes’s, and Pérez Triana’s 
opposing views on foreign investment. As such, the debate between these political actors 
represented the struggle over the future economic trajectory of the country. The loss of Panama 
was the catalyst which ultimately precipitated this incredibly important economic decision. 
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Would Colombia continue to implement the verdad de la deuda doctrine, or would it abide by 
the ‘rules of the game’ of British imperialism? Would the country continue to encourage 
foreign railway companies to expand, or would they implement the national ownership model 
advocated by Pérez Triana? As fig. 2.15 illustrates, Holguín won the argument on the verdad 
de la deuda doctrine. However, as subsequent chapters will demonstrate, with regards to the 
role of foreign railway companies in the development of national infrastructure, Pérez Triana’s 
model of national ownership and a programme of nationalisation of foreign railway companies 
dominated the two decades following the end of the Quinquenio. We can therefore split the 
period following 1904 until the start of First World War into two periods: The Quinquenio and 
the post-Quinquenio nationalistic era. The chapter has demonstrated the rehabilitation of 
Colombia’s sovereign debt was an immensely important and lasting achievement of the 
Quinquenio. However, as subsequent chapters will attest, despite short-term successes during 
the regime Reyes did not fulfil his vision of modernising Colombia with railway technology 
through direct foreign investment. The type of railway development which characterised the 
Porfiriato was replaced by a policy of national ownership. A central tenet of this policy was to 













Chapter 3. – The Northern Railway Companies 
3.1 Introduction 
[President Reyes and the Minister of Public Works] nailed down [the first rails] with their own 
hands … nobody supposed … that soon after it would be said … that all this was solely 
illusionary … that the works carried out … were only built on sands, because their basis which 
is the contract, is not legally exact for the simple reason that, although the engine runs across 
the wilderness, there is still wanted the consent of the national congress’.1 J. Fletcher Toomer, 
Director of the Great Northern Railway of Colombia, 1911. 
 
When Fletcher Toomer and the GNCRC entered the Colombian railway sector, they were naïve 
of Colombia’s unstable economic environment. As the above quote illustrates, Fletcher 
Toomer was forced to reconcile the nature of the unpredictable political milieu in which he was 
entwined. However, right up to the point the GNCRC was forced into nationalisation, they 
maintained the hope they would receive fairness, justice, and contractual stability if only they 
could move past the current contractual dispute. In contrast, as a leading member of Colombia’s 
political and economic elite, the CNoRC’s dominant shareholder and managing director Juán 
Manuel Dávila never expected to be treated with fairness or justice. As such, he manoeuvred 
within what Safford terms Colombia’s ‘catch-as-catch-can’ national business culture just as 
skilfully as the political actors with whom he and his company interacted. This assured not 
only the completion of his railway, but also its transformation into one of the most profitable 
lines in the Latin American region. 
3.1.1 Structure and Argument 
The central aim of the chapter is to answer the following question: what impeded the ‘northern 
railway’ companies expanding in the same way as other British railway companies in Latin 
America? The chapter is split chronologically into five periods: the nineteenth century origins, 
the period of crisis delineated by civil war and the loss of Panama (1899-1903), the Quinquenio 
(1904-09), the post-Quinquenian nationalistic reaction (1909-14), and the period of legal cases 
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and enforced nationalisation of British railways (1914-27). Within these chronological 
sections, the chapter focusses on two railway companies: the Colombian Northern Railway 
Company (CNoRC), and the Great Northern Central Railway of Colombia (GNCRC). The 
parts on the history of the CNoRC, describe how the London based company was a vehicle 
used by General Juan Manuel Dávila and his associates to monopolise the important trade route 
between the Bogotá and the salt mines of Zipaquirá, and that personal rather than national 
interests dominated company policy. The chapter shows how the CNoRC subsidiary, the 
Colombian Central Railway Company (CCRC), was created to protect these personal interests, 
first by hiding the influence of interested parties, and second by enabling expansion of the 
railway without diluting the profits from the monopoly on the transportation of salt. The 
guarantee system is demonstrated to have successfully stimulated the CNoRC to expand 
operations through the CCRC subsidiary, with expansion being terminated because of the 
development of a nationalistic perspective within national politics. Subsections focussing on 
the GNCRC illustrate how the positive perception of Colombia in London cultivated by Reyes, 
combined with the guarantee system, enabled large sums of capital to be raised in Europe with 
relative ease. These subsections document how the intervention of key political actors in a 
dispute over bonds eroded investor confidence in Europe, and arrested expansion of the 
railway. The bond dispute is shown as part of the wider anti-imperialist current explored in the 
previous chapter. In this manner, the chapter argues that positive macro-level interactions with 
international capital were overridden by negative micro-level interactions.  
3.2 Origins 
3.2.1 Origins of the ‘Northern Railway’ 
 
The railway companies addressed by this chapter should be understood as components of a 
single ‘northern railway’. In Colombia, there was no predetermined and specific plan of 
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development as was the case with the ‘redemptive work’ in Ecuador.2 However, there was a 
general consensus for the focus of development. This included: coastal railways linking each 
Caribbean port with the Magdalena River, a link between each regional capital in the interior 
with the Magdalena River, and a ‘northern railway’ running along the highlands of 
Cundinamarca, Boyacá, and Santander, connecting the capital Bogotá with Bucaramanga. A 
railway of this kind was first envisaged by the influential British-Colombian William Wills in 
1864.3 During the mid-1870s, the national press debated a proposed project named ‘Ferrocarril 
del Carare’ (Carare Railway), which sought to connect both Santander and Cundinamarca with 
the river at a single point at Carare. It was at this point that a polemic emerged over national 
policy. Some proposed large railway projects (such as the Carare or ‘Northern Railway’) which 
would integrate the country; others favoured short regional railways linking each population 
centre individually with the Magdalena River.4 Salvador Camacho Roldán favoured a short 
railway linking Bogotá with the Magdalena River at Girardot, and opposed the ‘Northern 
Railway’.5 Another vocal opponent was the national engineer Indalecio Lievano.6 The mid-
1870s support was led by the influential and famous contemporary Colombian economist 
Aníbal Galindo.7 A railway of the scale envisaged by Galindo et. al. (similar to the Antioquia 
Railway explored in chapter two) would require foreign financing. As the second chapter 
illustrated, the political policy of repudiation made financing such a project unrealistic. As a 
result, during the 1880s and 1890s Colombia focussed on the development of small-scale local 
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railways, and the ‘Northern Railway’ morphed from a national project into a small local railway 
connecting the salt mines of Zipaquirá with the capital. 
3.2.2 General Juan Dávila 
In 1892 the concession for the construction of a railway to the salt mines of Zipaquirá was 
purchased by General Juan Davila for $360,000 (approx. £72,000) who was bankrolled by 
Antonio Roldán.8 In the 1880s Roldán was alleged to have rented out government land worth 
$500 per annum for only $70, pocketing part of the difference.9 Thus from the outset, the 
purchase of the railway was associated with corruption and rent-seeking. Nuñez’s 
Regeneración government provided Dávila with a $15,000 subvention per km (approx. 
£3,000), which critics argued fully covered construction costs, meaning Dávila had attained the 
railway with nothing more than political capital.10 The contract of 1884 included a levy on net 
receipts, payable to the then State of Cundinamarca.11 This ‘tax’ was supposed to have been 
rescinded in the 1892 concession contract, which transferred the railway to Dávila. However, 
repeated contractual disputes (explored later in the chapter) occurred in subsequent decades, 
ultimately resulting in expropriation and forced nationalisation in the 1920s. Construction was 
financed through a mix of government subvention and credit, for which Dávila owed 
‘significant sums in both Colombia and overseas’.12 In an attempt to deflect criticism, Dávila 
claimed the railway had ‘cost much more than the $15,000 per kilometre’ subvention.13 A 
Foreign Office report on British railway companies in Colombia, completely contradicted this 
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statement, stating ‘the subvention of £3,000 fully represents the cost of construction’.14 As such 
contemporary criticisms were not without foundation. 
3.3 Finances and Shareholders 
3.3.1 Finances 
Safford argues the main factor which inhibited railway expansion in Colombia was the 
mountainous terrain.15 When construction of the railway to Zipaquirá began, there was no 
access to Bogotá other than by mule trails. The Cambao cart road was built specifically to 
enable the transportation of the materials and machinery required, but transportation of bulky 
goods remained expensive.16 If Safford is correct company finances should provide evidence 
of a struggle to service interest payments on the heightened capital expenditure imposed by the 
terrain. The pattern evident in table 3.1 is the opposite. Throughout 1905-24 net profits were 
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Table 3.1. - The Colombian Northern Railway Company Accounts F/Y 1905/6-1924/5 






















1905/06 £29,948 £12,965 £16,983 £480,000 £9,000 3.54% 2.66% 
1906/07 £30,311 £12,220 £18,091 £480,000 £9,000 3.77% 3.03% 
1907/08 £37,163 £15,926 £21,237 £480,000 £9,000 4.42% 4.08% 
1908/09 £37,880 £14,560 £23,320 £480,000 £9,000 4.86% 4.77% 
1909/10 £41,019 £14,593 £26,426 £480,000 £9,000 5.51% 5.81% 
1910/11 £42,492 £15,600 £26,891 £480,000 £9,000 5.60% 5.96% 
1911/12 £42,182 £13,746 £28,436 £480,000 £9,000 5.92% 6.48% 
1912/13 £48,702 £14,308 £34,394 £480,000 £9,000 7.17% 8.46% 
1913/14 £53,999 £14,782 £39,216 £480,000 £9,000 8.17% 10.07% 
1914/15 £53,864 £17,150 £36,715 £480,000 £9,000 7.65% 9.24% 
1915/16 £58,132 £17,722 £40,410 £476,300 £8,815 8.48% 10.50% 
1916/17 £61,771 £18,490 £43,281 £471,860 £8,593 9.17% 11.50% 
1917/18 £75,780 £32,191 £43,588 £467,300 £15,865 9.33% 23.36% 
1918/19 £87,796 £41,124 £46,672 £463,235 £15,662 10.08% 19.49% 
1919/20 £99,473 £36,975 £62,498 £457,335 £15,367 13.67% 31.42% 
1920/21 £108,567 £46,841 £61,726 £447,050 £14,853 13.81% 31.25% 
1921/22 £96,185 £42,710 £53,476 £439,730 £14,487 12.16% 25.99% 
1922/23 £101,398 £41,859 £59,538 £433,380 £14,169 13.74% 30.25% 
1923/24 £114,247 £47,116 £67,130 £433,380 £14,169 15.49% 35.31% 
1924/25 £109,804 £44,425 £65,379 £415,200 £13,260 15.75% 34.75% 
Sources: Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Boxes 928, 974, 1021, 1067, 1115-6, 1167, 1217-8, 
1267, 1318-9, 1369-70, 1420-1, 1469, 1512, 1557, 1602, 1647, 1693, 1738, 1782, 1830. 
Davis and Huttenback use companies’ annual reports to ascertain the returns on overseas 
investment. The method of analysis applied throughout this thesis is modelled on their ‘return 
on all capital claims’ approach and utilises the same source base.17 Fig. 3.1 illustrates the utility 
of this approach, since it immediately becomes clear how remunerative the CNoRC was. By 
the end of the period the net receipts of the railway represented over 15% of the total invested 
capital. But after allowing for the interest due on debentures, the return on share capital was 
even more impressive. CNoRC returns were many multiples of the average figures of 6%, 
5.33% and 5.7% given by Lewis, Edelstein, and Davis and Huttenback for Argentine, Latin 
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American, and British Overseas Railways.18 Like for like comparisons with the accounting 
record of similar British railways in Latin America would provide an even better measure of 
the fundamental profitability of the CNoRC from a regional perspective. But there are no 
studies of individuals railways which provide a similar level of detail to the analysis presented 
here. Nevertheless, these data illustrate the CNoRC was significantly more profitable than the 
average level of profitability necessary for British railway enterprise to be viable elsewhere in 
the world. 
In F/Y 1917/18, the directorship decided to decrease share capital to £150,000 by raising an 
equal number of debentures. The balance raised by these was paid to each shareholder at the 
rate of £5 per £10 share, resulting in a sharp increase in returns on share capital. The Dávila’s 
60% shareholding meant they received a one-off payment of approximately £90,000 without 
relinquishing any control over the enterprise. From F/Y 1913/14 onwards, when the return on 
share capital reached 10%, the CNoRC was able to pay down debt, and enabled the directorship 
to slowly repay the debentures raised for the one-off payment to shareholders. This resulted in 
a decrease in outstanding debentures from £317,300 in F/Y 1917/18, to £265,200 in F/Y 
1924/25. By F/Y 1923/24 when the national government expropriated the railway, the return 
on the remaining share capital was over 35%, illustrating the questionable basis of the 
historiographical consensus regarding the historical utility of Colombian railways which 
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Fig. 3.1 – Levels of share capital, interest bearing debentures, total capitalisation, 
return on share capital, and return on all invested capital of the CNoRC – F/Y 1905/06 – F/Y 
1924/25 
 
Sources: See table 3.1; Lewis, British Railways, pp. 217; Davis and Huttenback, Mammon, p. 107; Edelstein, 
Overseas Investment, p. 125. 
The data presented in Fig. 3.2 illustrates that by the mid-1910s, profitability was such that 
expansion would have been possible without additional capital calls. By 1924/25, the CNoRC 
had built up approx. £590,000 in cumulative retained earnings. To give some perspective, the 
Quinquenian expansion to Chiquinquirá was going to be funded with £750,000 of guaranteed 
railway bonds.20 The lack of motivation for the CNoRC to re-invest its retained earnings is 
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illustrative of significant institutional failure. The CNoRC’s finances demonstrate that if 
properly motivated, British railway companies could have expanded operations from their 
income alone. With access to the government guaranteed debenture market, they could have 
expanded even more swiftly. 
Fig. 3.2 – Annual and cumulative retained earnings for the CNoRC – F/Y 1905/06 – F/Y 
1924/25 
 
Sources: See table 3.1. 
Casson and da Silva Lopez argue that successful implementation of risk management strategies 
was an influential factor in determining the success of foreign direct investment in ‘high risk’ 
regions such as Latin America.21 Within the Colombian railway sector, one such risk 
management strategy was a conservative dividend policy, which was evident in all of the highly 
profitable British lines in Colombia. This policy has led the historiography, which has generally 
used dividends as the main sign of underlying profitability, to erroneously classify railways 
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such as the CNoRC, the DRC, and the BRPC as either fairly profitable, or not profitable at 
all.22 As is clear from fig. 3.3, the underlying profitability of the CNoRC was much higher than 
the payment of nominal dividends would suggest, and subsequent chapters show the same was 
true for the DRC and the BRPC. In FY1919/20 the return on share capital was 31.25%, yet the 
company only paid a 4% dividend to its shareholders. By forgoing payment of significant 
dividends, the CNoRC was able to develop reserves as an insurance against expropriation. This 
risk management policy, which sought to ameliorate the impact of political instability and 
insecure property rights, was vindicated when the national government seized the enterprise on 
the 14 July 1925 (explored subsequently).23 
Fig. 3.3 – Annual nominal dividends and return on share capital for the CNoRC – F/Y 
1905/06 – F/Y 1924/25 
 
Source: See table 3.1. 
The profitability of the railway was in of itself a discouragement to expansion, at least through 
the CNoRC entity. As the CNoRC’s account illustrate clearly, the monopoly on the 
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transportation of the salt from Zipaquirá was lucrative. Salt mines were interconnected with 
the Colombian state and represented a substantial proportion of governmental revenues.24 Salt 
was also one of the few items traded internally between regions, and as such the commodity 
provided the most reliable trade route of the interior. The expansion of the railway into Boyacá 
and onwards into Santander, would not be as profitable, and increasing share capital or interest 
on additional debentures would dilute profits. As such, the CNoRC’s situation was similar to 
that of to the São Paulo Railway, which Lewis argues refused to expand its operations to protect 
the monopoly profits provided by the existing section.25 The CNoRC’s solution was the 
creation of the CCRC subsidiary for the expansion, which raised its own debentures in London. 
The CNoRC provided a limited guarantee on these debentures, but this did not impact the 
finances and profitability of the parent company.  
3.3.2 Shareholders 
The hostility which Dávila had received in Colombia over his control over the railway, led him 
to claim that he had ‘transferred his concession to a respectable company in London’, and was 
offering the company’s shares to the market to pay the debts incurred by construction, in an 
attempt to placate his critics.26 Dávila argued this meant his involvement would be curtailed.27 
However, as Fig. 3.4 demonstrates, five years later he still held 9,850 shares (98.4% of share 
capital). In addition, he was listed as company director, meaning that for practical purposes he 
retained absolute control.28 
                                                             
24  Joshua Rosenthal, Salt and the Colombian State: Local Society and Regional Monopoly in Boyaca, 1821-
1900 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012). 
25  Lewis, Public Policy, p. 38. 
26  Dávila, Solicitud del General. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Dávila held 9.850 shares of a total of 10,007 with two shareholders holding a token 51 shares and a 
further 5 individuals holding 1 share each. ‘Colombian Northern Railway Share Register for the year 
1908’, TNA, BT31/31593/55900. 
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Fig. 3.4 – Colombian Northern Railway Company major shareholders by family 
 
Source: Shareholder Registers for 1903,1908, 1913, and 1924, TNA, BT31/31593/55900. 
By 1908 the CNoRC had raised an additional £118,890 by expanding the share capital to 
£300,000, meaning Dávila still in controlled 60% of share capital (£181,110).29 Dávila had also 
mortgaged the railway to raise debentures in London for £180,000.30 Outstanding liabilities 
were listed as follows: £18,000 loan to Fould & Company of Paris, £20,000 loan to a 
consortium of local political actors, and $1,050,000 (approx. £216,500) to the Colombian 
government for the subvention.31 Dávila’s debts totalled £254,500, £216,500 of which would 
be repaid to the national government in $100,000 (approx. £20,620) five-year instalments over 
fifty years.32 Dávila had raised £298,890 in London, enough to repay all debt whilst 
maintaining his 60% ownership. By registering the company in London, he had placed his 
wealth under the protective umbrella of British diplomacy. As such, the criticisms arguing he 
                                                             
29  ‘Colombian Northern Railway Share Register for the year 1908’, TNA, BT31/31593/55900. 
30  Contract dated 27 February 1898, TNA, BT31/31593/55900. 
31  Ibid. 
















had been effectively gifted the railway by the subvention system were largely accurate.33 
Dávila’s close associate Luis Felipe Ángulo purchased a significant portion of the additional 
share capital, and in 1913 the men owned approx. 75% of the railway, allowing Dávila to wield 
even greater control. This persisted until the 1924 nationalisation, when the families had 
increased their stake to 77%. British Minister Resident and Consul-General George Welby 
described Nuñez’s subvention system as ‘most unfortunate … for the country’, which attracted 
‘an unsound class of speculators’ who sought to carry out the concessions ‘without any 
expenditure of capital on their part’.34 The CNoRC illustrates that national political actors were 
not simple pawns of international capital, on the contrary, they successfully co-opted modern 
infrastructure for their own economic benefit. 
As Fig. 3.5 establishes, the remaining shares were mainly held by medium shareholders; small 
shareholders were almost entirely absent. The small and disparate nature of these blocks meant 
they were unlikely to provide counterbalance to Dávila’s and Angulo’s interests, meaning their 
control was comprehensive. 
                                                             
33  Dávila, Solicitud del General. 
34  Welby (Minister Resident) to Larcom (Head of American Department), 30 September 1903, TNA, 
FO55/415, f. 229 v. 
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Fig. 3.5 – Colombian Northern Railway Company shareholders by size 
 
Source: See Fig. 3.1.35 
Fig. 3.6 demonstrates that the main country of origin for the remainder of shareholders was 
Britain with smaller interests from French, German, and Swiss shareholders. British 
shareholders held between 15-20% of the share capital during 1908-24. The company thus 
remained overwhelmingly under Colombian control. This caused issues for the Foreign Office 
formulating policy towards the enterprise, which are explored later in the chapter. 
                                                             
35  Throughout this thesis shareholder groups are defined in the following terms: Small Shareholders £1-
















Fig. 3.6 – Colombian Northern Railway Company shareholders by country 
 
Source: See fig. 3.1. 
As has been illustrated, the CNoRC was initially registered in London to hide Dávila’s 
influence from his detractors in Colombia. The CCRC subsidiary created to finance the 
expansion to Nemocón, was also utilised to hide the identities of investors. A shell company 
named The Boyaca Syndicate Company was listed as a major CCRC shareholder.36 The 
shareholder register for the syndicate reveals yet more shell companies. 37 This is a well-known 
method to conceal the identity of investors. Subsequent share registers of the Boyaca Syndicate 
and CCRC demonstrate some familiar names.38 Both General Dávila and Henry Jenks were 
named as major shareholders. The Jenkses’ prominent role in the CNRC and government 
finances (detailed in chapter four), was the focus of a detailed contemporary study.39 
                                                             
36  Colombian Central Railway Company Share Register, TNA, BT 34/3207/86859. 
37  The Boyaca Syndicate Company Share Register, TNA, BT 34/3204/86681. 
38  Ibid; The Colombian Central Railway Company Share Register, TNA, BT 34/3207/86859. 
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3.4 Crises: 1899-1904 
 
3.4.1 The War of a Thousand Days 1899-1902 
 
 
The Northern Railway was completed in 1898, one year before the onset of war.40 It mobilised 
government troops from Bogotá to the army’s main staging-post in Zipaquirá, and as strategic 
infrastructure it was protected.41 As such, the railway was spared physical damage, and the 
impact on the railway was indirect. One factor which indirectly impacted the railway was the 
consistent inflation explored in chapter two. In 1902, the exchange rate moved from 205 to 800 
COP$/£ between June and December, and cash lost 75% of its value in the space of seven 
months.42  During the period of greatest instability, the relative value of a contract could change 
substantially between agreement and fulfilment. In an editorial on Colombia, The Times argued 
that prices fluctuated so rapidly that the paper profits of local merchants often represented a 
substantial loss when converted into gold.43 Under these circumstances, purchasing goods from 
overseas was difficult, and the instability also caused problems reporting company’s accounts 
in London.44 The financial crisis also affected the price of staple goods: coal rose 250%, 
meaning the railway’s fuel costs increased by the same degree.45  
3.5 Quinquenian Expansion: 1904-09 
The first chapter demonstrated that Reyes’s administration sought to salvage Colombia’s 
battered reputation as creditor by improving macro-level relations with European capital 
markets. The availability of credit for the GNCRC and CNoRC, demonstrates that this 
programme was largely successful. However, this section demonstrates with regards to the 
                                                             
40  Ortega, Ferrocarriles Colombianos. 
41  Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict, p. 138. 
42  ‘Note on Emission of Paper Money by the Government’, TNA, FO 55/409, f. 221. 
43  ‘The Condition of Colombia’, The Times, 17 March 1902. 
44  The annual reports during the war are missing since they were never filed: Guildhall Library, Stock 
Exchange Reports, Boxes 928, 974, 1021. 
45  ‘Cost of Living from Middle of January to Middle of February, 1903’, TNA, FO55/410, Ibid. f. 258. 
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GNCRC, the Reyes administration was unable to maintain this positive relationship at the 
micro-level. The argument established in chapter two regarding Reyes’s failure to consolidate 
his power, is also further developed through an analysis of the experience of the CNoRC.  
3.5.1 The Colombian Northern Railway Company 
It seems logical that British railway companies would benefit from the positive attitude towards 
foreign capital of the Quinquenio. But the story of the CNoRC is more complicated. The 
company was subjected to some particularly negative attention from the regime, as a reaction 
to the inability of Reyes to adequately consolidate his political power. There were two reasons 
for the negative attention: the questionable status as a ‘British’ company, and the oppositional 
political status of the Dávila and Angulo families controlling the company. 
The CNoRC was involved in a contractual dispute during the first year of the Reyes presidency 
over the original $1,150,000 subvention. The 1884 contract stipulated $100,000 should be 
repaid each five years.46 Since the subvention was paid before the devaluation of the peso, the 
government argued the debt should be repaid in gold backed pesos, rather than in paper pesos 
at an enormous discount.47 Davilá had already used the monetary crisis to avoid paying his debt 
to the Parisian trading house of Fould, and sought to similarly capitalise on the instability of 
the currency.48 The CNoRC used its technical status as a British company, which the Foreign 
Office viewed as questionable, to solicit diplomatic assistance.49. The Foreign Office was keen 
                                                             
46  Contract dated 27 February 1898, TNA, BT31/31593/55900. It should be noted the original contract was 
entered into with the now defunct state of Cundinamarca under the federalist ‘sovereign state’ system. 
47  Pérez to Welby (Minister Resident), 19 August 1905, TNA, FO 135/295. 
48  Dávila disputed the payment of his £20,000 debt to Fould & Company of Paris after José Manuel 
Marroquin issued decrees nos. 1265 and 1331 on the 11th of November 1901, cynically arguing the 
decree forbade him from making payment of a debt stipulated in Francs. For the dispute please see: 
Contract dated 27 February 1898, TNA, BT31/31593/55900; Boulard-Pouqueville to Felipe F. Paul dated 
17 May 1902, TNA, FO55/409, f. 161; ‘Memorandum by Mr Dickson on the question of the stipulation 
in foreign currencies’ TNA, FO55/409, f. 155; ‘British Trade With Colombia’, Financial Times, 10 
March 1902; Guthrie to Undersecretary of State, 3 March 1902, TNA, FO55/411, f. 66; Dickson to  Petty-
Fitzmaurice (Foreign Secretary), 4 June 1902, TNA, FO55/409, f. 88 v; Guthrie to Undersecretary of 
State, 1 December 1902, FO55/411, f. 136. 
49  In a letter to British Foreign secretary Edward Grey, British consul Spencer Dickson advised that the 
company was a British company only by technicality, since the shareholding was controlled by a small 
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to avoid an entanglement, but they could not be seen to allow the expropriation of a London 
listed company. They argued internally that the case was motivated by Dávila’s status as a 
‘persona non-grata’ of the Reyes regime, and commented that should he return from his exile 
in Europe he who would ‘undoubtedly’ be arrested due to his links with anti-Reyes 
conspiracies.50 Luis Felipe Angulo (a large shareholder in the company) was used as a conduit 
between the Foreign Office and Reyes to mediate the dispute, and only ‘strong representations 
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs’ avoided an administrative seizure of the railway.51 
Reyes dealt with the dispute in keeping with the caudillo archetype his administration 
attempted to emulate: the local manager of the railway Julio Pérez was arrested and charged 
with conspiring against the government.52 The case of the CNoRC was further complicated 
when the Foreign Office’s mediator Luis Felipe Angulo was implicated in a plot to attack the 
palace and assassinate Reyes.53 Ortiz argues Dávila and Angulo both shared ‘personal and 
business connections’ with Santiago Pérez Triana, who spent the Quinquenio covertly 
undermining the regime by sending copies of Desde lejos to associates in Colombia.54 These 
were disguised and sent by post through a proxy at the Union of London and Smith’s bank to 
avoid Reyes’s blockade of mail from political dissidents.55 A significant number were 
                                                             
group of Colombian elites. Dickson to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 29 January 1906, TNA, FO 371/42, ff. 
30-1. 
50  It is unclear from the source since when Dávila had been forced into exile. Dickson to Grey (Foreign 
Secretary), 23 December 1905, FO371/42, f. 12. 
51  Dickson to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 23 December 1905, TNA, FO 371/42 f. 11. 
52  Dickson to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 23 December 1905, TNA, FO 371/42 f. 11. 
53  Dickson to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 23 December 1905, FO371/42, f. 42. Readers should note that 
Angulo was a major shareholder in the railway and close associate of Dávila. 
54  Ortiz, Santiago Pérez Triana, p. 49. 
55  Pérez Triana to Lagos, 19 September 1908, BLAA, ‘Santiago Pérez Triana Cartas dirigidas a su sobrino 
Jorge Lagos’ Mss. 532; Pérez Triana to Lagos, 1 February 1909, BLAA, ‘Santiago Pérez Triana Cartas 
dirigidas a su sobrino Jorge Lagos’, Mss. 532. Readers should note that Desde Lejos had been banned by 
the regime due to its attacks on both the renegotiation of the public debt in Europe and the Quinquenian 
railway bond guarantee system. 
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intercepted by the government and incinerated on Reyes’s orders.56 The CNoRC was thus 
entwined in a wider political struggle. 
The Foreign Office pressured the CNoRC to appoint a manager detached from national politics, 
warning otherwise it would ‘be difficult, if not impossible … to afford them assistance’.57 
Dickson warned that ‘every Colombian is a potential conspirator’ advising that ‘British 
enterprises should be directed by British subjects’.58 Several months later, when Pérez had been 
released, Dickson warned that although the ‘immediate danger has passed … the Colombian 
government is looking for any pretext … to seize the enterprise’.59 Dickson’s efforts to change 
the manager were ultimately unsuccessful. Reyes overruled his suggestion of F.C. Child since 
he was married to into a Colombian family ‘implicated in the recent conspiracy’.60 This all-
pervasive political intrigue led Dickson to fear a repeat of the Punchard-McTaggard litigation, 
which had occupied the Foreign Office’s limited resources in Colombia for many years: 
The whole difficulty in this case arises from the fact that … the Colombian Northern Railway 
Company … is, in reality, under the control of Colombians. … Extricating the company from 
any difficulty into which they get entangled, by their own stupidity, will fall upon His Majesty’s 
Government and it is for this reason that I have done all in my power to avoid a second Punchard 
affair.61 
However, the Quinquenian period was not entirely negative for the company. A central tenant 
of the Quinquenian project was railway expansion, and the CNoRC benefitted from this 
institutional support. On the 22 September 1905, the Reyes administration signed a contract 
with the CNoRC for an expansion from Zipaquirá to Chiquinquirá, which originally provided 
a subvention of $9,990 (approx. £2,060) per km.62 On the 14 March 1907, the Reyes 
administration offered a full guarantee of 6% on £750,000 of railway bonds in place of the 
                                                             
56  Elias Ortíz, Santiago Pérez Triana, p. 90. 
57  Barrington to Dickson, 2 February 1906, FO371/42, ff. 17-8. 
58  Dickson to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 6 January 1906, TNA, FO371/42, f. 27. 
59  Dickson to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 6 January 1906, TNA, FO371/42, f. 26. 
60  Dickson to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 29 January 1906, TNA, FO371/42, f. 30. 
61  Dickson to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 29 January 1906, TNA, FO371/42, ff. 30-1. 
62  Cortés to Minister of Public Works, 27 November 1909, AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 414, f. 18. 
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subvention.63 This is the same kind of incentive provided to the Central Argentine Railway in 
1862, which Lewis argues was indispensable for its initial expansion.64 The CNoRC felt that a 
guarantee would facilitate raising ‘the whole amount of required capital’.65 Buoyed by the 
promise of a guarantee, the CNoRC subsidiary (CCRC) rapidly floated capital in London. 
£299,930 share capital, and £105,000 of interest bearing debentures had been raised by the end 
of the administration.66 The Colombian government was allocated £80,000 of shares in the 
CCRC subsidiary (approx. 27%), in exchange for the Department of Cundinamarca waving a 
claim for a levy on the CNoRC’s net receipts.67 Just like the concession contract of 1892, which 
was supposed to have nullified this claim, the agreement did not resolve the issue. Repeated 
legal cases were fought throughout the 1910s and 1920s over the levy, which are analysed later. 
These ultimately led to the expropriation and forced nationalisation of the railway in 1925. 
 
The first section of track between Zipaquirá and Nemocón was constructed quickly and 
efficiently, and it opened to the public on the 21 October 1907.68 Based on average construction 
costs for the CNoRC, the £750,000 guarantee would have been sufficient to complete the 
section to Chiquinquirá.69 But as is illustrated in subsequent subsections, the change of 
government completely derailed the expansion project. The projected line between Nemocón 
and Chiquinquirá was 90km, and the 16km section between Zipaquirá and Nemocón took 1.5 
years to complete. This construction rate would suggest a projected completion date of 1915, 
                                                             
63  Cortés to Minister of Public Works, 27 November 1909, AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 414, f. 18. 
64  Lewis, British Railways, p. 10. 
65  Cortés to Minister of Public Works, 27 November 1909, AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 414, f. 19. 
66  The Colombian Central Railway Company Share Register TNA, BT 34/3207/86859; Handwritten 
Document Titled: ‘Colombian Central Railway Company’ AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 414, f. 
203. 
67  The contract stipulated 5% of net receipts should be paid in the first 20 years of operation, 10% in the 
subsequent 20 years, and then 15% from this point onwards. ‘The Colombian Northern Railway 
Company. Report of the Directors, 20th November 1906’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, 
Box 928, pp. 1-2. 
68  Handwritten Document Titled: ‘Colombian Central Railway Company’ AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, 
Vol. 414, f. 203. 
69  ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, pp. 21-3. 
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yet the section was not completed until 1928.70 The Quinquenio provided a short-lived period 
of rapid expansion for the CNoRC, which illustrates how successful Reyes’s administration 
was at incentivising expansion with foreign capital. The capital inflow into the project was 
significant, and would have been substantially greater but for the abrupt end of the regime and 
its railway expansion policy. The experience of the CNoRC also demonstrates why this abrupt 
change occurred. The regime was skilled at projecting an image of stability in Europe, but the 
reality was quite different. Reyes struggled to consolidate his power internally which was 
indispensable to a Porfirian style economic revolution.  
 
3.5.2 The Great Northern Central Railway of Colombia 
The ‘Ferrocarril de Puerto Wilches’ has a central position within the historiography of the 
Colombian region of Santander. But within this, the GNCRC and British involvement in the 
project is generally approached as an afterthought. National historians such as Correa, Cuadros, 
Bayona, and Niño, acknowledge the importance of the railway for Santander’s economic 
history, but they fail to recognise the importance of the British concession and the anti-foreign 
and anti-imperialist political movements it faced.71 Correa’s study is comprehensive, but 
largely parallels the contemporary anti-imperialistic political discourse.72 Cuadros’s work 
establishes the symbolic importance of the railway for regional identity, and details the popular 
mobilisation in support of the railway. However, he fails to link these factors to the wider 
political campaign against foreign capital, which ultimately led to the collapse of the 
concession.73 Bayona and Niño acknowledge how influential the collapse was for the 
                                                             
70  Alfredo Ortega, Ferrocarriles Colombianos La Ultima Experiencia Ferroviaria del Pais 1920-1930 
(Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1932), p. 92. 
71  Correa, Café y ferrocarriles, pp. 74-80.; Manuel Bayona Sarmiento and Judith Niño Sánchez, Del 
Camino de Paturia al Ferrocarril de Santander (Bucaramanga:  SIC, 2002), pp. 86-97; Miguel Dario 
Cuadros Sánchez, Bartolomé Rugeles: Sociabilidad Política, Negocios y Función Pública 1899-1938 
(Bucaramanga: UIS, 2013), pp. 141-83. 
72  Correa, Café y ferrocarriles, pp. 74-80. 
73  Cuadros, Bartolomé Rugeles, pp. 173-83 
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subsequent rate of construction, but they miss the central role of the political campaign against 
the railway spearheaded by influential political actors.74 Palacios argues the failure of the 
project was influential in the fall of Santander and the rise of Western Colombia, but misses 
the crucial interplay of rising nationalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-foreign sentiments aimed 
at the GNCRC.75 As such, this chapter’s analysis of the GNCRC makes a significant 
contribution to national economic historiography, demonstrating how the collapse of the 
concession fundamentally influenced the economic trajectory of Colombia in the pre-war 
period. It also contributes to understanding the nationalist reaction against British economic 
interests in early twentieth century Latin America. 
                                                             
74  Bayona and Niño, Del camino, pp. 87-97. 
75  Palacios, Between Legitimacy, pp. 40, 54-55. 
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Fig. 3.7 – Map of the proposed route of the GNCRC between Bogotá and Puerto Wilches 
passing through Bucaramanga 
 
Source: ‘The Great Northern Central Railway of Colombia Prospectus’, TNA, FO371/1101.  
The GNCRC had two aims: linking the regional city of Bucaramanga with the Magdalena River 
valley, and subsequently linking Bucaramanga with Bogotá.76 One characteristic of the 
                                                             
76  After Bogotá, Bucaramanga was the most important city in the eastern part of the interior of Colombia. 
Bucaramanga was the principal city of the department of Santander. Between Santander and 
Cundinamarca lay the department of Boyacá. Each of these three departments were heavily populated by 
Colombian standards. As a result, linking the three regions was a long-time dream of the Bogotá press 
dating back to the 1860s. For origins of this dream see: William Wills, ‘Un Nuevo Pacto de Union’ El 
Tiempo, 22 June 1864. 
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concession was particularly important: it was financed by raising government guaranteed 
bonds, which Lewis, Miller, and Summerhill argue were indispensable to Argentine, Brazilian 
and wider Latin American railway development.77 Reyes’s concession agreed to provide a 
guarantee on £9,600 per km of mortgage bonds bearing 5.5% annual interest, leading to the 
formation of the GNCRC on the 4 April 1907, three years into the administration.78 £38,500 of 
the share capital was purchased by company directors and associates, and they also provided 
£74,000 of working capital.79 The GNCRC was authorised by telegram on the 25 July 1907 to 
raise bonds for the first 54km of line, representing £518,400 of capital, and £192,000 of bonds 
were issued corresponding to the first 20km.80 The impact of Colombia’s reputation as what 
Garner terms a ‘pariah state’ is illustrated well in Desde cerca.81 According to Holguín 
representatives of the Girardot Railway applied for a loan from Rothschild bank which was 
initially approved, but several days later this approval was revoked. Rothschild bank explained 
the prospectus referred to a railway to Santa Fé, which they had taken to mean in Argentina.82 
That the GNCRC was able to raise capital in London with ease, is indicative of the success of 
Reyes’s and Holguín’s programme to rehabilitate Colombia’s credit with the Holguín-Avebury 
agreement. For the first time in Colombia’s history, large-scale investment was raised for 
multiple railway projects concurrently. 
Problems began with the GNCRC project when President Reyes sent Torres Elicechea (then 
Minister of Finance) to replace Holguín as Colombia’s financial representative in London.83 In 
                                                             
77 Miller, Britain and Latin America, p. 133; Lewis, British Railways, pp. 97-123; Lewis, Public Policy, 
pp.35-8; Summerhill, Order. 
78  ‘Prospectus for the Great Northern Central Railway of Colombia’, TNA, FO371/1101, f. 114. 
79  Fletcher Toomer, Gran Ferrocarril Central del Norte de Colombia Puerto Wilches: La Verdad de Este 
Asunto (Bogotá: Imprenta de el Nuevo tiempo, 1911), p. 3. 
80  Cortés to Minister of Public Works, 3 August 1910, TNA, FO371/1101, f. 171. 
81  Garner, British Lions, p. 97. 
82  Holguín, Desde cerca, p. 75. 
83  Holguín acted as minister of finance during 1904 and 1909, whilst Torres fulfilled the role during 1908. 
It is unclear why Reyes made this decision, but it was certainly an influential one. Stronge (Minister 
Resident) to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 30 July 1908, TNA, FO371/437, f. 232. 
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1905, British consular official Spencer Dickson had referred to Torres as a ‘impecunious 
adventurer of doubtful antecedents’.84 Prior to Torres’s arrival, Holguín had been leading 
negotiations for a £2,000,000 loan to amortise the papel moneda. These broke down almost 
immediately, in large part due to Torres’s conduct.85 Moreover, after arriving for his mission 
in London, Torres immediately set about what appears to be the intentional sabotage of the 
GNCRC project. As the principal Colombian diplomatic representative in London, Domingo 
Esguerra previously authorised the government guarantee on GNCRC bonds under advice from 
Foss, Bilbrough & Co. (Colombia’s lawyers in London).86 Torres presented them with a draft 
of a formal protest which he wished to be turned into a notarial act which stated that 
‘[Domingo] Esguerra was not authorised by the government to sign this declaration’, 
effectively repudiating the agreement.87 Foss, Bilbrough & Co. explained the action ‘would be 
extremely detrimental to the credit of your government’.88 They subsequently informed the 
Minister of Public Works the request had been refused because: 
Should such an idea become prevalent in the minds of financiers and others in London or Paris, 
any chance of … raising money for national purposes such as railways, would be very greatly 
prejudiced, if not rendered impossible.89 
 
Torres ignored this advice and raised the notarial act through another lawyer’s office on the 22 
December 1908.90 Torres was ordered by President Reyes via telegram on the 29 December to 
immediately authorise issuance of bonds.91 As such, Torres was acting as a renegade member 
                                                             
84  Dickson to Petty-Fitzmaurice (Foreign Secretary), 9 August 1905, TNA, FO55/429, f. 150. 
85  Stronge (Minister Resident) to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 21 August 1908, TNA, FO371/437 f. 234. 
86  Foss-Bilborough & Co. to Nemesio Camacho, AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 395, ff. 18-21; Cortés 
to Minister of Public Works, 3 August 1910, TNA, FO371/1101, ff. 170-86. 
87  Foss-Bilborough & Co. to Nemesio Camacho, 22 December 1908, AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 
395, ff. 18-21. 
88  Foss-Bilborough & Co. to Nemesio Camacho, 22 December 1908, AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 
395, ff. 19-20. 
89  Foss-Bilborough & Co. to Nemesio Camacho, 22 December 1908, AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 
395, f. 20 
90  AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 395, ff. 18, 74. 
91  Reyes to Torres Elicechea, 29 December 1908, TNA, FO371/1101, f. 173; Torres Elicechea to Reyes, 
Minister of Public Works, 31 December 1908, AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 395, ff. 18, 165. 
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of the administration. This means the historiographical consensus that the bond dispute was 
part-and-parcel of national policy is ill-conceived.92 In order to expedite construction, the 
GNCRC offered its own bonds to the market forfeiting the guarantee, and finalised negotiations 
with ‘first class bankers in Paris … [for] all the capital necessary for the construction … as far 
as Bucaramanga’.93 The issuance of bonds began in May 1909 at 84.5% of par.94 When Torres 
learned the company was issuing its own bonds, he published articles in the French financial 
press accusing the railway of fraud.95 The release of these resulted in an immediate panic, 
forcing the GNCRC to sell the its bonds at a heavy discount.96 In 1910, the Ministry of Public 
Works confirmed Torres’s claims were spurious, acknowledging that the GNCRC had been 
within their rights to issue the bonds.97 This occurred after Torres’s role in the ‘Apulo Works’ 
corruption scandal had come to light, which is explored in detail in chapter four. 
The bond dispute led to lengthy negotiations and a notorious legal case which brought 
construction works to a standstill. By 1913, the public began asking why this breakdown in 
relations had occurred, and in response, Domingo Esguerra published an exposé of the affair 
in El Tiempo: 
With his famous protest Mr Torres no doubt had two aims: to appear as the saviour of national 
interests, at a time in which public opinion had turned against the concession contract, and to 
discredit my role, making it appear as if I was wholly responsible for the burdens the country 
would suffer, because according to him, I had superseded the instructions of the government.98 
 
Esguerra’s commentary illustrates how closely the case resembles the ‘Punchard-McTaggart’ 
affair explored in the previous chapter. Torres’s actions were fundamentally motivated by 
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political ambitions and personal enmity, the same two factors which led to the collapse of the 
‘Punchard-McTaggart’ concession. As such, the case illustrates how the personal interests of 
Bogotá’s political and economic elite – under the cloak of ‘patriotism’ or anti-foreign 
sentiments – repeatedly inhibited the application of foreign capital and expertise to the sector. 
There was a strong regionalist element to this phenomenon: what santandereanos termed the 
‘metropolitan elite’, worked tirelessly to ensure the national government’s limited resources 
would be applied to the development of the capital to the detriment of the provinces. This did 
not go unnoticed by the ‘elite bumanguesa’ (of Bucaramanga) who politically mobilised in 
defence of the project, and described the ‘metropolitan elite’ as ‘vampires’ out to ‘pilfer the 
national exchequer’.99 Esguerra argued that Torres ‘knew that the company did not pretend, nor 
could pretend [to the capital market] that the government would pay all interest [whilst the 
railway was in construction]’.100 As such, in his view, the take-down of the project was a 
politicised and complicit action. The fact that Esguerra was awarded honours by the 
governments of Japan, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia for his diplomatic career, 
whilst Torres lived in exile in Europe after fleeing charges of embezzlement, would generally 
lead one to side with Esguerra’s account of the bond dispute.101 
This subsection has highlighted three themes which recur throughout this thesis. The first is 
the general unawareness of Colombian elites of the way international capital markets 
functioned, and the far-reaching ramifications of their conduct. The second is Reyes’s inability 
to adequately consolidate his power and control his ministers. The third is the interplay of 
regionalism within railway policy. With Torres’s activity in London, these factors combined 
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to paralyse the GNCRC. From this point onwards, the railway expansion project, and hopes of 
further investment, were effectively over, even though it limped along in subsequent years. The 
administration’s successful action on the macro-level, had been undermined by the actions of 
one functionary. The subsequent section detail how the company was subsequently subjected 
to a propaganda campaign led by Santiago Pérez Triana, who also spearheaded a wider 
nationalistic and anti-imperialist backlash against British railway companies.102 I argue 
Torres’s intervention marks the total failure and end of the hitherto highly successful 
Quinquenian railway expansion project. It marks the point at which the application of the 
guarantee system in Colombia collapsed. In hindsight, it represents the point at which the fate 
of British railways was sealed, and the prospect of large-scale British investment in the 
Colombian railway sector ended for good. 
3.6 The Rise of Nationalism, 1909-14 
After the fall of the regime, Quinquenian contracts and associated railways remained highly 
visible artefacts of what men like Santiago Pérez Triana viewed as a collaborative and 
treasonous regime. Knight argues that a ‘myth’ has grown up around the Mexican revolution, 
which has ‘exaggerated the influence of ideas as compared to economics’.103 If the influence 
of nationalist ideas in Mexico has been overblown, in Colombia it has been undercooked. As 
this section illustrates, a tide of rising nationalism – strongly influenced by the loss of Panama 
– completely transformed Colombia’s relationship with British railway companies. This led a 
significant portion of Colombian elite society to define the continued existence of ‘la patria’ 
(the homeland) on the capacity to take control of foreign railways. Yet this fundamental change 
in policy is barely acknowledged within the national historiography, which understands 
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Colombian politics in the first three decades of the twentieth century on the basis of a 
‘conservative hegemony’.104 This chapter illustrates that when it comes to railway policy, there 
was no ‘conservative hegemony’, since the railway policies implemented by post-1909 
conservative governments, are indistinguishable from those proposed by Santiago Pérez 
Triana, the son of a radical liberal president. 
3.6.1 The Colombian Northern Railway Company 
The end of the Quinquenio left many expansion projects at a standstill. By November 1909, 
the collapse of the railway bond guarantee system resulted in a legal dispute which suspended 
the CNoRC’s expansion to Chiquinquirá. In March 1907, the Ministry of Public Works had 
offered the CNoRC’s subsidiary the CCRC a guarantee of 6% on £750,000 of bonds.105 The 
promise of this guarantee encouraged British investment, resulting in the issuance of £105,000 
of debentures and £299,930 of share capital.106 This offer was rescinded after the collapse of 
Reyes’s regime before any of the £750,000 of guaranteed bonds could be raised in Europe, and 
the agreement reverted to $9,990 of subvention bonds per km.107 During the Quinquenio, the 
CNoRC’s CCRC subsidiary had completed the 16km section between Zipaquirá and Nemocón, 
and was owed $159,840 (£32,957) of subvention bonds. The Ministry of Public Works 
pressured the company to resume works, but its representative Pedro Cortés argued works had 
ceased because the CCRC had been waiting ‘over two years’ to receive the bonds.108 The 
                                                             
104  Francisco Javier Flórez Bolívar, ‘Re-visitando la Hegemonía conservadora: raza y política en Cartagena 
(Colombia), 1885-1930’, Anuario de Historia Regional y de las Fronteras, 23 (2018), 93-120; Shirley 
Tatiana Pérez Robles, ‘Inmorales, injuriosos y subversivos: las letras durante la Hegemonía 
Conservadora 1886-1930’, Historia y sociedad, 26 (2014), 181-208; Isidro Vanegas Useche, ‘Eduardo 
Santos, la escena pública y la «hegemonía» conservadora’, Historia y Memoria, 14 (2017), 251-90; 
Eduardo Posada-Carbó, ‘Los límites del poder: elecciones bajo la hegemonía conservadora, 1886-1930’, 
Boletín Cultural y Bibliográfico, 39, 60 (2002), 31-65. 
105  Cortés to Minister of Public Works, 27 November 1909, AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 414, f. 19. 
106  Handwritten Document Titled: ‘Colombian Central Railway Company’, AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, 
Vol. 414, f. 203; The Colombian Central Railway Company Share Register TNA, BT 34/3207/86859. 
107  The CCRC’s first £105,000 debentures were guaranteed by the CNoRC rather than the government. 
108  Cortés to Delgado (Minister of Public Works), 27 November 1909, AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 
414, ff. 18-20. 
120 
 
Minister of Public Works Carlos J. Delgado claimed they had attempted to provide the bonds, 
but that Cortés ‘did not want to receive them until the government resolved whether to accept 
the change of subvention bonds to a guarantee’.109 It is plausible Cortés initially refused the 
bonds when a guarantee on bonds was possible, and that the Ministry ignored subsequent 
requests by arguing they had previously refused to receive them. Either way, the salient point 
is that construction ultimately ceased because of the change of administration. 
For its part, the CNoRC kept the promises it had made to the national government by providing 
£80,000 or 27% of the share capital in the CCRC subsidiary.110 Yet the national government 
failed to fulfil its obligations in return. The CNoRC’s management felt only a guarantee on 
bonds would provide the necessary ‘security’ to raise sufficient capital, and blamed the lack of 
progress on the collapse of the system of finance, paralleling the wider arguments of 
Summerhill, Lewis, and Miller, regarding the system’s importance for railway expansion in 
Latin America. 111 Cortés also attributed the breakdown of relations to the intervention and 
conduct of Torres Elicechea, who was so influential in the GNCRC’s bond dispute.112 In 
January 1910, the national government moved to annul the Quinquenian contract for the 
Chiquinquirá expansion, on the pretext that it had not been completed. The CCRC was given 
fifteen days to fulfil the contract, and subsequently entered negotiations for a modified 
concession contract to avoid expropriation.113 The dispute led the local populace of Ubaté – a 
city in middle of the region traversed by the projected expansion – to lodge a notarial action in 
protest.114  
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In August 1911, internal communications of multiple branches of the national government 
discussed the likely cost of a guarantee for the proposed extension. One study projected the 
expansion would produce 14.28% per year on the invested capital, and that a 7% guarantee 
would have little financial impact. Several modifications to the contract were proposed, 
including a decrease in the capital guaranteed per km.115 Despite these studies, neither a 
guarantee nor the subvention bonds were provided, and the CCRC were still requesting 
payment of the subvention in March 1912.116 The national government effectively bankrupted 
the CCRC and ensured nationalisation through renegotiation and withholding the subvention 
bonds. The CCRC burnt through cash reserves earmarked for construction on administrative 
costs. In addition, the £105,000 of 6% debentures raised by the CCRC incurred £6,300 of 
interest per year, and the payment of these was only guaranteed by the CNoRC until September 
1911.117 The CCRC’s net receipts in the fiscal year ending 30 June 1910 were only £1,909, 
which represented a significant shortfall on interest due on its debt. As such, continuing 
operations past September 1911 was unfeasible.118 The national government’s actions led to 
ire from British investors, who viewed the national policy towards railways as a return to the 
pattern of repudiation and abuse of property rights. A letter from a British investor in October 
1913 illustrates how Colombia’s reputation in London had been negatively affected: 
I have for years watched … the continuous growth of [Colombia’s] credit abroad, …  I am sorry 
any step should have been taken … which is likely to cause a feeling of unease amongst British 
investors.119 
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By the end of 1913, the national government had formed a concrete plan to nationalise the 
Zipaquirá-Nemocón CCRC subsidiary, which had now entered bankruptcy proceedings.120 The 
Ministry of Public Works and Colombian consular office in London, worked in unison to 
organise an offer of £5,000 per km to the CCRC’s receivers, representing a total of £80,000 
paid in government bonds.121 Considering the project had raised a total of £324,300, this offer 
represented a significant loss for British investors.122 By January 1914, the national government 
was close to a final agreement to nationalise the Zipaquirá-Nemocón line.123 But as was the 
case with the GNCRC, the CCRC’s £105,000 of debentures had been sold to French 
bondholders, and negotiations with French diplomats were holding back the nationalisation.124 
Debentures were highly devalued because interest had not been paid since the CCRC entered 
receivership. Correspondence between the Colombian consulate and Minister of Public Works 
discussed that the substantial discount should be exploited by methodically purchasing bonds 
in Paris to force through nationalisation. They lamented this was not possible since ‘there is no 
patience in our country’.125 The government reiterated their £80,000 offer for the railway and 
its £105,000 of debentures, with Juan Manuel Dávila of the CNoRC acting as intermediary. 
This was accepted by the receivers on the 27 March 1914.126 The final contract for 
nationalisation of the railway was signed on the 21 August 1915, but bankruptcy proceedings 
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in London delayed handing over the line. 127 These proceedings were completed on the 11 July 
1916 when the line was officially transferred to the government.128 
The nationalisation of the Zipaquirá-Nemocon line demonstrates clearly the priorities of the 
national government. The original guarantee was for £6,000 per km and the net operating 
income would have been offset against the debenture interest. As previously mentioned, the 
government’s own studies had suggested these costs would be minimal.129 Had it not been 
rescinded, the guarantee would have enabled the rapid completion of the section to 
Chiquinquirá. The national government objected to these outlays but were happy to raise 
sovereign debt bonds to gain control of infrastructure which was already providing a service. 
At £6,000 per km, the £80,000 of guaranteed bonds used to purchase the CCRC could have 
provided an additional 13km of track. As such, for the national government, 16km of track 
under national ownership were preferable to 29km under private ownership, and the priority 
was the end of British interests in the sector. By 1914, the national government had effectively 
sealed the nationalisation of the Zipaquirá-Nemocón section of railway, but they had failed to 
take control of the Bogotá-Zipaquirá line. The failure to nationalise the CNoRC coincided with 
the launch of a legal case by the department of Cundinamarca, based on clauses from the 1884 
concession contract.130 As has been discussed previously, these rights had been repeatedly 
relinquished by Colombian authorities, first with the concession contract of 1892, and 
subsequently in exchange for £80,000 (or 27%) of CCRC share capital. This 27% stake 
facilitated the nationalisation of the Zipaquirá-Nemocón section, since their shareholding gave 
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them rights to a share of assets from the receiver. The case launched by the Department of 
Cundinamarca illustrates the contractual instability and complex political power dynamics 
characteristic of the Colombian political environment. The Regeneración had officially ended 
the ‘sovereign states’, yet British railway companies were still interacting with two 
fundamentally independent institutional political actors, whose interests and actions seldom 
converged.  
3.6.2 The Great Northern Central Railway of Colombia 
Nationalism in Latin America has been broadly defined as fitting the characterisation of 
‘populist nationalism’, and as cases such as the Mexican revolution attest has often been 
associated with armed conflict.131 But the strongest example of nationalism in early twentieth 
century Colombia – the reaction against British railways – followed neither of these trends. 
The nationalism which developed in response to the GNCRC did not start as a populist 
movement: it originated from Colombia’s political elite. It was also fundamentally driven by 
personal interests, and a desire to develop political capital. Nevertheless, as an example of early 
twentieth century economic nationalism, the anti-imperialist movement against British 
railways represented a significant rejection of key elements of what Mayall terms the ‘liberal 
world order’.132 
In this subsection, I argue the stance of men like Santiago Pérez Triana represents a break with 
the economic consensus within Colombian liberalism, which had hitherto sought and 
welcomed foreign capital within the Colombian economy. This break between political and 
economic liberalism, has led Posada and Jaksić to explicitly remove the economic component 
from their analysis of nineteenth century Latin American liberalism in its entirety, which they 
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view as of secondary importance.133 I believe this approach is mistaken, especially with the 
case of Colombia. I argue throughout this thesis, that the abandonment of economic principles 
was not indicative of their secondary importance, but rather, a reaction to their unforeseen 
consequences, and part of the process of adapting the ideology to the requirements of the 
region. This change resulted in the formation of left-liberalism, which as Green argues, 
provided the ideological base for the rise of stereotypical Latin American populist nationalism 
in the form of Gaitanismo.134 This subsection illustrates how a nationalist reaction to British 
railways came early, and was central to the political and economic development of early 
twentieth century Colombia. Subsequent chapters build on this argument, demonstrating that 
the reaction to British railways was a central facet of the wider political transformation of 
liberalism in Colombia. In a sense, in reaction to Panama, Colombians made liberalism – which 
had hitherto been applied in a European-centric manner – their own. 
As was discussed previously, the GNCRC’s bond dispute had already made future financing 
all but impossible. But attacks on the railway did not cease, since the central objective was not 
only to end bond guarantees, it was to nationalise all British railway interests. Key political 
actors Francisco Montaña and Santiago Pérez Triana coordinated a propaganda campaign to 
delegitimise the railway; reminiscent of Cisneros’s experience in the 1880s.135 Subsequently 
the local manager Fletcher Toomer rebutted their accusations in a pamphlet published by El 
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Nuevo Tiempo newspaper.136 One such accusation, was that bonds had been raised at a discount 
of 50 or 42 per cent of their nominal value (depending on the source).137  However, primary 
sources demonstrate their inaccuracy: the first bond issuance in London had been raised at 
77%, and before Torres sabotaged the Parisian bond issuance the second tranche were offered 
at 84.5% (a 15.5% discount). 138 The panic created by Torres in the capital market meant 
subsequent bonds were heavily discounted. As such, the accusations of bonds being sold at 
heavy discounts were on one level accurate. However, the fact that those attacking the GNCRC 
had caused or contributed to devaluation of the bonds was completely omitted from their 
treatise.139 
Those attacking the GNCRC had dubious personal interests in other British railway projects. 
As chapter two explored, Santiago Pérez Triana had been a central political actor in the 
Punchard-McTaggart affair. He also shared personal and business connections with Juan 
Manuel Dávila and Luis Felipe Angulo of the CNoRC, who like Pérez Triana, had been vocal 
opponents of the Quinquenio.140  In his ‘eagerness to go against the decisions of his 
predecessor’, President Ramón González awarded Pérez Triana a new position heading the 
Colombian consul in London .141 Camilo Torres Elicechea was embroiled in the ‘Apulo works’ 
scandal, and was accused of embezzling the proceeds of a government guaranteed bond 
issuance for the CNRC, suggesting that his objection to government guarantees only applied 
when he was not personally benefiting from them. In addition, Torres’s son living in London 
was the manager of the Colombian Southern Railway Company, and Pérez Triana was on its 
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board of directors. 142 The Foreign Office’s opinion of both men was negative. Torres was 
described as an ‘impecunious adventurer of doubtful antecedents’. A Home Office 
investigation into Pérez Triana found he was in debt to tailors and landlords in London and his 
wife had unpaid debt relating to a ‘bond street tea shop’, leading them to conclude that his 
promise that Colombia would ‘always’ pay its debts was ‘worth very little’.143 His repudiation 
of the GNCRC’s guarantee was justified by an important caveat within this promise, for he 
stated that the government would only respect contracts that ‘honest and legitimate negotiations 
may have created’.144 For Pérez Triana, as a Quinquenian contract, neither prerequisite applied. 
The national railway historiography has acknowledged the impact of Pérez Triana’s corruption. 
Pérez Ángel has described him as ‘the principal political actor engaging in fraud in contra to 
the national interests’. Yet it has not understood his influential role in the collapse of the 
‘Ferrocarril de Puerto Wilches’ (GNCRC).145 
The most bizarre claim made by Pérez Triana was that the GNCRC’s director Fletcher Toomer 
had equated Colombians to monkeys that he had trained to eat out of the palm of his hand.146 
In an anti-imperial tirade, representative of his theatrical style of discourse, he called on 
patriotic Colombians to unite against the interests of foreign capital.147 Pérez Triana warned 
obligations were ‘nailed tight against the vital organs’ of the state, and would ‘rip the coat from 
the people’s backs and take bread from their mouths to pay interest on bonds [to foreign 
financiers]’.148 He equated the contract to ‘a putrid corpse’, and its clauses to ‘a thorn in the 
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flesh of the nation’, or a ‘medieval tool of torture’. 149 According to Pérez Triana the railway 
would ‘endanger our sovereignty’, and lead to ‘foreign intervention in our ports which the 
United States would come to like bees to honey.150 The piece tapped into a national fear of a 
repeat of Panama, but it argued the GNCRC represented an even greater danger: ‘here we 
discuss the very life of the republic, the contract causes more damage than the loss of a 
department, to save ourselves we must all unite, like those in a sinking ship or a burning 
house’.151 He went as far as to question the manhood of any Colombian not willing to resist the 
threat to national sovereignty: ‘if Colombians submissively accept this with smiles on their 
faces, it would be a good idea to open easy routes of emigration to the orient … where placid 
and oppressed men provide domestic service’.152 
This contemporary nationalistic and anti-imperialist commentary has left its mark on recent 
national historiography. Correa’s argument that the GNCRC’s bond issue ‘completely departed 
from what was stipulated in the terms of the contract’ closely parallels this contemporary 
political discourse.153 Francisco Montaña’s contemporary study of the concession contracts 
which is utilised by Correa argued that the GNCRC was ‘simply a shell’ which had ‘not 
provided its own capital’, but had spent all the products of the first bond emission without 
constructing any track of sufficient quality worthy of the outlay.154 This commentary was 
completely contradicted by the Ministry of Public Work’s annual report for 1910. This stated 
that the GNCRC was proceeding ‘in accordance with the scientific prescriptions and terms of 
the contract’, and that ‘the excellent quality of the materials … and engineering works’ as well 
as the ‘careful organisation’ meant it was ‘one of the best lengths of track in the country’.155 In 
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view of these contradictions, it is clear that the attacks were politically motivated. Montaña, 
Pérez Triana, and Torres viewed the guarantee as an attempt at defrauding the country, yet the 
GNCRC’s method of finance was in no way unusual. The literature has shown that guarantees 
of railway bonds were a prerequisite for attracting capital.156 The GNCRC was caught up in an 
ideological struggle, which as chapter two illustrated, had been set at the pinnacle of Colombian 
politics by the loss of Panama. 
Fig. 3.8 – Map showing the completed 20km section of railway referred to in the Ministry of 
Public Works’s 1910 report and the projected route to Bucaramanga 
 
Source: República de Colombia, Informe del ministerio de obras públicas al Congreso de 1911 (Bogotá: 
Imprenta Nacional, 1911), Unnumbered Fold-out page towards the end. 
This hostile and politically charged atmosphere led the GNCRC to enlist diplomatic assistance. 
Pérez Triana acting as the main point of contact did not help matters. Pérez Triana argued the 
contract was invalid because the congress had been suspended throughout the Quinquenio, and 
never approved it. Like Torres he also repudiated Esguerra’s approval of the guarantee, arguing 
he had lacked the necessary authority.157 Yet as was demonstrated earlier in the chapter, this 
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was not the case: Reyes had personally ordered Torres Elicechea to approve the GNCRC 
guarantee in accordance with Esguerra’s original arrangements.158 As such, the national 
government had reverted to type, it was once again repudiating pre-existing contracts with 
dubious justifications. As was discussed in chapter two, Pérez Triana was accused of receiving 
bribes from the British firm Punchard-McTaggard in the 1890s to ensure they were awarded 
the Antioquia Railway concession. In addition, whilst berating the imperialism of the GNCRC, 
he sat on the board of the British owned Colombian Southern Railway Company. He was also 
a signatory of the contract which provided the CNRC’s bonds a government guarantee.159 As 
such, just as was the case with Torres, his objection to bond guarantees or British railways, 
only seems to have applied when he had no personal interest in the beneficiaries of them.  
The GNCRC dispute resulted in a peculiar and perhaps even unique situation. The legal basis 
of a railway was being questioned after hundreds of thousands of pounds of British and French 
capital had been invested, and a 20km section had been brought into public service. The impact 
of this was clear: why would any cognisant European investor consider risking their capital in 
Colombia’s railway sector, when the worthlessness of Colombian concession contracts had 
once again been illustrated to the world’s financial markets? As the GNCRC director Fletcher 
Toomer pointed out, the fact that the ‘engine runs across the wilderness’ and Reyes and the 
Minister of Public Works had ‘nailed down [the first rails] with their own hands’, was 
irrelevant. Without the institutional respect of property rights, the bondholders’ investment was 
lost in its entirety.160 The suspension of construction works caused severe discontent in 
Santander, whose population felt the bond dispute had been orchestrated to harm the 
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department economically.161 Those attacking the company were described as ‘vampires’ 
sucking the lifeblood of the region by sabotaging efforts to ‘connect ourselves to the civilised 
world’.162 Opposition was said to emanate from ‘the high circles of politics’, with the single 
objective of ‘ruining the life of a blooming region’.163 The intertwined personal interests of 
those attacking the project did not go unnoticed by local commentators, who made implicit 
reference to Pérez Triana: 
Among these vampires, the usurers who trade the honour of our homeland (la patria) and use 
contracts to pilfer the national exchequer, have fought most vehemently to have congress … 
suspend the concession contract. … The notion that the national government will continue works, 
is so ridiculous that it only fits in the minds of the obtuse or idiots. … We all know well that the 
few resources at the government’s disposal are only sufficient to fill the pockets of the Bogotá 
elite which control the public purse through political intrigue. … Only foreign capital can redeem 
us.164 
 
In August 1911, the fervent local support led to a huge popular rally in Bucaramanga defending 
the GNCRC and demanding that the construction of the railway continue.165 The crowd 
demanded the removal of Minister of Hacienda Tomas O. Eastman from his post because of 
his negative comments on the utility of the railway. President Restrepo acquiesced to these 
demands three months later in an attempt ‘sooth the discomfort’ of santandereanos.166 Images 
of the protests can be seen in Figures 3.9 and 3.10. 
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Fig. 3.9 – The public of Bucaramanga congregated in front of the governor’s house 
 
Source: ‘Ferrocarril de Puerto Wilches’ El Tiempo, 29 August 1911. 
Fig. 3.10 – Demonstration in Bucaramanga in support of railway company 
 
Source: ‘Ferrocarril de Puerto Wilches’ El Tiempo, 29 August 1911. 
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This support of the GNCRC is paralleled in the local historiography of Santander, which has a 
much more positive perspective towards the British company than Pérez Ángel and Correa.167 
Bayona and Niño go as far as arguing that ‘it is clear that … [without the bond dispute] the 
GNCRC would have taken the locomotive as far as Bucaramanga before the end of the 1920s’ 
(instead of 1941).168 The growth of coffee in western Colombia as opposed to Santander, was 
influenced by the ‘high transportation costs’ in the latter, which ‘blocked the takeoff of modern 
capitalism’.169 The project’s failure therefore helped to reconfigure ‘regional hierarchies’.170 
As such, the collapse of the GNCRC was a momentous development for subsequent regional 
distribution of economic power, and if Bayona and Niño are right, it may well have completely 
changed the course of Colombian economic history. As Cuadros argues, the construction of 
the port of Puerto Wilches was viewed locally as the beginning of the ‘redemption of 
Santander’, whilst failure of the railway project implied being ‘exiled not only from el progreso 
but also from civilisation’.171 The collapse of the project thus represented not only an economic 
setback, but also an acute psychological trauma for santandereanos. 
In the year following the protests in Bucaramanga an amended concession contract was 
negotiated and signed on the 8 June 1912.172 The management of the GNCRC made several 
significant sacrifices, hoping these would break through the impasse and allow resumption of 
works. The first was a clause dictating that the railway would be nationalised without 
compensation after fifty years of operation.173 The second was that after allowing for a 
shareholder dividend, 62.5% of all future profits were to be paid to the national government.174 
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Third, the company would provide the national government with 150,000 additional shares in 
the company free of charge. Combined with government’s existing 50,000 shares, this would 
have represented a 40% stake.175 Finally, the contract provided strict deadlines for completion 
of the project. If these were not met, the concession would be voided, and the railway legally 
expropriated without compensation.176 The timescale was completely unrealistic. The proposed 
railway was 154km, and it rose from 65m to 959m above sea level.177 20km had been 
completed, and the new contract provided four years to complete the remaining 134km. This 
represented over 90m of track to be constructed per day on mountainous terrain which suffered 
from periodic torrential rains and associated landslides. To give some perspective on how 
unrealistic this was, in 1932 after eighteen years of national administration, there were still 
14km between Rio Negro and Bucaramanga to complete. The railway only arrived at Café 
Madrid on the outskirts of Bucaramanga in 1941.178 The national historiography has 
fundamentally misunderstood the significance of these contract renegotiations, which Cuadros 
believes ‘resolved the conflict’ between the two sides and understands as an attempt by the 
Restrepo administration to ensure the completion of the railway.179 Primary sources suggest 
the opposite was true: in August 1914, Fletcher Toomer claimed the Colombian Minister of 
Public Works had admitted the purpose of the 1912 contract was to make it ‘so onerous that it 
would be almost impossible for the Company to carry it out’.180 In view of the clauses it seems 
likely that Toomer’s allegation was accurate. 
The GNCRC and national government were embroiled in yet another dispute over bonds in the 
two years following the signing of the amended contract. This led to a public altercation aired 
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in The Times in June 1913. The published articles further entrenched the negative view of the 
GNCRC in international capital markets, making raising additional capital even less likely. The 
GNCRC argued it had ‘done everything in their power to obtain delivery of the new bonds 
from the Colombian Government’, and their refusal to comply meant they had ‘been unable to 
issue the new bonds or to proceed with construction of the railway’.181 The government’s 
lawyers released a rebuttal a few days later, in which they blamed the delay on the two parties 
being ‘at issue as to the construction of the supplementary contract’.182 Ortega and Correa both 
blame the GNCRC for the dispute, arguing that they maintained a policy of repeated 
renegotiation over terms.183 Yet the government’s lawyers conceded in The Times that the 
dispute revolved around the government’s own concerns over clauses in the contract, rather 
than those of the GNCRC, contradicting Ortega and Correa’s argument.184  In addition, the 
schedule regarding the issuance of bonds had already been covered in detail in the amended 
concession contract.185 Thus in a manner reminiscent of the many examples presented 
throughout this thesis, the dispute revolved around the national government repudiating a 
contract they had signed after lengthy negotiations. By the following year, the GNCRC had 
endured five years of fruitless negotiations since the first bond dispute, and they effectively 
ending their involvement in the construction project with the following telegram: 
The company is now convinced that the Colombian government does not intend to carry out 
engagements [for the] contract [of] 1912 …. and will claim compensation through proper 
channels for all losses, injury, prejudice and damage sustained by the company owing to the non-
fulfilment of the obligations undertaken by the government in the contracts of 1906.186 
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Following this announcement, the GNCRC ‘completely ceased construction works’ on the 4 
October 1914.187 However, just as had been the case for the CCRC, the protracted negotiations 
had financially crippled the company. Administrative costs, elevated substantially by repeated 
telegrams, correspondence, and legal costs, had burned through the cash raised by the original 
bond issuances, and the GNCRC had been pushed by the national government to the verge of 
bankruptcy. The situation was exploited to acquire the GNCRC through bankruptcy 
proceedings. The process of nationalisation was completed on the 18 April 1918, when the 
national government raised £428,580 of 5% sovereign debt bonds at a 70% discount to 
purchase the railway for £300,000.188 Just as was the case with the CCRC the deal represented 
a significant loss for British and French investors: the GNCRC’s had raised £192,000 in 
London, and £306,000 in Paris, representing a total of £498,000.189 Only 20km of railway had 
been completed which was presented as evidence that the GNCRC has been defrauding the 
country.190  It is understandable that this perception existed, and indeed persists within recent 
historiography, since the cost of construction based on the bond issuances represented a 
staggering £24,900 per km.191 The sovereign debt bonds raised by Colombia to nationalise the 
railway represented £21,429 per km added to the national debt. This reaffirms the contention 
made previously: the national government’s priorities were controlling existing railways over 
and above constructing new track. The national government preferred to indebt itself to the 
tune of £428,580 for 20km of railway, rather than commit to make smaller periodic payments 
on a guarantee of railway bonds which would ensure the completion of the remaining 134km.  
There is a tendency within the national historiography to make sweeping generalisations on 
railway construction costs, likely because of the lack of detailed empirical studies such as this 
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one. Junguito extrapolates the construction costs of the whole ‘northern railway’ branch 
(CNoRC, CCRC and GNCRC) at a high figure of approx. £18,630 per km. This analysis is 
based on a single contemporary source which speculated what such a railway might cost.192 
Pérez Ángel provides a counterfactual model in which he argues the approximate costs of 
construction of the GNCRC would have been £4,225 per km had it been constructed under 
national administration. His rationale is that the corrupt rent-seeking of foreign financiers and 
investors consumed most of the capital raised.193 The best rebuttal of Pérez Ángel’s argument 
is simply that – as has been illustrated clearly throughout the chapter – rather than benefit, 
British investors lost large sums of money from their foray into the Colombian railway sector. 
Both studies distort what were complexed multifaceted experiences with an arbitrary 
application of construction costs. As the chapter has demonstrated, there were extenuating 
circumstances to the poor performance of the GNCRC, which made continued construction all 
but impossible. Crucially, many of these costs were dependent on institutional and political 
changes out of the company’s control. 
Fletcher Toomer claimed that the first 20km had only cost £5,000 per km, arguing several 
factors had distorted the overall cost of the project.194 Firstly ‘10km of finished railway’ had 
been constructed ahead of the first 20km section, and sufficient rails for another 20km were on 
site and ready to lay. As such 50km of the projected 154km line had either been completed or 
had materials on site ready for construction.195 Second, rolling stock had been purchased and 
received for the first 65km, and 65km of telegraph line laid along the proposed route.196 Third, 
that a large modern station had been built at the river terminal, which was sufficient to meet 
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the ‘traffic requirements’ of the entire line.197 Bayona and Niño highlight the importance of 
this port infrastructure, arguing that its construction occupied ‘the majority of the [GNCRC’s] 
workforce’ and cost the life of a British engineer, who succumbed to tropical disease.198 Fourth, 
despite transiting baldíos lands, or in the words of the company, ‘a jungle’, the GNCRC had 
run a daily service on the first 20km of line for four years, in accordance with the wishes of the 
national government.199 Finally, during four years of contract negotiations, the GNCRC had 
incurred ‘enormous expenses in sending representatives to Bogotá, for cablegrams, legal 
advice, interest on unproductive capital, and other expenses in London’. Combined with the 
panic Torres’s publications had caused in the capital market, this meant the GNCRC had to 
‘dispose of many of its bonds at a price far below their intrinsic value in order to keep the 
railway open’.200 Lacking the company’s accounts it is not possible to verify the £5,000 per km 
figure, but we do know that  because it was forced to sell at a significant discount, the GNCRC 
received substantially less than the £306,000 nominal value of the French bonds.201 The 
evidence presented here suggests the true cost of construction was far lower than the £24,900 
of bonds raised per km, and that the performance of the company was far better than it appears 
at first glance. 
3.7 Legal Disputes and Expropriation, 1914-25 
3.7.1 ‘La nación’ versus the CNoRC 
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When the department of Cundinamarca launched a legal case against the CNoRC, the 
management argued the ‘claim is baseless and cannot be upheld’.202 The following years would 
prove them spectacularly wrong. The management’s error was underestimating the threat of 
contractual instability in Colombia. The CNoRC’s directorship found it inconceivable that their 
legal basis could suddenly come into question on the basis of a levy stipulated within a three-
decade old clause. Especially since rights to charge the levy had been repeatedly waived by the 
national government. They asserted confidently in 1915 that ‘to cede rights in the company to 
Cundinamarca, all the national laws cited would need to be abolished, and [the national 
government would need to] disavow all the rights acquired by the company’.203 The CNoRC’s 
founder and patriarch General Juan Manuel Dávila died in 1915, and his son Carlos A. Dávila 
had taken over administration of the railway. The CNoRC’s 1915 report stated that the 
knowledge lost with his passing was a significant blow to operations, especially concerning the 
dispute over the levy.204 The departmental government argued the 1892 amendment to the 1884 
concession contract had been signed by the Regeneración era government without ‘the consent 
of the department of Cundinamarca’.205 The Regeneración had in theory removed 
Cundinamarca’s sovereignty, but the case illustrates how in practice the departments continued 
asserting agency. The CNoRC was caught in the middle of this federal political power struggle. 
But the case was not only aimed at the CNoRC, Cundinamarca also sought recompense from 
the national government, for what it viewed as the illegitimate secession of the department’s 
sovereignty over the railway. Even though the national government – who subsequently 
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spearheaded the nationalisation policy against the CNoRC – were also targeted by the lawsuit, 
the CNoRC’s management believed the case was developed to weaken the company’s position, 
just as renegotiations had been used to bankrupt its CCRC subsidiary: 
The company has experienced marked hostility on the part of the public authorities, which has 
crystallised in a succession of lawsuits, … [with] the object … [of] despoil[ing] the company of 
the fruits of its labours and of its capital.206 
The case was awarded in favour of the department of Cundinamarca, against which the CNoRC 
launched an appeal. The CNoRC argued that the 1884 concession was itself void because the 
department of Cundinamarca had not complied with various requirements stipulated within 
it.207 Among these included the fact that ‘Cundinamarca did not provide [the company] a single 
inch of land’. They argued rights to the levy had been transferred to the national government, 
‘which it had subsequently waived in return for shares [in the CCRC subsidiary]’.208 This 
decision was ill-conceived. They had formally acknowledged that the national government had 
initially had a legitimate right to levy their income. This recognition allowed them to politicise 
subsequent disputes to assist efforts to nationalise the railway. The national government could 
now justify charging decades of accumulated charges by repudiating the 1906 agreement which 
had ceded the levy in exchange for CCRC shares. All they required was a pretext to do so. 
This pretext was established by 1921 when the national government launched litigation on the 
basis that the 1906 agreement was never fulfilled. This followed a period of heightened tensions 
between the local population and foreign railway companies, which saw CNoRC workers on 
strike, as well as on those of the CNRC and the Colombian Southern Railway.209 In support of 
this contention, the government’s ‘expert’ witness Gabriel Abada testified that the CCRC’s 
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ordinary shares did not provide ‘real tangible [ownership] rights’.210 The comment seems 
perplexing, since the 27% stake the shares conferred had already been used to enforce 
nationalisation. After completion of the 1906 agreement, the Colombian supreme court 
announced that ‘in view of the public deed … the matter is declared settled’.211 An almost 
identical statement was made by the government of Tolima regarding their similar dispute with 
the DRC, which as chapter six details, was also subsequently repudiated.212 Following the 
bankruptcy proceedings and nationalisation of the CCRC, the national government declared 
once again on the 21 August 1915 that ‘all matters between the Government, the company and 
creditors … are settled’.213 Another pretext for the repudiation of the 1906 agreement was that 
according to the national government the CNoRC had violated Ley 62 de 1887, by constructing 
the railway on top of the Camino del Norte colonial mule trail between Chapinero and Puente 
del Común.214 But the government had specifically authorised the use of this right of way in 
both Ley 104 de 1892 and Ley 66 de 1894. 215 The CNoRC was also alleged to have received 
subvention bonds for 70km of track whilst only providing 47km.216 But in both cases, the issue 
had been ignored for over two decades, only being pursued when it became politically 
expedient to do so. Repudiation and inconsistency towards contracts was not new. However, 
the CNoRC’s experience illustrates clearly how by the early 1920s, the full force of the 
legislative body of the Colombian state had been mobilised against British railways, with the 
sole intention of nationalising them. 
                                                             
210  República de Colombia, La nación contra The Colombian Northern, pp. 84-92, 97. 
211  Arango to Board of Directors of CNoRC, 2 October 1921, TNA, FO135/458, p. 3. 
212  Velez to Minister of Public Works, 23 January 1906, TNA, FO 135/473. 
213  Arango to Board of Directors of CNoRC, 2 October 1921, TNA, FO135/458, p. 4; Diario Official, No. 
15716, 11 February 1916. 
214  República de Colombia, La nación contra The Colombian Northern, p. 30; Ley 62 of 1887: 
http://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?id=1615022 accessed 17/12/2017 
215  Arango to Board of Directors of CNoRC, 2 October 1921, TNA, FO135/458, p. 1. 
216  República de Colombia, La nación contra The Colombian Northern Railway Company Limited (Bogotá: 
Imprenta Nacional, 1922), p. 30. 
142 
 
The 1921 case demanded retroactive annulment of the contracts of 1892, 1897, 1905, and 1915, 
which had repeatedly relinquished the contractual rights upon which the case rested.217 The 
national government’s claims for damages were as follows: 
Table 3.2 – Claims of the national government for damages from the CNoRC relating to 
receipt of subvention bonds for 23km of track which were not constructed. 
Item Colombian Pesos Pounds Sterling 
23km of Subvention bonds $345,000 £71,134 
7% interest received on bonds $43,791.82 £9,029 
Total received through deception $388,791.82 £80,163 
18% Interest January 1893 to December 1921 $2,029,493.08 £418, 452 
Total $2,447,444.28 £498,615 
Source: República de Colombia, La nación contra The Colombian Northern ,  p. 32. 
Table 3.3 – Claims of the national government for damages from the CNoRC relating to 
occupying the camino del norte mule trail, 1921. 
Item Colombian Pesos Pounds Sterling 
Value of the land occupied by the railway $119,728.62 £ 24,686 
Use of the public highway Chapinero-Puente 
del Común 
$311,876.16 £64,304 
Total $431,604.78 £88,990 
Source: República de Colombia, La nación contra The Colombian Northern, pp. 32-3. 
Table 3.4 – Claims of the national government for damages from the CNoRC relating to the 
‘tax’ on net receipts, 1924.218 
Item Colombian Pesos Pounds Sterling 
5% of net receipts first twenty years (1897-
1916) 
$158,133.55 £ 32,605 
10% of net receipts for remainder (1916-22) $212,312.14 £ 43,776 
Total $370,445.69 £ 76,381 
Source: República de Colombia, Los bienes ocultos de la nación en la Empresa del Ferrocarril del Norte 
(Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1924), p. 138 
These items represented a combined total of £663,986, which was many times the CNoRC’s 
nominal share capital of £150,000.219 In December 1923, the Colombian supreme court – which 
in 1906 had declared the matter ‘settled’ – ordered the CNoRC to pay almost three decades 
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worth of the levy, as well as the additional items listed in tables 3.2 and 3.3.220 Despite the 
CNoRC’s high levels of profitability, it was not in a position to pay a sum of this magnitude, 
and the national government had finally established the leverage they required to enforce 
nationalisation. As a result, in July 1924, CNoRC director Carlos Dávila proposed a sale price 
of $4,000,000 (£824,742). Although this was significantly more than the total capitalisation of 
£433,380, it illustrates how the CNoRC’s management were finally becoming receptive to the 
idea of nationalisation. As such, the national government’s deliberate strategy towards British 
railways, of making life so difficult they would willingly embrace nationalisation, had once 
again proved successful.221 
On the 4 May 1925, President Pedro Nel Ospina Vázquez issued an unexpected resolution 
declaring that the concession had been ‘terminated’, giving the CNoRC thirty days to hand 
over the railway, and on the 14 July, the ‘railway was in effect taken over’ by the national 
government. 222 When the railway – which was providing a return of 35% on share capital – 
was expropriated, the national press was said to have responded with ‘patriotic acclamation’.223 
El Tiempo declared the expropriation was the only reaction ‘compatible with our sovereignty 
and dignity’.224 When the Foreign Office provided diplomatic support, El Espectador warned 
that the British would do well to remember that ‘Colombia was a friend, … not a Colony, of 
Great Britain’.225 Meanwhile, The Times felt that expropriation had ‘ruined Colombia’s 
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225  Quoted in Seeds (Minister Resident) to Chamberlain (Foreign Secretary), 14 July 1925, TNA, 
FO135/460, (date and details of publication unclear). 
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credit’.226 By November the tone had changed somewhat, with the press displaying concern for 
the long-term consequences. El Nuevo Tiempo asked whether ‘the grave case’ would result in 
‘a lamentable international incident’.227 This increased in February 1926, when they learned 
the CNoRC’s £1,262,063 claim for compensation – based on a valuation elaborated by Duncan 
Allwork & Co accountants – had the support of the Foreign Office.228 The dispute was now in 
deadlock: the CNoRC feared losing the concession without compensation, and the national 
government feared an international incident like the Punchard-McTaggart litigation which 
would prejudice its credit overseas. A compromise was the obvious solution, and on the 26 
November 1926 CNoRC director E. A. Green and Colombian representative Alejandro López 
mutually agreed to nationalise the railway for £500,000.229 The government’s administrative 
seizure of the railway had forced the CNoRC into bankruptcy proceedings, and on the 24 March 
1927, the agreement for nationalisation was approved by the bankruptcy tribunal in England, 
and then ratified by the Colombian congress on the 27 November 1927.230 The managing 
director Carlos Davila was unhappy with the level of compensation offered, but conceded ‘it 
was probably the best that could be done’.231 
The Colombian government’s strategy of enforcing nationalisation by financially crippling 
British railways with extended negotiations or litigation was highly effective. The CNoRC’s 
experience illustrates that Colombian policy was the opposite of that followed by Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico during their period of rapid railway expansion, where national policy had 
focussed on ensuring the expansion of foreign-owned railways. In post-1909 Colombia, 
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national policy was focussed on ending expansion, and nationalising existing railways. This 
was a deliberate policy. It was not a failure, and Colombia was not a victim. It was a simple 
choice on the part of Colombia’s economic and political elite. This choice was determined by 
weighing up the economic benefits – which they continued to fundamentally believe the 
railway provided – as opposed to the threat to national sovereignty. The divide between 
Colombia and these countries was not its economy, terrain, or internal finances. The main 
factor was that its political and economic elite prioritised maintaining national sovereignty over 
economic development, and all political policy was moulded to serve this purpose. 
3.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has provided some important and wide-ranging conclusions which brings into 
question almost seventy-five years of orthodoxy within Colombian railway historiography. It 
has shown that Deas’s dismissal of the relevance of British railways within Colombian history 
as ‘few and short’ is ill conceived.232 As Miller pointed out, ‘what looked marginal to the 
British could be central to a small Latin American country’.233 Palacios argues the failure of 
Santander to complete a rail link to the Magdalena River, permanently transformed economic 
and political power dynamics in Colombia.234 The collapse of the GNCRC was central to one 
of the most important events in early twentieth century Colombian economic history: the fall 
of Santander and rise of Antioquia and Caldas. Until this thesis, the central role of the GNCRC 
in this process had never been acknowledged. British railways were not only relevant, but in 
fact central to early twentieth century Colombian political and economic history. 
In view of the material presented, the current within Colombian historiography, which 
discounts the importance of railways and criticises their inefficiency, seems highly 
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questionable.235 The GNCRC and CNoRC demonstrate that lack of expansion was dictated 
primarily by political and institutional factors, rather than geography. Correspondence shows 
management was unfazed by geography, which had a technical solution: their preoccupation 
was national politics. Company accounts demonstrate the CNoRC was highly profitable and 
could support the heightened capital requirements of Colombian geography. The same political 
and institutional factors which Cain and Hopkins, Summerhill, Lewis, Miller, and Garner argue 
enabled large-scale investment in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, are shown to have 
enabled similar progress in Colombia during the Quinquenio.236 The chapter illustrates how 
the Quinquenian transformation of Colombia’s credit overseas enabled a stream of investment, 
which was ended by the abrupt change in political ideology towards foreign railways. The 
GNCRC bond dispute demonstrates how these positive macro-level developments were 
undermined by micro-level interactions. The context provided throughout has shown that 
Correa’s, Ortega’s, and Pérez Ángel’s criticisms of the GNCRC’s construction performance, 
whilst understandable considering their source base, are ultimately generalisations of a much 
more complex story.237 In addition, the CNoRC and the GNCRC concessions demonstrate that 
Ramírez’s criticism of the concession system in her ground-breaking study of the history of 
Colombian transportation infrastructure misses an important factor. She argues that, ‘due to 
deficiencies in the elaboration of contracts the system had little success’, which is largely true, 
but attributes this failure to ‘excessively favourable conditions for concession holders’.238 
Whilst this was certainly true for concession holders under the Regeneración subvention 
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system, the opposite was the case for the later beneficiaries of Quinquenian contracts. Ramírez 
argues that ‘breaches, modifications and recurrent cancelations of contracts, resulted in 
financial losses for the country’.239 This statement is correct, but Ramírez, Correa, and Ortega 
blame the concession holders for these eventualities.240 The histories of the CNoRC and the 
GNCRC show a litany of renegotiations, breaches of contract, and contractual repudiations; all 
interrelated with the political desire to nationalise the enterprises. These events and their 
negative impact on railway development were a direct result of the actions of the national 
authorities. 
Santiago Pérez Triana’s successful opposition to the GNCRC and wider guarantee system, 
demonstrates that local elites exhibited significant agency. Colombian elites – even those which 
Robinson and Gallagher would classify as ‘collaborating elites’ – were not subservient to 
British interests.241 This is contradictory to the historiographical tendency identified by Brown 
to paint the Latin American region as one of perpetual victimhood or failure.242 The lack of 
railway expansion of the ‘northern railway’ should thus not be understood as a failure, but 
rather as a conscious choice. Men like Pérez Triana were not content to cede the economic 
destiny of Colombia to foreign investors and financiers. They were determined that the country 
should forge its own path. In addition, Dávila’s involvement in the CNoRC illustrates that at 
times ‘collaborating elites’ played the role of main protagonist rather than a supporting act. The 
contrast between the story of the CNoRC and the GNCRC suggests that British businessmen 
were ill-equipped to succeed in the Colombian economic environment, which varied so 
drastically compared with Britain and the formal empire. The relative stability of contractual 
law which the British were accustomed to operating under simply did not exist in Colombia 
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outside of the short-lived Quinquenio regime. In order to succeed they required either a largely 
subordinate and receptive elite which ‘publicly defended the British enterprises’ as Wright 
describes in pre-1914 Argentina, or a caudillo strongman to enact ‘legislative protection of 
property rights’ as described by Garner.243 The history of the CNoRC shows that monopolies 
created by the subvention system stimulated a heavy concentration of ownership: highly 
profitable lines were controlled by a small group of investors. Just as Lewis argues was the 
case in Brazil, the high levels of profitability demotivated shareholders to expand these lines.244 
Under these circumstances, a government guarantee was indispensable to entice investment 
and ensure expansion. The defeat of the guarantee system was thus influential in the country’s 
economic development. The Zipaquirá-Chiquinquirá expansion and Puerto Wilches-
Bucaramanga railway were not completed until 1928 and 1941.245 Based on Quinquenian 
construction rates, had flows of capital continued, these sections could have been completed 
with ease by 1914.246 Indeed, within this vein, Bayona and Niño argue that ‘it is clear that if 
the [bond dispute] difficulties could have been rectified the GNCRC would have reached 
Bucaramanga by the end of the 1920s’.247 Because Colombia chose to forgo British investment, 
it would have to wait until it 1920s to construct its railway network, when North American 
capital became available. By this point the utility of railways was questionable, since they were 
already being superseded by automobiles and air travel. As Meisel, Ramírez, and Jaramillo 
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argue, this meant whilst the railways were profitable, they ultimately came too late to be of 
substantial economic benefit to the country.248 
 
                                                             



































Chapter 4. - The Colombian National Railway Company 
4.1 Introduction 
Is it in the nation’s interests, that on top of the heavy burden of paying interest on the fourth 
mortgage bonds, it should continue making loans to the company to pay interest on the first 
and second mortgage bonds? … Colombia should not pay a penny more for this objective. 
Francisco Montaña, Lawyer of the Ministry of Public Works, 1910.1 
 
Francisco Montaña’s criticisms of the CNRC’s guarantee were influenced by two factors. The 
first was the growing nationalistic wave which was explored in the last chapter. The second 
was the increasingly dire finances of the railway, and the financial strain it applied to the 
national treasury. I argue the CNRC’s finances were negatively influenced by the civil war, 
and the clumsy business interaction of Henry Jenks in the first years following its floatation. 
This reaffirms what Meisel and Torres have argued: that the financial impact of the war was 
enormous.2 I also argue that the CNRC shared a dual relationship with the rising economic 
nationalism of the post-Quinquenio period. On one level, the CNRC suffered (as other railways 
did) from the increasingly hostile atmosphere which developed. On another level, the CNRC’s 
poor financial performance, the Jenkses’ interactions with local political actors, and an 
association with accusations of corruption and rent-seeking surrounding the ‘Apulo works’, 
created negative associations attached to the foreign railway companies and the guarantee 
system, accentuating the growing nationalistic reaction to foreign capital. As such, the CNRC 
played an integral role in the development of the nationalistic reaction which was explored in 
the last chapter. 
I argue that the implementation of the government guarantee encouraged investment from what 
I term middle-class capitalists, which limited the concentrated ownership pattern visible in 
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other British railway companies. Elsewhere in the interior, this pattern resulted in control by a 
small group of wealthy ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ and national capitalists. As is demonstrated in 
chapter five, on the coast this same process resulted in railways serving the interests of 
‘transnational capitalists’. The CNRC’s history reaffirms the strength of agency exhibited by 
Colombian elites, which in contrast to the passive and compliant Argentine elite described by 
Wright, dictated the terms of the collaborative relationship, and directed capital and technology 
to serve their own interests.3 I illustrate that the strength of this local agency was often 
detrimental to British interests, because British businessmen were generally unprepared to 
operate under what Safford terms Colombia’s ‘catch-as-catch-can’ national business culture.4 
This was a fundamentally cutthroat environment with endemic contractual instability and little 
respect for property rights. Cain and Hopkins argue that British economic imperialism in Latin 
America depended on consent, and the adoption of a specific type of political economy.5 This 
political economy, which counteracted wider Colombian business culture, was fundamental to 
the success of British enterprise, and was enthusiastically embraced during the Quinquenio. I 
argue that in Colombia, in order to succeed, ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ had to shed their 
gentlemanly ethos and embrace the national business culture. As such, the CNRC illustrates 
that in Colombia, British imperialism based on ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ was not possible 
without a caudillo style strongman to impose the institutional environment necessary for 
British business culture to operate. 
4.2 Origins 
4.2.1 Javier Cisneros, hacendados and international trading families 
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5  Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, I, pp. 276-315. 
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The Colombian elite spent the nineteenth century engaged in experimental ‘speculative 
production’ of an array of tropical export crops, all of which failed after a brief period of 
success, before finally finding coffee to be the perfect export commodity for the economic 
conditions of the interior.6 The construction of the Giradot (later CNRC) railway was part of a 
wider process identified by McGreevy, in which ‘coffee railways’ consolidated coffee 
exportation as the central component of the Colombian economy.7 In the 1870s, a scheme to 
construct a railway which would traverse the regions of Cundinarca, Boyacá, and Santander, 
before joining the river at Carare, captured the imagination of influential members of the 
economic and political elite.8 Fierce opposition to this plan materialised from members of the 
emerging class Palacios defines as hacendados.9 Palacios describes the hacendado as a man of 
‘progress’, which meant ‘better roads, cheap railways, and free exports’. 10 They share much in 
common with the seventeenth century ‘planter’ class of the British Caribbean described by 
Dunn.11 Like the planters, they dominated the politics and economy of the local environment, 
and crucially, saw themselves as belonging culturally and socially to European civilisation, 
which they sought to ‘impose’ on the interior ‘through growing coffee’.12 Members of this class 
such as the Camacho Roldáns established coffee cultivation in the region of Cundinamarca 
from the 1870s onwards. They agitated for the construction of regional railways providing 
individual connections to the Magdalena River.13 The debate regarding the implementation of 
national or regional railways, was a manifestation of the wider struggle between regionalism 
and centrism identified by Safford and Palacios.14 Unsurprisingly, the concept of linking 
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Bogotá with the Magdalena River evolved to serve the hacendados’ interests, integrating a 
route which traversed the coffee growing region. Fig. 4.1 illustrates that this route did not serve 
the wider requirements of the region. River navigation to Girardot was blocked by a series of 
rapids close to Honda. As a result, an entirely separate railway (the DRC) needed to be built 
between La Dorada and Honda, to link the upper and lower stretches of the river. Instead of a 
single railway linking Bogotá with the lower stretch of the river, a fragmented system of two 
























Fig. 4.1 – Map showing the CNRC (black and winding) the DRC (red) and the DRC ropeway 
(black and straight) routes 
 
Source: Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Box 1693, ‘Dorada Railway Prospectus’ in Dorada 
Railway Company Report for F/Y 1921-22. 
In 1881, the Cuban-born engineer Javier Cisneros was awarded a concession contract for a 
28km railway between the town of Tocaima in the coffee growing region, and the river port of 
Girardot.15 Cisneros represents a reconciliation of ‘Latin America’s … own reality’ and 
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international capitalism.16 Horna describes Javier Cisneros as a ‘Latin American version of … 
Andrew Carnegie, Cornelius Vanderbilt and J. P. Morgan’ stressing his contrast to men like 
Minor Keith, who whilst sharing his international business interests, were ‘only Anglo-
American adventurers’.17 Cisneros’ success depended on ‘extensive financial connections in 
Colombia and abroad’.18 He lived his life across borders, straddling the colliding worlds of 
emerging national and transnational capitalism, acting as a bridge between ‘gentlemanly 
capitalists’ in the city of London, and the emerging capitalist class in Colombia. He also 
brought international engineering expertise which allowed him to succeed where ‘everyone 
else had failed’.19 Cisneros’s technical and entrepreneurial talent led to him to become the most 
influential figure in nineteenth century Colombian transportation development. 
As Palacios, Bejarano, and McGreevy all demonstrate, coffee created vast economic power, 
which in turn created immense political capital.20 The hacendados and international trading 
families who shared close relationships with Cisneros, used this political capital to assure the 
construction of a direct railway connection for their businesses, which reached Tocaima on the 
edge of the coffee producing region in May 1883. In 1910 the Foreign Office put the costs of 
construction of the 39km section of railway as far as Juntas de Apulo as $950,000, which would 
represent approximately $850,000 for the 35km constructed by Cisneros.21 Railway 
construction was funded by the same subvention system as the CNoRC, from which Cisneros 
received $445,142.22 As such, they successfully co-opted foreign expertise and the national 
treasury to build their railway, significantly limiting their own capital investment requirement.  
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There was another related and overlapping group with direct interests in the railway: the 
Colombian merchant class. As Darwin argues, in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Peru, much 
of the international trade was controlled by British merchant houses.23 In Colombia, their 
influence was limited to ‘one British firm … operating … at Barranquilla’, without any 
operating in Bogotá, Medellin or Cartagena.24 As a result, the economic niche was filled by 
this national merchant class. Many were also hacendados, since they held direct interests in the 
production of coffee; some focussed exclusively on transportation and the sale of export crops 
in international trading centres. To fulfil this role, families needed to internationalise 
themselves. This process is described well by Rausch in her biography of Santiago Pérez 
Triana. When Pérez Triana arrived in New York, he took a position at the trading house of the 
influential hacendado Camacho Roldán family. He subsequently went into business with a 
member of the Koppel family (influential in the BRPC) resident in New York. 25 The 
construction of the Girardot railway allowed these national capitalists to control the production, 
transportation, and international commerce of Cundinamarcan coffee: a business which did not 
end at the Colombian frontier but operated across borders. They consolidated a transnational 
business in much the same way as the UFC. Colombian hacendados and merchants were not 
powerless pawns of international capitalism: they played an integral role in its construction, 
and they co-opted new technologies to do so. This subsection has illustrated the importance of 
Latin American political actors in the development of the railway, and the interconnected 
interests with the development of the international coffee trade. The next subsection contrasts 
this influential and efficient local agency, with the clumsy entrance of ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ 
and British railway ‘imperialism’ into Cundinamarca with the establishment of the CNRC.  
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4.2.2 Origins of the Colombian National Railway Company - Henry Jenks, 1899-1903 
With the completion of the ‘coffee railway’, the hacendados achieved their aims and the project 
lost political impetus. 26 Between May 1883, when the railway reached the edge of the coffee 
zone, and October 1899, when the CNRC took over the construction project, only 22km were 
added to the original 28km.27 7km of these were constructed by Cisneros, meaning only 15km 
were constructed by the interim national administration.28 Henry Jenks purchased the railway 
from Juan Bautista Mainero y Trucco on the 30 October 1899, after the war had started, but 
‘before the news of a revolution … was published in England’.29  By the time Henry Jenks 
became aware of the situation in Colombia, he had already raised £600,000 of 6% debentures 
mortgaged against the railway.30 Little is known of Henry Jenks’s life: his only entry into the 
historical record came with his involvement with the CNRC. His son Shirley became 
increasingly influential in the family’s interests in Colombia over the next decade, and we know 
significantly more about him. Shirley was born in 1881 and was educated as an English 
gentleman at Shrewsbury School.31 As fig. 4.2 illustrates, Shirley lived the typical life of a 
‘gentlemanly capitalist’, splitting his time between the city and a manor house in the south of 
England. The family’s wealth was less than the ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ of the DRC (analysed 
in chapter six), but the way Shirley chose to emulate the life of the landed gentry, fits Cain and 
Hopkins’ definition perfectly.32 
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Fig. 4.2 - Shirley Hatton Jenks’ place of residence, Pilsdon Manor, Dorset 
Sources: Evidence of Shirley Jenks’ place of residence: ‘Deeds and abstract re Barrow Hedges Estate, 
Carshalton’ London Borough of Sutton Archives, LG6/8/7/6-12, 
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/b896f94e-5bcf-4f50-9c65-2c8514a13007 accessed 
06/01/2018, Image of Pilsdon Manor: http://www.dorsetlife.co.uk/2012/04/pilsdon-manor-and-community/ 
accessed 06/01/2018. Photographer: George Olney https://www.georgeolney.co.uk/index
Henry Jenks exhibited the same naivety as Fletcher Toomer of the GNCRC, further justifying 
the argument that British businessmen were generally unequipped to operate in the 
unpredictable Colombian environment. Jenks’s decision to immediately raise the 6% 
debentures in London, was particularly ill-conceived, and significantly influenced the CNRC’s 
finances. Jenks was hoodwinked by the previous concession holder Mainero, who is presented 
by Luis Fernando Molina Lodoño as an extremely astute, knowledgeable, and aggressive 
entrepreneur with business interests throughout the country.33 Jenks seems to have based the 
purchase entirely on information available in the London financial press, since even a cursory 
communication with the Foreign Office’s representatives in Colombia, would have provided 
enough local knowledge to rethink his strategy. Indeed, after the war Jenks himself 
acknowledged that by the middle of 1899, ‘evident signs of a forthcoming revolution were 
33 Molina, Empresarios Colombianos, pp. 74-114. 
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noticeable’.34 The war delayed construction works for three years and seven months, during 
which interest was payable on the debentures. By the time works resumed, cumulative interest 
payments represented 21.5% of the nominal debt.35 Contemporary representations in Colombia 
of the Jenkses as master manipulators and agents of British imperialism seem contradictory to 
their experience with the CNRC. The Foreign Office simply viewed Henry Jenks as a naïve 
and imprudent businessman who had lost himself a great deal of money: ‘this has certainly 
been a most unfortunate venture for him … [the railway] has been mostly in the hands of the 
revolutionists during the whole war … one cannot but feel sorry for him’.36 
Following the war Henry Jenks launched a claim for compensation. In a letter to the local 
manager George Odell, he commented: 
I note that you have some hesitation in handing the claims of the Company to the Government. I 
can quite understand it and no doubt the Government will be disposed to discount it, but that will 
not affect the justice of it. It is either a just claim, or it is not a just claim; my view and that of the 
directors is that it is a just claim.37 
Jenks focussed on the concept of ‘justice’, much like Fletcher Toomer (GNCRC). Jenks’s 
concept of ‘justice’ was simply a description of normal business interactions in his home 
country. Jenks and Fletcher Toomer expected that the Colombian government would abide by 
the ‘rules of the game’ of international business transactions, and as such, respect agreements 
and contractual responsibilities. Jenks felt that since the concession contract stated that the 
national government was obliged to provide ‘any police or military force necessary for the 
safety of persons or property at any part of the line’, their inability to do so required financial 
compensation.38 But as was illustrated clearly in the previous chapter, Colombian governments 
                                                             
34  ‘Claim of the Colombian National Railway, Limited against the Government of the Republic’ TNA, 
FO55/415, f. 236. 
35  ‘Claim of the Colombian National Railway Company, Limited’ TNA, FO55/415, f 244. 
36  Welby (Minister Resident) to Larcom (Head of American Department), 30 September 1903, TNA, 
FO55/415, f. 229; ‘Ferrocarril de Santa Marta – La Prórroga del Contrato Peligros de Soberania’ El 
Tiempo, 11 January 1912; Rafael Villamizar, Negocios Colombianos. 
37  Jenks to Odell, 15 July 1903, TNA, FO55/415, ff. 231. 
38  ‘Claim of the Colombian National Railway Company, Limited’, TNA, FO55/415, f 236. 
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seldom honoured contractual obligations of this kind, and certainly felt no need to provide 
‘justice’ in cases where they had failed to do so.  
Table 4.1 – Henry Jenks’s claim for compensation. 
Item Value 
6% interest on first debenture issuance of £200,000 £43,000 
6% interest on first debenture issuance of £400,000 £86,000 
5% interest on share capital £80,163 
6% interest on contractor’s plant and materials  £418, 452 
Depreciation of contractor’s plant and materials £498,615 
Salaries £18,250 
Destruction of railway property £3,350 
Damage to railway track £1,000 
Destruction of company telegraph line and property £275 
Damage to stations and warehouses £175 
Expropriation of goods £392 
Theft of animals £311 
Damage to rolling stock £845 
Damage to construction works £500 
Destruction of the railway’s archives £1,000 
Total £333,548 
Source: ‘Claim of the Colombian National Railway Company, Limited’ TNA, FO55/415, f 244. 
As is evident in table 4.1, many items claimed by Jenks were a result of his own questionable 
decisions, rather than the government’s liability. In this regard, Minister Resident and Consul-
General George Welby argued that the only ‘sound items for compensation … amount to 
£7,348’.39 Welby feared that if submitted, the claim would create an association between the 
CNRC and the recent and traumatic Punchard-McTaggart case, and as such, ‘fill … [the] 
government with mistrust … [of] all connected with [Jenks] and his company’.40 As a result of 
his local knowledge, Odell also seems to have understood the claim was futile, but their advice 
fell on deaf ears. On some level, Jenks seems to have understood that the claim may not be 
received well:  ‘I quite see that a claim of such magnitude might come as a sort of bombshell 
                                                             
39  Welby (Minister Resident) to Larcom (Head of American Department), 30 September 1903, TNA, 
FO55/415 f. 229 
40  Welby (Minister Resident) to Larcom (Head of American Department), 30 September 1903, TNA, 
FO55/415 f. 230. 
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upon the government, and make them at first very angry’.41 But these rational thoughts were 
overwhelmed by his desire to seek ‘justice’. Jenks also felt that the claim would exert ‘pressure’ 
on the national government, ‘to get what we have asked for in the concession of the port of 
Buenaventura, the Cali railway, the railway bridge over the Magdalena and the Sabana 
railway’.42 Jenks and his ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ associates were uninterested in a local 
transport monopoly in the interior, because unlike the hacendados, international trading 
families, or the transnational capitalists explored in the next chapter, they had no existing local 
business interests which would economically benefit from the railway. Their aim was to secure 
a concession for a single railway from Bogotá to Buenaventura, opening what Posada terms 
the ‘Pacific route’. 43 
In view of his actions, the negative view of Jenks is understandable. But like the investors of 
the CNoRC subsidiary CCRC, or the GNCRC, Jenks lost a lot of money through his early 
involvement in the CNRC. His claims for compensation are the type Pérez Ángel and Ramírez 
consider impeded railway construction in Colombia, for which they blame foreign concession 
holders such as Jenks.44 Jenks’s and Fletcher Toomer’s (GNCRC) experiences clearly highlight 
that many of these disputes were instigated by the national government’s actions, whether it be 
failing to fulfil their contractual obligations to protect the infrastructure or reneging on previous 
agreements. The civil war which influenced the CNRC and the rapid change of government 
policy after 1909, were both a result of the instability of Colombian politics. In both cases, this 
instability was detrimental to the experiences of the railway companies, and the British 
businessmen connected to them. 
 
                                                             
41  Jenks to Odell (General Manager), 15 July 1903, TNA, FO55/415, ff. 231. 
42  Jenks to Odell (General Manager), 15 July 1903, TNA, FO55/415, ff. 231. 
43  Posada, The Colombian Caribbean, p. 160. 
44  Pérez Ángel, Nos Dejó el Tren, p. 46; Ramírez, ‘Los ferrocarriles’ in La infraestructura, p. 48. 
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4.3 Crises, 1899-1904 
4.3.1 Bipartisan Abuses during the War of a Thousand Days 
The CNRC was affected significantly by the War of a Thousand Days: it was at the very 
epicentre of the revolution and the railway and river terminal were ‘a constant scene of 
fighting’.45 As such, the railway’s experience contradicts Palacios’s argument that Colombia’s 
transportation infrastructure was not systematically targeted during the war.46 The conflict led 
to wholesale destruction of CNRC property, as well as an incredibly unstable environment. The 
local general manager George Odell commented that ‘abuses and destruction’ had been 
committed by ‘both the government and the rebels … for … two and a half years’.47 These 
included: ‘wooden bridges … repeatedly burnt and destroyed’, ‘locomotives … dismantled of 
the most important parts … rendering them useless’, ‘the telegraph line … destroyed’, the 
frequent robbery of the railway’s general stores, warehouses, and stations; and finally, the 
requisition of all the animals from the railway’s coal mines at Tocaima, resulting in their 
closure. This all left Odell feeling ‘helpless to save the Railway Company property from total 
destruction’.48  
Crucially, this abuse was bipartisan. One letter tells of liberal guerrillas storming the company’s 
warehouses and seizing the goods of various patrons: ‘in rushed the whole gang of troops’, 
who became ‘very ugly and were ready to commit any act’.49 Another discussed how the 
conservative government’s own troops forced their way into the warehouse at San Joaquin, on 
the premise of searching for guerrilla weapons. Odell felt the troops had arrived ‘with the evil 
intention of ransacking the place’, since they proceeded to take provisions and ‘all of the … 
                                                             
45  ‘Claim of the Colombian National Railway Company, Limited’, TNA, FO55/415, f. 236. 
46  Palacios, Between Legitimacy, p. 41. 
47  Odell to Mallet, 25 August 1902, TNA, FO 135/269. 
48  Odell to Mallet, 25 August 1902, TNA, FO 135/269. 
49  West to Odell, 23 January 1902, TNA, FO135/269. 
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[CNRC’s] animals’. Odell lamented that ‘instead of receiving the protection from government 
troops … we have to contend with abuses’. He felt these would ‘soon end in the entire ruin of 
the “Ferrocarril de Girardot” enterprise’. 50 The CNRC had the worse possible start, not only 
was construction delayed, but existing infrastructure was destroyed. These factors would have 
significant ramifications for the CNRC’s finances as time progressed, which are analysed in 
detail later in the chapter. 
4.3.2 Contractual Disputes: Corruption and Fraud 
A common thread running through this thesis, are the constant legal disputes between foreign 
concession holders, local political actors, and the local/national government. In this regard the 
CNRC’s experience was much the same. The previous concession holder Juan Bautista 
Mainero y Trucco and his close associate Ramón Jimeno displayed the same predatory business 
practices as Juan Manuel Dávila (CNoRC).51 This led to a dispute involving both the Foreign 
Office and the Ministry of Hacienda. The idea that the experience of foreign Businessmen in 
Colombia was different to those in the wider region is not a new concept. Safford argued that 
in Colombia ‘native entrepreneurs matched foreign innovators’, and that British and Americans 
struggled with the ‘catch-as-catch-can’ national business culture, leading to frequent failure of 
their business enterprises.52 However, what is new, is how this same phenomenon significantly 
influenced the development of the national railway network. Despite having identified the 
phenomenon within the wider business history of Colombia, Safford has largely overlooked it 
within his own work on Colombian railway history.53 Where these interactions were influential 
                                                             
50  Odell to Minister of Hacienda, 3 September 1902, TNA, FO135/269. 
51  Jimeno was one of the original concession holders of the Barranquilla Railway. 
52  Safford, ‘Foreign and National Enterprise’, pp. 503, 513. 
53  Safford, ‘El problema de los transportes’, pp. 555-67. 
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to the outcome of a project, national historiography has generally tended to attribute them to 
the concession holder, overlooking the agency of local political actors.54 
The CNRC’s dispute with Mainero highlights the significance of this phenomenon in the 
railway sector. Although Mainero was born in Italy, and ‘never acquired Colombian 
citizenship’, Molina argues that ‘his formation as a businessman in Cartagena, as well as his 
mentality … justifies being treated as a Colombian businessman’.55 Whereas Dávila used a 
monetary crisis to evade payment of debt incurred in Paris, Mainero took advantage of the 
chaos of the civil war to appropriate subsidy bonds, which he received seven months after the 
railway had been transferred over to the CNRC.56 The subsidy bonds were worth $100,000 of 
gold backed pesos, or the equivalent of £20,000.57 Mainero’s associate Jimeno obtained the 
bonds in May, yet ‘did not inform …[the company] until … July’.58 He agreed to hand over 
$60,000 of the bonds after pressure from the company engineer Mr Gibney, but transferred the 
remaining $40,000 (approx. £8,000) to Mainero.59 At the turn of the century, these were large 
sums, especially in the Colombian interior. The case led to the CNRC launching formal protests 
with both the Foreign Office and the Minister of Hacienda.60 Mainero refused to return the final 
$40,000 of bonds, arguing that they were owed to him as per the contract.61 To a Colombian 
businessman, these actions would have come as no surprise, because Mainero was notorious 
for legal disputes relating to his business interests. During his time on the coast, Mainero was 
said to have ‘fought with half the city’, and in Antioquia, he led ‘many famous legal cases’.62 
The CNRC argued in a letter to the Minister of Hacienda, that the concession contract ‘quite 
                                                             
54  Ramírez, ‘Los ferrocarriles’ in La infraestructura, p. 48; Correa, Café y ferrocarriles, pp. 76-7, 80; 
Ortega, Ferrocarriles Colombianos, p. 551; Pérez Angel, Nos dejó el tren. p. 46. 
55  Molina, Empresarios Colombianos, p. 75. 
56  Hodgson to Mainero y Trucco 23 February 1901, TNA, FO135/261. 
57  Ibid. 
58  Ibid. 
59  Ibid. 
60  Colombian National Railway to Ministro de Hacienda, 18 February 1901, TNA, FO135/261. 
61  Hodgson to Mainero y Trucco, 23 February 1901, TNA, FO135/261. 
62  Molina, Empresarios Colombianos, p. 84 
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clearly defined … that the Subsidy Bonds … were included in this purchase’, since it stated 
Mainero had ‘transferred all his rights, privileges, interests etc.’ in the railway. They included 
a copy of the contract to prove their point.63 The CNRC argued Mainero’s actions made it 
‘impossible to fulfil our obligations and agreement with our contractor for the construction and 
completion of the railway’.64 It is unclear whether the bonds were ever returned to the CNRC, 
because the issue does not appear in subsequent volumes of the Foreign Office archive. 
Nevertheless, the issue caused significant problems for the company during its first few years 
of operation. This combined with the ongoing civil war, made the first few years of the CNRC’s 
operation particularly difficult. 
4.4 Finances and Shareholders 
4.4.1 Finances 
The financial history of the CNRC is perplexing. From an operational perspective, it was a 
relatively profitable enterprise. Company profitability also developed rather rapidly, yet it 
entered bankruptcy just over two decades after being established. This subsection will illustrate 
that the main cause of this paradoxical situation, was Henry Jenks’s decision to purchase the 






                                                             
63  Colombian National Railway to Ministro de Hacienda, 18 February 1901, TNA, FO135/261. 
64  Ibid. 
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Table 4.2 - The Colombian National Railway Company Accounts F/Y 1909-1928 






















1909 £24,963 £27,476 (£2,513) £2,380,000 £29,600 -0.11% -£0.04 
1910 £61,672 £61,355 £317 £2,380,000 £88,800 0.01% -9.83% 
1911 £76,435 £58,554 £17,881 £2,380,000 £88,800 0.75% -7.88% 
1912 £100,034 £50,286 £49,748 £2,380,000 £88,800 2.09% -4.34% 
1913 £127,595 £56,751 £70,645 £2,380,000 £88,800 2.97% -2.02% 
1914 £123,634 £78,625 £45,009 £2,380,000 £88,800 1.89% -4.87% 
1915 £128,358 £66,796 £61,562 £2,380,000 £88,800 2.59% -3.03% 
1916 £144,647 £85,361 £59,286 £2,380,000 £88,800 2.49% -3.28% 
1917 £143,904 £86,919 £56,985 £2,380,000 £88,800 2.39% -3.54% 
1918 £150,470 £87,097 £63,373 £2,380,000 £88,800 2.66% -2.83% 
1919 £182,707 £91,715 £90,992 £2,380,000 £88,800 3.82% 0.24% 
1920 £252,975 £118,628 £134,347 £2,380,000 £88,800 5.64% 5.06% 
1921 £233,591 £150,900 £82,691 £2,380,000 £88,800 3.47% -0.68% 
1922 £235,467 £131,988 £103,479 £2,380,000 £88,800 4.35% 1.63% 
1923 £261,372 £148,559 £112,813 £2,380,000 £88,800 4.74% 2.67% 
1924 £266,545 £119,052 £147,493 £2,380,000 £88,800 6.20% 6.52% 
1925 £330,688 £146,050 £184,638 £2,380,000 £88,800 7.76% 10.65% 
1926 £342,928 £159,679 £183,249 £2,380,000 £88,800 7.70% 10.49% 
1927 £454,949 £237,505 £217,445 £2,380,000 £88,800 9.14% 14.29% 
1928 £507,726 £295,629 £212,097 £2,380,000 £88,800 8.91% 13.70% 
Sources: F/Y 1909/10-1921/22: Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Boxes 1115-6, 1167, 1217-8, 
1267, 1318-9, 1369-70, 1420-1, 1469, 1512, 1557, 1602, 1647, 1693. F/Y 1921/22-1928/29: Ferrocarril 
de Girardot: informe del gerente al Ministro de Obras Públicas correspondiente al año 1929 (Bogotá: 
Arboleba y Valencia, 1930). 
Fig. 4.3 illustrates clearly that within the context of Latin American railways, the overall 
financial performance of the railway was above average. Within a decade of completion, the 
CNRC reached parity with Edelstein’s 5.33% average rate of return for Latin American 
railways.65 By 1927, return on share capital (after debenture interest) reached 14.29%, and 
return on all capital reached 9.14%. Based on Edelstein’s figures, this represents 3.38 times the 
return on share capital, and 1.71 times the return on all invested capital of an average Latin 
American railway. It was also significantly higher than Davis and Huttenback’s 5.7% average 
                                                             
65  Edelstein, Overseas Investment, p. 125. 
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figure for overseas railways, and Lewis’s 6% figure for Argentine railways. The CNRC was 
thus significantly more profitable than the regional average, yet it faced bankruptcy by 1921/22. 
If all Latin American railways had been subjected the CNRC’s conditions, most would have 
shared its fate. As a case in point, in Mexico where the Porfiriato enabled such rapid railway 
expansion, Kuntz argues that railways were not even able to pay interest on bonds from their 
own income, let alone pay dividends to shareholders.66 This illustrates the exceptionalism of 
the Colombian environment. Historians have frequently attributed this exceptionalism to 
geography. This subsection argues that the exceptionalism of the CNRC’s experience was a 
legacy of the War of a Thousand Days. 
                                                             
66  Kuntz, ‘México’ in La expansión ferroviaria, p. 83. 
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Fig. 4.3 - Levels of share capital, interest bearing debentures, total capitalisation, return on 
share capital, and return on all invested capital of the CNRC – F/Y 1909 – F/Y 1928 
Source: See Table 4.2, Lewis, British Railways, pp. 217; Davis and Huttenback, Mammon, p. 107; Edelstein, 
Overseas Investment, p. 125.
The most significant impact of the war was that it increased the necessary time to become 
financially self-sufficient. £600,000 of debentures were raised in 1899. As is evident in fig. 4.4, 
operational profits did not rise above annual debenture interest until 1920. By this point, the 
company had incurred 20 years of interest on the £600,000 of debentures raised in 1899, and 
between 12 and 13 years on the £880,000 of debentures raised between 1908 and 1909. In total, 
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this amounted to £1,259,400, close to the £1,480,000 nominal value of these debts.67 These 
debentures were floated at discount, meaning during the life of the railway the CNRC likely 
expended more resources on interest payments than construction costs.68 A significant 
contributing factor, was the high interest rate applied to financial instruments connected to 
Colombia, linked to its history of repudiation. As was discussed in the previous chapter, like 
for like comparisons of company profitability are not possible because of a lack of detailed 
studies of individual British railway companies. Edelstein argues Latin American railways only 
provided an average return of 5.33%, Davis and Huttenback give a 5.7% average for overseas 
railways, and Lewis argues the return on Argentine railways ‘rarely exceeded 6 per cent, 
though the yield was usually substantially lower’.70 The 1908 debentures were floated at 80% 
and incurred 6% interest, representing an effective rate of 7.5%. The averages illustrate that 
this 7.5% effective interest rate would have made the majority of overseas railways 
economically unviable. If all British overseas railway companies had to operate under the 
conditions experienced by the CNRC relatively few would have been successful whether in 
Latin America or elsewhere in the world. 
                                                             
67  20 years 6% interest on £600,000 = £720,000. 13 years 6% interest on £430,000 = £335,400. 12 years 
6% interest on £450,000 = £324,000. This means a total of £1,259,400. 
68  Republic of Colombia, Colombian National Railway (1908) Customs Guaranteed 6% Debentures’, The 
Times, 26 October 1908 
70  Edelstein, Overseas Investment, p. 125; Lewis, British Railways, p. 217; Davis and Huttenback, 
Mammon, p. 107. 
171 
 
Fig. 4.4 – Operational profit/loss and debenture interest of the CNRC F/Y 1909 – F/Y 1928 
 
Source: See Table 4.2, Lewis, British Railways, pp. 217; Davis and Huttenback, Mammon, p. 107; Edelstein, 
Overseas Investment, p. 125. 
Between 1909 and 1919, a substantial deficit existed between the operational profits and 
debenture interest. As per the guarantee, the Colombian government paid this interest on the 
company’s behalf. However, these payments were accounted for as a separate interest-bearing 
debt. It is unclear what interest rate was applied, but as can be seen in fig. 4.5, it was sufficient 
to contribute significantly to the growth of the debt over time. By 1921, the debt to the 
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Fig. 4.5 – Debt and cumulative interest on debt to government of the CNRC F/Y 1909 – F/Y 
1928 
 
Source: See Table 4.2. 
As is evident from fig. 4.6, the debt to the government grew much more rapidly that the 
CNRC’s cumulative deficit. Some of this difference is explained by the cumulative interest. 
Another factor is that the CNRC did not begin paying any interest at all until 1913, and 
subsequently paid substantially less than would have been possible based on their net receipts. 
For example, in 1916 the CNRC’s net receipts were £59,286, yet they only paid £4,000 towards 
interest.71 However, by 1913 the national government had purchased 85% of the CNRC’s 
outstanding debentures.72 As a result, most debenture interest was owed to the national 
government itself. Thus, at this point, by covering debenture interest, the government was 
simply forgoing returns on its own investment. However, as is illustrated later in the chapter, 
                                                             
71  ‘Colombian National Railway Report of 1916’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Box 1420, 
f. 2. 
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the perception which formed within the increasingly nationalistic public sphere was that the 
CNRC was impoverishing the national exchequer. 
Fig. 4.6 – Cumulative deficit and debt to government of the CNRC F/Y 1909 – F/Y 1928 
 
Source: See Table 4.2. 
As fig. 4.7 analyses, decreases in the deficit on debenture interest was counteracted by the 
increasing interest payments on the debt to the government. This meant that even though the 
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Fig. 4.7 – Deficit on debenture interest, total deficit and annual interest to government of the 
CNRC F/Y 1909 – F/Y 1928 
 
Source: See Table 4.2. 
The inevitable result was bankruptcy, and the national government exploited this to nationalise 
the enterprise, although this process was much slower than had been the case with the GNCRC 
and the CCRC. Fundamentally, the exponential growth of the CNRC’s debt was a legacy of 
the civil war, which delayed construction works for three years and seven months. As table 4.3 
illustrates, during this time £129,000 of interest was incurred on the £600,000 of debentures 
which had been raised in 1899.73 In 1907, additional debentures were floated at a 20% discount. 
Part of this issuance was used to replace the capital lost through interest payment whilst works 
were suspended. This resulted in £161,250 of additional debt, or 37.5% of the new issuance. 
As is illustrated in table 4.4, this resulted in £9,675 of additional interest annually. meaning a 
total of £135,450 between 1907 and 1921. The combination of repairs required to fix physical 
damage sustained in the war, and the three-year and seven-month period during which 
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construction was paralysed, the railway was completed at least four years later than would 
otherwise have been the case.74  
Table 4.3 – Debt issued against the CNRC 
Item Type of Security Date 
Issued 
Value 
First Debentures Mortgage against railway 1899 £200,000 
Second Debentures Mortgage against railway 1899 £400,000 
Third Debentures Government guarantee 1907 £430,000 
Fourth Debentures Government guarantee 1908 £450,000 
Source: ‘The Colombian National Railway Company, Limited. Balance sheet, 31st December, 
1916’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Box 1469. 
Table 4.4 – Financial Impact of the Civil War on CNRC 
Item Working Impact 
Interest incurred during civil war £600,000 at 6% for 3.583 years £129,000 
Interest incurred on new bonds  £161,250 at 6% for 14 years £135,450 
Total Increase in debt £161,250 raised at 80% to net £129,000 £161,250 
Total Debt of Company 
Percentage increase in debt 
Increase in annual interest 
£200,000 + £400,000 + £430,000 +£450,000 
£161,250 / £1,480,000 




Source: ‘Republic of Colombia, Colombian National Railway (1908) Customs Guaranteed 6% Debentures’, 
The Times, 26 October 1908; ‘Claim of the Colombian National Railway Company, Limited’ TNA, FO55/415, f 
244. 
Fig. 4.8 displays a counterfactual analysis, which projects the CNRC’s financial position 
without the war’s influence. The analysis presented is conservative, only considering two 
variables. Crucially, it uses actual data rather than the type of ‘assumed data’ which has been 
heavily criticised by Hobsbawm.75 The problems of using this type data is exemplified within 
the national historiography by the studies of Junguito and Pérez Ángel, who utilised assumed 
or projected (and objectively inaccurate) construction cost data.76 The first amendment 
decreases annual interest by £9,675, which was shown in table 4.4 to have been a direct result 
of the war. The second amendment moves the finances of the company back four years, 
meaning counterfactual figures for 1909 are replaced with the actuals for 1913. This change 
                                                             
74  Construction was delayed for 3 years and 7 months. The damage which had to put right before new 
construction could be initiated is likely greater than, but certainly no less than five months. 
75  Eric Hobsbawm, On History (London: Abacus, 1998), pp. 124-43. 
76  Pérez Ángel, Nos Dejó el Tren; Junguito, ‘Historia Económica’. 
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reflects the impact of the construction delays on the development of the company’s freight and 
revenues. The true impact of the war was likely much greater, since the war devastated the 
economy of Colombia, significantly impacting the amount of freight available to the railway. 
In addition, the significant physical damage to railway property has not been factored into the 
calculation at all. Despite its conservative nature, the model demonstrates the war was the root 
cause of the CNRC’s bankruptcy. A second counterfactual has been added which projects 
finances without some geographical and climatic complications during construction, but with 
the civil war.77 
 
Fig. 4.8 – Counterfactual analysis of railway finances - cumulative deficit/surplus over time 
 
Source: See Table 4.2; TNA, BT 31/16224/62637; ‘Republic of Colombia Colombian National Railway (1908) 
Customs Guaranteed 6% Debentures’, The Times, 26 October 1908; ‘Claim of the Colombian National Railway 
Company, Limited’, TNA, FO55/415, f 244. 
                                                             
77  The CNRC raised an additional £450,000 in 1908 to cover construction costs resulting from geographical 
and climatic problems. A significant amount of the £450,000 was provided to Jenks for interest payments 
he had made on the CNRC’s behalf. As such, the remainder of £192,857 has been deducted from the 
total debt outstanding in the counterfactual. ‘Colombian National Railway Report of 1908’, Guildhall 
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The lack of construction delays and decreased debt levels in the counterfactual model means 
that the deficit would have decreased much more rapidly. By 1921, the company would have 
been able to return all support payments to the government from its own profits. This would 
have been a markedly different experience for the national government. In the second 
counterfactual, the peak cumulative deficit is lower than in the first, but the delays caused by 
the war mean the deficit does not decrease as rapidly. The patterns illustrated by the 
counterfactual models suggest geographical factor endowments were not as influential in 
determining the success of railway development as politics, instability, and conflict.  
3.4.1 Shareholders 
The CNRC is unique within the Colombian context because it was financed and completed 
with the guarantee system of finance. The previous subsection has illustrated the influence of 
the government guarantee on company finances. This subsection analyses the type of 
shareholding pattern it produced, and how this compares with other British railways. Fig. 4.9 
demonstrates that in 1913 the shareholding of the CNRC was quite unlike that of the BRPC, 










Fig. 4.9 – Comparison of patterns of ownership of CNRC (1914), BRPC (1913), CNoRC 
(1913), and DRC (1913) based on size of shareholding 
 
Source: See footnote.78 
The CNRC’s shareholding was controlled principally by small (£200 and under) and medium 
(£201-£2,000) shareholders, and the Colombian government. This contrasts with the pattern of 
ownership of the BRPC, the DRC, and the CNoRC, which was concentrated in the hands of 
large shareholders with holdings over £2,000. As is detailed in chapters five and six, these 
shareholders came to dominate the expansion policy of the railways. As is evident in Fig. 4.10, 
in 1914 the five largest private CNRC shareholders controlled only 8.3%. In contrast, in 1913 
the two largest shareholders of the CNoRC controlled 75.5%.79 These circumstances made it 
                                                             
78  CNRC: Shareholder Registers for 1914, TNA, BT31/16224/62637; BRPC: Shareholder Registers 1913, 
Companies House, Company No. 26163 (Barranquilla Investments Ltd); DRC: Shareholder Reports for 
1913, Companies House, Company No. 84226, Ashtead Holdings Limited [Dorada Extension Railway 
Limited]; CNoRC: Shareholder Registers for 1913, and 1924, TNA, BT31/31593/55900; Within the 
calculation (and throughout the thesis) shareholder groups are defined in the following terms: Small 
Shareholders £1-£200, Medium Shareholders £201-£2,000, Large Shareholders £2,000+. 
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difficult for large shareholders to influence policy in the same way as those of the BRPC, the 
DRC, and the CNoRC. The Colombian government’s 33.3% effectively made it impossible. 
Fig. 4.10 – CNRC major shareholders, 1914 
 
Source: Shareholder Register for 1914, TNA, BT31/16224/62637. 
Notable shareholders include Robert Lebaudy. Robert was the son of one of the founders of 
the French sugar refining business Lebaudy Brothers, which controlled France’s sugar beet 
refining industry.80 Robert’s investment in the Colombian National represented only 3.33% of 
the share capital, a much smaller percentage than the largest private shareholders in the other 
railways. The next largest shareholder was William Edward Balston, who with his brother 
Richard was co-owner of W&R Balston, a paper mill in Maidstone Kent.81 Balston’s 
shareholding was also relatively small at only 1.33% of the capital, much less than his 5.7% 
                                                             
80  Shareholder Register for 1914, TNA, BT31/16224/62637. Robert’s brother Jacques was a famous French 
empire builder in the mould of Cecil Rhodes, who sought to create a new nation in Saharan Africa. See: 
Philippe Di Folco, L'empereur du Sahara (Paris: Galaade, 2014); Bennet Maxwell, ‘The Emperor of the 
Sahara’ The Independent, 14 September 1998. 
81  TNA, BT31/16224/62637; ‘Whatman set to Close’ 
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stake in the Dorada Railway Company.82 German bankers Gustave Lansberger and Paul 
Lindenberg from Dresdner Bank each held 1.25% of the share capital.83 Finally, Deutsche Bank 
held a 1.18% stake in the railway.84 Another notable shareholder was Sir Edward Payson Wills, 
of the Imperial Tobacco Company. As of the 31 December 1909, he held a £4,000 investment 
in the CNRC, representing 0.47% of the issued share capital.85 This investment made up only 
a tiny fraction of the £2,531,207 estate he left when he died the following March.86 As is the 
case with the BRPC and DRC shareholder registers (covered in subsequent chapters), many 
shareholders seem to fit the ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ concept. They had medium (£201-£2,000) 
and large (over £2,000) shareholdings, their place of residence was in London or the home 
counties, and their profession was either within the financial sector (banker, stockbroker, etc.), 
or was listed as ‘gentleman’. However, a major contrast is how many shareholders do not share 
this pattern. There are many more middle-class shareholders with a small (£1-£200) or medium 
(£201-£2,000) sized holding. These include accountants, barristers, reverends, solicitors, 
military officers, doctors, dentist, schoolmaster, etc. Even more surprising, is the quantity of 
lower-middle class, and in some cases working class shareholders. The share register contains 
entries for: butcher, grocer, paper strainer, tripe dresser, draper, warp-dresser, meat salesman, 
farmer, electrician, felt weaver, dairyman, chemist, book binder, coal merchant, colliery 
manager, cashier, fish and game merchant, mariner, ironmonger, joiner, leather merchant, 
weaver, postal clerk, etc. The importance of these patterns is how they contrast with the other 
railways. The CNRC is the only railway where we see a significant interest in the shareholding 
by what I term throughout this thesis as middle-class capitalists. 
                                                             
82  Dorada Railway Company Share Register for 1913 Companies House, Company No. 84226 (Ashtead 
Holdings). 
83  Shareholder Register for 1914, TNA, BT31/16224/62637 
84  Ibid. 
85  Ibid. 
86  ‘Sir Edward Wills’ Estate’, The Times, 14 May 1910. 
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Fig. 4.11 – CNRC Shareholders by location, 1914 
 
Source: Shareholder Register for 1914, TNA, BT31/16224/62637. 
Fig. 4.12 – CNRC British Shareholders by region, 1914 
 




































































The geographic patterns of shareholders evident in figs. 4.11 and 4.12 further support what the 
analysis of shareholder groups and large shareholders illustrates. Firstly, there is a much greater 
interest in the railway by European capitalists than is the case for other railway companies. In 
1914, German, Belgian, French, Dutch, and Swiss shareholders represented 9.85%, 7.8%, 
6.7%, 0.98% and 0.35% of issued share capital. European shareholders therefore controlled 
25.68% of the company. The CNRC was the only railway in the country where European 
interests in the share capital came anywhere near to these levels. Secondarily, British 
shareholders of the CNRC match Cain and Hopkins’ characterisation of the geographic 
distribution of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ exactly: British shareholders were overwhelmingly 
domiciled in London or the South East of England. Control of the CNRC was thus split between 
four groups: the national government, British ‘gentlemanly capitalists’, European capitalists, 
and middle-class capitalists. This was a much more diverse mix than was the case for the DRC, 
the BRPC, the SMRC or the CNoRC. As was demonstrated in chapter three, the CNoRC was 
mainly controlled by national capitalists, with a smaller but significant interest on the part of 
British ‘gentlemanly capitalists’. Chapters five and six show that the DRC was controlled by a 
mix of ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ and national capitalists, whilst on the coast the BRPC and the 
SMRC were controlled principally by ‘transnational capitalists’, along with a mix of 
‘gentlemanly capitalists’ and national capitalists. In all four cases, middle-class capitalists were 
almost entirely absent, or were present in such small numbers as to be inconsequential. This 
analysis of data illustrates that implementation of the guarantee system of finance had a 
significant impact on the pattern of ownership that emerged. The government guarantee 
provided security for the investor, which increased the availability of credit. In addition, this 
security attracted less wealthy investors, less able to invest in speculative and risky enterprises 
such as the BRPC or the DRC. These provided significant returns, but as chapters five and six 
shall illustrate, they depended on the continuation of precarious geographical monopolies. This 
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analysis suggests ownership patterns of the GNCRC would likely have been similar, if the 
application of the guarantee system had not been resisted. Paradoxically, rather than a 
mechanism to ensure control by foreign interests, the guarantee seems to have resulted in a less 
concentrated ownership pattern. The system shut out large shareholders, who used their 
influence to protect geographic monopolies, syphon off profits, and delay or terminate 
expansion of the railways to serve the less lucrative trade of the hinterlands, where from a 
developmental perspective, the infrastructure was most required.  
4.5 The Quinquenio, 1904-1909 
The last section illustrated how the government guarantee interacted with company finances 
and influenced the patterns of ownership. This section presents the system’s application from 
two perspectives. The first subsection of this fifth section of the chapter focusses on the 
construction of the railway, illustrating how the availability of capital and technical expertise 
overcame the geographical challenges, refuting the prevalent position within national 
historiography that geographic factor endowments precluded large-scale railway expansion.87 
The second subsection explores the corrupt behaviour of key political actors in the ‘Apulo 
works’ controversy, and analyses how this resulted in a negative association, between 
government guarantees, ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ such as the Jenks, and the rent-seeking of 
‘collaborating elites’.88 
4.5.1 Expansion with Government Guaranteed Debentures 
Lewis, Miller, and Summerhill all argue guarantees enabled Argentine, Brazilian, and wider 
Latin American railway development.89 However, whilst the system’s importance is well 
                                                             
87  Safford, ‘El Problema de los transportes’. 
88  Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, I; Gallagher and Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’. 
89 Miller, Britain and Latin America, p. 133; Lewis, British Railways, pp. 97-123; Lewis, Public Policy, 
pp.35-8; Summerhill, Order. 
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established from a Latin American perspective, in Colombia its influence and failure remains 
poorly understood. This historiographical imbalance is illustrated well by the recent 
comparative study of the expansion of railway networks in Latin America. Whilst the 
government guarantee systems are a central focus of the respective chapters for Mexico, Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, and Chile, the chapter for Colombia makes only a passing mention 
to the system, in which Correa repeats the same argument he made in relations to the GNCRC, 
that the system led to exploitation by unscrupulous foreign financiers.90 Álvaro Panchón and 
María Teresa Ramírez also largely overlook the Quinquenio period and the guarantee system, 
preferring to focus on the period of government led railway expansion in the 1920s.91 I argue 
that in Colombia, the system’s implementation became intertwined with the regionalist and 
personal interests of local political actors. Nepotism, corruption, personal interests, and 
regionalism interacted with British capital through the guarantee system to direct investment 
away from the GNCRC, and towards the CNRC. 
                                                             
90  La expansión ferroviaria en América Latina, ed. by Sandra Kuntz Ficker (Mexico City: COLMEX, 
2015); Correa, ‘Colombia’ in La expansión ferroviaria, pp. 142-43; Correa, Café y ferrocarriles, pp. 76-
7. 
91  Ramírez, ‘Los ferrocarriles’ in La infraestructura, pp. 3-6. 
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Fig. 4.13 – The route of the railway and local topography 
 
Source:  República de Colombia, Informe del ministerio de obras publicas al Congreso de 1911 (Bogotá: 
Imprenta Nacional, 1911), Unnumbered Fold-out page towards the end. 
 
After re-establishing construction works following the war, the CNRC experienced various 
catastrophes during 1903-04. The project was paralysed when the lead engineer John C. Gibney 
and four of his crew died of tropical diseases in Girardot.92 The threat of tropical diseases to 
construction crews in Girardot had also hampered Javier Cisneros’s construction projects in 
the 1880s, who was unable to attract local labourers due to a perception that the area was 
‘infected’.93 The company faced a similar challenge, and just as they had in the early 1880s, 
the national government assisted by offering 1,000 government troops as manual labour.94 
                                                             
92  República de Colombia, Informe que rinde el Ministerio de Obras Publicas ante el Señor Designado 
(Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1909), p. 134. 
93  Horna, Transport Modernization, p. 133. 




Tropical rainstorms also caused several serious landslides. The most dramatic of these swept 
away the majority of the line between La Mesa and Hospicio, resulting in a costly 
reconstruction.95 The bridge over the Apulo river was also destroyed twice by heavy rainfall, 
once in in March of 1904, and again in April after having been replaced.96 This resulted in the 
suspension of traffic between Juntas de Apulo and Anapoima for three months.97 In order to 
avoid a repeat of these events, a 2.4km section of new line was constructed from km 44 onwards 
to avoid the two river crossings.98 The Foreign Office and Colombian Ministry of Public Works 
both acknowledged the crucial role British engineers played in successfully overcoming these 
challenges.99 The Ministry felt the CNRC ‘had the calibre of engineer required to overcome 
the great difficulties’ presented by the Colombian terrain.100 Both sides felt the CNRC’s 
replacement lead engineer Alexander Gulliver played a particularly important role. He gained 
experience of Andean railways working on the Transandine railway in Chile and Argentina, 
and was said to have ‘possessed in a marked degree the gift of inspiring confidence in his 
subordinates’.101 Despite facing the geographical challenges the historiography argues impeded 
Colombia’s railway development, British engineers completed the final 82km of track in the 
space of five years.102 When the railway was transferred to the CNRC in 1899, only a 50km 
section had been completed in the eighteen years since construction work began in 1881.103 
Regionalist and personal interests also impeded progress. In 1905, just as construction on a 
                                                             
95  ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, p. 27. 
96  ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, p. 27. 
97  ‘Colombian National Railway Report of 1904’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Box 879, f. 
1. 
98  ‘Colombian National Railway Report of 1904’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Box 879, f. 
2. 
99  ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, p. 27; Informe que rinde el 
Ministerio, pp. 134-9. 
100  Ibid, p. 135. 
101  Ibid, p. 135; ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, p. 27. 
102  ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, pp. 25-8. Within the historiography 
factors such as high construction costs, difficult terrain, challenging engineering, and adverse climatic 
conditions are often posited as explanations for the lack of railway expansion in Colombia. See: Safford, 
‘El Problema de los transportes’. 
103  ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, pp. 25-27. 
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new section was about to be initiated, the national government decided to revaluate the 
railway’s route. They were keen to reroute the railway to join the Southern railway company 
at Sibaté, rather than with the Sabana railway at Facatativá.104 The Southern Railway’s 
management contained two familiar names: Camilo Torres Elicechea’s son Guillermo was the 
general manager, and Santiago Pérez Triana sat on its board of directors.105 Ultimately the route 
did not change, but the event was estimated to have delayed construction by around four 
months.106 
                                                             
104  ‘Colombian National Railway Report of 1905’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Box 928, f. 
1. 
105   ‘Colombian Southern Railway Ltd. Share Registers’, Company No: 91778, TNA, BT 31/11819/91778. 




Fig. 4.14 – The bridge over the River Apulo, c. 1911 
 
Source:  Republica de Colombia, Informe del ministerio de obras públicas al Congreso de 1911 (Bogotá: 
Imprenta Nacional, 1911), Unnumbered Fold-out page towards the middle. 
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Because of these climatic, geographical, institutional and administrative problems, the CNRC 
required additional capital to complete the project. But the railway was already mortgaged on 
existing debt. In order to enable construction works to continue, the government agreed to 
guarantee interest payments of 6% on £430,000 of new debentures, in return for several 
concessions.107 The first was £165,000 worth of share capital free of charge, which in addition 
to the £135,000 the government already held, would represent a 33.3% stake.108 Secondly, the 
CNRC agreed to cede the claims for compensation relating to the civil war which were detailed 
earlier in the chapter.109 Finally, the CNRC agreed to invest £21,000 of the receipts of the 
debenture issuance in a ‘pleasure and health resort, with [luxury] hotel and necessary houses 
and shops’ which would be constructed in Apulo and act as a tropical retreat for the political 
elite of the capital.110 The financial improprieties related to the subsequent construction of this 
retreat, would lead to Camilo Torres being indicted for embezzlement.111 This agreement was 
highly favourable to the government, since the concessions had a combined nominal value 
greater than the issuance of the bonds.112 But as is illustrated later in the chapter, the 
government guarantee engendered significant hostility. 
According to the company’s reports, this £430,000 would have been sufficient to complete the 
line, had it not been for another series of unforeseeable disasters. Heavy rainfall led to 
landslides meaning ‘the line’ had to be rebuilt ‘several times over’.113 In addition, the first 
40km of the railway between Apulo and Girardot had to be relayed.114 The Ministry of Public 
                                                             
107  ‘Colombian National Railway Report of 1907’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Box 974, f. 
1. 
108  Informe que rinde el Ministerio, p. 138. 
109  Ibid. 
110  Ibid, p. 139; ‘Colombian National Railway Report of 1907’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, 
Box 974, f. 1. 
111  Torres Elicechea, Carta Abierta al Presidente. 
112  The original claim for compensation made by Henry Jenks was for £333,548, which combined with 
£165,000 of share capital and £21,000 of investment in Apulo comes to £519,548. 
113  ‘Colombian National Railway Report of 1908’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Box 1021, 
f. 1. 
114  This section was constructed before the CNRC took over the railway. Most had been constructed by 
Cisneros, some under national administration. Relaying the track was necessary because of insufficient 
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Works commented that: ‘the rails on this section weight only 19.5kg per metre, there are 
insufficient sleepers and those present are unserviceable’.115 The basic parameters of the line 
such as traffic and rolling stock, had not changed sufficiently for the conditions to have been a 
result of anything other than incompetence, or the deliberate use of unsuitable materials in 
order to extract funds from the maintenance budget. The works to repair the line to avoid a 
repeat of the landslides were ‘necessarily very costly’, and in order to finance them the 
government agreed to guarantee interest on one final issuance of debentures for £450,000.116 
In return they requested additional ‘representation on the board’ and the appointment of 
national ‘engineers to superintend the final works’.117  
A significant portion of this new £450,000 floatation was immediately transferred to Jenks, for 
interest payments of £180,000 he had made on the CNRC’s behalf. He agreed to receive 
debentures in lieu of cash, but would only accept them at 70%.118 Of the £450,000 issuance 
Jenks received £257,142, leaving a remainder of £192,857. These remaining debentures were 
sold in London at 80%, meaning of the £450,000 floatation, only £154,285 was available to 
the CNRC for construction works.119 Despite the fact that these convoluted financial 
transactions were underwritten by the national government, and orchestrated by a ‘gentlemanly 
capitalist’ who many considered locally as an agent of imperialism, Santiago Pérez Triana and 
Camilo Torres Elicechea remained absolutely silent.120 No wonder, since despite berating the 
GNCRC, they had played active roles in negotiating the CNRC’s government guarantee. Both 
                                                             
sleepers, low grade iron rails, deteriorated wooden bridges, etc. Informe que rinde el Ministerio, pp. 139-
40. 
115  Ibid. 
116  ‘Colombian National Railway Report of 1908’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Box 1021, 
f. 1. 
117  ‘Colombian National Railway Report of 1908’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Box 1021, 
f. 2. 
118  Torres Elicechea, Carta Abierta al Presidente, p. 60. 
119  Republic of Colombia, Colombian National Railway (1908) Customs Guaranteed 6% Debentures’ The 
Times, 26 October 1908 
120  Villamizar, Negocios Colombianos. 
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signed the contract, Pérez Triana as a member of the CNRC’s board of directors, and Camilo 
Torres on behalf of the national government.121 
Rescinding the GNCRC’s government guarantee meant more resources were available to 
support the construction of the CNRC. As was discussed in chapter three, the collapse of the 
GNCRC was a momentous development for subsequent regional distribution of economic 
power. Palacios argues that the growth of coffee in western Colombia as opposed to Santander, 
was influenced by the ‘high transportation costs’ resulting from the failure to develop a rail 
link, which ‘blocked the takeoff of modern capitalism’.122 Attacks on the GNCRC, and support 
of the CNRC, ensured significant competitive advantage to coffee growers in Cundinamarca, 
as did the development of the DRC ropeway for the coffee growers of Caldas. Inhabitants of 
Santander claimed attacks by the ‘metropolitan elite’ on the GNCRC were inspired by personal 
interests and regionalism, with the single objective of ‘ruining the life of a blooming region’.123 
The long-term impact of prioritisation of the CNRC over the GNCRC suggests there was some 
truth to this statement. The GNCRC and the CNRC demonstrate that government support was 
influenced by the personal and regional interests intertwined with the project. Implementation 
depended not on economic rationale, but political capital. Only one of the railways was 
subjected to the prolonged and coordinated attack from the national press. The government 
guarantee ensured the CNRC’s completion and Cundinamarca’s ascendancy, whilst recantation 
of the GNCRC’s guarantee led to the collapse of the project, and Santander’s stagnation. This 
illustrates clearly, that in Colombia, just as was the case in Argentina and Brazil, the guarantee 
system was the difference between success and failure. 
4.5.2 Apulo Works Controversy 
                                                             
121  República de Colombia, Documentos Relacionados, pp. 46-7. 
122  Palacios, Between Legitimacy, pp. 54-55. 




This subsection explores how government guarantees and foreign railway companies became 
associated with the corruption of members of the Reyes administration in the ‘Apulo works’. I 
argue this stimulated the growth of political resistance to the system. The ‘Apulo works’ project 
sought to construct a luxury tropical retreat in Juntas de Apulo, where the railway intersected 
the Apulo River valley.124 Its main function was as a playground for the Bogotano elite. Apulo 
is 420m above sea level, and because of its equatorial latitude enjoys a perpetual balmy climate 
resembling a sunny day in the height of a European summer. The project’s financing was 
extremely convoluted, and can be summarized as follows. The Colombian government agreed 
to guarantee interest on £30,000 of CNRC bonds. These same bonds would be purchased by 
the government at 70% to net £21,000, which would be handed over to Camilo Torres 
Elicechea. The government thus agreed to pay £1,800 of interest annually to access £21,000 of 
capital from their own treasury.125 When Torres was subsequently accused of embezzlement 
the only material he could provide in his defence were bank receipts for money received, 
suggesting there were no checks and balances in place to track how the money was used.126 
The whole affair was indicative of corruption, and the Jenks were right at the centre of these 
suspicious and seemingly fraudulent business dealings. In view of this, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that years later Colombia’s lawyers in London commented that the Jenkses’ 





                                                             
124  República de Colombia, La Ciudad y el Valle del Apulo y el Ferrocarril de Girardot (Bogotá: Imprenta 
Nacional, 1906); Camilo Torres Elicechea, Fondos para las obras de Apulo (London: [s.n.] 1910), p. 4. 
125  Torres Elicechea, Fondos; República de Colombia, La Ciudad y el Valle; Camilo Torres Elicechea, 
Mision Fiscal en Europa (Lausanne: Borgeaud, 1916); Gerardo Pulecio, Alegato que presenta Gerardo 
Pulecio ante el tribunal superior en defensa del Dr. Camilo Torres Elicechea Asunto: Obras de Apulo 
(Bogotá: El Nuevo Tiempo, 1911). 
126  Torres Elicechea, Fondos, pp. 20-2. 
127  Smith to Upjohn, 19 August 1911, AGN, MRE, Box 513, Folder 56, f. 59. 
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Fig. 4.15 –Hotel Apulo, the centrepiece of the elite’s tropical retreat in Juntas de Apulo 
 
Source: BLA, Colección Gumersindo Cuéllar Jiménez, FT1426, BRBLAA55621-3 
http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/imagen/gumercindo-cuellar/hotel-apulo-ferrocarril-de-girardot-
colombia, Accessed 18/06/2017. 
The affair was particularly damaging because Reyes and his son were involved. Once received 
by Torres, cash was deposited with the national bank. It was subsequently transferred by 
cheque to various notable local political actors connected to the Reyes administration. These 
included: President Reyes himself, the family business Reyes e Hijo (Reyes and Son) and Jorge 
Holguín’s son Daniel.128 The value of each cheque was detailed, but justification of where the 
funds were spent was entirely absent.129 The whole of the £21,000 sum had disappeared, yet 
                                                             
128  Torres Elicechea, Fondos, p. 23. 
129  Torres Elicechea, Fondos, p. 19-23. 
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works had not been completed, and the luxury Hotel in Apulo required additional remedial 
work. Of course, none of this came to light until after Reyes had in the words of Palacios, 
‘slipped aboard a United Fruit Company boat and sailed off into exile’.130 The scandal brought 
the legitimacy of the whole Quinquenian project into question, and with it, the guarantee 
system. The question in the minds of the Colombian public was: were promises of material 
progress just the platitudes of a collaborator taking his cut from foreign interests? 
Torres and Reyes were indicted on the 25 April 1910 for theft of public funds, and an 
extradition order raised for Torres.131 Neither sought to clarify and justify expenses, they 
simply argued the funds were the property of the CNRC to distribute as they saw fit, and thus 
no theft had taken place.132 The CNRC made no comment, strengthening the perception that 
Reyes, Torres, Jenks and the British company were in cahoots.133 This reinforced their 
reputation as collaborators, and sullied the image of the government guarantee which had 
enabled the debacle to occur. There is no evidence Jenks or other British capitalists received 
any of the £21,000. By engaging in these questionable financial arrangements, British interests 
desired to curry favour with a leader they imagined would be leading the country for the 
foreseeable future. The case illustrates that British companies were at times complicit in 
attempts to extract resources from the treasury, but crucially, and in contrast to the argument 
of Pérez Ángel, this process was fundamentally driven by local elites, rather than by foreign 
financiers and concession holders.134 The project also illustrates the dominance of Bogotá’s 
elite society over the country’s credit and fiscal revenues. These were exploited to create a spa 
                                                             
130  Palacios, Between Legitimacy, p. 63. 
131  Gerardo Pulecio, Alegato que presenta Gerardo Pulecio; Torres Elicechea, Fondos, p. 3. 
132  Gerardo Pulecio, Alegato que presenta Gerardo Pulecio; Torres Elicechea, Fondos, p. 3; República de 
Colombia, Proceso Relativo a las Obras de Apulo (Bogotá: Imprenta Moderna, 1912). 
133  Villamizar, Negocios Colombianos; Torres Elicechea, Fondos; Gerardo Pulecio, Alegato que presenta 
Gerardo Pulecio; República de Colombia, Proceso Relativo. 
134  Pérez Ángel, Nos Dejó el Tren, p. 46. 
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town to serve as a tropical paradise for the Bogotano elite to rest, only a few hours train journey 
from the city. 
4.6 Towards Nationalisation 1909-1923 
The previous section of this chapter illustrated that key figures within the Quinquenio could be 
classified as ‘collaborating elites’ based on their business relationships with the ‘gentlemanly 
capitalist’ Jenks family. As such, we could consider the CNRC’s relationship with the Reyes 
administration as an example of British imperialism, as defined by Cain and Hopkins. The post-
Quinquenian administration was characterised by an ‘eagerness to go against the decisions’ of 
Reyes and his regime, presented under the auspices of a patriotic and nationalistic rear-guard 
action against prior collaboration with foreign interests.135 The first subsection of this sixth 
section of the chapter demonstrates that despite the nationalistic rhetoric of key post-
Quinquenian political actors such as Pérez Triana, corruption and rent seeking by members of 
the administration was just as prevalent as it was during the Quinquenio, and that the 
collaborative relationship with the Jenks family continued on some levels. In the second 
subsection, I argue that whilst evidence of British ‘imperialism’ persisted, at the macro-level, 
government policy had indeed taken a nationalistic turn towards the ideas espoused by Pérez 
Triana in Desde lejos. 
4.6.1 Santiago Pérez Triana, José Vicente Concha & Shirley Jenks 
As was discussed in chapter three, Santiago Pérez Triana was named Colombia’s representative 
in London following the end of Reyes’s regime.136 Considering Peréz Triana’s anti-imperialist 
rhetoric, one would assume that upon taking up this position, links to the Jenks family would 
have been cut. Not only did this not happen, the complete opposite occurred: The Jenkses’ 
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influence in government finances increased. Upon evaluating the Jenkses’ enduring influence, 
Colombia’s legal counsel in London Herbert Smith commented that: 
Mr Shirley Jenks is a financier in the city who had succeeded to the business for a good many 
years past carried on by his father. The Jenks, pere et fils, have both had many transactions with, 
and good many interests, in Colombia. They are not of high standing, but it is fair to state, that 
whilst their methods often give room for stringent criticism, they have on occasion found 
comparatively large sums, which directly or indirectly, have been utilized by Colombian 
enterprise. Whether their association has been one which has proved altogether beneficial to 
Colombia is a vexed question, because although, undoubtedly the money they have found has 
been useful it may well be urged that their financial methods in London have not altogether 
tended to popularise the national credit of Colombia.137 
Pérez Triana had enjoyed personal links with the CNRC and its predecessor the Girardot 
Railway since at least 1883.138 Pérez Triana also shared a personal relationship with the Jenks 
predating the CNRC’s formation in 1899, sat on its board of directors, and ‘signed the contract’ 
of August of 1908 which assured a government guarantee.139 This occurred only a year after 
publishing Desde lejos, and four years before he compared the GNCRC’s guarantee to a ‘putrid 
corpse’ which stole ‘bread from … [the people’s] mouths to pay interest … [to foreigners]’.140  
Pérez Triana, and his counterpart in the Paris consulate José Vicente Concha, negotiated a 
£500,000 loan with Shirley Jenks.141 A dispute arose because of the ineptitude of both men. 
The agreement provided Jenks security by mortgaging the Muzo emerald mines, but neither 
realised this asset was already part of a Quinquenian concession to the Colombian Emerald 
Company Ltd.142 In addition, they had contracted for the loan and received an advance of 
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£67,710 before congressional legislation was in place to authorise the transaction.143 Both men 
had heavily criticized Reyes’s and Holguín’s engagement with European capital markets. Yet 
once they were charged with the same responsibility, they continued the relationship with a 
key ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ ally of the regime. When approval was not forthcoming, Pérez 
Triana employed a familiar tactic, arguing the lack of authorisation in congress invalidated the 
agreement.144 The advance was returned to Jenks, but in remarkable similarity to his father, 
Shirley Jenks proceeded to claim damages for a perceived loss of prestige in London.145 The 
government’s solicitors commented that in their professional opinion the letters Pérez Triana 
had exchanged with Jenks represented ‘a [legally binding] contract’.146 A letter sent to Concha 
reveals that Pérez Triana felt they were perhaps culpable for what had transpired.147 Another, 
sent a week later, discussed how the government and lawyers worked in unison to coordinate 
stories to repudiate the contract: ‘Mr Smith … suggested … that the government not only 
denies that we had authority, … but also claim that we did not advise them regarding 
negotiations’.148  
In December 1909, Pérez Triana and Concha negotiated a second loan with Jenks, this time for 
the minor sum of £28,000 to cover interest payments on the CNRC’s debentures.149 This loan 
was arranged under such advantageous terms for the creditor, that even considering the 
government’s dire finances, incompetence alone seems insufficient to explain its approval.150 
The inconsistencies between Pérez Triana’s anti-imperialist rhetoric, his links to Jenks, and his 
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collaborative behaviour in London, did not go unnoticed in Colombia. In an open letter to Pérez 
Triana in January 1910, Reyes’s Minister of Foreign Affairs during 1906-08, Alfredo Vásquez 
Cobo, mocked the new administration’s performance in London in comparison to Holguín’s:  
The last financial operations carried out by Dr. José Vicente Concha, last December, I think 
deserve an explication; because at a first glance they seem to belong among the “monstrosities” 
of which you speak of in your interesting book. General Holguín only employed a few months to 
complete his negotiations, yet Dr. Concha managed to sign a loan in London which mortgaged 
three government assets in just one morning.151 
Pérez Triana and Concha had mortgaged the shares held by the government in the Magdalena 
Navigation Company, the revenues of the government’s emerald mines, and consular 
revenues.152 All of this for a small loan. Vásquez Cobo accused the men of mortgaging these 
assets without the authorisation of congress, just as was the case for the larger £500,000 loan. 
In addition, the loan carried an 8% interest rate and Jenks received a 2% commission.153 
According to Rafael Villamizar, Pérez Triana used his position for the same corrupt rent-
seeking as Reyes and Torres displayed in the ‘Apulo works’.154 For example, in 1911 the 
government’s lawyers prepared the legal documents required for local police to confiscate 
emeralds worth £40 which had been illegally brought to London from Colombia.155 For this 
simple service, the lawyers charged the Colombian government £1,031, a huge sum of money, 
which in 2015 represents just under £94,000.156 The invoice was so large that the Ministry of 
Foreign Relations sent Pérez Triana a letter enquiring whether the value on the invoice was 
correct, assuming it must have been a misprint. Pérez Triana responded that: 
My opinion is that the invoice must be correct, based on the fact that they are indisputably 
honourable people and lawyers of high standing. However, I cannot assume responsibility of 
saying whether or not the invoice is correct, and it is not even possible to do so, since English 
customs dictate in the case in which there is doubt, it should be subject to expert examination. 
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Nevertheless, my opinion is that there is no justification to proceed with this type of examination 
due to the respectability and standing of the lawyers which I have already expressed.157 
The same lawyers charged only £126 for writing all the policies, contracts, and notarial 
documents for the CNRC’s 1908 £450,000 bond emission. Yet they charged over one thousand 
pounds for ‘taking a Little box of emeralds from a helpless Colombian’. In the words of 
Villamizar ‘the scandalous invoice was paid’.158  
These three events illustrate that despite nationalistic rhetoric, on a micro-level, key political 
actors within the new regime maintained a close (perhaps even collaborative) relationship with 
‘gentlemanly capitalist’ allies of the Quinquenian regime. Furthermore, within these 
interactions, they displayed the same corrupt behaviour which they had criticised during the 
Quinquenio. In view of the clear inconsistencies in Pérez Triana’s position, how should we 
view his wider political project? Was it all a sham? And as such, is Rausch wrong to represent 
him as a ‘crusader [for] hemispheric unity’ in the face of imperialism?159 Should Pérez Triana 
be considered an anti-imperialist ‘crusader’, or an opportune ‘collaborating elite’? It may seem 
counterintuitive, but my view is that he was both, just as Reyes was both a ‘collaborator’ and 
a champion of material ‘progress’. The tendency to project ideology onto history obscures the 
fact that people – even influential political actors – have the potential to fulfil contradictory 
roles. As such, concurrently fulfilling the roles of ‘hero’ or ‘villain’, ‘collaborator’ or anti-
imperialist ‘crusader’, is not a contradiction in terms. I believe Pérez Triana held genuine 
nationalistic beliefs and that Reyes’s pursuit of material ‘progress’ was sincere, and both cared 
deeply for the future of Colombia. However, they were both imperfect and complex 
individuals. 
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Pérez Triana was certainly erudite, or as Rausch argues, a ‘man of letters’, but as his business 
career in the United States and his involvement in the Punchard-McTaggart affair both 
illustrate, he was also a man both tempted and driven by the material world.160 He was also a 
man of his time and place, and as such, fundamentally shaped by what Safford terms 
Colombia’s ‘catch-as-catch-can’ national business culture.161 Pérez Triana’s story – which has 
been woven through the last three chapters – illustrates that the stance towards railways and 
foreign investment within the Colombian political scene was complex and contradictory. The 
first few decades of the twentieth century were a period of national reflection in the face of the 
disaster of Panama. How could Colombia define itself as a nation after its body politic had been 
mutilated? As the second chapter illustrated, this period was particularly painful for liberals. 
Pérez Triana still fundamentally believed in the liberal ideal of ‘progress’, but his faith in ideas 
such as mobility of capital had been shattered. The traumatic ideological chaos caused by the 
collapse of his liberal belief structure explains the contradictory positions he occupied. On a 
macro-level, this also explains why Colombia moved from embracing capitalistic liberalism as 
strongly as any country in the region to implementing aggressive anti-foreign policies towards 
British railway companies so rapidly. What Wright argues took decades in Argentina, where 
‘the oligarchy publicly defended the British enterprises as agents of progress’, occurred in 
Colombia in only a few years.162 
4.6.2 The New National Railway Policy, the CNRC and Nationalisation 
Despite Pérez Triana’s actions representing Colombia in London, post-Quinquenian 
government policy mirrored the policies presented in Desde lejos.163 He had achieved this with 
nothing more than a typewriter and the international postal service. The new national railway 
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policy had two aims, the first was to develop new railways under national ownership, the 
second was to nationalise railways in private hands. This policy quickly solidified in the first 
few years following the Quinquenio, and by 1912 after a year of discussion in congress, there 
was an almost complete national consensus. The Proyecto de Ley Sobre Ferrocarriles 
presented to congress in October of 1912, established the legislative basis for this policy.164 It 
authorised the floatation of government bonds to purchase the three coastal railways and the 
CNRC. A maximum level was placed on the purchase prices, a combined total of £1,700,000 
for all three coastal railways, and £1,800,000 for the CNRC.165 Congress reacted 
overwhelmingly positively, but despite feeling it contained ‘transcendental ideas in relation to 
national fiscal and economic policy’, they were conscious that the plans were financially 
impractical for the foreseeable future.166 These discussions represented the impulse of railway 
policy for the following two decades. Other than the DRC’s Manizales-Mariquita Ropeway, 
no further expansion of private railway companies was permitted, and an aggressive policy of 
nationalisation was implemented.  
The government had agreed in 1909 to guarantee interest on the bonds raised in 1899, meaning 
the government was liable to pay interest on £1,480,000 of debt.167 Because of the guarantee, 
a special sense of urgency was attached to the CNRC. National political elites from both parties 
asked with increasing frequency that since Colombia was obliged to pay interest on bonds as a 
guarantor, why not just raise bonds themselves and own the railway outright? Francisco 
Montaña’s study of the CNRC’s bonds further stoked growing hostility towards government 
guarantees for private railway companies: 
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Is it in the nations interests, that on top of the heavy burden of paying interest on the fourth 
mortgage bonds, it should continue making loans to the company so that it can pay interest on 
the first and second mortgage bonds? … Colombia should not pay a single cent more.168 
This reaction illustrates how combative Colombia’s political elites were compared to those of 
other countries, where the utilisation of guarantees had been successfully implemented. The 
CNRC’s guarantee only extended to interest on bonds. In contrast, the Brazilian government 
guaranteed dividends to shareholders. After opening in 1881, the Great Western of Brazil 
‘collected guaranteed dividends … every year … until the turn of the century’, yet despite this 
heavy and long-term burden, evidence of the same level of political resistance is absent within 
Summerhill’s study of the system’s implementation.169 Lewis describes similar regionalist 
disputes to the Cundinamarca-Santander tug of war over the CNRC and GNCRC government 
guarantees in Brazil, but these did not result in questioning the legitimacy of the system itself, 
as it did in Colombia.170 In Argentina ‘the threat of expropriation’ was used to force the Buenos 
Aires Great Southern Railway into ‘constructing extensions’.171 In each case, the contrast with 
Colombia is clear, policy in Argentina and Brazil focussed on ensuring expansion of private 
railway companies. In Colombia, after 1909 policy was focussed on avoiding expansion and 
seizing control of them. 
 
As was previously illustrated, the civil war’s impact on CNRC finances put significant financial 
strain on the national government. This strain, combined with the negative experiences with 
the Jenkses, the ‘Apulo works’, and corruption of Reyes and members of his government, 
further entrenched the negative image of the CNRC and guarantee system within the public 
imagination. Rafael Villamizar, who played a key role in efforts to nationalise the railway, 
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argued that it had ‘cost the nation £3,000,000, yet belongs to an English company’.172 Whilst 
this sum was a substantial exaggeration, it is easy to see why the government viewed the 
arrangement as detrimental.173 In view of the urgency surrounding the government guarantee, 
and the strategic importance of the railway, a more detailed piece of legislation was presented 
to congress in September 1912, which specifically focussed on the CNRC.174 This sought to 
realise a ‘patriotic duty … for the public good’ by authorising the government to ‘contract a 
loan at 5% for the sum necessary to collect all of the mortgage bonds floated by the company 
… and the acquisition of all the company’s shares’.175 The measure had such overwhelming 
support, that even the original author of the guarantee Rafael Reyes, made a speech to congress 
to promote it: 
 
The time has not come to cast judgment on what has come to be known as the Quinquenio ... The 
Girardot Railway was one of my proudest accomplishments; I felt that this industrial social work 
was politically indispensable to our national life. ... I did everything humanly possible to reduce 
its costs and sacrifices made by the nation to a minimum ... According to reports, the railroad ... 
is producing an annual yield of £ 60.000, which represents 6% interest on capital of £ 1,000,000. 
... after only 3 years after opening for service, this amply justifies the provisions made by my 
administration … Now ... the company ... has been sued in London by second mortgage 
bondholders ... if these legal proceedings are not brought to an end they will result in the forced 
liquidation of the company, the auction of the Railroad, and the total loss of this valuable 
company to the Republic.176 
 
In November 1913, President Carlos E. Restrepo referred to the CNRC as a ‘grave and 
transcendental problem’, which the government had solved by purchasing the CNRC’s 
debentures to ‘eliminate the serious dangers to the credit and sovereignty of Colombia’. 177 By 
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the time the speech was made, the national government had control of 85% of the CNRC’s 
outstanding debentures.178 In December 1913, the Colombian consulate in London felt that ‘the 
government today has control of the railway’, since in addition to being ‘the owner of 300,000 
shares, many of the [debentures], and a creditor of a great sum [to the CNRC]’ the government 
also had a ‘preponderant influence within the board of directors’179 Thus, from the end of 1913, 
government control over the infrastructure had for all practical purposes been achieved. 
However, formal nationalisation of the railway would take significantly longer. 
 
One reason for the ‘urgent priority of nationalising [the CNRC]’, was the desire and necessity 
to address the developing crisis of transportation on the Magdalena River.180 This crisis, caused 
by silt and low water levels in the upper Magdalena River, meant that by June 1919, 
transportation between Bogotá and La Dorada using the combination of the CNRC, river 
steamers, and the DRC, had ground to a standstill.181 As is explored in chapter six, the 
concentrated shareholding of the DRC, and the interested parties’ focus on maintaining their 
lucrative monopoly, meant government incentives to encourage the DRC expanding their 
operations to Girardot had failed.  Completing this single uninterrupted length of railway from 
Bogotá to La Dorada, was also described as a ‘transcendental work’.182 In 1915, the CNRC 
was compared to the Guayaquil-Quito railway in Ecuador, in the sense that ‘the government 
has responsibilities and expenditures, whilst the concession holder enjoys profits and 
guarantees’.183 This Ecuadorian railway is described by Kim Clark as a ‘redemptive work’ 
which played a central role in nation building.184 In Colombia, the CNRC did not unite the 
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country physically as in Ecuador, but its nationalisation certainly united the country against 
foreign interests. Jenks and the CNRC were accused of standing in the way of the 
nationalisation. The government needed access to the CNCRC’s accounts, but ‘several years 
relating to construction works had been incinerated on Jenks’s orders’, because he did not wish 
the ‘umbilical cord to the national treasury cut’.185 Revista Moderna also felt that there were 
stronger imperialistic forces allied with the CNRC: 
 
We all know that a telegram exists on certain desks in London, charged with threats to Colombia, 
and ready to be sent if the nation decides to defend its interests against the interests of others. A 
permanent death sentence, signed and sealed, just like the one held over one of the Counts of 
Charolais.186 
 
Shirley Jenks was also attempting to create a through rate monopoly through his combined 
interests in the CNRC, the Cartagena Railway, and Magdalena River navigation companies, 
for which he was attacked by contemporaries.187 Jenks had a vested interest in the growth of 
Cartagena over other coastal cities, because of significant investments in the city’s water 
supply. He overextended himself in this investment and it ultimately led to his bankruptcy.188  
 
Despite the 33.3% share capital and 85% of debentures held by the national government, the 
enormous debt, and dire financial situation of the CNRC, it took another seven years following 
Revista Moderna’s article for nationalisation to be achieved. During this time, heightened 
tensions between the local population and foreign railway companies developed, which saw 
the CNRC’s workers go on strike in November 1919, as well as those of the CNoRC and the 
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Colombian Southern Railway Company.189 When the nationalisation was completed in 
December 1922, CNRC shareholders received no compensation whatsoever, since the CNRC 
handed over the railway in return for the national government assuming all of its liabilities.190  
 
The nationalisation illustrates several points. First, the CNRC’s finances, and the corruption 
and rent-seeking of associated political actors, tainted the image of the guarantee system. As a 
result, the CNRC became a rallying point for anti-foreign, anti-imperialist sentiment. By 1910, 
when Francisco Montaña published his expose on the company’s debentures, this process was 
already advanced. As such, the experiences with the CNRC and its guarantee, heavily 
influenced the wider conception of guarantees and British railway companies in Colombia. It 
was because of the experiences with the CNRC, that such an aggressive policy towards other 
railways such as the GNCRC, the CNoRC and the CCRC, was implemented. The CNRC 
illustrated the dangers to national sovereignty and the national treasury posed by the system, 




The CNRC and its experience with the guarantee system, had a defining influence on the 
development of national railway policy. Many factors combined to create a negative perception 
of guarantees and foreign railway companies: the disappointing finances of the company, the 
collaborative and corrupt behaviour of members of the Reyes regime, the ‘Apulo works’, the 
perceived imperialistic role of the Jenkses, etc. Government guarantees came to be seen as a 
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costly and dangerous threat to national sovereignty. Despite this, the CNRC’s history illustrates 
that when applied, the guarantee system could ensure the successful completion of 
infrastructure projects, irrespective of geographical and engineering challenges, illustrating 
how fundamental it was to developing railways in the wider region. Without the guarantee, the 
railway could not have been completed. But the CNRC’s history illustrates that the system was 
prone to being co-opted to serve the personal and regionalist interests of Colombia’s combative 
elite. The CNRC was relatively profitable from a regional perspective, and the most significant 
influence on the CNRC’s financial problems, was the disruptive influence of the civil war 
during the first few years following incorporation. Torres and Meisel both demonstrate the 
devastating economic impact of the war at the macro-level; the CNRC shows its impact on 
individual enterprise was just as great. 191 As such, the war was a determining factor for the 
failure of the guarantee system. This is a important conclusion for both national and regional 
historiography, because until this thesis, the dynamics of the system’s implementation in 
Colombia were almost entirely unknown.192 
A wide body of literature details the fundamental role of guarantees for railway development 
in Latin America.193 Summerhill’s study provided a view of the system’s successful 
implementation in Brazil at the micro-level. 194 The CNRC demonstrates the successful 
implementation witnessed in Brazil was not inevitable. The system required two prerequisites: 
political stability and a receptive and passive elite. This was achieved momentarily in Colombia 
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negatively. The system is also largely overlooked by Ramírez who focus on the state-led project of the 
1920s. Correa, ‘Colombia’ in La expansión ferroviaria, ed. by Kuntz, pp. 137-67; Ramírez, ‘Los 
ferrocarriles’ in La infraestructura, pp. 3-6. 
193  Lewis, British Railways; Lewis, Public Policy; Summerhill, 'The Development of Infrastructure'; 
Summerhill, Order; Summerhill, ‘Market Intervention’; Miller, Britain and Latin America, p. 134. 
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with Reyes’s caudillo style dictatorship. However, as the first two chapters illustrated, Reyes 
was significantly less successful than Díaz in pacifying the elite and producing internal political 
stability. Both Garner and Coatsworth demonstrate this political order was indispensable to the 
modernising project he implemented within the Mexican economy.195 Fleming argues that in 
mid-1870s Argentina, hostility to a ‘7 percent guarantee [paid] directly to shareholders’ led to 
‘a delay of nearly three years’ expanding the Gran Oeste, whilst Lewis contends that prior to 
1880 ‘the perennial constitutional problem’ inhibited railway expansion.196 As such, in 
Argentina, political resistance and instability contributed to the stagnation of railway 
construction prior to the boom of the 1880s, just as it did subsequently in Colombia. However, 
the federalisation of Buenos Aires in 1880 established ‘internal order … until 1929’, and 
provided the stability required for the rapid growth of the network.197 Both Brazil and 
Argentina guaranteed dividends to shareholders, significantly outstripping the support received 
by the CNRC, yet neither Wright, Lewis, or Summerhill describe the same level of political 
opposition which materialised in Colombia.198 Argentina ended railway guarantees in 1891, 
but rather than an ideological aversion to government support of foreign interests, the decision 
was influenced by the ‘abuse of the guarantee system’, far surpassing the levels of support in 
Colombia.199 To give some perspective, the Eastern Argentine received £1,000,000 of support 
payments, surpassing its £970,000 capitalisation.200 In contrast, the CNRC’s debt to the 
Colombian government reached £1,400,000 in 1921, of which over £400,000 was cumulative 
interest. The support payments received by the CNRC were at most £1,000,000, on a total 
capitalisation of £2,480,000. They would have been significantly less but for the civil war. In 
                                                             
195  Coatsworth, Growth, pp. 1-15; Garner, British Lions, pp. 94-117.  
196  Fleming, ‘Profits and Visions’, in Railway Imperialism, ed. by Robinson, p. 76; Lewis, British Railways, 
p. 44. 
197  Lewis, British Railways, p. 44. 
198  Summerhill, ‘Market intervention’; Wright, ‘British-Owned Railways’, Lewis, Public Policy; Lewis, 
British Railways. 
199  Wright, British-Owned Railways, p. 77; Lewis, British Railways, pp. 113, 117. 
200  Lewis, British Railways, p. 117. 
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addition, Argentina had been paying guarantees for over two decades by the time the system 
was rescinded.201 The about turn in Colombian policy occurred in the space of five years. 
Wright describes how in Argentina ‘antiforeign nationalism’ materialised in the first decade of 
the twentieth century, but was nullified by the ‘all-powerful rule of the oligarchs’ who 
maintained a positive stance to foreign interests.202 As such, the contrast between the CNRC’s 
(and GNCRC’s) experience to that in Brazil or Argentina suggests Colombia’s elites were 
uniquely predisposed to antagonistic agency against outside economic influences. These 
factors explain why the modernising project of the Quinquenio was less successful and 
enduring than those of Mexico, Argentina, or Brazil, despite applying effectively the same 
ideological and economic model.  
The strength of local agency also meant that the relationship between Cain and Hopkins’s 
‘gentlemanly capitalists’ and Robinson and Gallagher’s ‘collaborating elites’ was much less 
stable than elsewhere in the region.203 Based on the evidence presented, we could certainly 
classify the intersection between the Jenks and local political actors as an example of ‘British 
imperialism’, and the local populous certainly considered this to be the case. However, this was 
not a classical imperialistic relationship. The chapter has demonstrated that local political 
actors fundamentally drove this relationship. Rather than being passive and compliant enablers 
of the interests of foreign capitalists, the Colombian political elites co-opted British capital and 
technology to serve their own interests. By the 1880s, families such as the Camacho Roldáns 
and Pérez Trianas were constructing transnational businesses long before Minor Keith 
dominated the banana zone. In contrast, as Darwin and Platt argue, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
and Peru, the elite were content to leave this same lucrative economic niche to British and 
                                                             
201  Lewis, British Railways, pp. 97-117. 
202  Wright, British-Owned Railways, p. 103. 
203  Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, I; Robinson and Gallagher, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’. 
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European trading houses.204 In view of this background, it is unsurprising that Colombia’s 
political elite demanded a similar level of control over infrastructure as it held over 
international trade. These desires were manifested in the form of heel dragging in negotiations, 
demands for representation on the board, repudiation or breach of contracts, and the request to 
use company funds to develop elite recreational infrastructure. British businessmen were 
overwhelmed and bewildered by this ‘catch-as-catch-can’ business culture, and as such 
Miller’s observation that British businessmen were ‘forced to compromise with the endemic 
corruption they encountered in Latin America’ is highly applicable to Colombia.205 Shirley 
Jenks provides an example of a businessman that accepted this compromise by slowly adapting 
and thriving within the alien environment. 
As a British businessman in the ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ mould, Jenks faced agency from the 
government apparatus and local Cundinamarcan elite concurrently. Unlike Dávila or Mainero 
he initially lacked what Molina terms the ‘business mentality’ exhibited by successful 
nineteenth and early twentieth century Colombian Businessmen.206 Jenks’s case demonstrates 
that a caudillo style leader was essential for conventional ‘British imperialism’ (or the 
guarantee system) to function, since it assured the implementation of the specific flavour of 
North’s ‘rules of the game’ that ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ were accustomed to working under.207 
Posada and Jaksić argue that the ‘historiographical insistence on the caudillo tradition in Latin 
America has impeded the proper appreciation of how weak the executive power often was’.208 
                                                             
204  Rausch, Santiago Pérez Triana, pp. 25-30; Darwin, Unfinished Empire, pp. 169-170; Platt, Latin 
America, pp. 136-72. 
205  Rory Miller, ‘Foreign Capital, The State and Political Corruption in Latin America Between 
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But in the context of foreign investment, this is exactly why a caudillo style leader was so 
necessary, since it addressed this fundamental and systemic institutional weakness. 
The most fundamental ‘rule of the game’, was the stability of and the respect for contractual 
agreements. Outside the Quinquenio these fundamental ‘rules of the game’ were absent. The 
histories of the CNRC, the CNoRC, the GNCRC, the BRPC, the SMRC and the DRC all 
illustrate that the ‘imperialism’ of British railway companies in Colombia (if it existed at all in 
the standard sense) was not as straightforward as that which existed in Argentina or Brazil. No 
Colombian railway fits Robinson’s ‘colonizing, immigrative railway imperialism’ model.209 
The lack of European immigration associated with railway construction perhaps helps to 
explain increased resistance and local agency, similar to how the UFC’s failure to import 
Caribbean labour inhibited the growth of its power in the banana zone.210 In addition, as the 
next chapter illustrates, railways such as the BRPC or the SMRC were controlled by 
‘transnational capitalists’. These were less directly tied to the projection of national interests 
and imperial power in the traditional sense, because their businesses did not function as a 
simple economic connection between the imperial metropole and a developing peripheral 
economy. As such, with the possible exception of the DRC, no British railway in Colombia 
really fits traditional models for understanding British imperial economic expansion. 
The pattern of ownership created by the guarantee system further limited the construction and 
projection of influence and power. This pattern was different to the one evident in railways 
financed with subventions. The government was the largest single shareholder, and large 
shareholders did not control as much of the share capital as elsewhere in Colombia. The 
guarantee avoided the detrimental effects of the concentrated shareholding patterns explored 
in the third, fifth, and sixth chapters. The government’s large stake acted as an additional 
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counterweight against efforts to mould expansion policy in the interests of influential 
shareholders. Robinson and Gallagher argue ‘collaborating elites’ were necessary for 
empire.211 The CNRC’s history demonstrates how the agency exhibited by Colombian elites 
disrupted the orthodox mechanism of economic control employed by British capitalists. The 
‘Apulo works’ of the CNRC and the Chiquinquirá expansion of CNoRC demonstrate that in 
both railways, the relationship between ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ and ‘collaborating elites’ was 
dominated by the interests of the latter, who directed resources for their own benefit. These 
interests created significant resentment and resistance, leading to early nationalisation. 
 
                                                             



































Chapter 5. - The Coastal Railways 
5.1 Introduction 
Separatism started to germinate in Panama under the shadow of the [American] railway 
company. … [which] became the lynchpin of the succession movement. … Who can guarantee 
… these companies will not fall into the hands of North American speculators? … Nationalising 
the railways of the Atlantic Coast, is strategically speaking, turning the key in the lock of 
security of the nation. … The very security and integrity of the nation depends on this. El 
Republicano, 1911.1 
 
In 1911 El Republicano and much of Colombia’s political elite were preoccupied with what 
the transnational interests interweaved with the SMRC and BRPC would mean for national 
sovereignty. This chapter demonstrates that rather than an irrational reaction to a traumatic 
event, Colombian elites were right to be concerned. Posada and Muñera argue the Caribbean 
region was distinct from the interior largely because of its economic proximity to the world 
economy.2 This chapter shows that as a result of this proximity, both the BRPC and SMRC 
were controlled by a group Cain and Hopkins term ‘gentlemanly capitalists’, and another Sklair 
and Robinson term the ‘transnational capitalist class’.3 Sklair explores the consolidation of this 
global class in the second half of the twentieth century.4 In this chapter I argue that – just as is 
the case in Colby’s study of Central America – the origins of transnational capitalism are 
clearly visible in the early twentieth century Colombian Caribbean.5 These interests are 
particularly evident in the SMRC, and to a lesser extent in the BRPC. The first section of the 
chapter argues that the BRPC’s geographical monopoly created a railway as remunerative as 
any in the Latin American region. This led to a mix of ‘transnational capitalists’ and 
‘gentlemanly capitalists’ rapidly taking control of the company for the monopoly level profits. 
                                                             
1  ‘Grave Peligro para la integridad de la Nación – necesidad de nacionalizar los ferrocarriles de la Nación’ 
El Republicano, 11 August 1911. 
2  Eduardo Posada, Colombian Caribbean. 
3  William Robinson, Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change and Globalization 
(London: Verso, 2003), p. 39; P.J Cain and A. G. Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British 
Expansion Overseas II: New Imperialism, 1850-1945’, The Economic History Review, 40 (1987), 1-26; 
Sklair, ‘The Transnational Capitalist Class’; Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class. 
4  Sklair, ‘The Transnational Capitalist Class’; Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class. 
5  Jason Colby, The Business of Empire United Fruit, Race and U.S. Expansion in Central America 
(London: Cornell University Press, 2013). 
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The interests of these shareholders led to a company policy dedicated to protecting the 
geographical monopoly, rather than expanding operations. However, I also argue the BRPC 
enabled Colombia to access international engineering expertise, necessary to construct the 
infrastructure required for the ‘despegue cafetero’ economic growth of the 1920s.6 The 
chapter’s second section argues the SMRC’s and the UFC’s congruent interests dominated 
expansion plans. These interests, combined with the government policy designed to reign in 
the UFC, arrested railway expansion to the Magdalena River. The SMRC was dominated by 
the interests of transnational capital, but the chapter rejects monolithic representation of the 
SMRC/UFC relationship, arguing it was complex and multifaceted, and interconnected with 
Britain’s leading banana importer Fyffes. Rather than a conduit of empire for the UFC, the 
SMRC is presented as succumbing (much like the region) to its more powerful economic 
interests. But the idea of the UFC’s omnipotence is also rejected. The chapter proves that all 
sections of Colombian society displayed agency in the face of the UFC’s encroachment, and 
as such, Bucheli’s concept of an unbroken receptive perspective towards foreign capital 
throughout the ‘conservative hegemony’, within which rising opposition to the UFC is 
attributed solely to the liberal opposition, is a misconception.7 Whereas LeGrand illustrated 
agency from workers in the zone, this chapter illustrates that significant attempts were made 
by the conservative national government to limit the UFC’s power though its relationship with 
the SMRC. I demonstrate and that nationalisation of the coastal railways was central to national 
railway policy, contradicting Bucheli’s argument that the conservative national government 
‘opposed nationalization’.8 Ultimately, I argue that the UFC’s experience with the SMRC was 
                                                             
6  Bejarano, ‘El Despegue Cafetero’. 
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York: New York University Press, 2005), pp. 88-94. 
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216 
 
significantly different to the one presented by Colby in Central America, paralleling the 
argument of Tucker that ‘banana corporations never dominated national governments [in 
Colombia], as they did in the smaller countries to the north’.9 
5.2 The Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company 
5.2.1 Origins 
The Barranquilla Railway was built to avoid ‘a shifting and unstable sand bar’ within the 
Magdalena River delta known as the Bocas de Ceniza, which ‘impeded ocean vessels from 
reaching [Barranquilla]’.10 The Bocas de Ceniza made any other transportation route between 
Barranquilla and the outside world impractical, creating a strong monopoly.  
Fig. 5.1 – Map showing the BRPC and the Bocas de Ceniza sandbank it was built to avoid 
 
Source: Posada, The Colombian Caribbean, p. 118 
                                                             
9  Colby, The Business of Empire, p. 158; Richard Tucker, Insatiable Appetite: The United States and the 
Ecological Degradation of the Tropical World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 158. 
10  Posada, Colombian Caribbean, p. 163. 
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As was discussed in the first chapter, the original concession for the Barranquilla Railway was 
awarded to a British man named W.J. Kelly in 1865.11 However, this agreement was 
subsequently violated, and the concession was transferred to General Ramón Santodomingo 
and Ramón Jimeno the same year. The first was the vice president of the state of Bolívar and 
Chief General of the army in the state. The second was described by Kelly as ‘a member of the 
legislature, and one of the warmest partisans of the government’.12 These men, ‘together with 
the German immigrant minority and their connections in Bremen, built the railroad’.13 Ramón 
Santodomingo was a radical liberal signatory of the 1863 Rionegro constitution. He was also 
the great uncle of the modern Colombian billionaire Julio Mario Santo Domingo, and the  
award of the Barranquilla Railway concession represents the family’s first step on their way 
towards entering what Sklair terms the ‘transnational capitalist class’.14 The construction of the 
railway revolutionised Barranquilla, replacing Santa Marta and Cartagena as the dominant port 
for international trade.15 The geography of the river made the railway ‘very profitable almost 
from the outset’, attracting a group of wealthy shareholders who rapidly developed majority 
control of the enterprise16 I argue in subsequent subsections that the interests of these 
shareholders led to the company focussing its energies on protecting its monopoly, rather than 
expanding its operations. 
5.2.2 Javier Cisneros 
The Cuban-American civil engineer Javier Cisneros played an important role in the 
development of this railway. During the first administration of Rafael Nuñez (1880-1882) 
Cisneros proposed building a rail extension from Puerto Salgar to Punta de Nizperal, where the 
                                                             
11  ‘Daniel O’Leary’s despatch No. 12’, 24 November 1865, TNA, FO135/88. 
12  Ibid. 
13  Horna, Transport Modernization, p. 144. 
14  Sklair, ‘The Transnational Capitalist’; Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class. 
15  Juan Santiago Correa, ‘El Ferrocarril de Bolívar y la consolidación del Puerto de Barranquilla’ (1865-
1941)’, Revista de Economía Institucional, 14 (2012), 241-66 (p. 263). 
16  Horna, Transport Modernization, p. 144. 
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waters were more suitable for anchoring ships.17 He was initially thwarted by local opposition, 
until he arranged for an associate to purchase the concession and subsequently transfer it to 
him.18 Cisneros then gradually transferred ‘his property to joint stock companies … in England 
in order to obtain that nation’s influence’, influenced by his ‘long experience in witnessing 
intrigues and nationalistic reaction against his enterprises’.19 This was a tactic subsequently 
paralleled by Dávila and the CNoRC, on the basis that if threatened, their interests would enjoy 
British diplomatic intervention. Between 1888 and 1889, Cisneros constructed an extension of 
the line to Puerto Colombia, where the conditions were more advantageous for ocean going 
vessels than at Salgar.20 A modern iron pier was constructed by the British engineer John B. 
Dougherty using ‘British equipment and materials’, which when opened on the 15 July 1893, 
was the third largest in the world, and represented ‘one of the most dramatic engineering feats 
ever witnessed by Colombia’21  
5.2.3 Finances 
As Table 5.1 demonstrates, the BRPC was a highly profitable enterprise. Debt was also low: 
only £100,000 of interest bearing debentures were outstanding between F/Y 1904/05 and F/Y 






                                                             
17  Horna, Transport Modernisation, p. 145. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Ibid, p. 146. 
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21  Illegible to President Reyes, 2 November 1907, AGN, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 320, f. 89; Horna, Transport 
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Table 5.1 – The Barranquilla Railway Company Accounts F/Y 1904/5-1929/30 





















1904/05 £48,287 £30,415 £17,872 £300,000 £6,000 5.96% 5.94% 
1905/06 £44,371 £26,885 £17,486 £300,000 £6,000 5.83% 5.74% 
1906/07 £36,852 £24,960 £11,892 £300,000 £6,000 3.96% 2.95% 
1907/08 £43,947 £23,819 £20,128 £300,000 £6,000 6.71% 7.06% 
1908/09 £42,724 £22,769 £19,955 £300,000 £6,000 6.65% 6.98% 
1909/10 £45,922 £23,526 £22,396 £300,000 £6,000 7.47% 8.20% 
1910/11 £53,793 £27,174 £26,619 £300,000 £6,000 8.87% 10.31% 
1911/12 £55,551 £27,992 £27,559 £300,000 £6,000 9.19% 10.78% 
1912/13 £71,017 £32,292 £38,725 £350,000 £6,000 11.06% 13.09% 
1913/14 £70,581 £35,238 £35,343 £350,000 £6,000 10.10% 11.74% 
1914/15 £57,123 £31,076 £26,047 £350,000 £6,000 7.44% 8.02% 
1915/16 £73,823 £34,207 £39,616 £350,000 £6,000 11.32% 13.45% 
1916/17 £74,012 £37,746 £36,266 £350,000 £6,000 10.36% 12.11% 
1917/18 £60,183 £39,565 £20,618 £350,000 £6,000 5.89% 5.85% 
1918/19 £73,534 £47,011 £26,523 £350,000 £6,000 7.58% 8.21% 
1919/20 £129,385 £82,368 £47,017 £350,000 £6,000 13.43% 16.41% 
1920/21 £153,864 £105,942 £47,922 £400,000 £6,000 11.98% 13.97% 
1921/22 £138,176 £101,395 £36,781 £450,000 £10,000 8.17% 8.93% 
1922/23 £151,151 £100,309 £50,842 £450,000 £10,000 11.30% 13.61% 
1923/24 £167,686 £107,487 £60,199 £450,000 £10,000 13.38% 16.73% 
1924/25 £184,069 £119,137 £64,932 £397,461 £6,687 16.34% 19.42% 
1925/26 £241,789 £155,566 £86,223 £419,550 £1,564 20.55% 21.16% 
1926/27 £303,889 £180,219 £123,670 £400,000 £0 30.92% 30.92% 
1927/28 £334,689 £179,616 £155,073 £480,000 £0 32.31% 32.31% 
1928/29 £363,386 £231,770 £131,616 £500,000 £0 26.32% 26.32% 
1929/30 £234,937 £166,815 £68,122 £750,000 £0 9.08% 9.08% 
Sources: Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Boxes 879, 928, 974, 1021, 1067, 1115-6, 1167, 
1217-8, 1267, 1318-9, 1369-70, 1420-1, 1469, 1512, 1557, 1602, 1647, 1693, 1738, 1782, 1830, 1879, 
1929, 2030, 2081. 
Fig. 5.2 illustrates how the share capital of the company increased from £200,000 to £750,000 
between F/Y 1911/12 and F/Y 1929/30, because of several bonus shares issuances to existing 
shareholders. The BRPC received no additional capital from these, and initial shareholders did 
not relinquish any of their stake in the railway’s monopoly. Davis and Huttenback’s principal 
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measure of return on capital was set against ‘all capital claims’.22 On this basis, the basic rate 
of return for the BRPC reached 30% towards the end of the 1920s, significantly higher than 
Lewis’s 6% figure for Argentine railways, Edelstein’s 5.33% average for Latin American 
railways, or Davis and Huttenback’s 5.7% average for overseas British railways.23 Whilst these 
only provide regional or national averages, the BRPC’s profitability is sufficiently high in order 
to suggest it was comparatively an extremely profitable enterprise. 
Fig. 5.2 - Levels of share capital, interest bearing debentures, total capitalisation, return on 
share capital, and return on all invested capital of the BRPC – F/Y 1904/05 – F/Y 1929/30 
 
Sources: See table 4.1 and Edelstein, Overseas Investment, p. 125; Lewis, British Railways, pp. 217; Davis and 
Huttenback, Mammon, p. 117. 
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However, bonus share issuances between F/Y 1912/13 and F/Y 1929/30 make using a basic 
rate of return ‘on all capital claims’ flawed and misleading, since for many shareholders the 
effective return on share capital was substantially higher. Fig. 5.3 displays profits after 
debenture interest as a proportion of the original share capital of £200,000. This gives a more 
representative illustration of the experience of shareholders who had held shares before the first 
bonus shares issuance in F/Y 1912/13. It is particularly important to illustrate the experience 
of these shareholders, because as the next subsection will demonstrate, large shareholders 
holding significant interests in 1891 still held a 40% stake in the enterprise in 1920. The figures 
displayed in Fig. 5.3, are by any means of analysis, monopoly level profits. In these 
circumstances, the understandable preoccupation of the shareholders was to maintain the 
lucrative monopoly, rather than expand operations. 
Fig. 5.3 – Return on shares held before the first bonus share issuance in F/Y 1912/13 
 
Sources: See Table 1. 
Throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century, the BRPC paid a dependable but 






















































































































once in F/Y 1906/07, because of the uncertainty surrounding the national government’s rights 
to nationalise the line, and a ‘war of rates’ with the competing Cartagena railway, and again in 
F/Y 1919/20, when the board decided against a dividend because of a debenture issuance of 
£50,000 at 8% to finance reinforcing the pier with concrete. 24 Rippy’s argument that 
Colombian railways were not particularly profitable, which remains unchallenged by the 
national historiography to date, is based on the average nominal value of dividends paid by the 
BRPC and other Colombian railways.25 However, as fig. 5.4 illustrates, the effective dividend 
income for long term investors was significantly higher. By F/Y 1929/30, shareholders who 
acquired their stake in the 1910s, 1920s, or before, enjoyed an effective dividend income of 
between 16% and 20%. Within Latin American historiography only the Panama Railroad 
Company and the São Paolo Railway Company present a similar shareholder experience.26 
Casson and da Silva Lopes argue investment in high-risk environments such as Latin America 
depended on risk-management strategies.27 One such strategy – implemented by the CNoRC, 
the BRPC and the DRC – was conservative financial management, meaning dividend payments 
fell well below underlying profitability. As such, underlying profitability is only evident 
through analysis of accounting records. Since dividend income has been used as the principal 
measure of profitability internationally, a re-evaluation of the profitability of British railway 
investment may well be necessary on a much wider basis.  
                                                             
24  ‘Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company Report of 1907’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, 
Box 974, ff. 1-2; ‘Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company Report of 1920’, Guildhall Library, Stock 
Exchange Reports, Box 1602, f. 5. 
25  Rippy, British Investments, pp. 118-9. 
26  Correa, The Panama Railroad, p. 132; Lewis, Public Policy, pp. 32-3, 54-5. 
27  Casson and da Silva Lopes, ‘Foreign direct investment’. 
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Fig. 5.4 – BRPC nominal dividends, effective dividends for shares held before 1912/13 (1), 
and effective dividends for shares acquired between F/Y 1912/13 and F/Y 1920/21 (2) -  F/Y 
1904/05 – F/Y 1929/30. 
Source: See Table 1. 
The BRPC’s only potential expansion route was upstream following the banks of the 
Magdalena River. To provide any extra utility, the railway would need to expand as far as one 
of the river ports of the interior. The closest, Puerto Wilches (of the GNCRC), was over 500km 
upstream, the next, Puerto Berrio (of the Antioquia Railway), was over 100km further 
upstream, then La Dorada (of the DRC) was at least a further 100km upstream. Thus, at the 
very minimum, the BRPC had to construct 700km of track to link up with the railways of the 
interior. The Cucuta Railway had plans to expand its line as far as Tamalameque, approx. 
200km nearer to the coast than Puerto Wilches. However, ‘the project only ever existed in the 
imagination, and was never realised’.28 An expansion upstream would have been beneficial for 
the national economy. Periodic problems of navigability on the river would have been solved, 
28 Olga Lucía Pradilla Landazábal ‘El ferrocarril de Cúcuta 1876-1960: expresión de unos cambios 
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and the connection with the interior would have been quicker and more dependable. However, 
the freight wrestled from the river steamers would not have been sufficient to justify the 
enormous capital outlay, especially without the security of a government guarantee. The BRPC 
was already processing all the freight which made its way down the river as far as Barranquilla. 
For the shareholders, there was little to be gained from a costly and risky expansion project. 
As subsequent subsections will detail, this led to a focus on improving the pier infrastructure 
to protect what in 1910 the Foreign Office described as ‘a practical monopoly on the import 
and export trade’.29 
4.2.4 Shareholders 
The BRPC closely parallels other railways established through the subvention system, which 
tended to be dominated by large shareholders. Fig. 5.5 demonstrates how small shareholders, 
elsewhere largely made up of what I term ‘middle-class capitalists’, were almost entirely absent 
from the BRPC shareholding.30 In 1891 there was not a single shareholder with a holding under 
£200. In 1929 this had risen to only 3%. Large shareholders with an investment greater than 
£2000 decreased from 87% in 1891, to just under 63% in 1929. Medium sized shareholders 
holding between £201 and £2000 rose from 13% in 1891, to 34% in 1929. This is a stark 
contrast from the CNRC, where by 1913, small and medium shareholders held a greater stake 
than large shareholders. This supports the argument made in the previous chapter, that the 
government guarantee system employed by the CNRC attracted these middle-class capitalists. 
The evidence available suggests the guarantee system encouraged a less concentrated 
shareholding pattern, whilst the monopolistic railways created by the subvention system 
encouraged control by the emerging ‘transnational capitalist class’ or ‘gentlemanly capitalists’. 
                                                             
29  ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, p. 51. 
30  Within shareholder records of British Railway Companies in Colombia those with small shareholdings 
under £200 in value were often from middle-class backgrounds. The majority were professionals, but 
lower middle-class businessmen such as butchers, greengrocers and shop-keepers, also appear. 
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Fig. 5.5 – BRPC shareholders by size 
 
Sources: Shareholder Registers 1891, 1913, 1920, 1929, Companies House, Company No. 26163 (Barranquilla 
Investments Ltd).31 
Fig. 5.6 illustrates how Javier Cisneros held a large stake from the outset, which in 1891 
represented 56%. At this time five families, including his, controlled over 80% of the share 
capital. In 1913, this had dropped to approx. 40%. An additional four families had each 
acquired large interests representing approx. 18%. As a result, nine families controlled 58% of 
the company. These families were different to the types of investors seen in the interior of the 
country. Characteristics which stands out are significant wealth, links to international finance 
and commerce, and membership of what Sklair and Robinson define within the current world 
economy as the ‘transnational capitalist class’. These are characteristically international in 
nature and unrestrained by national boundaries.32 One such investor was Bendix Koppel, who 
owned 8% of the company. Bendix’s mother was part of the Warburg family, with banking 
                                                             
31  Throughout this thesis shareholder groups are defined in the following terms: Small Shareholders £1-
£200, Medium Shareholders £201-£2,000, Large Shareholders >£2,000. 


















interests throughout the western world. Another was the Isaac family, who were established in 
both London and Bogotá, and developed their shareholding to almost 14% of the enterprise by 
1920. London stockbrokers Alfred and Ernest Schiff held 3% of the company. The Schiff 
family were influential in both London and New York, and when they died, left estates totalling 
£1,647,000.33 
Fig. 5.6 – BRPC major shareholders 
 
Sources: See Fig. 5.5. 
Sklair argues ‘new technologies’ and a ‘new global political economy’ leading to 
‘unprecedented mobility of capital’ are the motors of present day globalisation through 
transnational capitalism.34 This commentary could easily be describing the experience of 
                                                             
33  The Palgrave Dictionary of Anglo-Jewish History, ed. by W. Rubinstein, Michael A. Jolles and Hilary 
L. Rubenstein (New York: Palgrave, 2011), p. 871. 
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shareholders of the BRPC or other railways in the early twentieth century. Technologies like 
the telegraph and steamship, meant shareholders – many of who likely never stepped foot on 
Colombian soil – were able to develop an economic interest which many within the national 
local elite felt threatened the sovereignty of the entire country. Furthermore, this investment 
was enabled by the development of what could be termed a ‘global political economy’, which 
was enthusiastically embraced by Latin American leaders such as Reyes (Colombia), and Díaz 
(Mexico). Other shareholders such as the British-South African banker, financier, and mining 
magnate Sir Sigmund Neumann, London Banker John Leman Whelen, the Jiggins, Clark, and 
Glass Hooper families, fit much better within the ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ concept. Most were 
domiciled in Britain, within either the metropolitan area or in South-East England, and thus fit 
Cain and Hopkin’s classification, which understands this social class as the driving force of 
British imperialism.35. Shareholders with a presence in Colombia maintained strong links to 
the City of London. Koppel was born in Europe but lived in Colombia. Cisneros was born in 
Cuba but lived in Colombia and America. These political actors straddle the divide between 
the national and ‘transnational capitalist’ class. They lived their lives across borders, 
exemplifying Sklair’s ‘citizens of the world’ description.36  
The shareholding records lead to some important questions. Were these shareholding patterns, 
and the entry of the ‘transnational capitalist’ or the ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ into the national 
economy, beneficial or detrimental for Colombia? We witness a consolidation of control by a 
small group of powerful and enormously wealthy shareholders, with international interests and 
influence, who wielded control over infrastructure with an effective monopoly over the 
international trade of the interior. As the quote opening this chapter demonstrates, the national 
35 Youssef Cassis, City Bankers, 1890-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 127; Cain, 
and Hopkins, British Imperialism, I; Shareholder Registers for 1891, 1913, 1920, 1929, Companies 
House, Company No. 26163 (Barranquilla Investments Ltd),. 
36 Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class, p. 70. 
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political elite understood the threat these interests posed to national sovereignty.37 The BRPC 
underlines a significant problem of capitalist driven economic development in peripheral areas: 
capital gravitated towards where it was needed least. The infrastructure employed was certainly 
of a high quality, but this infrastructure was used primarily to protect the railway’s monopoly. 
But could things have been any different? The railway was already constructed by Cisneros 
before it became a British company. However, to service the needs of the interior, the pier’s 
infrastructure needed to be of a high standard, with sufficient capacity to service most of the 
country’s foreign trade. Ramírez argues ‘the lack of technical knowledge’ remained a 
stumbling block to infrastructure development during the 1920s, meaning constructing the pier 
would have been difficult (if not impossible) without foreign involvement.38 As the next 
subsection illustrates, the loss of sovereignty was counterbalanced by access to international 
capital and engineering expertise. This enabled Colombia to construct transportation 
infrastructure to service its export trade which assured international competitiveness. 
5.2.5 Civil War, Contractual Dispute and Expansion 1899-1914 
The BRPC was largely unaffected by the guerrilla warfare of the civil war, and the physical 
impact was less than that suffered by the CNRC, the DRC or the SMRC. According to the 
company’s report for 1903, ‘during the long period of the revolution not the slightest damage 
was sustained by the company’s property’.39 The greatest effect was the decrease in 
international trade, leading to decreased revenues and profits.40 The inflation of the Colombian 
peso was also an issue. The BRPC management attributed success facing the challenges to the 
                                                             
37  ‘Grave Peligro para la integridad de la Nación – necesidad de nacionalizar los ferrocarriles de la Nación’, 
El Republicano, 11 August 1911. 
38  Ramírez, ‘Los ferrocarriles’ in La infraestructura, p. 48. 
39  ‘Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company Report of 1903’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, 
Box 787, f. 1. 
40  ‘Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company Report of 1901’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, 
Box 688, f. 1. 
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local general manager C.P. Yeatman.41 Whilst material damage to the enterprise was avoided, 
the civil war paralysed the production and transportation of coffee and other export 
commodities from the interior. In F/Y 1903/04, a large backlog of goods flowed out of the 
interior, doubling the tonnage carried and the company’s profits.42 
In the aftermath of the war, the BRPC’s most pressing issue was clarifying the government’s 
contractual right to nationalise the railway, which was unclear and led to a protracted legal 
case. The original concession contract entered legislation through ley 49 de 1884, and included 
a clause enabling nationalisation twenty years after the railway reached Puerto Belillo.43 The 
BRPC and national government disagreed over when this twenty-year period began. The 
national government felt the clause came into effect as of June 1907, twenty years after the 
extension of the railway was completed.44 The BRPC argued the twenty-year period should 
start from the point at which ‘the pier [extension] was opened to public traffic … [on] the 15 
June 1893’ representing an end date of 15 June 1913.45 This disagreement was based on 
different interpretations of the original contract. The contact stated: 
After twenty years (20) from the date when the railway shall have been extended as far as Puerto-
Belillo and open for traffic, the government may redeem the whole railway with its annexes and 
accessories for the sum at which the railway and accessories may be valued for their material 
value by experts appointed by the government.46 
The uncertainty occurred because the pier was not specifically referenced within the clause, 
leading to a debate over whether ‘railway’ referred to the whole enterprise including the pier, 
or just the terrestrial track. Colombian courts eventually ruled in favour of the BRPC, setting 
                                                             
41  ‘Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company Report of 1902’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, 
Box 737, f. 1. 
42  ‘Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company Report of 1904’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, 
Box 830, f. 1. 
43  Illegible to Reyes, 2 November 1907, AGN, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 320, ff. 88-91. 
44  Illegible (Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company) to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 15 February 1908, TNA, 
FO371/436, f. 310. 
45  AGN, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 320, f. 91. 
46  Illegible (Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company) to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 15 February 1908, TNA, 
FO371/436, f. 310. 
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the first opportunity for nationalisation as the 15 June 1913.47 Two further opportunities for 
nationalisation would follow at ten-year intervals. The first in 1923 allowed purchase with a 
20% discount; the second in 1933 included a 40% discount.48 After courts ruled in favour of 
the BRPC, it remained unclear whether the national government would subsequently 
nationalise the railway. This inhibited modernisation and investment. The 1912 Proyecto de 
Ley Sobre Ferrocarriles created a legislative basis for the nationalisation of the coastal 
railways, adding to the general feeling of uncertainty for the BRPC.49 At the annual meeting of 
shareholders in 1913, the company secretary commented that:  
For two or three years past, and until the contract with the executive was signed (only a few 
weeks ago), they had been living, so to speak, from hand to mouth, fearing to order rolling stock 
in advance of actual requirements lest it might be left on their hands in the event of the 
government’s exercising its right of purchase, and they had been quite unable to take in hand 
such important works as the extension of the pier.50 
 
When the first opportunity for nationalisation arrived on the 15 June 1913, Colombia’s 
unfavourable financial position meant funding the nationalisation was unfeasible. Both parties 
also viewed nationalisation as undesirable at this time. Additional capacity for vessels on the 
pier was indispensable to the developing export economy.51  Waiting another decade assured 
the pier extension would be completed with foreign capital and engineering expertise, and the 
second opportunity for repurchase in 1923 included a 20% discount.52 Forgoing this 
opportunity to repurchase the railway, assured another decade of operations for the BRPC, and 
                                                             
47  Illegible (Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company) to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 15 February 1908, TNA, 
FO371/436, f. 310. 
48  Illegible (Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company) to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 15 February 1908, TNA, 
FO371/436, f. 310. 
49  ‘Proyecto de Ley “Sobre Ferrocarriles”’, 30 October 1911, AGN, Congreso Legislativo, Vol. 1579, ff. 
39-55. 
50  ‘Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company Limited’, The Times, 1 November 1913. 
51  ‘Proyecto de Contrato entre el Gobierno de Colombia y The Barranquilla Railway & Pier Company, 
Limited’, AGN, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 321, ff. 258-60; Illegible (Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company) 
to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 15 February 1908, TNA, FO371/436, f. 310. 
52  Illegible (Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company) to Grey (Foreign Secretary), 15 February 1908, TNA, 
FO371/436, f. 310. 
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some semblance of stability. The pier had represented a bottleneck for international trade, and 
the BRPC immediately began pier expansion to provide sufficient capacity for the growing 
demands of Barranquilla. Colombia could only export what its rudimentary system of 
transportation could cope with, and as the principal point of exchange with the world economy, 
the pier at Puerto Colombia was an indispensable part of this. The uncertainty surrounding the 
BRPC’s position benefited the Cartagena Railway, which as a competing route, was able to 
compensate for the delay in the improvements of the BRPC’s infrastructure. 
Fig. 5.7 – Plans for expansion of the BRPC pier, 1916 
 
Source: Kincaid, Waller, Manville & Dawson Consulting Engineers, June 1916, AGN, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 321, 
f. 405. 
Fig. 5.7 presents the engineers’ plans for the Puerto Colombia pier expansion, which included 
adding an extra 300 feet to the pierhead, increasing its length by 50%. The pierhead was also 
widened, increasing the surface area by 80%, and adding an extra rail along its length. In 
addition, the wooden surface of the iron and steel pier would be replaced with reinforced 
concrete. The additional 300ft meant the pier now stretched 4300ft, or 1.31km out to sea.53 
                                                             
53  Correa states that before the expansion the pier was 4,000ft long. Plans of the extension state 300ft was 
added to the end: Correa, ‘El ferrocarril de Bolívar’, p. 257; Plan of Pierhead elaborated by Kincaid, 
Waller, Manville & Dawson Consulting Engineers, June 1916, AGN, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 321, f. 405. 
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Like the Manizales-Mariquita ropeway, which is covered in the next chapter, in terms of scale 
and quality, the pier was comparable to the best examples of the technology in the world. The 
extension and widening of the pier was completed in February 1916; reconstruction in 
reinforced concrete began immediately and was completed in December 1923.54 Figs. 5.8 and 
5.9 provide a view of the original 1893 pier and the 1923 reinforced concrete pier. As the 
principal point of exchange for the export economy, these changes were essential to the 
subsequent development of the national economy, which in the 1920s entered an unprecedented 
period of growth based on coffee exportation termed ‘el despegue cafetero’.55 The lack of a 
pier extension would have inhibited this economic growth, until the ‘Pacific route’ to 
Buenaventura reached the coffee growing region of Caldas in 1930.56 
54 ‘Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company Limited, Report of the Directors, presented 28th November 
1917’, Guildhall Library, Box 1469, p. 3; ‘Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company Limited, Director’s 
report for the year ending 30th June, 1924’ Guildhall Library, Box 1782, p. 3. 
55 Bejarano, ‘El Despegue Cafetero’. 
56 Posada, Colombian Caribbean, p. 160. 
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Fig. 5.8 – Image of the original iron and steel pier c. 1900s 
 
Source: Allen Morrison Collection, http://www.tramz.com/co/ba/ba.html accessed 26/06/2016. 
Fig. 5.9 – Image of the new pier c. 1920s 
 
Source: Alvaro Mendoza Collection, http://www.tramz.com/co/ba/ba.html  accessed 26/06/2016. 
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5.2.6 Competition, redundancy and Nationalisation: 1914-1933 
Competition between Caribbean ports had been ongoing since the colonial period in Colombia. 
During Colonial times Barranquilla had been a minor port of little economic consequence, and 
Santa Marta and Cartagena dominated international trade. The railway transformed 
Barranquilla into Colombia’s principal international port.57 In an attempt to wrestle back 
control over international trade, a railway was hastily built between the port of Cartagena and 
the Magdalena river port of Calamar. This subsequently suffered ‘from the results of cheap 
construction’ in the form of high maintenance costs, and a ‘distinctly primitive’ means of 
transferring goods to river steamers.58 In December 1906, a ‘war of rates’ between the BRPC 
and the Cartagena route occurred.59 Each railway had created strategic alliances with a 
corresponding river steamer company. Their aim was that by lowering freight charges to non-
remunerative levels, they could wrestle freight away from their competitor, and strengthen their 
monopoly. The Foreign Office commented that the results of this policy were ‘disastrous’ for 
both sides.60 Barranquilla was in a superior position to serve the export trade, because the 
infrastructure in place at Puerto Colombia was superior to that implemented at the terminus of 
the Cartagena railway, which the Foreign Office described as being not fit for purpose.61 
However, where the Cartagena railway lacked infrastructure it made up for in strategy. In 1912 
the Cartagena (Colombia) Railway Company merged with the Colombia Navigation Company 
(which ran a riverboat service on the Magdalena River), creating the Colombian Railways and 
Navigation Company.62 This meant through-rates and an integrated service from La Dorada to 
the Caribbean could be offered, and even when the Barranquilla Railway was used as the transit 
                                                             
57  Correa, ‘El ferrocarril de Bolívar’. 
58  ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, p. 16. 
59  ‘The Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company Limited, Report of the directors, 25th October 1907’ 
Guildhall Library, Box 974, p. 1. 
60  ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, p. 17. 
61  Ibid. 
62  ‘Articles of Association – Colombian Railways and Navigation Company Ltd.’ TNA, 
BT31/37496/88115; ‘The Cartagena Railway Amalgamation’, The Times, 22 October 1912. 
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point, the Colombian Railway and Navigations Company (holding company for the railway) 
was often the company transporting the goods by river steamer from the interior to 
Barranquilla, leading it to become ‘the largest transport company in the Magdalena’ on the 
basis of its riverboat operations.63 This tactic seems to have been influenced by Shirley Jenks’s 
interests in river navigation, the Cartagena Railway, and the CNRC.64 One reason Jenks 
developed these interests was an effort to stimulate urban growth in Cartagena because of his 
investment in the city’s water supply (covered in chapter 4).65 Jenks’s interweaved interests in 
railway and river navigation facilitated a better integrated service than offered by the BRPC.66 
Fig. 5.10 – Colombian coffee exports by port, 1916-26 (tons) 
 
Source: Posada, Colombian Caribbean, p. 161. 
As fig. 5.10 elucidates, in the late 1910s to early 1920s, Jenks’s Cartagena route had some 
limited success in acquiring a greater share of Colombia’s coffee exports. However, other than 
                                                             
63  ‘Pineda Lopez & Cia’, El Tiempo, 2 May 1911; Posada, Colombian Caribbean, p. 171. 
64  Thomas Fischer, ‘Empresas de Navegación’, pp. 1010-11; ‘Ferrocarril de Santa Marta – La Prorroga del 
Contrato Peligros de Soberania’, El Tiempo, 11 January 1912. 
65  ‘Adjourned Public Examination of the Debtor Shirley Hatton Jenks’, 5 February 1929, Document in 
Private Collection of Shirley Jenks’ papers held by Tacy Rickard, Teignmouth, Devon. 














a brief anomaly in 1920 where Barranquilla’s share of coffee exports dropped to approx. 150% 
of Cartagena’s, Barranquilla’s status as Colombia’s principal export port was not challenged. 
In contrast, the development of what Posada defines as the ‘Pacific route’, was a serious threat 
to Barranquilla’s role as export hub, and indeed that of the Caribbean region more generally.67 
Fig. 5.10 demonstrates how by 1926, Buenaventura was close to equaling Barranquilla as a 
hub for coffee exportation. This was influenced by the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914, 
which enabled Buenaventura to serve both the Pacific and Atlantic trade routes. The integration 
of the railways of Caldas with the Pacific Railway network also played a part. In 1927, a branch 
off the Pacific railway’s main trunk line reached Armenia, and in 1930, the branch reached 
Pereira, providing a direct outlet to the Pacific for the most prolific coffee producing region of 
the interior.68 As is explored in chapter six, prior to the development of the Pacific railway, the 
coffee production of this zone was carried across the Andes on the Manizales-Mariquita 
ropeway of the DRC, forwarding it on to Barranquilla from the river port of La Dorada. 
                                                             
67  Posada, Colombian Caribbean, p. 160. 
68  Hoffmann, ‘History of Railway Concessions’, pp. 77, 82-4. 
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Fig. 5.11 – BRPC annual receipts F/Y 1904/05 – F/Y 1930/31 
 
Source: F/Y 1904-F/Y 1929/30: See Table 1, F/Y 1930/31: ‘Company Results’ The Times, 4 November 1931. 
Fig. 5.11 illustrates that the Pacific Railway, Buenaventura, and world financial crisis of 1929 
combined to substantially impact the railway’s income. In the space of two years, between F/Y 
1928/29 and F/Y 1930/31, annual income almost halved from £363,000 to £182,700. The 
situation of the BRPC was complicated further by the national government’s attempts to open 
the Bocas de Ceniza. As was explained at the beginning of the chapter, this ‘shifting and 
unstable sand bar’ was the geographical basis of the BRPC’s monopoly.69 Without this barrier, 
the railway would lose its raison d'être. The national government were also aggressively 
pursuing the nationalistic policy towards the coastal railways established in the 1912 Proyecto 
de Ley Sobre Ferrocarriles.70  By May 1932, the national government was blocking BRPC 
remittances to London for taxes and administrative costs, signaling its intention to take 
advantage of the repurchase clause in 1933.71 The railway was finally purchased by the national 
                                                             
69  Posada, Colombian Caribbean, p. 163. 
70  ‘Proyecto de Ley “Sobre Ferrocarriles”’, 30 October 1911, AGN, Congreso Legislativo, Vol. 1579, ff. 
39-55. 
























































































































government on the 15 June 1933 for $1,645,333.90 (£339,244), which would be paid over ten 
years in installments which included  6% annual interest.72 The sale of the railway was a 
positive outcome for the BRPC, which the management called ‘a very fair and satisfactory 
settlement’.73 This capital was invested into commercial property in London, and the BRPC 
changed its name to Barranquilla Investments.74 In December 1936 a few years after the sale, 
the Bocas de Ceniza were officially ‘declared open’ by the national government.75 This meant 
infrastructure was ultimately redundant, and by 1940 the railway ‘had been practically 
abandoned’.76 Correa summed up the irony of the final years of the railway, commenting that 
‘the government bought [a railway] which it very quickly made obsolete with the completion 
of [the Bocas de Ceniza] works’.77 This thesis explains these actions. As previous chapters 
demonstrated, post 1909 Colombian railway policy was not driven by the economic rationality 
Correa feels should drive policy. It was driven by nationalism. 
5.3 The Santa Marta Railway Company 
Of all British railways in Colombia, the SMRC was most closely linked to economic activities 
often characterised as economic imperialism. Indeed, the railway’s development largely 
parallels the ‘railway imperialism’ model presented by Robinson, other than the lack of 
immigration. In Latin America, this turned countries or regions ‘into an economic satellite as 
easily as a self-governing colony’, but crucially, when railways were established ‘at the end of 
shipping lines’, they ‘tended to integrate a country’s economic development into a free-trading, 
international economy and leave the ownership of its economic assets in local hands’.78 This 
                                                             
72  ‘Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company.’, The Times, 22 Dec. 1933. 
73  ‘Company Meetings – Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company – Property taken over by government’, 
The Times, 22 December 1933.  
74  The company remains trading today as a holding company for a large commercial property portfolio in 
central London. A business which in recent years has been perhaps even more lucrative than the railway 
was in its heyday. ‘Barranquilla Investments’, The Times, 29 January 1957. 
75  Posada, Colombian Caribbean, p. 167. 
76  Posada, Colombian Caribbean, p. 170. 
77  Correa, El ferrocarril de Bolívar, p. 263. 
78  Robinson, Railway Imperialism, pp. 184-5. 
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was certainly true for the area surrounding Santa Marta, where, as Tucker argues, the local elite 
‘maintained control of most of the country’s banana land’.79 Kepner and Soothill noted in their 
1935 study The Banana Empire, that the SMRC was the UFC’s main means of control over 
the banana producing region.80 Since the UFC did not control the land, they had to use the 
railway to stop ‘competitors from entering the market’.81 Sklair argues late twentieth century 
transnational capitalism is characterised by ‘the emergence  of a global  culture  and  ideology 
of consumerism,  based  on  the  promotion  of  global  brand  consumer  goods  and services’. 
This is consistent with LeGrand’s study of the banana zone in the early twentieth century, 
where the UFC and SMRC brought with them ‘colgate, quaker oats, … Chevrolet cars, and 
Firestone and Goodyear tires’.82 The impact of what I term the tri-company UFC/Fyffes/SMRC 
transnational business alliance (covered in detail below) on the banana region, was great from 
a social and cultural as well as an economic perspective. However, as LeGrand argues, the 
UFC ‘did not wield absolute power’.83 
The representation of the SMRC’s and the UFC’s relationship as monolithic and the UFC’s 
economic power as omnipotent, is prominent within Colombian popular culture. The banana 
massacre occurred when the Colombian army opened fire on a large group of banana workers 
engaging in an anti-UFC strike in December 1928. In the Nobel prize winning novel Cien años 
de soledad, Gabriel García Márquez describes how the naïve desires of the inhabitants of 
Macondo to ‘link the population with the rest of the world’ by ‘brining the railway’, led to the 
arrival of North American imperialists.84 The novel’s climax sees José Arcadio Segundo 
waking up on a pile of dead banana workers in one of the SMRC’s carriages, on their way to 
                                                             
79  Tucker, Insatiable Appetite, pp. 158-9. 
80  Charles David Kepner and Jay Henry Soothill, The Banana Empire: A Case Study of Economic 
Imperialism (New York: Russell & Russell, 1935), p. 164. 
81  Posada, The Colombian Caribbean, p. 55 
82  LeGrand, ‘Living in Macondo’, p. 345. 
83  Ibid, p. 354. 
84  Gabriel García Marquéz, Cien Años de Soledad (Barcelona: Bruguera, 1985), pp. 213-20. 
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be dumped into the ocean.85 The prominent position within García Márquez’s novel has burnt 
the event into the public consciousness, significantly influencing even recent historiography.86 
The SMRC is presented as complicit in the massacre, explicitly in the novel, implicitly within 
recent historiography.87 Historically, the Banana workers strike was a popular manifestation of 
the nationalist stance towards foreign capital which developed following the Quinquenio. 
Following the event, the UFC described one of the leaders of the strike as ‘a most dangerous 
communist’, illustrating that the government’s response – of breaking up the meeting by 
murdering the attendees – was influenced by the hysterical fear of communism spreading 
throughout the western world.88 The events of the Massacre would lead one to assume political 
elites accepted subservience to foreign capital, and Bucheli presents the ‘conservative 
hegemony’ (1886-1930) as an unbroken period of a consistent receptive stance to the UFC and 
foreign capital.89 Subsequent subsections detail that these perspectives are mistaken, and that 
the whole spectrum of Colombian society offered agency and resistance in the face of the 
UFC’s encroachment. Ultimately, just as LeGrand argued, the reality of the SMRC’s and 
UFC’s relationship with the region, was far more complex than has generally been 
acknowledged by the historiography.90 This chapter illustrates that political elites and the wider 
public recognised the threat posed by the UFC and the SMRC, and details agency from across 
Colombian society in the face of UFC’s increasing economic grip on the banana zone. 
85 García Marquéz, Cien Años, pp. 290-91. 
86 Eduardo Posada-Carbó, ‘Fiction as History: The Bananeras and Gabriel García Márquez's One Hundred 
Years of Solitude’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 30 (1998), 395-414; Dan Koeppel, Banana: The 
Fate of the Fruit That Changed the World (London: Penguin, 2008), p. 84-6; Mario Bernardo Figueroa 
Muñoz ‘Recuerdo y escritura. A proposito de la massacre de las bananeras en García Márquez’ in 
Bananeras: Huelga y Masacre 80 Años ed. by Mauricio Archila Neira (Bogotá: UNAL, 2009) pp. 173-
90. 
87 García Marquéz, Cien Años, pp. 290-9.; Kevin Coleman, ‘The Photos That We Don’t Get to See, 
Sovereignties, Archives, and the 1928 Massacre of Banana Workers in Colombia’ in Making the Empire 
Work: Labour and United States Imperialism, ed. by Daniel E. Bender and Jana K. Lipman (London: 
New York University Press, 2015), pp. 112-23. 
88 ‘Memorandum, Colombian Division’, United Fruit Company, 8 March 1929, reproduced in: Coleman, 
‘The Photos’, p. 107. 
89 Bucheli, Bananas and Business, pp. 88-94. 




Like other coastal railways, the SMRC was established to connect a Caribbean port with the 
Magdalena River.91 The main motivation was regional competition between the ports. Once 
the first section of the railway was completed, the cultivation of export crops soon followed.92 
As such, ‘banana production in the zone went hand-in-hand with railroad construction’, and 
when the railway reached Cienaga in 1887, ‘banana fields sprang up to the south’, the extent 
of which are illustrated in fig. 5.12 below.93 
Fig. 5.12 – Map of the SMRC and banana producing region 
 
Source: LeGrand ‘Living in Macondo’, p. 338. 
The origins of the American banana trade can be traced back to Captain Lorenzo Dow Baker, 
who in March 1871 used his Cape Cod fishing schooner to transport bananas from Jamaica to 
                                                             
91  Anonoymous, Ferrocarril de Santa Marta (Bogotá: Imprenta de Vapor de Zalamea, 1889). 
92  Ortega, Ferrocarriles Colombianos, p. 591; Maurice P. Brungardt, ‘The United Fruit Company in 
Colombia’ in American Business History: Case Studies, ed, by Henry C. Dethloff and C. Joseph Pusateri  
(Arlington: Harlan Davidson, 1987), pp. 235-56 (p. 237). 
93  Brungardt, ‘United Fruit in Colombia’, p. 237. 
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Boston.94 The experiment was a success, and by 1885, Baker consolidated the trade by forming 
the Boston Fruit Company through a partnership with ‘twelve New Englanders’ with $15,000 
of capital.95 The floatation of the SMRC in 1887 thus coincides with the birth of the banana 
trade in the western hemisphere. The trade was a foreign undertaking involving British and 
American interests working in alliance almost from the outset. Minor Keith arrived in 1894, 
and ‘began buying land in Santa Marta, and set up a branch of his export operations’.96 His 
story illustrates that the banana trade was directed by ‘transnational capitalists’ unconstrained 
by national borders: he was an American who spent the 1870s building railways and business 
interests in Central America, subsequently listing the ‘Colombian Land Company’ in London 
to develop the export trade in Colombia. 97 Keith amalgamated the London-based Colombian 
Land Company with the Boston Fruit Company in 1899 forming the UFC.98 In 1903, Keith 
began building a shareholding in Britain’s leading banana importer Fyffes, and as subsequent 
subsections detail, in 1913, the UFC achieved complete control of the business’s interests in 
the banana zone, which included the SMRC.99 Without the American banana trade, Santa Marta 
could easily have become a coffee producing region. Indeed, in 1905, the value of coffee 
produced for export around Santa Marta was still comparable to the burgeoning banana 
trade.100 But the lucrative banana trade created a stampede to cultivate land served by the 
railway, and exports increased exponentially during 1904-10. As fig. 5.13 illustrates, by 1910, 
the region of Santa Marta was exporting 4,370,000 bunches per annum, all transported by the 
SMRC. 
                                                             
94  Peter N Davies, Fyffes and the Banana: Musa Sapientum, A Centenary History 1888-1988 (London: 
Athlone, 1990), p. 26. 
95  Davies, Fyffes, p. 30. 
96  Tucker, Insatiable Appetite, p. 159. 
97  Ibid, ‘Articles of Association – Colombian Land Company’, TNA, BT 31/5238/35603. 
98  Davies, Fyffes, pp. 35, 96. 
99  Davies, Fyffes, pp. 122, 257. 
100  ‘Report for the year 1905 on the trade of Santa Marta’ 1906, CXXIII, Cd. 2682-78, p. 747 
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Fig. 5.13 – Number of banana stems exported through the port of Santa Marta, 1891-1910 
 
Sources: 1891-1908: ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, p. 51. 1909: ‘Report 
for the year 1909 on the trade of Santa Marta’ 1910, Vol. XCVII. p. 501, 1910: ‘Report for the year 1910 on the 
trade of Santa Marta’ 1911, Vol. XCI, Cd. 5465-131, p. 302. 
The departmental and national governments provided many benefits with the SMRC 
concession to entice investment. These included: a $60,000 per year subvention for a period of 
five years, waiving tariffs on imported materials, and a land grant of 100,000 hectares.101 The 
expansion of the banana trade and the UFC, was strongly linked to the policies of the 
Quinquenio.102 Reyes introduced ‘loans of $15 for each hectare of land brought into banana 
cultivation, as well a tax exemption on exports’.103 These policies led to him being considered 
‘the most receptive president to foreign investment’ in Colombia’s history, with a special 
connection to the UFC.104 This connection means he is viewed by some as a traitor to foreign 
                                                             
101  Ortega, Ferrocarriles Colombianos, p. 591; Brungardt, ‘United Fruit in Colombia’, p. 239. 
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interests, who ended his administration in disgrace by boarding ‘a United Fruit Company boat 
and sail[ing] off into exile’.105 
The SMRC controlled the only means of distribution of the crop, meaning its value to the UFC 
was far greater than the nominal share capital; large tracts of land included were a substantial 
bonus. The SMRC’s strategic value and dependence on the banana trade meant expansion 
policy was quickly overwhelmed by the interests of exporters. This is something which also 
occurred with what McGreevy termed ‘coffee railways’, exemplified by the Girardot (CNRC) 
railway, where the hacendado class’s desire to connect the coffee-producing region to the 
Magdalena River overwhelmed the railway’s initial purpose as Bogotá’s link to the world 
economy.106 In similar fashion, the SMRC expanded through a network of ‘spurs off into the 
banana plantations’, instead of towards the Magdalena River (see fig. 5.12).107 In both cases, 
once the railway reached the productive region, the railway’s construction stagnated, and the 
raison d'être became serving the interests of the export sector, tying into Ocampo’s concept of 
‘speculative production’ of export crops.108 However, whereas in the interior coffee 
monoculture was spearheaded by an emerging national capitalist class, on the coast the export 
of bananas was driven by ‘transnational capitalists’ exemplified by Minor Keith. National 
entrepreneurs including Santiago Pérez Triana attempted to develop the banana export trade 
independently in the 1880s, but as Brungardt demonstrates, they failed because of a lack of 
capital and the necessary international infrastructure.109 
5.3.2 Shareholders 
                                                             
105  Palacios, Between Legitimacy, p. 63. 
106  McGreevy, An Economic History, pp. 244-279; Horna, Transport Modernization, pp. 128-40; Palacios, 
Coffee in Colombia, p. 133. 
107  Brungardt ‘United Fruit in Colombia’, p. 237. 
108  Ocampo, Colombia y la Economía Mundial. 
109  Posada, Colombian Caribbean, p. 55; Brungardt, p. 238. 
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A historiographical consensus exists that argues the UFC and the SMRC had monolithic 
relationship from the early stages of the development of the banana trade, and that for all intents 
and purposes the two companies were one and the same. Viloria argues that by 1901, the UFC 
‘controlled 92% of the share capital’.110 Brungardt suggests the UFC took control in 1899.111 
Bucheli gives the date as ‘the first years of the 1900s’.112 Eduardo Posada gives 1906.113 None 
provide a reference for a primary source. In each case, the documentary rationale for the claim 
is unclear.114 The ambiguity and lack of clear documentary evidence, suggests these assertions 
are influenced by portrayal of a monolithic UFC/SMRC relationship within the contemporary 
press and Colombian literature.115 This subsection demonstrates that informal and formal 
control of SMRC by the UFC occurred significantly later than these authors suggest. This and 
subsequent subsections reconfigure the interpretation of the historiographical orthodoxy, 
arguing the relationship was complex and multifaceted. 
                                                             
110  Viloria, Empresarios del Caribe, p. 45. 
111  Brungardt ‘United Fruit in Colombia’, p. 237. 
111  Ibid, p. 239. 
112  Bucheli, Bananas and Business, p. 150. 
113  Posada, Colombian Caribbean, p. 171. 
114  Posada provides two sources for a subsequent statement regarding plans to expand the line to the 
Magdalena River. Neither source provides a single page reference denoting specific evidence of the date 
of transfer of ownership. Brungardt’s footnote cites a source relating to ‘customs abuses’ mentioned 
towards the end of the sentence in which the 1899 date is mentioned. There is no source cited specifically 
for the year the UFC took over the SMRC. Both Viloria and Bucheli seem to cite no primary source at 
all. 
115  In a discussion with Viloria at Banco de la Republica on the 19 February 2018, he remarked that the 
perception that the UFC had taken control of the railway company was consistently presented in the 
contemporary press, and stemmed from the local comprehension of British and American economic 
interests as one and the same.  
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Fig. 5.14 – Major shareholders of the SMRC, 1892-1931 
 
Sources: Shareholder Registers for above years, TNA, BT31/31074/24941. 
As fig. 5.14 illustrates, during 1892-1907 London stockbroker and Liberal Member of 
Parliament Alexander Henderson was the SMRC’s dominant shareholder. His shareholding 
dated back to the initial floatation in 1887.116 In 1892, £600,000 of capital had been authorised, 
but only £105,000 taken up. Henderson’s 9750 shares (£97,500) represented a 92.3% stake, the 
same proportion as Viloria claims the UFC purchased in 1901.117 However, there is nothing to 
suggest Henderson’s holding had any connection to the UFC, since his primary activities in the 
market was as a railway speculator: Henderson’s fortune was established financing railway and 
canal projects, both nationally and internationally.118 As well as a majority shareholder in the 
SMRC, he was also a large shareholder in the Manchester Ship Canal, and chairman of the 
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Great Central Railway.119 Henderson’s residence in the home counties presented in fig 5.15 is 
representative of the ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ social class described by Cain and Hopkins.120 
However, Henderson’s business interests were international, and he had formed a transnational 
business network through his brother Frank, who ‘was based’ in Montevideo, and served as the 
‘ambassador’ for the family’s business interests in South America.121 
Fig. 5.15 – Alexander Henderson’s residence Buscot Park 
Source: https://www.nationaltrust.org.uk/buscot-park accessed 02/05/2018 
Henderson also had a long-term relationship with James Livesey, who acted as consulting 
engineer for many of the family’s railway projects in South America.122 In 1885, Henderson’s 
brother Brodie entered Livesey and Son as an apprentice. Henderson further solidified his links 
to the South American railway sector in 1891, when he purchased Brodie a partnership in the 
                                                             
119  Ibid. Henderson’s estate became what is today Henderson Global Investors. 
120  Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, I. 
121  David Wainwright, Henderson: A History of the Life of Alexander Henderson, First Lord Faringdon, 
and of Henderson Administration (London: Quiller Press, 1985), p.28. 
122  Ibid, p.23. 
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firm, which according to Boughey ‘dominated’ the South American railway sector.123 Livesey 
was listed in 1907 as a major SMRC shareholder, along with Henderson. In 1895, Brodie 
travelled throughout South America surveying the family’s railway assets. During this journey, 
he briefly studied the physical state of the SMRC, which had had the first 30km of track carried 
away by a tropical storm the year before.124 
In 1907, issued share capital had risen to £264,100, and Henderson still held 16,070 shares 
(£160,700), representing 60.9% of the company.125 As such, the documents consulted suggest 
the dates between 1899 and 1906 provided by Viloria, Brungardt, Bucheli, and Posada, for the 
transfer of ownership to the UFC, are erroneous. The UFC did not assume control of the SMRC 
until 1912, and this was only through a proxy: Fyffes director Edward Cecil Barker. Barker 
had purchased 25,396 SMRC shares (£253,960), including most of Henderson’s £160,700 
1907 shareholding. By this point, issued share capital had risen to £309,100, and Barker’s 
£253,960 stake represented 82%. The UFC had achieved a majority share of Fyffes two years 
before, in July 1910. In 1913 Fyffes share capital rose from £450,000 to £1,000,000, and the 
UFC acquired every one of the additional 550,000 £1 shares. At this point the UFC purchased 
the ‘balance of shares from individual holders, … and Fyffes became a completely owned, 
though autonomous, subsidiary of the UFC’.126 This merger between the biggest British banana 
importer (which sourced a significant supply from the Colombian banana region), and the UFC, 
cemented the strategic alliance between British and North American capitalists in the region, 
and assured the UFC’s domination of the Colombian banana trade. When this merger occurred 
123 Ibid, p. 23-6; David Boughey, ‘British overseas railways as free-standing companies, 1900–1915’, 
Business History, 51 (2009), 484-500 (p. 494). 
124 Wainwright, Henderson, p. 23-6; Marshall (General Manager) to Welby (Minister Resident), 9 
November 1900, Santa Marta, TNA, FO135/255. 
125 TNA, BT31/31074/24941. 
126 Davies, Fyffes, pp. 122-3 
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in 1913, Fyffes already controlled the SMRC through Edward Cecil Barker. After the merger, 
Barker effectively became an employee of the UFC, meaning proxy control was assured. 
However, as a British company, the SMRC maintained much stronger links with British 
subsidiary Fyffes than the parent company. In 1910, when the UFC first took a majority holding 
in Fyffes, the banana trade with Britain represented 51.6% of the Colombian banana export 
market.127 Evidence of the enduring influence of Fyffes, is illustrated by the fact that their 
SMRC shareholding was not transferred into the UFC’s own name until 1927, when it 
represented a 70.7%. It took until 1931 for UFC to achieve a 91.5% holding in the SMRC, over 
three decades after Viloria and Bucheli argue this occurred.128 In Colombia the UFC felt the 
need to hide their interests through a proxy, supporting LeGrand’s argument that UFC ‘did not 
wield absolute power’ in the banana zone.129 In Central America, Colby demonstrates how they 
wielded their power in full view.130 The UFC’s power and influence in the Colombian banana 
enclave was based on a strategic alliance with British capital in the shape of Fyffes and the 
SMRC. This began informally, based on shared interests, but became increasingly absolute. 
This process began with the 1913 merger, followed by direct control of the SMRC in 1927, 
and the rise to 91.5% direct ownership in 1931. The Fyffes/UFC merger and proxy control of 
the SMRC, demonstrates the formation of transnational business connections between British 
and North American capitalists within the Colombian banana zone. In view of LeGrand’s work, 
it illustrates the significant influence of these connections on the cultural, social, and economic 
development of the banana ‘enclave’. 131 As subsequent subsections shall demonstrate, it also 
influenced the political development of the entire country. 
                                                             
127  ‘Report for the year 1910 on the trade of Santa Marta’ 1911, Vol. XCI, Cd. 5465-131, p. 302. 
128  Viloria, Empresarios del Caribe, p. 45; Bucheli, Bananas and Business, p. 150. 
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This subsection uses quantitative analysis to reconstruct the SMRC’s finances from a 
fragmented data set. 132 I address why despite benefitting from an unprecedented rise in export 
cargo, the SMRC ran at a loss throughout the 1920s. This is a question which to date has only 
been asked by Viloria, who argues that from 1906 the SMRC ‘always’ ran at a loss.133 The lack 
of clarity over the sources behind this assertion, means it is difficult to clarify the rationale 
behind it. The company’s annual reports presented in fig. 5.16 mirror Viloria’s data set for the 
period 1921-36, but they paint a much different picture for the period 1906-21.134 They show 
that contrary to Viloria assertion, between 1906 and 1921 (except for a loss in 1919), the SMRC 
was modestly profitable, and it was only subsequently in the 1920s and early 1930s that the 
company reported substantial operational losses. Nonetheless, Viloria asks a pertinent 
question: ‘what was the motivation for a private company to function at a loss for such an 
extended period of time?’135 He favours the explanation put forward by both Díaz Granados 
and Brungardt that the SMRC manipulated its accounts to post a loss and avoid the 10% 
departmental levy on earnings, allowing the UFC to ‘cavalierly declare that the railroad was 
losing money’.136 Díaz Granados’s argument seems to have been influenced by the nationalistic 
antagonism against British railway companies detailed throughout this thesis. In paralleling the 
contemporary political discourse, Viloria misses the importance of the UFC’s intertwined 
                                                             
132  The series has been constructed using the following sources: 1906 and 1907: ‘Report on the Railways of 
Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, p. 51; 1912-36: Various SMRC annual reports titled ‘Santa Marta 
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446; 1914: AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 509; f. 450, 1917, 1918, 1919: AGN, República, 
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República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 511, f. 303; 1922: AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 511, f. 333; 1923, 
1924: AGN, República, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 511, f. 357; 1931 and 1936: BT31/31074/24941. 
133  Viloria, Empresarios del Caribe, p. 45. 
134  Viloria’s data is taken from: Manuel Díaz Granados, Geografía Económica del Magdalena Grande 
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revise it to ascertain what the original primary source is, because there is no copy within the British 
library system. Viloria, Empresarios del Caribe, p. 214. 
135  Manuel José Díaz Granados, ‘Ciento cincuenta millones ha perdido el Magdalena en el Ferrocarril de 
Santa Marta’, Revista Fiscal del Magdalena, 11, (1962), cited by Viloria, Empresarios del Caribe, p. 46. 
136  Viloria, Empresarios del Caribe, p. 46; Brungardt, ‘The United Fruit Company’, p. 239. 
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interests with the SMRC (and Fyffes). These interests explain not only why the company would 
wish to, but indeed, why it was able to run at a loss. The novel analysis presented here, argues 
the UFC was disinterested in the inconsequential paper profitability of the SMRC, since it 
provided the UFC with much greater economic benefits. Avoiding a 10% ‘tax’ on earnings was 
of little strategic interest to the UFC. This oversight is likely influenced by the belief that the 
UFC controlled the railway from 1901 onwards, which obscures the vital and causal connection 
between the UFC taking formal control of the railway, and the drastic change in its financial 
performance. 137 For this reason, this chapter provides a ground-breaking contribution to 
understanding the dynamics of the transnational business relationships forming in the banana 
enclave in the early twentieth century, and the importance of these to wider Colombian history. 
Fig. 5.16 – Profit/loss of the SMRC, 1906-24 
 
Sources: See footnote 132. 
As is clear from fig. 5.17 until 1920 expenses followed the same trend as traffic receipts, but 
subsequently grew out of sync with the SMRC’s revenues, leading to substantial losses. This 
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coincided with transition to formal (rather than proxy) control by the UFC. In the mid-1930s, 
expenses moved back in sync with receipts, returning to the trend evident before 1920, but by 
December 1935 an accumulated loss of £1,596,500 sat on the balance sheet.138 Objectively, the 
SMRC had the perfect circumstances for a profitable line. The development of the banana trade 
meant dependable freight income, since the railway held an effective monopoly on the export 
trade. The bonanza which occurred around Santa Marta made many very wealthy, very quickly, 
so why was the opposite the case for SMRC shareholders?  
Fig. 5.17 – Expenses, receipts and banana receipts of the SMRC, 1906-24 
 
Sources: See footnote 132. 
Fig. 5.18 demonstrates how the SMRC’s revenues were dominated by the banana trade. During 
the period 1906-36, banana freight represented between 65% and 75% of total revenue, 
reaching a peak of 76% in 1918. As such, the SMRC’s economic interests were tightly 
intertwined with those of the banana industry and the UFC.  
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Fig. 5.18 – SMRC Revenues split by category, and banana receipts as % of total receipts, 
1906-36 
 
Sources: See footnote 132. 
As the previous subsection illustrated, between 1922 and 1927 the UFC took formal control of 
the SMRC by transferring Fyffes director Edward Cecil Barker’s majority shareholding into 
the UFC’s name. This event coincides with the period of the SMRC’s greatest losses. In annual 
reports, the management blamed these financial results on heavy rains.139 But climatic factors 
had been a factor from the outset, with a ‘cyclone’ in 1894 causing significant damage.140 As 
such, these do not seem sufficient to explain the pattern. In addition, fig. 5.19 illustrates that 
the increase in expenses during the 1920s was accounted for within ‘traffic expenses’, whereas 
repairs and line maintenance resulting from unfavourable climatic conditions fell under ‘other 
expenses’.  
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Fig. 5.19 – Proportion of ‘traffic expenses’ and ‘other expenses’ (line maintenance accounted 
for within other expenses) as % of total company expenses. 
 
Sources: See footnote 132. 
 
Fig. 5.20 illustrates a direct correlation between rising banana cultivation for export and 
decreasing profitability. The SMRC also experienced increasing losses during the economic 
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Fig. 5.20 – Banana exports (stems) 1891-1940, and Profits of the SMRC, 1904-1936 
 
Sources: SMRC Profits: See footnote 132; Exports 1891-1910: see fig. 4.14; Exports 1911-1940: Adolfo 
Meisel, ‘Dutch Disease and Banana Exports in the Colombian Caribbean, 1910- 1950’ Borradores de 
Economía, 108, (1998), 1-32, (p. 14). 
http://www.banrep.gov.co/sites/default/files/publicaciones/archivos/borra108.pdf Accessed 29/12/2017 
 
Bucheli argues the UFC’s interdependence with the SMRC directed its expansion towards 
bringing new land into banana cultivation.141 During the rapid rise in exports during the 1920s, 
this policy led to the SMRC and the UFC constructing branch lines into the banana plantations. 
A possible explanation for the SMRC’s increased operating expenses, is that the SMRC was 
charging construction costs for these lines to the profit and loss account, rather than the balance 
sheet. Unfortunately, the company’s statutory accounts are not detailed enough to verify this 
theory. However, it would explain the seemingly causal relationship between financial losses 
and increasing cultivation. It would also explain why the SMRC’s finances recovered following 
the 1929 crash, when banana cultivation expansion ended, which from a standard economic 
perspective, seems to defy logic. This type of manipulation is not implausible, since as 
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Stevenson-Clarke and Bowden argue, from the ‘railway mania’ of the 1840s onwards, 
speculators agitated for ‘revenue out of capital’ accounting practices, which maximised 
dividends by capitalising expenses; long-term investors sought ‘capital out of revenue’, where 
capital investment (such a new branch) was charged as an expense to the profit and loss 
account.142 Intentionally seeking a loss is of course a more extreme example, and would be 
illogical for a standard limited company seeking a return for its shareholders. But as previous 
subsections illustrated, the SMRC was not a normal limited company answerable to 
shareholders seeking a return. From 1912 onwards, over 70% was controlled by the UFC, first 
using Fyffes director Edward Cecil Barker as its proxy, and subsequently in its own name. 
In 1920, Santa Marta’s inhabitants were conscious of these ‘connected interests’. In a petition 
to the Ministry of Public Works, a group of concerned citizens argued these interests made 
solving the ‘railway question’ impossible. They argued this was the most important national 
issue ‘since Panama’.143 In 1920 the UFC declared profits of US$44,000,000 (approx. 
£9,070,000) and payed a 57.8% dividend to shareholders.144 In 1925, Fyffes, which represented 
only a fraction of UFC’s banana interests, paid dividends of £1,250,000.145 Bananas could be 
produced ‘much more efficiently’ in Colombia than by Fyffes’s Jamaican suppliers, meaning 
the Colombian trade was even more lucrative.146 The monopoly over distribution provided by 
the SMRC, allowed the UFC to fix prices and dissuade ‘competitors from entering the market’, 
thus ensuring the continuation of the UFC’s domination of the banana region.147 As such, the 
SMRC’s profitability was irrelevant to the UFC, because it provided economic benefits far 
142 Peta Stevenson-Clarke and Bradley Bowden, ‘Difference of purpose: The usage of railway accounts in 
Victoria and Queensland (1880–1900), a comparative study’, Accounting History, 23 (2017), 231-51 (p. 
232). 
143 Various Residents of Santa Marta to Ministry of Public Works, 22 September 1920, AGN, República, 
Ferrocarriles, Vol. 511, f. 90. 
144 Judith White, Historia de una ignominia (Bogotá: Editorial Presencia, 1978), p. 35. 
145 Davies, Fyffes, p. 123. 
146 Ibid, p. 144; 
147 Posada, The Colombian Caribbean, p. 55 
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surpassing the paper losses of the railway (which never surpassed £120,000 per annum). In 
comparison with the UFC’s gargantuan profits, these figures were insignificant. The obvious 
solution to the SMRC’s losses was raising freight charges on bananas, which Kepner and 
Soothill suggested were ‘too low’ and the cause of the losses.148 In 1920, the Ministry of Public 
Works considered mandating a rise, and requested a report on the likely impact from the 
departmental government of Magdalena.149 The report’s conclusion was that raising freight 
charges would be detrimental to the lives of banana workers and cultivators, since the UFC 
would deduct the additional freight charges from payment to cultivators, forcing them to take 
the burden of the shortfall.150 When the ministry communicated directly with the UFC over 
potential rises, the local manager excused himself from expressing an opinion on the matter. 
However, from the brash and aggressive tone of the letter, the implicit meaning was clear: the 
UFC would not accept a rise in freight charges on bananas.151 Thus, without the UFC’s policies, 
the SMRC could simply have raised banana freight charges to solve its financial problems. By 
keeping the SMRC working at a loss, the UFC ensured subservience to its economic interests, 
because it required financial support to stay afloat. 
5.3.4 War of a Thousand Days (1899-1902) 
The civil war created several issues for the SMRC’s management. As with the CNRC, the war 
stalled construction works, in this case on the extension to Fundación.152 The geographical and 
environmental problems which plagued the CNRC project had also affected the SMRC: in 
December of 1894 an ‘unprecedented cyclone and cloud burst … entirely wrecked the first 
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thirty miles of [the] railway, from Santa Marta to Riofrio’. The storm carried away ‘iron and 
timber bridges alike’, and the damage to these, as well as embankments and track, resulted in 
a ‘loss estimated at considerably over £50,000’.153 The war compounded these capital losses. 
As with the CNRC, liberal rebels seized the railway several times to mobilise around the 
department. This interrupted operations and damaged company property. On the 9 November 
1900, the local manager communicated with the Foreign Office, describing difficulties 
experienced during the war: 
Since [the 31st March] … the situation in this country has gone from bad to worse, particularly 
here on the coast. On two separate occasions the revolutionists have surprised and taken 
possession of some of our locomotives[.] ... The second occasion was a … complete surprise for 
everyone[.] ... Trains employed in the transport of bananas were seized on the 9th of October, … 
thus suspending entirely this export business.154 
 
The letter once again demonstrates the inability of the government to provide a stable 
environment for British railway companies. The seizure of the railway and associated damage 
compounded the SMRC’s capital losses.155 It also illustrates the intertwined interests of the 
UFC/Fyffes/SMRC tri-company transnational relationship: the export business of the first two 
depended wholly on the last. These congruent interests explain the strategic alliance formed, 
as well as the slow process of amalgamation of the three entities from 1910 onward.156 The 
opposition shown by sections of the Colombian elite, demonstrates that they recognised the 
threat these intertwined interests represented. The SMRC relied on the UFC’s banana trade for 
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more than just the cargo from which most of its revenues derived. Communication with 
international capital markets, the business world, and the Foreign Office, also depended 
entirely on the UFC’s infrastructure. In a letter written in November 1900, local employee 
Mansel Carr wrote to the Foreign Office explaining the impact of the interruption of the banana 
export trade on the SMRC’s operations: 
What a terrible thing this revolution is! Until quite lately I suppose this district has suffered less 
than any other[s] … [because] exportation of bananas … had not been interrupted. [Now] the 
insurgents are in possession of this section of country which embraces all the banana producing 
region … and the railway service … [is] suspended. Two banana steamers … had to leave without 
cargo so the Company will doubtless discontinue the service. 
These fruit steamers were … our only means of communication with the outside world, arriving 
punctually, every fortnight with our English and American newspapers and letters and returning 
to New York in seven days – as a means of getting to the States or Europe this route is far quicker 
than any other. We shall now have to depend on Port Colombia with the endless delays entailed 
by the lack of any regular mail service between here and Barranquilla.157 
 
Carr was referring to the BRPC pier head. This highlights how the rudimentary internal 
transport infrastructure influenced Colombia’s cultural, social, and economic integration. As 
the letter shows, when the banana steamer service was operational, the port of Santa Marta was 
‘closer’ to the international trade centre of New York, than it was to its sister port of 
Barranquilla. Garner argues similar patterns occurred in Mexico, where railways linked 
‘regional economies more to the global economy than with each other’.158 These connections 
were established and maintained to serve the interests of ‘transnational capitalists,’ such as 
Minor Keith in Colombia, or Weetman Peerson in Mexico.159 Carr described how the central 
government’s lack of influence transformed local political dynamics. Local political actors 
with an anti-foreign perspective who to Carr’s mind resembled the leaders of the Boxer 
revolution in China, exploited the power vacuum to attack the SMRC: 
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There is a small clique of narrow minded “Boxers” who have always, systematically made it their 
business to try and make trouble for this English Company – just at present these “Boxers” are 
unfortunately “on top” and have the willing ear of the chief of the department.160 
Another letter from the company told much the same story: 
The … local government is chiefly composed of a small clique who has always been hostile to 
all foreign enterprises in the country, and in particular to this company, they may in their 
eagerness commit acts which lead to further trouble.161 
 
When Carr made these comments at the turn of the twentieth century, the development of 
Colombia’s anti-imperialist socio-political movement was still in its early stages. The material 
presented in this subsection demonstrates that British railways were a focal point for anti-
foreign sentiment from early on. As subsequent subsections illustrate, this anti-foreign 
sentiment culminated in a violent apex with the banana massacre of 1928, with the SMRC’s 
infrastructure serving as centre stage for the social conflict. 
5.3.5 Growing Opposition and Disputes 
As has been mentioned in previous subsections, during the Quinquenio Rafael Reyes 
implemented policies encouraging banana cultivation. At this time the railway was already 
serving the banana zone. Reyes’s strategic interest was rapid growth of banana cultivation, 
which was already served by the existing policy of expanding track into the banana plantations, 
meaning the SMRC was not afforded the institutional support for rapid expansion extended to 
other British railways. But when Reyes fell, the SMRC became the target of the same growing 
opposition and hostility to British railways experienced in the interior. With Reyes gone, the 
preoccupation of national authorities became whether the original aim of linking Santa Marta 
with the Magdalena River would be fulfilled. The capital losses caused by climatic conditions 
and the civil war, meant expenditure had substantially outstripped the original budget for this 
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task. In 1911, when the local manager put the SMRC’s case before the congress, he claimed 
the company had already invested £1,000,000.162 The SMRC’s 1887 concession included a 
£400,000 government repurchase clause. He argued this clause had ‘paralysed the constructive 
energies of the railway’, since it was ‘unreasonable to expect the company to invest more than 
£1,000,000 in a project which has to be sold for £400,000 after 30 years’.163 The contract 
required the railway to reach the Magdalena River, but the obligation to sell at a substantial 
discount made this impractical. The SMRC argued that ‘[no] capitalist in the world’ would 
willingly invest their capital in a project under these circumstances.164 Nine years had passed 
since the civil war, yet little progress had been made in negotiations. Without a renegotiation, 
the SMRC’s only means of survival was further convergence with the UFC/Fyffes. As previous 
subsections have detailed, this period coincides with amalgamation of these transnational 
businesses, and further consolidation of their economic power in the banana zone. 
As has been discussed throughout previous chapters, the early 1910s saw a nationalistic 
reaction to foreign railway companies. This opposition was codified into government policy in 
the 1912 Proyecto de Ley Sobre Ferrocarriles, which directly contradicts Bucheli’s argument 
that the conservative national government ‘opposed nationalization’.165 The danger posed by 
the interweaved interests of UFC/Fyffes/SMRC were acutely felt by commentators in the 
national press. During the early 1910s the SMRC was discussed in the press on almost a daily 
basis.166 In August 1911 El Republicano argued ‘we should not forget that separatism started 
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to germinate in Panama under the shadow of the [American] railway company’, before adding 
that since the company’s shares were traded freely, this could lead to a repeat of ‘the 
dismemberment of our national territory’. The newspaper warned that the Panama Railway 
Company ‘became the lynchpin of the succession movement’ to protect its interests, and that 
‘something similar may well come to pass’ on the coast. They felt the ‘very security and 
integrity of our nation’, rested on whether their proposed solution: nationalisation of the coastal 
railways, was implemented.167 Views were clearly influenced by a desire to avoid a repeat of 
the Panamanian disaster, but they were also non-partisan: the conservative government and 
liberal press seemed equally preoccupied. During debates in the congress, Joaquín Campo 
argued that ‘the SMRC has always considered that the public authorities are meek and receptive 
to those who come to then, even when to the detriment of the public good’.168 In January 1912, 
the fears were presented by El Tiempo more concisely: ‘expansion of the railway company … 
is the perfect route towards the loss of national sovereignty’.169 The very ‘survival of the nation’ 
was deemed to rest on the resolution of the ‘railway question’. Four days later they added that 
‘the day that the American flag flies over the pier in Santa Marta … Colombia will practically 
be on the road to American domination’.170 Only a year later, these fears were vindicated when 
the UFC completed their hostile takeover of Fyffes, and US control of the railway was 
assured.171 
Government action (or inaction) renegotiating the contract, stemmed from the same fear of the 
UFC further solidifying its power, which had been discussed in the press and the congress. But 
their inaction only made this more likely. This fear became reality in 1913, when the UFC took 
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full control of Fyffes, and its stake in the SMRC.172 But to assume that Fyffes or the SMRC 
desired this subservient relationship with the UFC is a mistake. One of Fyffes founders Arthur 
Stockley described the moment major shareholders learned that the UFC had achieved majority 
ownership as a ‘body-blow’.173 In view of this, was the criticism of the SMRC justified? As 
LeGrand argues, stressing the ‘internal complexity’ of the region, the situation was more 
complicated than it appears at first glance.174 The business practice of the UFC was clearly 
monopolistic and exploitative, and railway infrastructure was involved, but to what extent was 
the railway complicit in these actions? From 1913 onwards, when the UFC seized control of 
Fyffes, there is evidence of control through a proxy. But before this date, the relationship seems 
to be one based on congruent interests. Within the circumstances which presented themselves, 
what other course of action could the SMRC realistically have taken but to serve the UFC’s 
interests? By the 1920s, the SMRC was running at a loss (the reasons for which remain 
unclear), and as such, depended on the UFC to cover its losses to simply continue operating. 
The SMRC lacked the capital to expand towards the Magdalena River, which as Bucheli 
argues, meant their focus was opening new land for banana cultivation to increase banana 
freight. 175 Rather than being a willing and complicit partner in the UFC’s colonisation of the 
banana zone, the SMRC’s history (as well as that of Fyffes), illustrates how British interests 
were slowly ‘colonised’ by the UFC in the same manner as the region. This subsection has 
illustrated how in the first years of the 1910s, opposition grew to the SMRC in line with the 
wider socio-political development of nationalism against foreign investment. The next 
subsection details how this materialised in the form of legislative and physical agency in the 
face of the UFC’s increasing economic power.  
172 Ibid. 
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5.3.6 Resisting Foreign Control 
The SMRC’s situation was significantly more complicated than other British railways. 
Extensions had been constructed by both the SMRC and the UFC within the banana zone. The 
UFC built its own network within the plantations. This led to direct confrontation between the 
UFC, the Ministry of Public Works, and the SMRC. The ministry argued in 1913 that the 
SMRC had not been granted the authority to extend the line into these new areas.176 The UFC 
argued that this track was developed independently of the railway company, on privately held 
land, and thus did not require government authorisation. In response, the ministry ruled that 
the UFC and the SMRC could not ‘refuse public service on any part of the network’. They 
justified this ruling by arguing, as Posada does, that the UFC used its branches to stop banana 
producers selling to anyone else.177 The SMRC was thus implicated in the UFC’s aggressive 
and monopolistic business practice, and public hostility from the press continued, particularly 
from El Tiempo. In February 1915, the SMRC communicated with the Ministry of Public 
Works, requesting they intervene to stop what they viewed as libellous attacks.178 These 
included a common accusation that the railway was charging too much for its services.  179 As 
previous subsections demonstrated, if anything, the SMRC needed to raise its charges, but was 
unable to do so because of the UFC’s policies.  Another consistent line of attack was the lack 
of an extension to the Magdalena River, which the SMRC was obliged to provide. However, 
whilst congruent interests with banana exporters encouraged expansion into the banana lands, 
the lack of an expansion to the Magdalena River was influenced by government inaction to 
renegotiate contractual terms. This inaction was itself a manifestation of widespread political 
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opposition to the SMRC. Within the negotiations, the various SMRC contracts were a source 
of conflict and uncertainty on both sides. A letter addressed to President José Vicente Concha 
demonstrates that clarity regarding the legal basis of the railway, was absent even at the highest 
levels of government: 
Which contracts remain valid to date? Well, the contracts of 1881, 1887 and 1903 remain in 
force, however, the contents of the first and second are only valid insofar as they do not contradict 
the contents of the third. The contracts of 1890, 1893 and 1897 were declared null and void by 
all involved parties.180 
 
Without consensus on the SMRC’s legal position, the formation of a coherent government 
policy was difficult. When the letter was sent, the most recent iteration of the contract had been 
in force for twelve years, yet discussions still revolved around clarifying the legal position, 
rather than planning negotiations. The case demonstrates once again the problematic nature of 
the Colombian legal system. Amendments resulting from negotiations were enforced with a 
supplementary contract: anything which did not contradict the supplementary contracts 
remained legally valid. After many iterations, neither side was entirely sure where they stood. 
An archaic clause could be utilised by either side at any time to serve its interests. This 
happened repeatedly with both the CNoRC and the DRC. In addition, all contracts were 
introduced through legislation, and needed to pass through the congress and the senate. This 
led to lengthy debates on every contractual amendment. During the Quinquenio, Reyes 
suspended the function of both bodies, which significantly simplified the process of award of 
concession contracts.  This explains the rapid progress in railway development during this 
period.  
In addition to heel-dragging in negotiations, more physical forms of resistance to foreign 
control developed. In 1916, a populist campaign of intimidation and direct action was 
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implemented by local ganaderos (cattle ranchers), who mobilised large herds of cattle along 
the railway, causing substantial material damage to rails and sleepers.181 This same tactic was 
also followed by the UFC, who led ninety-five cattle along the line in February 1917.182 This 
event brings into question how absolute the UFC’s proxy control of the SMRC was, because 
four years after it took control of Fyffes, the UFC was still intimidating the SMRC, who 
submitted a formal complaint to the Ministry of Public Works over the UFC’s behaviour.183 
The SMRC was attacked from both sides: local people protested the perceived collusion with 
the UFC, which was concurrently using the same tactics to browbeat them into submission. In 
1918, there were more examples of popular direct action. Large groups formed to physically 
attack the railway infrastructure and intimidate staff into participating in a strike. El Nuevo 
Tiempo used this event to claim railway staff were unwilling to work, and apt to strike, leading 
to the SMRC raising another formal complaint with the Ministry of Public Works for libel.184 
By the early 1920s, the conflict with the SMRC had really begun to heat up, spurred on in no 
small part by growing resentment over the UFC’s influence in Colombia. On the 21 August 
1921 a telegram was sent to President Suárez which pleaded ‘I beg you to consider quickly 
nationalising [the SMRC], if not prepare yourself Colombia, to suffer another outrage worse 
than Panama’.185 On the 10 September, another frantic telegram arrived in broken Spanish 
addressed to the president: ‘citizens municipality anxious nationalisation Santa Marta railway 
preventative measure possible mutilation country’.186 Despite the growth of the UFC’s 
influence, some still supported the expansion of the SMRC. One telegram from ‘prominent 
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characters of different political colours’ sought the extension to ‘reclaim our progressive 
impulse’.187 Some hoped the railway could be extended as far as Tamalameque, to ‘join up 
with the Cucuta Railway’ and lobbied the ministry in ‘defence of our progress and economic 
interests’.188 As was mentioned previously, plans to extend the Cucuta railway to Tamalameque 
‘only ever existed in the imagination’.189 
These attempts to force through the expansion were in vain. The SMRC had been involved in 
an ongoing legal battle much like the CNoRC’s, or the DRC’s, since 1915.190 In 1925, a 
negative ruling was made against them. This was part-and-parcel of the attempts of the 
government to limit the UFC’s power, by stopping any further expansion of the railway. The 
judgement limited the concession ‘to those sections of line which were constructed and opened 
to public service on October 31, 1911’, and established that ‘the company was, from October 
19, 1920, under obligation to sell the railway to the nation’.191 The ruling undoubtedly sought 
to limit the UFC’s control of the extensions into the plantations, which had been constructed 
in the 1920s. These objectives were ultimately unsuccessful. The difference between the 
SMRC’s experience, and that of the CNoRC, the CCRC subsidiary, the GNCRC, or the DRC, 
is that unlike these other entities, the SMRC had the economic and financial power of the UFC 
behind it. The Colombian government bullied the CNCRC, the CNoRC and its CCRC 
subsidiary into bankruptcy. But it was unable to accomplish this with the SMRC. The SMRC 
was already running at a loss, and the UFC simply bankrolled the company because of its 
strategic importance. The government also had no shareholding in the SMRC, as it had done 
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in the CCRC, the CNoRC, the CNRC or the GNCRC. As a result, it was powerless to force 
through nationalisation under the same terms as it had with these weaker British companies. 
The result was a compromise: ‘in 1932, … a double agreement was reached: the government 
acquired the line but the [SMRC], under the financial control of the [UFC], leased it for thirty 
years’.192 This was a good outcome for the UFC, which maintained its control of the entire 
transportation infrastructure of the banana zone. As such, the results for the Colombian 
government were nothing like the one-sided nationalisation negotiations for the CCRC, the 
CNoRC, or the GNCRC. But at the same time, the actions of the government, which sought to 
reign in the power of the UFC through these nationalisation negotiations, illustrate that it was 
not powerless in the face of this transnational capitalist enterprise, and that it did exhibit 
agency. 
4.3.7 The Massacre, the SMRC and International Context 
José Arcadio Segundo awoke … in a silent and endless train … he realised he was laying on 
the dead … he saw dead men, women, and children, who were to be thrown in the sea as if they 
were nothing but rejected bananas.193 
In a single paragraph, García Márquez constructed perhaps the most influential critique of 
capitalism in Colombian history, since it was presented through popular culture, in a manner 
any reader could comprehend. His novel provides a cautionary tale of the perils of a society 
which values material progress and economic output above all else. But as Posada argues, the 
idea that ‘novels are truer to history than history itself’ is mistaken.194 García Márquez’s 
representation of the banana strike and its aftermath, has created an ingrained assumption of 
collusion and unanimity between UFC and the SMRC. This chapter has illustrated clearly, that 
the historical relationship was much less clear-cut. Too much has been written about the banana 
massacre for this thesis to contribute anything original regarding what transpired on that day. 
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However, this chapter has provided an important contribution to the developments preceding 
the event. That railway infrastructure was the scene of the strike action, was not a coincidence. 
As previous chapters have illustrated, the nationalist reaction against foreign railway 
companies was well advanced by the early 1910s. In addition, the movement against them 
materialised as a predominantly economically left-wing movement, part of the wider 
development of left-liberalism. The strike action was a popular manifestation of the developing 
reaction to foreign capital in Colombia, which had first coalesced around British railway 
companies. Indeed, García Márquez on some level seems to have understood this, since 
preceding the massacre he describes how the banana workers first action was to attack SMRC 
infrastructure: ‘the workers … began … destroying the rails to impede the transit of trains’.195 
Holding the strike action surrounded by railway infrastructure, was a symbolic, visual, and 
visceral confrontation with the most obvious physical representation of foreign interests.  
Tucker was completely correct in arguing that the UFC never dominated Colombia as ‘they 
did in the smaller countries to the north’.196 There was a vastly more powerful and concerted 
effort at a governmental level to resist the SMRC/Fyffes/UFC tri-company transnational 
business relationship in Colombia than Colby argues occurred in Central America.197 The 
Central American countries raised sovereign debt in London to construct banana railways 
which the UFC used to colonise the region.198 In the Colombian banana zone, the UFC had to 
take control of Britain’s biggest banana importer to seize control of the transportation 
infrastructure, and even then, it was only controlled through a proxy. In Colombia it took the 
UFC until 1927 to achieve what occurred in Central America rapidly with seemingly little 
effort expended. The pre-existing racial diversity within Colombian Caribbean society, also 
195 García Márquez, Cien años, p. 287. 
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meant that the company was unable to use the racial divisions described by Colby to fracture 
society and avoid concerted popular resistance.199 As LeGrand argues, this diversity was 
accentuated by internal migratory flows during the development of the banana trade.200 As 
Keppler and Soothill argued, as a result they acted ‘in closer harmony with each other than … 
the heterogenous groups of labourers in Central America’.201 The UFC attempted to change 
this by petitioning to import 10,000 West Indian labourers. But they were unable to force their 
will on the Colombian government.202 The use of force was not an isolated event, in ‘1918 
alone’ the UFC utilised ‘U.S. military forces put down banana workers’ strikes in Panama [and] 
Colombia’, and in 1912 the U.S. invaded Honduras to ensure the UFC would be awarded rights 
to ‘build railroads and grow bananas’.203 Coleman argues that an important precipitating factor 
in the massacre was the leader of the government troops’ fear of ‘class solidarity’. The photo 
he provides (see fig. 5.21) visibly illustrates this solidarity and determined agency against the 
ugly realities of transnational capitalism. As Coleman argues, and this chapter illustrates, the 
men were thrust into the ‘centre of a struggle over local and national sovereignty’, which had 
been developing since the British railway was built. 204 
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Fig. 5.21 – Leaders of the Plantation workers strike 
 
Source: Coleman, ‘The Photos’, p. 104. 
The class solidarity witnessed in the strike was a manifestation of the wider anti-foreign socio-
political movement developing in Colombia since the early 1910s, which Green has covered 
in detail.205 Pérez Triana’s Desde lejos thesis, which attacked foreign railway companies, is an 
example of an early manifestation of this same political wave.206 In contrast to Coleman, who 
views the events of the massacre through the familiar lens of victimhood, this chapter has 
illustrated that all levels of Colombian society offered resistance to the construction of U.S. 
and British empire by ‘transnational capitalists’ in the banana enclave.207 The SMRC was the 
central conduit through which Colombian society at the elite and governmental level attempted 
to reign in the UFC. They were unsuccessful, and their actions to stall expansion of the SMRC 
strengthened rather than weakened the UFC’s position. Nevertheless, the intention was clear. 
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As was the intention of the banana workers in 1928, or other examples of popular action 
presented here. The massacre occurred in the face of a rising wave of populist left-liberal 
nationalism opposed to foreign interests.208 Railways, as the most visible example of foreign 
interests, were the first target, and attacks came almost immediately following the end of the 
Quinquenio. The Banana workers strike is a representative of this same phenomenon.  
4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated that the expansion of Colombia’s coastal railways was inhibited 
by the interests of emergent transnational capitalism, and government resistance to it. The 
history of coastal railways is thus much different to those of the interior, where investment is 
much better conceptualised within ‘gentlemanly capitalism’, or a standard emerging national 
capitalist class. Analysis of the shareholder records demonstrates that the interests within the 
BRPC and the SMRC were composed of three groups with a good degree of overlap. The 
‘transnational capitalist class’ almost entirely controlled the SMRC and had significant 
influence over the BRPC. The ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ class also had a significant interest in 
the BRPC. British families such as the Whelens, Jiggins, Clark, and Glass Hooper families are 
perfect examples of this class, and their strong connection to Britain means they cannot be 
considered as part of the first group. The emerging national capitalist class had a much greater 
interest in the railways of the interior. In the SMRC, they are entirely absent, and in the BRPC 
the only examples are Cisneros, Vargas, and Koppel. However, their international connections, 
and lack of a strong link to Colombia, mean they could easily be considered ‘transnational 
capitalists’. Other BRPC shareholders could also fit into multiple groups. The Schiffs could be 
considered as ‘transnational capitalists’ or ‘gentlemanly capitalists’, and different members of 
the Isaac family could be considered as any of the three. However, the important factor is that 
208 Green, Gaitanismo, pp. 60-2 
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those who can be considered to be either ‘transnational capitalists’ or ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ 
wholly controlled the destiny of the BRPC and the SMRC. These are the only British railways 
where this is the case. The chapter has demonstrated that the interests of these groups dictated 
expansion policy. Their interests in the BRPC led to a focus on protecting the company’s 
monopoly, whilst the SMRC served the interests of men like Minor Keith of the UFC, or 
Edward Cecil Barker of Fyffes. This directed expansion away from the Magdalena River, and 
into the banana plantations. The Colombian government reacted to these transnational interests 
and terminated any future expansion of the SMRC into the interior. 
The chapter has shown that the port of Barranquilla and the Colombian banana zone owe their 
development almost entirely to the BRPC and the SMRC. The development of the railways 
originated from competition between ports. The raison d'être of the BRPC became maintaining 
the primacy of Barranquilla as the Colombian interior’s gateway of trade to the world. This 
was achieved by protecting the company’s monopoly. The fall of the BRPC was not caused by 
poor strategy or mismanagement, as was the case with some railways of the interior. It was a 
result of systemic changes the railway could not control. The ‘Pacific route’, bocas de cenizas 
works, and the world financial crisis all combined to make the company’s infrastructure 
redundant. The SMRC’s original role was to provide a similar service to Santa Marta, by 
connecting the city to the Magdalena River, and re-establishing the city as a hub of international 
trade. The railway succeeded in bringing international trade back to Santa Marta, but it was a 
different kind to that originally imagined. The railway came just in time for Santa Marta to be 
integrated into the burgeoning international banana trade. The interests of this trade soon 
overwhelmed the railway, which came to serve banana exporters such as Fyffes and the UFC. 
This occurred initially because of common interests, and subsequently because of 
amalgamation. But this relationship was multifaceted and contradictory. The SMRC’s role was 
that of a strategic (and at times unwilling) business partner, rather than a complicit co-
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conspirator. Ultimately, the SMRC had little choice but to acquiesce to the more powerful 
economic interests of the UFC. Above all else, this chapter has demonstrated that Colombia 
was not a victim in these encounters, it dictated its relationship with transnational capital on its 
own terms. The country was never dominated by these interests, and resistance to them 




Chapter 6. – The Dorada Railway Company 
6.1 Introduction 
The company’s obligation (if it exists at all), arises from the contract made on 14th July 1896, 
i.e. during the paper money regime; it therefore follows that such obligation, according to the 
preceding paragraph, is payable in Colombian currency, but in the proportion of $1.00 present 
day currency for each $100.00 of the money agreed in the contract, so that, instead of owing 
$2,000,000.00, the company only owes $20,000.00, if anything at all.1 ‘Memorandum showing 
how the supposed debt of the Dorada Railway co. has been increased to one hundred times its 
real amount’, 1940. 
 
The ‘Tolima tax’ referred to above is the most illustrative legal case in the history of British 
railways in Colombia. By the time the DRC had submitted its memorandum to the Foreign 
Office, the dispute had been ongoing for almost two decades. The 1938 award in favour of the 
Department of Tolima, played a significant role in the process of nationalisation. Unlike other 
British railways in Colombia, the DRC closely fits standard models of British economic 
imperialism. It displayed all the trappings of empire: a sizable enclave, an unassailable 
geographical monopoly, ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ and ‘collaborating elite’ shareholders, its own 
football team, and a tumultuous relationship with the national government. In many ways, the 
DRC’s history parallels that of the Brazil’s São Paulo Railway, which Platt argues ‘[held] a 
nation to ransom … for decades’ and refused to expand its operations into the hinterlands to 
protect its lucrative monopoly.2 On one level, the ‘Tolima tax’ represents the struggle between 
the national authorities and the monopoly of a foreign company, but it also illustrates the 
contractual instability within the Colombian economic environment. 
The DRC was the most strategically important railway of the interior. Its monopoly depended 
on river rapids which separated the lower and upper Magdalena River at Honda. River steamers 
could not traverse this barrier, and a land link was required to bridge the gap. The Magdalena 
                                                             
1  ‘Memorandum. Showing How The Supposed Debt of the Dorada Railway Company Has Been Increased 
To One Hundred Times Its Real Amount’, TNA, FO 135/473 
2  D.C.M Platt, ‘Economic Imperialism and the Businessman: Britain and Latin America before 1914’ in 
Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, ed. by Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (London: Longman, 1972), 
p. 300; Lewis, Public Policy, p. 38. 
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River travels almost the entire length of Colombia and served as the principal highway between 
the interior and the Caribbean coast. Every major city in the interior was within easy reach of 
the river which was indispensable for trade. When a railway was completed between 
Arrancaplumas (on the southern outskirts of Honda) and Yeguas (22.5km upstream from 
Honda) on the 8 September 1884, the two sections of the river were linked by an efficient 
means of transportation, and the lack of an alternative route provided a strong monopoly. It 
was within this context that the struggle for power between the DRC, the National and Local 
governments, and the local populace developed. 
This chapter will present the history of the DRC in six sections. The first is the origins of the 
railway. The second will explore finances and shareholders. The third will focus on the 
experience in the period of national crisis (1899-1902). The fourth will explore expansion 
during the Quinquenio (1904-09). The fifth will detail post-Quinquenian expansion (1909-22). 
The sixth and final section explores the move towards nationalisation (1923-56). I argue that 
the DRC is an example of British economic imperialism in Latin America in the mould of the 
Brazilian Sao Paolo Railway. Moreover, I argue its history demonstrates clearly that 
withholding institutional incentive to foreign capital did not avert construction of empire within 
Colombia. On the contrary, the comparison between the CNRC which received a government 
guarantee and the DRC, the SMRC, and the BRPC, which did not, illustrates that foreign 
investment which was not directed by institutional incentive, still constructed economic 
imperialism over monopolistic and vital trade routes. These economic interests were more 
difficult to control or expel from the country. The chapter illustrates that just as was the case 
for the SMRC and the BRPC, the interests of international capital, the strength of economic 
imperialism, and the lack of institutional incentive for expansion, inhibited the expansion of 
the railway which was essential for Colombia’s economic development. I argue that the DRC 
ropeway demonstrates how efficient free market capitalism was at applying novel technologies 
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where they would ensure a lucrative monopoly. However, the failure of the expansion between 
Ambalema and Girardot illustrates clearly that the free market was incapable of directing 
capital where it was most required without institutional incentive.  
6.2 Origins 
6.2.1 Construction 
The Dorada Railway was constructed to bypass the ‘saltos de Honda’, which were ‘formed by 
rocks which cross[ed] the course of the stream’, meaning ‘the least deviation … would … [lead 
to a vessel’s] destruction’.3 As was discussed in chapter four, hacendados used their political 
influence to ensure Bogotá’s rail link with the river would pass through their coffee-growing 
lands in south-western Cundinamarca. The barrier between the two sections of river impeded 
Cisneros transporting construction materials from Barranquilla to the railway terminal in 
Girardot. The Dorada railway project was strategically allied with the Girardot Railway, and 
Cisneros’s hacendado associates.4 Cisneros was not only a competent engineer, but also an 
astute businessman; a trait which attracted significant hostility from interested parties.5 As 
such, he understood from early on that the trade of the surrounding regions of Cundinamarca, 
Tolima, Antioquia, and Cauca, with an ‘agricultural, mining and trading population of 
1,064,270’, would provide a lucrative monopoly.6 In addition to the necessity to move 
construction materials, more generally, the Girardot railway required a separate railway 
bridging the upper and lower sections of the river to serve its raison d'être, since without one, 
international trade would still depend on a mule trail.7  
                                                             
3  Dawson to Davis, 10 November 1884, Report No. 115, Consular Despatches-Barranquilla, 6 Vols., III. 
Cited in Horna, Transport Modernization, p. 120. 
4  Horna, Transport Modernization, p. 137. 
5  Horna, Transport Modernization, pp. 123-4. 
6  Dawson to Davis, 10 November 1884, Report No. 115, Consular Despatches-Barranquilla, 6 Vols., II. 
Cited in Horna, Transport Modernization, p. 119; Horna, Transport Modernization, p. 121. 
7  Hernán Horna, Transport Modernization, p. 137. 
278 
 
Fig. 6.1 – Map illustrating the DRC (Red) the CNRC (Black) railways and the DRC (Straight 
Black Line) ropeway. The DRC’s proposed ‘Girardot Expansion’ would bridge the gap 
between Girardot and Ambalema 
 
Source: ‘Dorada Railway Prospectus’ in Dorada Railway Company Report for F/Y 1921-22, Guildhall Library, 
Stock Exchange Reports, Box 1693. 
The capital requirement was low since the railway ran along the banks of the river. the British 
Foreign Office estimated construction costs at just £3,420 per kilometre.8 The railway was 
                                                             
8  ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, p. 34. 
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completed from Yeguas 22.5km north of Honda to Arrancaplumas just south of Honda in 
September 1884, financed entirely with national capital.9 As table. 6.1 illustrates, Tomás 
Germán Ribón was the primary initial investor. He was part of ‘a distinguished colonial family 
with creole and European links’, who were ‘among the first Colombians to internationalize’ 
themselves.10 Tomás Germán Ribón ran an import/export business centred on the French 
market in Paris. Other investors such as Rafael Parga, Pedro Agripino Merino, and Enrique 
Cortés had interests in London. The two civil engineers Francisco Javier Cisneros and Federico 
Parraga also provided capital, and both had connections in New York. As did Pío Rengifo, a 
close associate of Santiago Eder of the Manuelita sugar company.11 The interested parties 
shared many of the same economic interests as those who established the Girardot Railway. 
Just like the Girardot Railway, the railway’s raison d'être was serving the interests of the 
hacendados of Cundinamarca and Colombian trading families.  
Table. 6.1 – DRC Shareholder List 1890 
Surname First Names City Occupation Shares Capital 
Ribón Tomás Germán Paris Gentleman 13,166 £131,660 
Cisneros Francisco New York Civil Engineer 1,813 £18,130 
Parraga Federico New York Civil Engineer 629 £6,290 
Edmonds Walter Kent Gentleman 1 £10 
Merino Pedro Agripino London Merchant 22 £220 
Parga Rafael London Merchant 721 £7,210 
O'Leary Charles London Gentleman (British Consul) 1 £10 
De La Torre Simon London Gentleman 1 £10 
Zapata Felipo Kent Advocate 1 £10 
Rengifo Pio New York Doctor of Medicine 485 £4,850 
Cortes Enrique London Merchant 60 £600 
Source: TNA, BT31/4108/26379 
Garner argues the reliance on domestic sources of capital for early railway projects in Mexico, 
was a result of the ‘failure to meet … external debt obligations and … reputation as a pariah 
                                                             
9  ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, p. 34. 
10  Horna, Transport Modernization, p. 122. 
11  ‘Azúcar Manuelita, la pionera’, Dinero, 17 September 2004 http://www.dinero.com/edicion-
impresa/especial-comercial/articulo/azucar-manuelita-pionera/24922 accessed 10/02/2017. 
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state’.12 The same was also the case for Colombia, meaning capital had to be found internally. 
British merchant houses in Argentina and Uruguay controlled much of the export trade, and 
‘when the regional economy took off in the 1870s and 1880s’, they were ‘perfectly placed to 
provide … railway investments’.13 In Colombia, the lack of British merchants meant men like 
Tomás Germán Ribón filled this vacant economic niche. The lack of British merchants in 
Colombia led to the economic relationship with Britain taking ‘a very different form’.14 The 
DRC, the CNoRC, and the BRPC, were all transferred to British companies after national elites 
had provided initial financing. Chapters three and five demonstrated how elites formed the 
CNoRC and the BRPC to transfer their economic interests under the protective umbrella of 
British diplomatic machinery. Over time a portion of their interests were sold to ‘gentlemanly 
capitalists’, but local ‘collaborating elites’ maintained a strong influence, often eclipsing that 
of foreign shareholders. Germán Ribón and his associates did the same in 1888, establishing 
the DRC, and the same pattern of the gradual entrance of ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ interests 
occurred.15 
6.3 Finances and Shareholders  
6.3.1 Finances 
What is immediately apparent is that the DRC was a highly profitable enterprise. The monopoly 
provided by the rapids at Honda meant international trade from Cundinamarca and the Upper 
Magdalena Valley depended on the DRC to reach Barranquilla. After the completion of the 
DRC ropeway in 1922 the railway also transported much of the coffee exports from Caldas. 
This provided a dependable revenue stream. But dependence on the export economy had 
                                                             
12  Garner, British Lions, p. 97. 
13  Darwin, Unfinished Empire, p. 170. 
14  Miller, Britain and Latina America, p. 243. 
15  Shareholder Reports for 1890, 1895, 1913, 1920 and 1929, Companies House, Company No. 84226, 
Ashtead Holdings Limited [Dorada Extension Railway Limited]  
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drawbacks. The earnings of the railway dropped off spectacularly during the First World War, 
and again in 1922, when heavy rains caused the failure of a large portion of the coffee crop.16 
Table 6.2. – The Dorada Railway Company Accounts F/Y 1905-1928 



















1905 £42,435 £20,963 £21,472 £368,290 £5,341 5.78% 5.83% 
1906 £53,230 £26,122 £27,108 £492,277 £9,847 5.29% 5.51% 
1907 £26,770 £27,062 -£292 £622,210 £17,760 -5.53% -0.05% 
1908 £48,410 £28,475 £19,935 £698,500 £20,428 -0.14% 2.85% 
1909 £54,780 £33,688 £21,092 £698,500 £20,910 0.05% 3.02% 
1910 £64,408 £29,916 £34,492 £698,500 £20,910 3.88% 4.94% 
1911 £71,004 £30,275 £40,729 £690,500 £20,555 5.76% 5.90% 
1912 £89,044 £34,655 £54,389 £690,500 £20,430 9.70% 7.88% 
1913 £103,003 £38,118 £64,885 £748,500 £21,739 12.33% 8.67% 
1914 £99,232 £44,038 £55,194 £776,200 £25,438 8.50% 7.11% 
1915 £92,301 £42,641 £49,660 £776,200 £25,572 6.88% 6.40% 
1916 £99,742 £39,714 £60,028 £776,200 £25,572 9.84% 7.73% 
1917 £106,949 £45,568 £61,381 £773,006 £25,476 10.26% 7.94% 
1918 £100,953 £53,617 £47,336 £790,200 £25,380 6.27% 5.99% 
1919 £139,950 £78,316 £61,634 £790,200 £25,380 10.36% 7.80% 
1920 £198,799 £127,245 £71,554 £837,700 £26,790 12.79% 8.54% 
1921 £223,374 £116,444 £106,930 £855,200 £28,948 22.28% 12.50% 
1922 £141,768 £91,941 £49,827 £950,000 £35,925 3.97% 5.24% 
1923 £208,702 £126,928 £81,774 £847,751 £36,580 12.91% 9.65% 
1924 £255,849 £142,520 £113,329 £778,081 £30,561 23.65% 14.57% 
1925 £199,865 £136,249 £63,616 £756,901 £26,777 10.53% 8.40% 
1926 £273,229 £157,136 £116,093 £728,531 £24,686 26.12% 15.94% 
1927 £435,427 £238,931 £196,496 £970,038 £22,946 28.74% 20.26% 
1928 £501,566 £271,860 £229,706 £934,653 £19,848 34.75% 24.58% 
Sources: Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Boxes 928, 974, 1021, 1067, 1115-6, 1167, 1217-8, 
1267, 1318-9, 1369-70, 1420-1, 1469, 1512, 1557, 1602, 1647, 1693, 1738, 1782, 1830, 1879, 1929, 2030, 
2081. 
As has been discussed previously the BRPC and the CNoRC were significantly more profitable 
than Rippy suggests.17 This was also the case for the DRC. His flawed interpretation is 
                                                             
16  ‘The Dorada Extension Railway Limited - Report and Statement of Accounts for the year ended 31st 
December, 1922’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Box 1738, p. 2. 
17  Rippy, British Investments, pp. 118-9,  
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influenced by his source base, which provides only capital outstanding and dividends. Rippy’s 
focus on dividends led him to suggest that British railways in Colombia were generally ‘not 
very remunerative’.18 This contrasts with the work of Edelstein, which combines both dividend 
income and capital gains.19 Like Rippy, Lewis focusses on dividends for evaluating Argentine 
Railway financial performance, which he argues were ‘not … excessive’.20 The problem with 
a focus on dividends alone is that these are influenced by the risk-management strategies of the 
company directors. A moderately profitable company operating in a stable environment may 
well pay relatively high dividends, since it does not need to accumulate capital or build up a 
reserve for unforeseen circumstances. In contrast, a highly profitable company (such as the 
DRC) which operates in a hostile environment, may for strategic reasons not pay any dividends 
at all. As Casson and da Silva Lopez argue, investment in high-risk environments was dictated 
largely by the successful implementation of risk-management strategies.21 The conservative 
dividend policies evident throughout the Colombian railway sector, is an example of a risk-
management strategy conceived to enable foreign investment in a high-risk area. Fig. 6.2 
illustrates that the DRC’s returns on all invested capital and on share capital were significantly 
higher than Lewis’s 6% figure for Argentine railways, Edelstein’s 5.33% average for Latin 
American railways, or Davis and Huttenback’s 5.7% average for overseas British railways.22 
As has been discussed in previous chapters these figures do not provide like for like 
comparisons. Nevertheless, the sources utilised here illustrate that the DRC’s profitability was 
many times greater than the regional average, and as such the historiographical consensus 
which views the railway company as only moderately profitable is mistaken. 
                                                             
18  Rippy, British Investments, p. 116. 
19  Edelstein, Overseas Investment, p. 120. 
20  Lewis, British Railways, pp. 217-8. 
21  Casson and da Silva Lopes, ‘Foreign direct investment’. 
22  Lewis, British Railways, pp. 217; Davis and Huttenback, Mammon, p. 107; Edelstein, Overseas 
Investment, p. 125. 
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The DRC was much more active within the debenture market than other railway companies. 
Rather than the abrupt changes in the outstanding debentures seen elsewhere, the DRC 
employed a flexible approach, issuing and cancelling debentures when required to finance the 
ropeway expansion. Once this was completed in 1922, the DRC began rapidly repaying its 
debentures from net receipts, rather than increasing dividends to shareholders. One reason for 
this was the hostile environment. As has been detailed throughout previous chapters, from 1909 
onwards, companies such as the CCRC, the GNCRC, the CNoRC, and the CNRC, were 
browbeaten into nationalisation by the national government. Their investors often lost all or a 
significant portion of their capital in the process. 
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Fig. 6.2. – Levels of share capital, interest bearing debentures, total capitalisation, return on 
share capital, and return on all invested capital of the BRPC – F/Y 1905 – F/Y 1928 
 
Source: See Table 6.2; Lewis, British Railways, pp. 217; Davis and Huttenback, Mammon, p. 107; Edelstein, 
Overseas Investment, p. 125. 
Fig. 6.3 illustrates that (just as Rippy argued) the DRC’s dividends were moderate until the 
1920s, when they increased to a range between 5-8%. But these were not, as Rippy implied, 
indicative of a lack of profitability.23 Fig. 6.3 illustrates that the DRC’s underlying profitability 
was significantly higher than dividends suggest.  
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Fig. 6.3 – Dividends and return on share capital of the DRC – F/Y 1906 – F/Y 1929 
 
Sources: See table 6.2. 
As Fig. 6.4 illustrates clearly the DRC had the capacity to pay much higher dividends if it had 
chosen to do so. In most years the retained net earnings outstripped the dividends paid. In 1928, 
the DRC paid £48,308 of dividends to shareholders, and over £120,000 into various reserve 
accounts and sinking funds, all to provide security to the shareholders. It could have paid a 
20% dividend in 1928 with ease if it had really desired to do so. Yet within Rippy’s method of 
analysis, the 8% dividend the DRC paid that year is considered representative of its underlying 
profitability.24  
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Fig. 6.4 – DRC Debenture Interest, Annual Dividends and Annual Retained Earnings – F/Y 
1905 – F/Y 1928 
 
Source: See table 6.2. 
The reason the DRC did not reinvest its earnings in railway expansion is not a simple case of 
hoarding profits. As subsequent sections detail, the national authorities also bear responsibility 
for their conduct. The failure to provide an environment which incentivised reinvestment of 
profits, was a significant institutional failure. The DRC and the wider Colombian railway sector 
demonstrate that it was institutional incentive which drove railway expansion in Latin America, 
rather than profitability or business prospects. The DRC was amongst the most profitable in 
the Latin American region, yet it failed to construct a short and inexpensive length of track. In 
contrast, in Porfirian Mexico railways’ earnings were generally not even enough to pay interest 
on bonds.25 It is clear from the DRC’s accounts that a significant portion of its cash earnings 
were allocated to providing security to its shareholders. Had the railway operated in a more 
favourable political environment, the necessity for this ‘insurance’ against expropriation would 
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be reduced, and more of the DRC’s cash would have been available for expansion. A guarantee 
on DRC bonds would have been necessary to entice investors into expanding operations, and 
ideally these would have been extended to the guarantee of shareholder’s dividends offered in 
Brazil.26 But as chapters three and four demonstrated, the guarantee system was delegitimised 
by a combination of the CNRC’s finances, the Jenks, the ‘Apulo works’, and Torres’ and Pérez 
Triana’s attacks on the GNCRC’s guaranteed bonds. 
By 1928, cumulative retained earnings were £745,845, and cumulative dividends were 
£360,867. With the same level of institutional incentive provided in Brazil, the £1,106,712 of 
cash generated by the business could have been directed towards expanding operations.27 
£385,000 was invested by the DRC in the Manizales-Mariquita ropeway. The DRC could have 
constructed three additional infrastructure works of this kind with dividends and retained 
earnings accumulated between 1905-1928, without even raising any additional capital in 
London. The DRC’s potential for expansion was not limited as the BRPC’s was. From its 
position in the centre of the interior, the DRC could have expanded along the banks of the 
Magdalena south to connect with the CNRC at Girardot (approx. 75km), and north to connect 
with the Antioquia railway at Puerto Berrio (approx. 165km). This would have provided a 
direct rail link between Medellin and Bogotá. The expansion to Ambalema cost the DRC 
£4,600 per km, meaning the £1,106,712 of retained earnings and dividends translates to approx. 
240km of new track, enough for both extensions.28 Once the DRC had reached Girardot, it 
could have continued west through Ibague to connect with the Pacific railway at Armenia, 
opening up Bogotá to what Posada describes as the ‘Pacific route’ to Buenaventura.29 As a 
profitable railway in a strategic position, the DRC had the potential to link up the national 
26 Summerhill, ‘Market intervention’. 
27 Summerhill, ‘Market Intervention’. 
28 According to a Foreign Office report the extension was 81Km: ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 
1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, p. 34; ‘La Dorada Railway Company Report for 1907’, Guildhall Library, 
Stock Exchange Reports, Box 1021, f. 7. 
29 Posada, The Colombian Caribbean, p. 160. 
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railway network if the right institutional incentives had been presented. This did not occur, 
because as the previous four chapters have illustrated, with the fall of the Quinquenio, the 
politics of railway expansion in Colombia turned strongly against foreign railway companies. 
6.3.2 Shareholders 
Chapter five demonstrated that the coastal railways were dominated by transnational capital. 
The DRC’s ownership pattern follows a traditional relationship of ‘imperialism’, with a strong 
relationship between ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ and ‘collaborating elites’.30 As was the case with 
other railways established in the late 1880s, the company was initially dominated by local 
elites, before expanding with an influx of foreign capital. As we see in fig 6.5, in 1890, just 
after the railway was established, the two main shareholders were Francisco Javier Cisneros 
and Tomás Germán Ribón. Between them, the two men controlled slightly less than 90% of 
the share capital, with Germán Ribón alone controlling 78%. By 1895, the shareholding had 
diversified, with Germán Ribón selling shares to other local elites and British investors. The 
most relevant among these was Ignacio Guttierez Ponce, who served as Colombian consul in 
London. After Germán Ribón was awarded a concession contract in 1905 to extend the railway 
to Girardot, the share capital was expanded to pay for the expansion.31 Four wealthy British 
‘gentlemanly capitalist’ families purchased shares in the company: the Quilters, the Morrisons, 
the Cooopers, and the Balstons. Between them they held a controlling influence of 60% of 
share capital over the project. With the Germán Ribón and Ponce’s shareholdings this influence 
rose to 83% between six families. This control was maintained until at least 1920. In 1929, 
through a combination of divestment and expansion of share capital, the ‘gentlemanly 
capitalists’ control had decreased to 22.5%. These British families fit Cain and Hopkins’ 
                                                             
30  Cain, and Hopkins, British Imperialism, I; Gallagher and Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’. 
31  ‘Contrato Celebrado con el Sr. Tomas German Ribon para la Construcion de un Ferrocarril desde Honda 
o sus inmediaciones hasta Flandes o Girardot’, Diario Oficial, No. 12422, 14 August 1905. 
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descriptions of the social class exactly.32 They were very wealthy, heavily involved in the 
financial sector, and maintained country estates in the south of England. Subsequent sections 
of the chapter detail how the Germán Ribóns and the ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ worked in unison 
to protect the DRC’s monopoly: a relationship highly characteristic of the ‘collaborating elite’ 
role understood by Robinson and Gallagher as fundamental to British economic imperialism.33 
Fig. 6.5 – DRC major shareholders, 1890-1929 
 
Source: Companies House, Company No. 84226, Ashtead Holdings Limited [Dorada Extension Railway 
Limited] Shareholder Reports for 1890, 1895, 1913, 1920, 1929. 
The Quilters were an accounting and stockbroking family who accumulated great wealth in the 
financial markets and business world. Rather than landed gentry entering the financial sector 
as described by Cain and Hopkins, the Quilters were financial elites who used their immense 
wealth to reinvent themselves as landed aristocracy. In 1883, the patriarch Sir William Cuthbert 
                                                             
32  Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, I. 












1890 1895 1913 1920 1929
Ribón Cisneros Ponce Cooper Balston Morrison Quilter
290 
Quilter (see fig. 6.7) purchased Bawdsey Manor (see fig. 6.6), a stately home with a 9000 acre 
estate.34 He entered politics in 1885 as a liberal MP, and in 1897 a baronet was created for him, 
cementing the family’s aristocratic pedigree.35 
Fig. 6.6 – Bawdsey Manor, seat of the Quilter Baronets
Source: ‘The house that would not be beaten by German bombs: Grade II manor house which was Britain’s first 




34 Kimberly Morse Jones, ‘Quilter, Sir William Cuthbert, first baronet (1841–1911)’, in Oxford Dictionary 




Fig. 6.7 - Sir William Cuthbert Quilter held 8068 shares (approx. 23%) 
 
Source: ‘in Society and a Member of Parliament’ Vanity Fair, 9 February 1889. 
The Coopers were an accounting family who established Cooper Brothers & Co (today Price 
Waterhouse Coopers). The founding brothers originally worked at Quilter, Ball & Co. the 
accounting firm of the Quilter family.36 The family shareholding was split between the sons of 
William Cooper, who was one of the founders of Cooper Brothers & Co.37 This demonstrates 
the connections between the Quilters and Coopers, and the closed nature of the group 
controlling the DRC. A notable member of the family invested was Sir Alfred Cooper (see fig. 
                                                             
36  John Richard Edwards, ‘Cooper family (per. 1854–1994)’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/47718, accessed 1 March 2017]. 
37  Ibid. 
292 
 
6.8), a world-famous physician who served ‘kings and princes’.38 When he died, he left an 
estate totalling £14,130, of which his £3,000 investment in the railway represented a significant 
portion.39 
Fig. 6.8 – Sir Alfred Cooper held 300 DRC shares (approx. 0.85%) 
 
Source: ‘Men of the Day’, Vanity Fair, 30 December 1897. 
The Morrisons were one of the richest families in Britain. The family dynasty was established 
by James Morrison, through Morrison, Dillon & Co, a business empire based on the rapid 
                                                             
38  D'A. Power, ‘Cooper, Sir Alfred (1838–1908)’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,  
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/32546, accessed 2 March 2017] 
39  Ibid. 
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movement of low value goods.40 In 1857, he died leaving a fortune estimated to be between 
£4,000,000 and £6,000,000.41 The relative value in 2015 represents between £344,000,000 and 
£516,000,000.42 The family’s wealth was such that in 1853 James Morrison purchased the 
whole island of Islay which has an area of 620km2.43 The four family shareholders were James 
Archibald, Hugh, Walter, and Dorothy. James Archibald and Hugh were grandsons of James 
Morrison, and heirs to his fortune. Walter was James Morrison’s son.44 Dorothy was a 
granddaughter, and the sister of James Archibald and Hugh.45 The wealth of the family was 
such that both James Archibald and Hugh had separate and enormous stately homes in the 
South of England (see figs. 6.9 and 6.10). 
                                                             
40  ‘Morrison, James’ in Sidney Lee, Dictionary of National Biography (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1894) 
pp. 108-9. 
41  Charles Jones, ‘Morrison, James (1789–1857)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19326, accessed 2 March 2017] 
42  Calculated with historic inflation datasets at: 
 https://www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/relativevalue.php accessed 02/03/2017. 
43  David H. Caldwell, Islay, Jura and Colonsay: A Historical Guide (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2011), p. 79. 
44  http://thepeerage.com/p50982.htm#i509820 accessed 02/03/2017. 
45  http://thepeerage.com/p33024.htm#i330238 accessed 02/03/2017. 
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Fig. 6.9 – Hugh Morrison’s home Little Ridge, Fonthill Estate, Wiltshire 
Source: http://www.fonthill.co.uk/fonthill-history accessed 13/02/2018
Fig. 6.10 – James Archibald Morrison’s home Basildon Park. 
Source: https://www.nationaltrust.org.uk/basildon-park accessed 02/03/2017. 
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William Edward Balston held a 5.7% share in the DRC and a 1.33% interest in the CNRC.46 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the source of his family’s wealth was a paper mill 
in Kent. His wealth was inherited, as the heir to the fortune created by his grandfather, William 
Balston.47 This was a trait also shared by other major shareholders in the railway. They were 
rich, lived a privileged life in mansions as landed gentry, but their lifestyle was not based on 
their own business acumen. The necessity to receive a return on inherited wealth perhaps 
explains why the men were drawn to the railway project, since its monopoly provided a 
dependable annual dividend. 
Fig. 6.11 – Breakdown of DRC shareholders by group 
Source: See footnote.48 
46 Shareholder Register for 1914, TNA, BT31/16224/62637; Companies House, Company No. 84226, 
Ashtead Holdings Limited [Dorada Extension Railway Limited] Shareholder Reports for 1913 and 1920. 
47 Family Tree: http://www.minotaur.org/family-tree/famg01.htm#109 [accessed 04/03/2017], History of 
the Mill: http://www.vintagepaper.co.uk/the-history-of-j-whatman-fine-art-paper [accessed 
04/03/2017]; http://www.kentonline.co.uk/maidstone/news/campaign-to-save-historic-mill-32289/ 
[accessed 04/03/2017]. 
48 Companies House, Company No. 84226, Ashtead Holdings Limited [Dorada Extension Railway 
Limited] Shareholder Reports for 1890, 1895, 1913, 1920, 1929. Throughout this thesis shareholder 
groups are defined in the following terms: Small Shareholders £1-£200, Medium Shareholders £201-












1895 1913 1920 1929
Other Companies Nominees Investment Trusts
Large Shareholders Medium Shareholders Small Shareholders
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Fig. 6.11 demonstrates the DRC’s concentrated ownership pattern. This contrasts sharply with 
the CNRC, which was dominated by medium and small investors. As has been established, the 
large shareholders were all part of the social class Cain and Hopkins term ‘gentlemanly 
capitalists’. The main differences between the DRC and the CNRC’s experience, was the 
institutional incentives received for investment, and the geography traversed. The CNRC 
received a full guarantee of debenture interest, whilst the DRC received no assistance at all. 
The CNRC’s guarantee succeeded in attracting capital for what was a significantly risky 
investment. In contrast, the DRC’s relationship with the capital market was dictated entirely 
by the free market. 
6.4 Crises, 1899-1902 
6.4.1 Arrancaplumas Ferry Dispute 1899 
In the months leading up to the War of a Thousand Days, the DRC experienced its first serious 
problem with regionalism. The DRC operated a ferry service across the river at its southern 
terminal at Arrancaplumas. In December 1898, a bridge over the river was completed by the 
Colombian engineer Bernardo Navarro (see fig. 6.12).49 Navarro had been awarded a 
concession contract for the bridge which provided a monopoly on the conveyance of goods and 
people across the river. He requested that the ‘service of the said ferry should be done away 
with altogether’.50 The DRC argued since the ferry predated the bridge by fifteen years, it 
should be exempt.51 The DRC enlisted diplomatic assistance from the Foreign Office, who felt 
that the national government’s intention was to favour national interests over foreign ones, 
rather than to enforce the contractual obligations.52 This prioritisation of national business 
49 ‘Puente navarro, 100 años de historia’, El Tiempo, 6 January 1999. 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-877042 accessed 25/07/2017. 
50 Emerson (General Manager) to Minister of Finance, 3 February 1899, TNA, FO55/389, f. 184. 
51 Emerson (General Manager) to Minister of Finance, 3 February 1899, TNA, FO55/389, f. 184; Emerson 
(General Manager) to Villiers (Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs), 10 March 1899, TNA, 
FO55/389, f. 189. 
52 Anonymous internal handwritten note, TNA, FO55/389, f. 180. 
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interests over those of foreigners was an early example of growing nationalism against foreign 
railways, years before it solidified within national railway policy.53 The dispute also illustrates 
the repeated problem of contractual instability in Colombia, and the negative influence it had 
on British railway companies. 
Fig. 6.12 – Puente Navarro (Navarro’s bridge) c. early twentieth century 
Source: Uncategorised photo held by the Museo del Rio Magdalena, Honda, Colombia, consulted February 
2018.
Within the dispute the preoccupation of the DRC’s management was similar to that of Henry 
Jenks (CNRC) and Fletcher Toomer (GNCRC) in their respective disputes with the national 
and local authorities. A document outlining the DRC’s objections sent to the Foreign Office 
stated that ‘[we] only ask for justice’.54 This reiterates the argument made in earlier chapters; 
53 Ibid. The bridge still provides an indispensable link between municipalities on either side of the river, 
and is a source of local pride because it was financed and administered by a local merchant. When 
carrying out field work and presenting a public engagement exercise at the Museo del Rio Magdalena in 
Honda, the importance of the monument was clear to see, as a small pamphlet produced by 
schoolchildren of the municipality of Puerto Bogotá, Cundinamarca, which the bridge connects with 
Hondá, Tolima, illustrates: http://escritoresfuturo3000.blogspot.com.co/2015/01/puente-navarro-120-
anos-de-inicio-de-su.html accessed 13/02/2018. 
54 Dorada Railway Co. Ld. Ferry at Arrancaplumas’, TNA, FO55/389, f. 199. 
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namely that British economic interests expected a similar institutional environment to the one 
they were accustomed to working under at home. Garner refers to this same behaviour as the 
‘gentlemanly ethos’, which ‘operated on the values of ‘order, duty and loyalty, honour, and 
obligation in business transactions’.55 According to Cain and Hopkins, exhibiting this 
behaviour was fundamental to the whole concept of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’.56 As previous 
chapters have illustrated, ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ in Colombia struggled to modify their 
strategy to navigate what Safford described as Colombia’s ‘catch-as-catch-can’ national 
business culture: cutthroat in nature, with a flexible rather than concrete approach to business 
agreements.57 As such, outside of the Quinquenio which enforced contractual stability, 
‘gentlemanly capitalism’ in the standard sense could not function.58 Chapter four illustrated 
that by the time of the Quinquenio, the Jenkses had begun to modify their behaviour to better 
navigate the national business culture. Rather than focussing on ‘gentlemanly’ concepts such 
as ‘justice and honour’, Shirley Jenks was willing to engage in business practices which made 
him complicit in the corruption of ‘collaborating elites’ to grow his influence within Colombian 
society. As is explored later in the chapter, the DRC’s ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ also learned to 
modify their approach, embracing ‘collaborating elites’ such as Tomás Germán Ribón, to 
protect their monopoly profits. The Arrancaplumas dispute is important, because it illustrates 
that the DRC’s functionaries exhibited the same doux behaviour of the ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ 
class at the beginning of their interactions with Colombia’s political and economic elite.59 
6.4.2 War of a Thousand Days 
During the war, the upper Magdalena River valley was controlled by liberal rebels, whilst 
Honda and the lower section were controlled by the conservative government. As a result, 
55 Garner, British Lions, p. 11. 
56 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, I, pp. 53-104 
57 Safford, ‘Foreign and National Enterprise’, p. 503. 
58 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, I, pp. 276-315. 
59 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, I, pp. 53-104 
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Honda and the railway terminal straddled the frontline of the conflict, and represented an 
epicentre of fighting. The following excerpt describes scenes during an attack by 1,500 liberal 
rebel troops in December 1901. 
The fighting in the streets of Honda … was very severe and no quarter was given … to prisoners 
… all were shot and their bodies were thrown into the river Magdalena. [Fighting] lasted for 
about four hours without cessation, and hardly a house on the south side has escaped being hit by 
bullets.60 
60 Illegible to Petty-Fitzmaurice, 21 December 1901, TNA, FO55/400, f. 211; British Vice Consul at Honda 
to Unknown, 11 December 1901, TNA, FO55/400, f, 217. 
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Fig. 6.13 – Internal view of bullet hole and external view of the ‘acampamento Ingles’ 
railway residence in Honda as it exists today 
 
 
Source: The above photos were taken at what is referred to today as the ‘acampamiento Ingles’ in Altos del 
Rosario in Honda, February 2018.61 
                                                             
61  The current inhabitant Don Jaime Torres commented that the building was originally erected by Cisneros 
with the same zinc laminate utilised for other buildings, but it was lined internally with luxurious 
Jamaican hardwood. When discussing the War of a Thousand Days he immediately showed me the bullet 
hole which had been hidden behind a family photograph. He added that a matching hole had originally 
existed in the external zinc sheeting but the sheet in question had been replaced long ago. 
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The conflict played out meters away from the DRC’s infrastructure. As fig. 6.13 illustrates, the 
railway management’s residence in Honda bears the marks of the conflict to this day. But the 
impact of the conflict was not limited to physical manifestations: it also influenced the DRC 
politically. Government requisitions of rails and other materials made maintaining the line 
difficult, and the DRC were obliged to provide transportation services to the government 
throughout.62 In the first months of 1902, paranoia led to the national government requesting 
the removal of company local manager J. F. Bateman from his position, on the basis he was 
politically aligned with the liberal rebels.63  
Just as was the case with other railways, the war also affected revenues. Operations were in 
such chaos that annual reports could not be prepared for the stock exchange.64 In March 1904, 
after the DRC’s operations had normalised, a report was produced for the previous four 
financial years, which demonstrate how depressed revenues had been by the conflict.  





1900/1 £6,327 £5,703 £624 
1901/2 £12,802 £7,543 £5,258 
1902/3 £13,400 £6,600 £6,800 
1903/4 £46,000 £18,000 £28,000 
Source: ‘The Dorada Railway Company - Directors Report to 31st 
March, 1904’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Box 830. 
The financial impact on the DRC was not as great as on the CNRC because it was free of debt. 
In addition, in 1903, commerce which had been immobilised in interior was shipped to the 
                                                             
62  Pilditch & Smitheet to President Marroquin, 18 February 1902, FO55/412, f. 29V. 
63  Pilditch & Smitheet to President Marroquin, 18 February 1902, FO55/412, f. 29V. An interesting 
anecdote is the fact that being married to a local inhabitant Bateman stayed in Honda the rest of his life 
and is buried in its cemetery. Bateman’s allegiance to the liberal cause is unclear, but that of his grandson 
Jaime Bateman Cayón is not, who founded the guerrilla organisation M-19 which splintered from the 
liberal coalition behind Rojas Pinilla following the 1970 general election. 
64  ‘The Dorada Railway Company - Directors Report to 31st March, 1901’, Guildhall Library, Stock 
Exchange Reports, Box 688; ‘The Dorada Railway Company - Directors Report to 31st March, 1902’, 
Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Box 737. 
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Caribbean, providing the DRC’s finances with an immediate boost. Conflict had a greater 
impact on railways such as the SMRC and the CNRC, which were undertaking construction 
projects financed by debt. Existing railways which enjoyed strong monopolies such as the 
DRC, the BRPC, or the CNoRC, were less affected. As such, Colombia’s political instability 
favoured monopolistic railways, and constrained larger-scale projects with a more 
developmental influence on the economy. 
6.5 Quinquenian Expansion, 1904-09 
6.5.1 The Ambalema Prolongation: Successes and Failures of the Quinquenio 
In Mexico, ‘the favourable treatment of overseas businessmen’ was a central component of the 
Porfiriato government, and Díaz exercised ‘authority over the Mexican judiciary’ to 
specifically assist foreign interests. 65 Reyes similarly suspended the congress and the senate 
throughout the Quinquenio (1904-09), allowing contracts to be approved without waiting years 
whilst political debates raged within both bodies. As a result, the on 14 August 1905, only a 
year into the administration, a new concession contract for an extension to Girardot was issued 
to the DRC.66 As has been illustrated throughout the thesis, outside of the Quinquenio new 
concession contracts or renegotiations dragged on for years, often with no resolution. The 
expansion was conceived to link the DRC with the CNRC, providing an uninterrupted rail 
connection between Bogotá and the lower Magdalena River valley. The concession was 
awarded to the largest major shareholder: Tomás Germán Ribón.67 Construction was managed 
by S. Pearson & Sons, the famous nineteenth century civil engineering company.68 Paul 
Garner’s study of Weetman Pearson in Mexico demonstrates that the firm enjoyed close 
                                                             
65  Garner, British Lions, p. 71. 
66  Anonymous, Contrato Celebrado con el Sr. Tomas German Ribon para la construccion de un ferrocarril 
desde Honda o sus inmediaciones hasta Flandes o Girardot (Bogotá: Imprenta Eléctrica, 1905). 
67  Ibid. 




relations with the government of Porfirio Díaz, reminiscent of the relationship between the 
Jenks and political actors of the Quinquenio.69 It seems likely S. Pearson & Son’s role was 
related to Reyes’s close association with Díaz, with whom he had ‘the opportunity of studying 
under’ in Mexico.70 The firm made rapid progress, and the expansion was completed as far as 
Ambalema on the 27 September 1907, just two years after the contract had been signed.71 The 
expansion was twice the length of the original length of track, and as such, the first three years 
of Reyes’s Quinquenio had achieved more than the previous two decades.72 The firm had 
performed admirably, and the DRC argued it represented the best section of railway in the 
country.73 The expansion cost the company £372,570, representing a low figure of £4,600 per 
kilometre.74 
The DRC’s rapid expansion during the Quinquenio, demonstrates what could be achieved with 
a stable and receptive political environment, and access to British capital and expertise. The 
DRC was able to raise debentures almost at par, selling £350,000 in the capital market for 
£345,000, despite carrying no government guarantee.75 This compares favourably to the 
CNRC, which raised government guaranteed debentures at a significant 20% discount.76 
President Reyes played a key role in facilitating this investment. As has been discussed 
previously, he and his finance minister had worked to improve Colombia’s reputation in the 
exterior by renegotiating and resuming payment of the sovereign debt. The results were 
dramatic. Just as Garner argues was the case in Mexico, what was previously considered a 
                                                             
69  Garner, British Lions, pp. 104-8. 
70  ‘We published a few days ago an emphatic’, The Times, 29 September 1905. 
71  ‘La Dorada Railway Company Report for 1907’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Box 1021, 
f. 3. 
72  ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, p. 34. 
73  ‘La Dorada Railway Company Report for 1907’, Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Box 1021, 
f. 3. 
74  According to a Foreign Office report the extension was 81Km: ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 
1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968, p. 34; ‘La Dorada Railway Company Report for 1907’, Guildhall Library, 
Stock Exchange Reports, Box 1021, f. 7. 
75  Smithers to Reyes, 30 September 1908, AGN, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 374, f. 360. 
76  ‘Republic of Colombia Colombian National Railway (1908) Customs Guaranteed 6% Debentures’, The 
Times, 26 October 1908. 
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‘pariah state’ was now viewed by investors in London as a legitimate target for investment.77 
Commentary from The Times demonstrates the positive view of Reyes, and contempt for men 
such as Pérez Triana who had criticised the negotiations: 
General Reyes is fully alive to the fact that such enterprises can only be carried through by foreign 
capital ... But his policy in this respect has much opposition to overcome in the foolish obstruction 
of his ignorant countrymen, who fail to see the advantages, and raise the cry that the foreigners 
are fleecing the country for their own benefit.78 
The original concession to Girardot was not completely taken up, mainly because the Cambao 
road contract was subsequently awarded to major shareholder Tomás Germán Ribón on the 18 
May 1906.79 The cart road enabled connection of the capital with the upper Magdalena valley. 
As a result, Germán Ribón and his ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ associates, were able to establish a 
total monopoly of transport between the capital and lower Magdalena in direct competition 
with the CNRC. The interplay between the cart road and the DRC, illustrates that even in the 
first decade of the twentieth century, a struggle between roads and railways was already 
developing within national infrastructure development policy. As Ramírez argues, this struggle 
was won definitively by the former in the 1930s.80 Reyes attempted to intervene and entice the 
DRC to complete the expansion to Girardot, by offering a guarantee of interest on additional 
debentures.81 However, it was not enough. The prospective revenues of the Cambao cart road 
were greater than those of the expansion. To ensure the railway was constructed to Girardot, a 
guarantee on dividends like that provided in Brazil would have been necessary. But as the first 
three chapters illustrated, Reyes did not even have sufficient political capital to implement 
guarantees of interest on bonds without members of his own administration sabotaging his 
efforts. Providing institutional incentive over and above this base level, was completely 
                                                             
77  Garner, British Lions, p. 97. 
78  ‘We published a few days ago an emphatic’, The Times, 29 September 1905. 
79  Anonymous, Carretera de Cambao Contrato Celebrado con el Senor Tomas German Ribon (Bogotá, 
Imprenta de la Luz, 1906). 
80  Ramírez, ‘Las carreteras’, in La infraestructura, ed. by Ramírez and Panchón, p. 66-71. 
81  Smithers to Reyes, 30 September 1908, AGN, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 374, f. 359. 
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unrealistic. Reyes’s failure to ensure the expansion to Girardot, was a major blow to the aims 
of his administration, since it made the direct rail connection between Bogotá and the lower 
Magdalena impossible. In 1915, Revista Moderna blamed Jenks for blocking this 
‘transcendental work’.82 The reality is that the failure was determined much earlier.  Reyes’s 
government could not provide the necessary level of incentives to the DRC because of the 
nationalistic ire government guarantees inspired domestically. But despite this failure, Reyes 
provided a constructive impulse to the DRC which resulted in twice as much track laid in the 
first three years of his administration than in the two decades preceding it. 
6.6  Post-Quinquenian Expansion, 1909-1922 
The DRC was unique as the only foreign-owned railway permitted to expand its operations 
following the end of the Quinquenio. As the previous four chapters have shown, after this 
period government policy prioritised government control of foreign railways over the 
expansion of the railway network. As the CNoRC and GNCRC in chapter three demonstrated, 
for the national government taking control of an existing short section of track was preferable 
to additional track in foreign hands. With the SMRC, the government was willing to halt 
expansion entirely to try to limit the growth of the transnational interests associated with the 
railway. In view of this, we may well ask, why was the case of the DRC different? In this 
section, I argue the reasons are twofold. First, the DRC’s profitability and the strength of its 
geographical monopoly meant the railway was not a realistic target for nationalisation. The 
national government had no financial interest in the railway, and it could not use renegotiations 
to financially cripple it. Second, the Manizales-Mariquita ropeway provided significant 
impetus to the national economy, and by opening up Caldas for coffee exportation, it was in 
the interests of the economically and politically dominant hacendado class. This goal 
                                                             
82  ‘De Bogotá a la Dorada Directamente’, Revista Moderna, 2, 7 (1915), p. 6. 
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momentarily took precedent over the strong nationalist and anti-foreign currents running 
through Colombian politics. Nevertheless, as is explored in later in the chapter, once the 
ropeway was completed in 1922, this nationalist current was aimed squarely at the DRC. 
6.6.1 Expansion to Girardot: Monopoly, the Cambao Road, and Major Shareholders  
As previously mentioned, the Quinquenian contract awarded to the DRC authorised the railway 
to expand as far as Girardot. Rafael Reyes had offered a guarantee on bonds in 1908 for the 
section between Ambalema and Girardot, but this had not been taken up.83 As has been detailed 
throughout, when Reyes ‘slipped aboard a United Fruit Company boat and sailed off into exile’, 
it brought the legitimacy of his whole political project into question.84 Quinquenian contracts 
were viewed as artefacts of collaboration, and as such, companies which had based their 
expansion plans on them were thrown into chaos. As a result, the contract had to be 
renegotiated, taking three years before it was regranted by the Restrepo administration in 
1912.85 An expansion to Girardot was fundamentally important for the economy of the interior, 
and it was described by contemporaries as a ‘transcendental work’. 86 It would facilitate a non-
stop service between Bogotá and La Dorada, eliminating the need for costly freight transfers 
from railway cars to river boats at both Girardot and Ambalema. 
The Ministry of Public Works lamented in 1912, that if only ‘instead of extending the railway 
to Ambalema, it had been extended to Girardot, [the railway] would have actually served the 
commercial interests of the interior of the country’.87 The ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ of the DRC 
had witnessed concession contracts awarded to other British companies, only to be repudiated 
at a later date, with heel-dragging in negotiations paralysing construction for sufficient time to 
                                                             
83  Smithers to Reyes, 30 September 1908, AGN, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 374, f. 359. 
84  Palacios, Between Legitimacy, p. 63. 
85  República de Colombia, Memoria del Ministro de Obras Públicas al Congreso de 1914 (Bogotá: 
Imprenta Nacional, 1914) p. XXXIII. 
86  ‘De Bogotá a la Dorada Directamente’ Revista Moderna, Vol. 2, 7 (1915), p. 6. 
87  República de Colombia, Ministerio de Obras Públicas - Memoria Congreso de 1912 (Bogotá: Imprenta 
Nacional, 1912) p. 51. 
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financially cripple the company and enforce nationalisation. That the DRC refused to enter a 
costly expansion in this hostile political environment, is understandable. Furthermore, major 
shareholders had taken a direct interest in developing the Cambao cart road, which was 
mentioned earlier.88 A direct rail service from Bogotá to La Dorada would make the Cambao 
road obsolete, and major shareholders invested in it stood to lose out. Charles Morrison had 
invested £25,000, Sir William Cuthbert Quilter £25,000, Company Secretary William Smithers 
£5,000, and German Ribón £10,000. The cart road’s total share capital stood at £80,000, and 
these four men controlled 81.25% of the enterprise.89 As we saw in Fig. 6.4, in 1913, the 
Morrison, Quilter, and Ribón families also held a controlling share of the DRC. The company 
accounts for 1913 paid lip service to other shareholders, suggesting that the ‘directors are 
studying the question’ of whether the expansion was desirable.90 However, as the 1908 letter 
to Reyes from company secretary William Smithers demonstrates, a decision to focus on the 
Camboa cart road had been taken by major shareholders years before.91 Circumstances in 
which a railway company refused to expand to protect a monopoly were not unique to 
Colombia. In Brazil, Lewis argues the Sao Paulo Railway Company also refused to expand its 
operations beyond the existing monopoly.92  
A central thread running through the thesis has been the inability of ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ 
to adjust their business strategy to navigate what Safford refers to as the ‘catch-as-catch-can’ 
national business culture: a cutthroat economic environment with a pervasive lack of 
contractual stability. 93 As was illustrated earlier in the chapter the DRC’s administrators 
displayed this same characteristic behaviour in the ferry dispute. However, the Girardot 
                                                             
88  Anonymous, Carretera de Cambao Contrato Celebrado. 
89  Smithers to Reyes, 30 September 1908, AGN, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 374, f. 355. 
90  ‘The Dorada Railway Company - Directors Report to 31st March, 1914’, Guildhall Library, Stock 
Exchange Reports, Box 1319. 
91  Smithers to Reyes, 30th September 1908, AGN, Ferrocarriles, Vol. 374, f. 359. 
92  Colin Lewis, Public Policy, p. 38. 
93  Safford, ‘Foreign and National Enterprise’, p. 503. 
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expansion – or lack thereof – illustrates that over time the ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ learnt to 
shed their doux ethos. In the 1890s, the DRC’s management had argued ‘[we] only ask for 
justice’, yet during the 1910s they meted out injustice, by refusing to complete a key piece of 
infrastructure, reminiscent of the Sao Paulo Railway, said to have held ‘a country to ransom’.94 
In 1938, El Tiempo similarly accused the DRC of having ‘extorted a third of the country for 
many years’.95 This modification in strategy seems to have been a result of the close 
interactions with local ‘collaborating elites’ such as Tomas Germán Ribón. This same change 
of strategy was apparent in chapter four, where Shirley Jenks and the management of the CNRC 
played a complicit role in the fraudulent activity of the ‘Apulo works’, to ensure the success of 
their business dealings. Shirley Jenks attempted to construct a similar monopoly as the DRC’s 
by combining his interests in the CNRC, the Cartagena Railway, and Magdalena River 
navigation companies. He was attacked by contemporaries for this action, but they exaggerated 
his impact on the economy.96 As chapter five illustrated, the Cartagena Railway’s ‘war of rates’ 
was generally unsuccessful, because of the strength of competition in the form of the BRPC. 
Thus, despite Shirley Jenks’ reputation as an agent of imperialism, he never influenced or 
impeded national railway strategy to the same extent as the owners of the DRC. For this reason, 
the DRC represents a much more clear-cut example of economic imperialism. 
It could be argued that this contradictory behaviour was simply indicative of hypocrisy, and 
that Cain and Hopkins’s argument of a doux British imperialism based on ‘gentlemanly 
capitalism’ is spurious.97 However, this thesis has demonstrated that British businessmen 
initially exhibited an ethos based on the concept of justice, similar to the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century concept of gentlemanly behaviour. Furthermore, ample examples have been 
                                                             
94  D.C.M Platt, ‘Economic Imperialism and the Businessman’, p. 300; ‘Dorada Railway Co. Ld. Ferry at 
Arrancaplumas’, TNA, FO55/389, f. 199. 
95  Una Empresa Afortunada, El Tiempo, 17 January 1938. 
96  Fischer, ‘Empresas de navegación’, pp. 1010-11; Ferrocarril de Santa Marta – La Prorroga del Contrato 
Peligros de Soberania’, El Tiempo, 11 January 1912. 
97  Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, I. 
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provided to illustrate how this approach, which was perceived locally as naivety or weakness 
to be exploited, was a significant factor in the repeated failure of British railway enterprise. 
Indeed, we can go right back to the very opening of this thesis, with the case of W.J. Kelly to 
illustrate how the naïve and doux attitude of British businessmen was an impediment to railway 
investment from the very start.98 By the 1910s, the ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ had begun to 
overcome this inherent naivety, and to form an inherently successful and profitable enterprise; 
this is highly significant. They had come to learn that a ‘gentlemanly’ ethos was not conductive 
to business in Colombia, because national elites refused to follow the ‘rules of the game’ of 
British imperialism. The experiences of the CNoRC, the CCRC, and the GNCRC, had shown 
that efforts to develop the infrastructure of the country would be exploited to weaken the 
position of British interests, and to nationalise them. The lack of stable ‘rules of the game’, 
which North argues are indispensable for sustained economic growth, explains why railway 
expansion was so sluggish in the post-Quinquenio period.99 The failure of British private 
investment meant Colombia had to wait for the state-led ‘danza de los millones’ expansion 
policy of the 1920s, to make further progress on the rail network.100 But from the perspective 
of public policy, this was not a problem, but rather an achievement. Whereas policy in 
Argentina and Brazil focussed on ensuring expansion of private railway companies, post-1909 
Colombian policy focussed on avoiding expansion, and seizing control of foreign railways.101 
The failure of the Girardot extension was the most influential institutional failure in the history 
of Colombian infrastructure development, and the case underlines the necessity of institutional 
incentive to corral investment to where it was most required. As Summerhill argues, even in ‘a 
pure price system’ uncertainty, and worries over expropriation, ‘mean that infrastructure 
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investment may languish at levels much lower than are warranted by prevailing conditions’.102 
The history of the DRC is a perfect illustration of how Summerhill’s theoretical observation 
played out on the ground in Latin America. There was no place or point in time where such a 
small amount of foreign capital would have had such a huge impact on the Colombian 
economy, yet the rail link between Ambalema and Girardot was not completed. The model 
chosen to overcome this problem, was the state-led expansion policy followed in the 1920s, 
rather than the institutional incentives for foreign investment applied in Brazil, Argentina, and 
Mexico. In the context of Latin America, it is fair to say the latter was much more successful 
in terms of railway development. 
6.6.2 A Clash of Cultures: Locals, Workers, and Enclaves 
The decision of large shareholders to reject expansion to Girardot contributed to a growing 
crisis of transportation.103 Bogotá depended on the upper Magdalena River for its links to the 
outside world. Colonisation of sparsely inhabited areas of the interior, intensive agricultural 
practices, and the exploitation of land on hillsides had led to silt deposits inhibiting river 
navigation. Soil erosion had been a problem since the Colonial period, but the scale of 
population and cultivation spurred on by the coffee exportation boom brought the upper section 
of the river to a crisis point: 
The bad passes [on the river] get more appalling with every passing day, and since improving 
them has been tried many times, experience suggests it is not possible. I make these comments 
on the basis of recent and repeated personal experiences. Grave accidents have occurred to four 
separate boats on the last four voyages on the Alto Magdalena.104 
These transportation problems cut off the DRC’s supply of coal and firewood, effectively 
paralysing its operations.105 The crisis also stoked resentment and hostility from the public. The 
                                                             
102  Summerhill, ‘The Development of Infrastructure’, p. 295. 
103  ‘El Problema de los Transportes’, El Tiempo, 11 June, 1919. 
104  Dr. Gabriel Gonzalez, ‘El Ferrocarril de la Dorada y el problema de los transportes’, El Tiempo, 9 
November 1919. 
105  ‘Lo que pasa en el ferrocarril de la Dorada’, El Tiempo, 2 June 1919. 
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local reaction was similar to what Lewis argues occurred when the São Paulo Railway refused 
to extend its line into the coffee growing hinterlands.106 A conference was organised with the 
Colombian Society of Agriculturalists, attempting to allay the public’s fears. The DRC’s 
representative argued they were keen to extend the line and blamed negotiations with the 
national government.107  But as was established earlier in the chapter, the DRC’s large 
shareholders were unwilling to support the project because of their personal interests in the 
Cambao Road. The company’s hope that the conference would abate public anger was 
misplaced. The conference occurred during a period of heightened tensions between the local 
population and foreign railway companies, which saw strikes on the CNRC, the CNoRC and 
the Colombian Southern British registered railway companies.108 An aspect of the conference 
which further enraged the public, were comments made by a local Colombian representative 
of the DRC Dr Gabriel Gonzalez: 
One of the major hurdles the company faces in order to provide a good level of service is the lack 
of suitable, competent and trustworthy personnel. It is a disgrace and is painful to acknowledge, 
but it is a fact which is demonstrated daily within government and commerce. Other than in a 
few rare cases, sufficiently skilled, trained and efficient personnel simply cannot be found for the 
diverse destinations and employments [within the company].109 
The public viewed these comments as an insinuation that they were backwards, corrupt, 
incompetent, and ultimately incapable of maintaining modern technology. The backlash led to 
the issuance of a public apology in El Tiempo two weeks later.110  
The reference to trustworthy personnel alludes to the same ‘catch-as-catch-can’ national 
business culture which Safford argues led to the murder of the British manager of the salt mines 
of Zipaquirá, when he ‘refused to permit workers to steal salt’.111 Safford has also argued that 
                                                             
106  Lewis, Public Policy, p. 38. 
107  ‘El Ferrocarril de la Dorada y el problema de los transportes’, El Tiempo, 9 November 1919. 
108  ‘La Huelga Ferroviaria de Hoy’, El Tiempo, 22 November 1919; ‘La Actitud de los Ferroviarios de 
Bogotá’ El Tiempo, 21 November 1919; ‘La Huelga en el Ferrocarril de Girardot’ El Tiempo, 21 
November 1919. 
109  ‘El Ferrocarril de la Dorada y el problema de los transportes’, El Tiempo, 9 November 1919. 
110  ‘Los Empleados Del Ferrocarril de la Dorada’ El Tiempo, 22 November 1919. 
111  Safford, ‘Foreign and National Enterprise’, pp. 503, 513. 
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Colombia had developed a viable technological elite during the nineteenth century.112 The 
development of this elite did not seem to assist British railway companies, which continued to 
depend on foreign engineers and technicians. This remained the case for the DRC right up to 
nationalisation in 1956, even for relatively low skilled work. Various British engineers also 
provided an important contribution to the development of the local environment. By 1932, 
there were four separate British owned businesses in Mariquita and Honda. One belonged to 
the descendants of J. F. Bateman, the DRC manager who has been removed from his post 
during the civil war.113 
Fig. 6.14 – The ID card of Eduardo Nicholas, the Trinidadian warehouse manager 
 
Source: The ID card is held by Eduardo’s son Don Carlos Nicholas and was consulted in a field trip to 
Mariquita in February 2018. 
                                                             
112  Frank Safford, The Ideal of the Practical: Colombia’s Struggle to Form a Technical Elite (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1976). 
113  José Ernesto Ramírez, ‘Ingenieros ingleses en el norte del Tolima’, Boletin Cultural y Bibliografico, Vol. 
XLIII, No. 71-72 (2006), 139-64, (p. 141). 
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Staff brought in from overseas included Eduardo Nicholas (see fig. 6.14) a Trinidadian-British 
technician who worked as a warehouse operative, and local manager Leslie Frost.114 After 
studying in London Nicholas joined the railway in 1912 at the age of twenty-four. In 1956, he 
was charged with the final handover of the railway and British enclave to the Colombian 
government.115 Frost entered the GWR’s Swindon workshops as an apprentice at sixteen, 
spending five years learning the railway trade before moving to Colombia to work for the 
BRPC. After six years working in Barranquilla, he returned to Britain for a short period, before 
taking a position in British Sudan where he spent five years. On the 18 November 1935, he 
took up a position at the DRC as manager of the ropeway, in which he remained until 
nationalisation.116 This requirement for foreign expertise created an enclave dynamic, and the 
families of employees spent decades living in ‘enclaves’ in Mariquita and Manizales, creating 
a significant parallel community.117 It seems likely the enclave itself enabled the DRC to attract 
expertise, since living in the mansions within (see fig. 6.15), offered a lifestyle railway workers 
could never aspire to enjoy at home. 
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116  Smith, Cocaine Train, pp. 23, 108. 
117  Smith, Cocaine Train, pp. 23, 108. 
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Fig. 6.15 – The Enclave Houses No. 1 (top) and No. 2 (bottom) Both J. H. Blackett and 
Lesley Frost spent time living in the No. 1 mansion 
 
Source: Photos taken during field trip to the enclave in February 2018. 
A British community existed in Mariquita since the early 1820s, when the Colombian Mining 
Association sent Cornish miners to reopen the Santa Ana mine. This British mining presence 
persisted throughout the nineteenth century.118 The DRC constructed British-style country 
mansions and houses for employees in Mariquita, for which standalone refrigeration and 
sanitation systems were developed.119 As fig. 6.15 illustrates clearly, the DRC attempted to 
                                                             
118  John Cordy Jeaffreson, The Life of Robert Stephenson, F.R.S. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
repr. 2014 [1864]), I, pp. 65-78; Powles, New Granada, pp. 19-25. 
119  Óscar D. Moreno Martínez, ‘The longest ropeway in the world. A case study of the British technological 
influence in Colombia’ (unpublished MSc dissertation, Imperial College London, 2013), pp. 29-30. 
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recreate the ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ lifestyle in Colombia, and the compound would not have 
looked out of place in Kenya, South Africa, or Southern Rhodesia. Moreno argues inhabitants 
of the zone viewed the technologies on display as exotic as the ice brought to Gabriel García 
Márquez’s fictional Macondo.120 The enclave even had an Anglican church and graveyard (see 
fig. 6.16).121 Throughout Latin America, British railway companies preferred to employ a cadre 
of foreign engineers and technicians, although in places such as Buenos Aires, the numbers 
were far greater, and the community generally existed as a ‘suburban middle class’.122 Brown 
argues these communities left an enduring mark on Latin American culture: ‘British railway 
workers … were … significant in the adoption of association football’.123 Many of the first 
football clubs in South America were established by British railway workers, and the DRC 
maintained its own team (see fig. 6.16).124 In 1927 locals from Honda beat the DRC British 
railway workers in an impromptu match: the news was met with national pride, jubilation, and 
a write up in the most prestigious national newspaper.125 
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Fig. 6.16 – The DRC football team (above) and a burial at the Anglican graveyard in the 
enclave (below) 
 
Source: The photos are held by Eduardo’s son Don Carlos Nicholas and were consulted in a field trip to 
Mariquita in February 2018. 
The crisis of transportation, and the suspicion the enclave dynamic created, led to a rapid 
deterioration of the DRC’s relationship with the local populace and government. By 1923, the 
relationship had broken down, and El Tiempo published the following at the behest of patrons 
of the DRC’s services: 
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The railway’s service worsens with each passing day. Today we left Honda one hour late, and it 
took two more to travel the twenty kilometres … The railway shamelessly abuses the public, 
harming their interests substantially … Such odious and damaging conduct by this foreign 
company.126 
On the 23 October 1923, exactly one month after the article was published, the departmental 
government of Tolima launched a legal case against the company. This dispute is explored in 
detail later in the chapter. 
6.6.3 The Manizales-Mariquita ropeway: Success of the Free Market 
The Manizales-Mariquita ropeway was a unique development for the Colombian economy. 
Pérez Ángel’s Colgados de las nubes presents an important analysis of the economic 
contribution of the ropeway to the economy of Caldas, and Moreno’s recent study of the 
ropeway’s construction and implementation is a significant step forward in highlighting the 
international and imperial dimensions of the project.127 However, its experience as a British 
company remains unknown, and its impact on wider economic development has not received 
the attention it deserves from the national economic historiography. I argue that the system was 
well suited to Colombia, because it was adaptable to mountainous terrain and required less 
capital investment per km. In this subsection I argue the system quickly became a profitable 
and self-sustaining enterprise. The ropeway was the first transport infrastructure which crossed 
the cordilleras between eastern and western Colombia, and as such, completely reconfigured 
the economic interconnectivity of the interior. By linking the DRC to the city of Manizales, the 
railway was able to transport coffee from Caldas for export. The coffee trade guaranteed a 
dependable income stream, meaning the ropeway did not burden the parent company or dilute 
the income of the large shareholders. 
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Work on the ropeway commenced in 1913, and the Manizales station was inaugurated and 
opened to traffic on the 3 February 1922.128 In 1913, 199,000 sacks of coffee were produced in 
Caldas, representing approx. 20% of national production.129 The DRC had to overcome severe 
technical challenges to access this lucrative market, but British investors were seldom fazed by 
engineering challenges, as long as the economic environment provided stability and 
opportunity for profit. The first major challenge was the project’s scale: when completed the 
ropeway would be the longest in the world.130 The second challenge was logistics. Construction 
works began in 1913, but they were quickly interrupted by the First World War. The costs of 
materials and transportation was increased, and the British government had placed wartime 
restrictions on manufacturers and exports.131 Railways had made transporting materials to the 
capital more straightforward, but Caldas remained remote and inaccessible. Transportation of 
construction materials relied on traditional mule trails, and muleteers were forced to improvise:  
The transport of driving wheels … 2.6 meters in diameter, and of voluminous steam engines 
required the skill of old muleteers who built pallets for four or more oxen … rolls of various 
kilometres [of cable] were carried … with the help of 20 mules tied together … by complex 
harnesses created by local muleteers.132 
The DRC combined traditional and local logistical ingenuity with modern engineering 
expertise. Sir Douglas Fox and Partners were the consulting engineers for the project, who 
brought a wealth of experience of tropical infrastructure development. They helped build the 
Rhodesian railway system, many South African railways, the Angolan Benguela railway, the 
South Indian Railway, the Southern Sao Paulo Railway in Brazil, and the Central Argentine 
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Railway.133 Attracting foreign capital was dealt with by Quilter & Co, the family firm of one 
of the DRC’s major ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ shareholders. They offered £150,000 of debentures 
at a 7.5% discount. Nominal interest was 6%, which represented an effective interest rate of 
6.5%.134 The DRC’s implementation of the ropeway, illustrates how its ‘gentlemanly 
capitalists’ were able to attract British capital and engineering expertise with ease. The 
logistical, geographical, and engineering challenges, led to the project going over budget.135 
Yet once the ropeway opened to traffic, it quickly became remunerable. Peak capital 
investment hit £385,000 at the end of 1921, representing £5,375 per km.136 
Table. 6.4 – Comparative analysis of capital expenditure of CNRC, CNoRC, BRPC and 
DRC railways and the DRC Ropeway per km 
Railway Capitalisation Length Capital/Km 
CNRC £2,480,000 132km £18,788 
CNoRC £480,000 47km £10,213 
BRPC £300,000 17km £17,647 
DRC £698,500 116km £6,022 
DRC Ropeway £385,000 71.63km £5,375 
Source: See Tables 3.1, 4.2 5.1, 6.2, 6.5 and ‘Report on the Railways of Colombia’ 1910, Vol. XCVI, Cd. 4968. 
 
As table 6.4 illustrates, ropeway expenditure was significantly lower than other British 
railways, and slightly lower that the DRC’s existing track. However, with closer inspection, 
the project looks even more advantageous. Ropeways travelled in straight lines across 
terrain. Railways had to take advantage of existing topography, skirting mountains and 
meandering through valleys to minimize gradients. Ropeways thus requires less km to cover 
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the same distance. As such, in real terms, the comparative cost per km of the ropeway was 
significantly lower than simple calculations presented in table 6.4 suggest.137 To give some 
context, the CNRC constructed 132km of track between Girardot and Facatativa, which in 
a straight line is approx. 75km. This gives a figure of 1.75km of railway required for each 
1km travelled in a straight line. Applying this ratio to the ropeway gives a real cost per km 
of only £3,064 per km. With these factors considered, ropeways represented, or as Pérez 
Ángel has argued, represent a viable alternative or addition to Colombian transportation 
infrastructure.138 
Table 6.5 – Ropeway Company Financials F/Y1920-28 





























1920 £48,934 £32,638 £16,296 £339,044 £109,044 £11,903 £11,903 £4,393 4.81% 
1921 £51,808 £39,051 £12,757 £385,000 £155,000 £1,650 £13,553 £11,107 3.31% 
1922 £64,759 £40,330 £24,429 £385,000 £155,000 £9,044 £22,597 £15,385 6.35% 
1923 £98,763 £51,086 £47,677 £385,000 £155,000 £34,167 £56,764 £13,510 12.38% 
1924 £97,848 £53,581 £44,267 £337,500 £107,500 £34,457 £91,221 £9,810 13.12% 
1925 £114,569 £65,248 £49,321 £324,371 £90,000 £42,688 £133,909 £6,633 15.21% 
1926 £92,870 £65,956 £26,914 £287,000 £57,000 £21,884 £155,793 £5,030 9.38% 
1927 £65,866 £62,522 £3,344 £287,000 £57,000 -£734 £155,059 £4,078 1.17% 
1928 £69,232 £62,239 £6,993 £287,000 £57,000 £2,618 £157,677 £4,375 2.44% 
Sources: Guildhall Library, Stock Exchange Reports, Boxes 1557, 1602, 1647, 1693, 1738, 1782, 1830, 1879, 
1929, 2030, 2081. 
Fig. 6.17 demonstrates how quickly the ropeway became remunerable following its 
completion in 1922. The return on all capital increased from 3.31% to 15.21% in the space 
of four years. By the mid-1920s, operational profitability outstripped debenture interest 
                                                             
137  It is not possible to ascertain the exact km necessary for a railway following the route of the ropeway, 
since it would require a topographical and engineering survey. Nevertheless, we can be certain it was 
significantly greater than the straight line taken by the ropeway. 
138  Pérez Ángel, Colgados, pp. 205-7. 
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many times over: in 1925 operational profitability was £49,321, whilst debenture interest 
was only £6,633. The £42,688 remainder was available for dividends, further capital 
investment, or paying down of debt.  
Fig. 6.17 – Profitability and rate of return on capital of the ropeway 
 
Sources: See table 6.5. 
As fig. 6.18 illustrates, the DRC used the majority of retained earnings from the ropeway to 
pay down debt. Between 1923, when interest bearing debt was at a peak of £155,000 and 1926 
the ropeway paid off £98,000, or 63.22% of its outstanding debt. This conservative 
management served the company well, because in 1927 a direct rail link between Buenaventura 
and Armenia in Caldas was completed, opening up what has been defined by Posada as the 
‘Pacific route’ for Caldas’s coffee exports, and leading to a dramatic drop in revenues and 
profitability.139 By 1930 this had been extended as far as Pereira, and Buenaventura’s status as 
the principal port of departure for the coffee of Caldas was assured. The ropeway continued 
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serving coffee production surrounding Manizales, but it had lost its monopoly over transporting 
Caldas’s coffee, which had been the economic rationale of the project. Because of this the 
dramatic change in the freight did not financially cripple the enterprise. When the company’s 
revenues and profits collapsed, annual interest on debentures had fallen to only £4,375. Losing 
a large portion of the coffee freight from Caldas was a blow, but existing intra-departmental 
trade was still sufficient to service the ropeway’s diminished debt levels, without becoming a 
burden on the DRC shareholders. 
Fig. 6.18 – Debt levels and profitability of the ropeway (current prices) 
 
Sources: See table 6.5. 
As coffee freight decreased it was compensated by a rising trade in salt. By 1928, the ropeway 
transported more salt from Zipaquirá across the cordilleras to Manizales than coffee from 
Caldas to Mariquita, whereas in 1924, three times more coffee than salt had been transported.140 
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Opening up the ‘Pacific route’ forced the Ropeway to adapt its business model, but it was not 
a fatal blow to operations. The ropeway illustrates how efficient the free market was at applying 
novel technology, but also that in the absence of institutional incentive, attracting British capital 
depended on geographical monopolies. The ropeway opened a new productive area to the 
world economy, but when it faced competition in the form of the Pacific Railway, its business 
model collapsed. This general reliance on the free market as the primary means of directing 
capital, is the reason most British railways in Colombia monopolised an existing trade route. 
Without institutional incentives, Colombia had to cede control over vital trade links to foreign 
interests to attract investment, and as a result, capital was not applied in the interior where it 
was most required. 
6.7 Towards Nationalisation, 1923-56 
6.7.1 The ‘Tolima Tax’ 
This thesis has illustrated that contractual disputes were pervasive within Colombian railway 
history. But the ‘Tolima Tax’ was the most severe and protracted dispute experienced by a 
British railway company.141 The 1881 concession contract was awarded by the sovereign state 
of Tolima, before the centrist Regeneración reorganised the country.142 The contract stipulated 
that during the eighty years during which the concession was valid, a $0.05 levy was payable 
to Tolima for every 150kg transported by the railway. By December 1891, $40,477 was 
outstanding, and both parties agreed for this to be paid in instalments, with the last being due 
on the 1 July 1895. On the 23 September 1893, a further contract was signed which agreed to 
pay the DRC a subvention of $40,477 (wiping out the debt).143 The department also agreed to 
                                                             
141  A testament to the severity of the dispute is the fact the Foreign Office collected at least 12 volumes of 
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142  Report presented by author described by FO as a ‘Company Manager’ (possibly General Manager J.H. 
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renounce all future claim for the ‘tax’, providing the expansion to Conejo (La Dorada) was 
completed and wooden bridges were replaced with iron ones.144 Local conditions precluded the 
completion of expansion works by the date stipulated, but another contract was signed on the 
14 July 1896 which amended terms. Debt accrued up to the 1 March 1898 would be written off 
as long the extension to Conejo (La Dorada) was completed, and the bridges were replaced. In 
addition, the levy would only apply to import and export cargo in future.145 The extension to 
Conejo (La Dorada) was completed, and the department of Tolima confirmed the tax would be 
rescinded as long as Iron bridges were completed by 1 July 1899, and an extension towards 
Girardot was initiated. As has been discussed elsewhere, at this time the Colombian peso was 
depreciating in value rapidly. The real value of the $0.05 tax was diminishing, and the 
department was keen to make the most of the dispute before the value of the levy became 
insignificant. Construction works were subsequently paralysed by the War of a Thousand Days, 
and once again the efforts to fulfil the terms proved impossible. During the war, the railway 
was commandeered by the national government, and by its end, the government owed the DRC 
$51,191.63 for services rendered and damages inflicted.146 Following the war the expansion 
towards Girardot was initiated, fulfilling all of the government’s terms. On the 23 January 
1906, the governor of Tolima sent the following telegram confirming the annulment of the tax: 
To the Minister of Public Works, Bogotá, 
I am in receipt of your communication of the 8th instant No. 22, in which this office has advised 
that The Dorada Railway and this Department are quit of all obligations one to the other (‘en 
paz y salvo’). 
Yours, etc. (Signed) FELIX A. VELEZ M.147 
 
Upon receiving confirmation from both the national and departmental governments that the tax 
had been rescinded, the company ‘considered the question of the Tolima tax as settled for all 
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147  Velez to Minister of Public Works, 23 January 1906, in ‘The Dorada Railway Company Limited A Short 
Summary of the Tolima Lawsuits’, TNA, FO 135/473. 
325 
 
time’.148 The levy was forgotten for nineteen years. But on the 29 October 1923, the department 
of Tolima launched a legal case to charge it for decades of freight movements. Based on the 
deterioration of the DRC’s relationship with the government and local populace, it seems likely 
the case was related to the popular perception that the company worked against the national 
and public interest. El Tiempo certainly felt the case centred around a struggle over 
imperialism, arguing in the run up to the supreme court’s ruling, that the company had ‘extorted 
a third of the country’.149 
The inflation which occurred during the ‘paper money regime’ of the 1890s, complicated the 
case.150 Rafael Reyes introduced a gold backed peso through the Ley 59 de 1905 to run in 
parallel with the papel moneda until emissions of bills could be redeemed. The exchange rate 
would run at one hundred paper pesos per gold peso.151 The litigation demanded payment in 
gold pesos, at the same nominal rate as the levy had been defined in the 1881 contract. The 
DRC argued this had resulted in the debt increasing by a factor of 100, from $20,000 to 
$2,000,000.152 This was the equivalent of over £400,000, and 42% of the entire share capital. 
The arguments of both sides had some merit, and ultimately, as was generally the case in 
Colombia, the dispute came down to interpretation. The sum claimed by the department was 
in line the original real value of the levy. But the DRC maintained, with some justification, that 
since the levy was defined nominally at $0.05 per 150kg, and during the 1890s the papel 
moneda had been the legal tender, it should have been paid in paper pesos (representing an 
enormous discount in real terms). The dispute rested fundamentally on the interpretation of Ley 
59 de 1905. The Department of Tolima argued the law established that debts which had been 
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established prior to the paper money regime should be paid at par in gold pesos. The question 
of interpretation was what established the debt. Was the debt established in 1881 when the 
contract was signed, or was it established at the point the debt was charged (on an annual basis). 
These legal disputes over terminology were common, and they exhausted British entrepreneurs 
who were not used to these constant reinterpretations of contractual obligations. Whether the 
DRC’s argument was valid or not, is less important than the fact that – just as was the case with 
the CNoRC – rights to levy the DRC’s receipts had already been relinquished in the contract 
of 1896, as well as in writing by the Department of Tolima in 1906.153  
This dispute was the result of several factors. The first was the fracture between local and 
national politics. The national government did not explicitly support the Department of 
Tolima’s claim, and the Supreme Court was outside of their remit. The Department of Tolima 
could selectively apply clauses handpicked from the many iterations of contracts, whilst 
ignoring others. The litigation was similar to the one launched by Cundinamarca against the 
CNoRC. Chapter three explored how during the Regeneración and the Quinquenio the right to 
charge the levy to the CNoRC were repeatedly waived in contracts and agreements, only to be 
charged retroactively later. In the case of both the DRC and the CNoRC the problems stemmed 
from the institutional changes implemented during the Regeneración. This illustrates that 
Nuñez was not entirely successful in his aims: departmental governments maintained a degree 
of sovereignty over railway companies, despite efforts to centralise political power in Bogotá. 
For companies operating in Colombia, nothing could be taken for granted: clauses from 
contracts signed decades ago could suddenly re-emerge as serious problems. Both the DRC 
and the CNoRC endured contractual conflict which continued for two decades without 
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resolution, stemming from clauses in the 1880s concession contracts. The DRC won the first 
court case launched in 1923, but a later Supreme Court appeal was launched in 1936 which 
subsequently ruled in favour of Tolima.154 
The Department’s case focussed on proving that the transported cargo was greater than figures 
in the DRC’s accounts. They completely avoided addressing why the clause – which had been 
declared null and void by both the national and local governments – should be enforced. 155 
This focus on cargo discrepancies was utilized to foment anger against the DRC, by insinuating 
the scale of its profits had been hidden. This perception was easy to manipulate when many 
already felt ‘foreigners are fleecing the country for their own benefit’.156 Furthermore, Deas 
demonstrated that Colombians had complained about the DRC’s terrible provision of services 
from the 1890s onwards.157 Financially punishing the DRC, was therefore viewed as a justified 
action, and El Tiempo, who had accused the DRC of ‘extorting a third of the country’ earlier 
in the year, celebrated the supreme court’s ruling in these terms in August of 1938.158 
Ultimately, the litigation was understood by all parties to be a struggle over imperialism. The 
Foreign Office conceded to President Eduardo Santos in 1940, that the DRC was ‘very Colonial 
in character’.159 Despite famously opposing the concept of informal imperialism in Latin 
America, Platt conceded that in Brazil the Sao Paulo Railway held ‘a country to ransom’.160 
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The available evidence suggests the DRC did something similar in Colombia.161 Just as Pérez 
Triana had done in his famous speech to The Hague, President Santos went as far as to evoke 
Shakespeare’s Shylock, arguing the DRC’s continued existence ‘was like demanding a full 
pound of flesh from Colombia’.162 By this point, the 1938 supreme court ruling had forced the 
DRC to concede that they were going to lose the railway, and needed to focus on obtaining the 
best possible terms in nationalisation negotiations.163 Nationalisation did not occur until 1956, 
eighteen years after the supreme court’s judgement. However, as the Foreign Office’s 
correspondence with President Santos illustrates, it is fair to say that at this point the die had 
already been cast. The DRC’s nationalisation represents the end of the strongest example of 
informal economic imperialism in Colombia, and the fact its demise coincides with the Suez 
crisis, is highly symbolic of Britain’s imperial decline. The negotiations have been preserved 
within twelve volumes in Kew, and their contents are highly indicative of the feeble nature of 
Britain’s once mighty diplomatic machinery. The Colombian government drove a hard bargain 
in these negotiations, and the Foreign Office were powerless to assist the DRC, who in 1956 
were forced to accept a rather insulting payment of coffee with a market value of US$1,000,000 
for the railway and enclave.164 
6.8 Conclusions 
The DRC illustrates, just as previous chapters have, that contractual disputes were the norm in 
Colombia, rather than the exception. These were often caused by the multiple iterations of 
contracts which were conflicting and contradictory. The DRC’s ‘Tolima tax’ case demonstrates 
the impact of the local/national political power dynamic more clearly than other British 
railways. The DRC experienced two completely different relationships with government on a 
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national and local level. Local opposition was understandable and influenced by the lack of 
convergence between shareholder and national interests. The failure to expand to Girardot 
contributed to a transportation crisis. However, the shareholders were simply following their 
own interests. Ultimately, it was the place of the national government to ensure a convergence 
of these interests through institutional incentives and legislation. Rather than induce the DRC 
to continue expansion, the increasingly hostile environment meant the company became more 
focused on protecting the monopoly, and less disposed to invest in expanding operations.  
The DRC’s experience reiterates how indispensable institutional incentive was for expansion. 
The railway’s history illustrates that the market in of itself was unable to allocate capital to 
where it was most required. In Brazil, institutional incentives were required to open up the 
hinterlands of the interior to the world economy, and in Argentina, the success of the Central 
Argentine – which opened up the Pampas – was dependent on a guarantee of 7% returns on 
investor capital granted in 1862.165 A section between Girardot and Ambalema was short and 
inexpensive, but it was not in the interest of large shareholders. To entice investment, the 
government needed to offer sufficient institutional incentives to compensate for losses in the 
competing Cambao cart road. This did not happen, and the expansion was not built. In contrast, 
the history of the DRC ropeway illustrates how efficient the market was at innovation and the 
introduction of new technology when it facilitated the construction of a strong transportation 
monopoly.  
Of all British railways in Colombia the DRC most closely fits the ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ 
model, and on every level, the railway exhibited all the hallmarks of economic imperialism. 
The DRC (much like the BRPC and the SMRC) illustrates that without institutional incentives 
or regulation, foreign capital migrated towards existing trade routes and geographical 
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monopolies. Whether serving the international trade of the interior (BRPC and DRC), or the 
burgeoning banana trade (SMRC), these railways became dominated by powerful international 
political actors. The interests of these were seldom congruent with those of the country, and 
the companies’ energies were focused on the maintenance of monopolies, rather than on the 
expansion of operations. As such, the threat railway bond guarantees were perceived to pose 
to national sovereignty, was ultimately beside the point. As the DRC, the BRPC, and the SMRC 
all illustrate, institutional incentives in the form of bond guarantees were not necessary for 
Colombia to lose sovereignty over the conduits of its international trade. If anything, the 
railways financed with guaranteed bonds (CNRC and GNCRC) were the least imperialistic in 
Colombia, because institutional support was counterbalanced by concessions made by the 
companies during negotiations. In contrast, the DRC, the BRPC, and the SMRC all wielded 
significant economic power, and their influence endured much longer than that of the CNRC, 
despite the desire of the national government to nationalize them from the early-1910s 
onwards. It was easier to control the actions of a company which depended on financial support 
than one which was entirely self-sufficient. The economic power behind the DRC, the BRPC, 
and the SMRC meant the national government had little or no leverage.  
The DRC illustrates the necessity for state intervention in the railway sector. The Colombian 
government decided to direct development through state ownership, rather than institutional 
incentives and legislation. The history of the DRC and other British railway companies in 
Colombia demonstrates that this decision ultimately retarded the expansion of the national 
railway network. The reason Colombia failed to build an expansion from Ambalema to 
Girardot, connecting the DRC and the CNRC, had nothing to do with geography, lack of 
capital, lack of expertise, or any of the explanations posited by the national historiography for 
the retardation of the national railway network. The expansion did not happen because the state 
did not provide sufficient incentive for private capital. With regards to Argentina, Lewis argues 
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that ‘whether Argentina could … have financed railway construction from domestic sources is 
a sterile debate’.166 Colombia provides a concrete example of the result of a Latin American 
country putting this debate into practice. Colombia consciously spurned British investment in 
the post-Quinquenio era. As a result, little progress on a national railway network was made 
until North American capital came on stream in the 1920s. Colombia missed out on the positive 
developmental aspects British railway investment provided Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, yet 
still had to contend with the worst aspects of British railway imperialism in the form of the 
BRPC, the SMRC, and the DRC. Colombia’s anti-imperialist stance ultimately led to the worst 
of both worlds.
                                                             



































Chapter 7 - Conclusions. 
 
The protection that the lack of internal communications within our national territory has 
provided us, has made us indifferent … towards the wider world, … with the candid belief that 
… no-one could possibly cross the sacred borders of la patria [to threaten our sovereignty]. … 
Well, we have had the first painful lesson demonstrating that things cannot go on as before. Our 
territory has been mutilated and we have been betrayed. Santiago Pérez Triana, Desde lejos, 
1907.1 
This thesis has provided a novel interpretation of Colombian economic, social, and political 
history during the first three decades of the twentieth century, illustrating that not only were 
British railways relevant to Colombian political, social, and economic history, they were 
fundamentally central to it. The whole of Colombian society displayed agency against the 
construction of economic imperialism through the conduit of British railway companies. As 
Pérez Triana’s above quotation illustrates clearly, the reaction against foreign interests was 
influenced heavily by the loss of the department of Panama, which brought the question of 
sovereignty to the forefront of national politics. The process was particularly visible in the 
Banana enclave, where British and North American interests in the Banana export trade became 
increasingly intertwined. Nationalisation of British railways dominated the national debate at 
the very pinnacle of society. The issue was frequently discussed in the national newspaper El 
Tiempo, in Presidents’ speeches, and in debates within the national congress; it was felt that 
the sovereignty, identity, and even the survival of ‘la patria’, hinged on successfully bringing 
British railways under public ownership.  
7.1 Profitability 
This thesis has proven conclusively that not only were British railways profitable, but in some 
cases, they were amongst the most profitable in the Latin American region. This overturns the 
idea that railways were unsuited to Colombian terrain, and consequently a waste of resources. 
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But these conclusions have more wide-ranging implications for international historiography. 
Fig 7.1 illustrates the enormous discrepancy between the profitability of, and the nominal 
dividends paid by the DRC, the CNoRC, and the BRPC. By the 1920s, profitability of the 
companies was between ten and thirty-five percentage points higher than annual dividends, 
which for the DRC and the BRPC stood at 8%. But the DRC, the CNoRC, and the BRPC were 
not simply exceptions to the general level of profitability of the sector. Fig. 7.2 illustrates that 
when taking consideration of the years since incorporation, profitability increased at a similar 
rate across the sector. But as the fourth chapter demonstrated, despite the rapid growth of 
revenues, the local environment made it difficult for companies to withstand the long gestation 
period inherent to the railway sector. 
Fig. 7.1 – Percentage point gap between return on share capital and nominal dividends 1904-
1929, CNoRC, BRPC, DRC 
 













Fig. 7.2 – Percent return on all capital of the DRC, the BRPC, the CNoRC and the CNRC 
following incorporation 
 
Source: tables 3.1, 4.2, 5.1 and 6.2. 
 
The low nominal dividends paid by the DRC, the CNoRC, and the BRPC represented a form 
of risk-management strategy: revenues which could have been paid as dividends were 
accumulated in sinking-funds as a hedge against political risk. The level of dividends paid by 
British railways in Colombia led Rippy to argue they were not particularly profitable.2 Casson 
and Da Silva Lopes argue that effective risk-management is a determinant of successful 
investment in high-risk areas.3 As such, it is likely similar discrepancies between nominal 
dividends and underlying profitability may well have occurred in other high-risk regions. 
Dividends have been utilised throughout international historiography as the principal gauge of 
profitability within the railway sector.4 In view of the significant variance identified here, 
where railways operated in high-risk environments, and their dividends have been used as the 
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principal measure of financial performance, the profitability of British overseas railways may 
well need to be re-evaluated. Casson has argued that insufficient source material exists to 
provide a detailed view of free-standing companies.5 This thesis has shown the opposite to be 
true: accounting records illustrate the everyday experiences, as well as the return provided to 
investors in significant detail. This case study has thus presented a workable way forward for 
the business history of British overseas investment and free-standing companies. 
7.2 Nationalism and Liberalism 
British railways were a symbol of power, sovereignty, national progress, and solidarity. As 
such, nationalisation policies transcended economic, financial, or even political considerations. 
This thesis has shown that the lack of expansion of the network was not a failure but rather a 
conscious choice to forge the national destiny independently. Colombian elites decided to 
forego the developmental advantages offered by railways, to ensure Colombia would remain 
the master of its own destiny. Colombia did not play the role of victim in its interactions with 
foreign capital, but rather agency was displayed at all levels of society against the construction 
of economic imperialism, and it entered the world economy on its own terms.  
Colombia’s decision to go it alone might be seen as admirable, although in hindsight, 
misguided: the decision to spurn British investment significantly retarded railway 
development, and ultimately, it did not avoid British economic imperialism within the railway 
sector. Nationalism forced British interests to entrench their position by protecting the 
geographical monopolies established during the Regeneración and Quinquenio. In this sense, 
Colombia ultimately received the worst of both worlds: unassailable monopolies which were 
difficult to dislodge, yet little of the developmental advantage British investment had provided 
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Press, 1998), pp. 99-128 (p. 100). 
337 
 
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, or Mexico. From a strictly developmental perspective, Colombia 
would have been better off embracing British investment, but as the events on the Panamanian 
isthmus or within the banana enclave have demonstrated, more was at stake than simply 
economic development. Colombia did face a threat to national sovereignty, of this there is no 
doubt, and national politicians were right to recognise the situation as such. 
The thesis has demonstrated that the growth of economic nationalism was connected to the 
evolution of Colombian liberalism. The precipitating event was the loss of Panama, which 
demonstrated to many that liberalism, in its traditional form, was incompatible with the national 
reality. Colombian elites increasingly understood that they could not play host to foreign 
interests without endangering national sovereignty. This fact was further underlined by the 
growing influence of the intertwined interests of the UFC, Fyffes, and the SMRC in the banana 
zone. The alliance between British and American economic imperialism demonstrated to the 
political elite how precarious national sovereignty was in the face of transnational capitalism. 
Colombian liberals were forced to confront the reality of liberal capitalism, or what Mayall 
terms the ‘liberal world order’.6 Their response was to reject economic liberalism in favour of 
economic nationalism, integrating this within a Latin American re-interpretation of liberalism, 
leading to left-liberalism and Gaitanismo. 
7.3 Political Economy and Public Policy 
The thesis had demonstrated that British companies were inextricably linked to the ebb and 
flow of national and regional politics. The Quinquenio (1904-09) was almost universally 
beneficial for British companies. However, in the years that followed, the environment rapidly 
deteriorated when the nationalisation policy inspired by Desde lejos solidified within national 
politics.7 As such, expansion was dictated primarily by changes in national political economy 
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and public policy. But the changing environment was not just a national issue, but part of a 
wider regional political movement. Panama lit the touch paper of Colombian nationalism in 
1903, but from a regional perspective, the 1902 British blockade of Venezuela was equally 
important. These events created regional solidarity against imperialism. As a result, a concerted 
effort to collectively influence international institutions was made through the Drago doctrine 
conference at The Hague convention of 1907. It is no coincidence that Santiago Pérez Triana, 
who was so influential in the rise of nationalistic public policy towards British railways 
domestically, played an influential role putting forward Latin Americans’ case at The Hague, 
since both were part of the same regional political phenomenon.8  
Uruguay’s anti-imperialist railway policy during Batllismo (1911-15), was accompanied by ‘a 
new wave of anti-foreign economic nationalism between 1909 and 1914’ in Argentina, 
mirroring the changes witnessed in Colombia.9 But these countries had already constructed 
substantial networks, whilst Colombia’s nationalistic movement occurred when only a small 
and rudimentary railway network had been established. Anti-imperialism had no real 
developmental influence on Argentina or Uruguay, but in Colombia, it ended the prospect of a 
large-scale network developed with British capital. Wright presents Argentine economic 
nationalism as an afterthought, worthy of study, but not a factor of causation for the nature of 
the national railway network.10 Because of the focus on Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico, the 
historiography has failed to recognise the inhibitive effect rising nationalism had on railway 
expansion elsewhere in Latin America. The thesis has demonstrated that the spread of 
economic nationalism throughout the region, suffocated Colombia’s attempts to develop its 
transportation infrastructure, illustrating the profound influence of national politics on 
infrastructure development. Colombia implemented institutional incentives for foreign capital 
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during the Quinquenio, but these were fleeting. The short-term successes of the Quinquenio, 
and the abrupt cessation of expansion which followed, illustrate that railway construction was 
dictated primarily by public policy, rather than geography. 
7.4 The Market versus Institutional Incentive 
This thesis suggests that the market was an inadequate mechanism for allocating capital to 
where it was most needed in the periphery. There is a clear distinction between the CNRC, 
whose debentures received government guarantees, and the DRC, the SMRC, the CNoRC, and 
the BRPC, which were dictated entirely by the free market. The institutional incentive provided 
to investment in the CNRC, ensured the completion of a vital infrastructure project. In contrast, 
the DRC, the BRPC, the CNoRC, and the BRPC all constructed monopolies to syphon off 
profits or support secondary economic interests. Preoccupation with protecting these 
monopolies took precedence over expanding the railways, and as such, the companies worked 
at cross purposes to national interests. Ultimately, the reliance on the free market as the 
mechanism to allocate capital, meant investors gravitated towards monopolisation of vital trade 
routes which served their own economic interests. Chapter four illustrated that applying 
institutional incentives enabled a convergence of national interests with those of the CNRC’s 
shareholders, ensuring the completion of the project. 
The DRC provides the perfect example of the free market’s failure to allocate capital to where 
it was most needed. The Girardot-Ambalema expansion would have enabled direct rail 
transportation from Bogotá to the lower Magdalena River, and provided a significant 
developmental impulse to the national economy. There was a fundamental conflict of interest 
between major shareholders and the country, and without the state to cajole capital, 
shareholders acted in their own interest. Thus, in opposition to the central thesis of neo-
liberalism, the thesis demonstrates that Adam Smith’s invisible hand was insufficient to ensure 
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the necessary capital was employed to open the interior to the world economy. Without 
institutional incentive, capital gravitated towards railways with limited developmental benefit 
for the country’s economy. Indeed, with the DRC, the BRPC, and the CNoRC, British capital 
only arrived once a railway serving each geographical pinch-point had already been 
established, meaning in each case, the benefit to the national economy was nil. The CNoRC 
and the DRC, were both induced into expanding operations during the Quinquenio (1904-09), 
but this developmental impulse disappeared with the fall of the regime. The DRC’s ropeway 
provides an important exception, and it illustrates the efficiency of the market in implementing 
new technology where economic incentive existed. Yet it also demonstrates that without 
institutional incentive, raising capital depended on the potential for the establishment of a 
geographical monopoly. With no direct competing trade route between Caldas and the 
Magdalena River valley, the ropeway offered the construction of a lucrative monopoly. 
Without this prerequisite, British investors were simply unwilling to risk their capital in a high-
risk environment. 
The literature has shown that guarantees were indispensable to railway development 
throughout the Latin American region.11 This thesis has shown this was equally true in 
Colombia, and that the collapse and delegitimisation of the system, was a significant factor in 
the lack of expansion. This conclusion has never been articulated by the national 
historiography, which has largely attributed the lack of railway expansion to geography, rather 
than political and institutional factors. From a theoretical perspective, this brings the experience 
of Colombia in line with countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, where the system 
was influential to the rapid expansion experienced during the age of high imperialism (1870-
1914). Colombia provides an example of the result of the failure to implement the necessary 
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institutional prerequisites for attracting British capital. Had the policies of Reyes’s Quinquenio 
continued, Colombia’s experience would have more closely paralleled that of Argentina, 
Brazil, or Mexico. 
7.5 Conflict 
This thesis has shown how profound the impact of the War of a Thousand Days was for railway 
companies. It was particularly acute for the CNRC: chapter four demonstrated conclusively 
that the war was almost entirely responsible for the eventual bankruptcy of the enterprise. 
Economic viability was compromised by delays. In addition, the interest incurred during these 
delays led to additional interest-bearing debt, substantially increasing the breakeven level of 
the enterprise. The counterfactual presented in chapter four demonstrated that the impact of the 
war was greater than the geographical challenges faced. But even when physical damage to 
company property was limited (as with the BRPC), the war interrupted operations. 
Geographical problems had a technical solution. In contrast, conflict was a risk which could 
not be managed. Political risk could also be managed by cultivating relationships with 
‘collaborating elites’. But how could a railway company overcome the destruction of its 
property, or a long-term hiatus to construction works, during which interest on debentures had 
to be paid with capital which had been earmarked for construction? Colombia was uniquely 
cursed by this problem, since its most destructive period of civil conflict came during the period 
of greatest flows of capital investment. Argentina had been historically blighted by conflict 
because of its ‘perennial constitutional problem’. But these problems were resolved by 1880 
when the federalisation of Buenos Aires established ‘internal order … until 1929’.12 Likewise, 
in Mexico, Díaz’s policies ensured the country was open to business throughout the Porfiriato 
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(1876-1911). By identifying the role of the civil war, the thesis has highlighted another 
significant factor inhibiting Colombia’s railway expansion in comparison to other countries. 
7.6 Credit Worthiness 
This thesis has illustrated the importance of Colombia’s creditworthiness in determining capital 
flows into the railway sector. It has shown that the verdad de la deuda doctrine acted as an 
impermeable barrier to investment up until the Holguín-Avebury agreement of 1905. As a 
result, Colombia entered the twentieth century far behind other countries in the region in terms 
of railway investment. Where British investment had occurred, it seized control of existing 
railways benefitting from strong geographical monopolies (e.g. DRC and BRPC, both 
incorporated in 1888). The thesis has demonstrated that Rafael Reyes and Jorge Holguín 
revolutionised Colombia’s creditworthiness overseas, opening the country up to large-scale 
investment for the first time since independence. Colombia’s creditworthiness was maintained 
in the decades following the Quinquenio (1904-09), but the increasingly hostile political 
environment arrested further investment in the sector. As such, the thesis has demonstrated 
how important Reyes’s rehabilitation of Colombia’s credit overseas was to its long-term 
economic history. 
7.7 Contractual Instability 
One theme which repeats throughout the thesis is the issue of contractual stability, or more 
precisely, the ill-defined and precarious basis of property rights. This led to every railway 
surveyed experiencing repeated contractual disputes. North has established a theoretical basis 
for the economic impact of unstable property rights. 13 This thesis has illustrated the practical 
reality of foreign enterprise operating under these conditions. The uncertainty which affected 
the railways had two causes. The first was the frequently ambiguous wording of contracts. The 
                                                             
13  North, Institutions. 
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second was multiple reiterations of contracts, with conflicting and contradictory clauses. The 
impact varied from extreme (the DRC’s and the CNoRC’s disputes with the departments of 
Tolima and Cundinamarca), to minor (the dispute over the date of the option of nationalisation 
on the BRPC). Yet in both cases, the disputes influenced expansion plans. The BRPC delayed 
construction to await a decision on the ruling over the buy-back clause, whilst the hostility of 
departmental government halted any further expansion of the DRC and the CNoRC. 
Meanwhile, the repudiation of the GNCRC’s Quinquenian concession contract (spearheaded 
by local political actors) resulted in the collapse of the entire enterprise. Henry Jenks’s 
investment in the CNRC was also dogged by contractual disputes from the outset, beginning 
with the disagreement with Mainero y Trucco, and culminating with the controversy over of 
the Apulo works. Finally, the SMRC’s legal dispute illustrated that even the upper echelons of 
the national government were unsure as to the particular legal basis of the company. As such, 
this was a consistent problem for British railways companies, which was universally 
detrimental to investment and expansion. 
7.8 Imperialism, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalists’, and Transnational Capitalism  
The analysis of shareholder registers and the interactions of ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ company 
officials and local ‘collaborating elites’, has provided a detailed view of a key intersection of 
British economic imperialism in Colombia. The shareholding patterns evident in railways 
established by the Regeneración era subvention system, were dominated by four groups. The 
first was a small group of wealthy British investors, atypical of the ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ 
concept, who controlled a significant share of the enterprise. As chapter six illustrated, this 
enabled control of the DRC’s expansion policy. The second group was made up of local elites, 
generally with ties to the import/export business, and often with direct interests in the coffee 
trade. As chapters four and six illustrated clearly, the nature of their interactions with British 
‘gentlemanly capitalists’, mean they can be considered as ‘collaborating elites’. But as chapters 
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three and four demonstrated, they were never truly subservient to these British interests. They 
dominated the CNoRC’s shareholding, and as the ‘Apulo works’ illustrates, even when elites 
did not directly control the enterprise, they successfully co-opted it to serve their own economic 
interests. The third group were transnational capitalists, who seized control of the coastal 
railways. They directed the BRPC’s company policy towards protecting the geographical 
monopoly, allowing them to continue extracting monopoly profits, to the detriment of national 
interests. Meanwhile, the transnational capitalists of the UFC and Fyffes took control of the 
SMRC to support secondary economic interests in the banana trade. The final group was what 
I have termed throughout as middle-class capitalists. The thesis demonstrated how they were 
drawn to the CNRC project by the government guarantee. They were unable to wield the same 
absolute control as occurred with the DRC, the SMRC, or the BRPC, because they did not 
represent a concentrated and cohesive block. Ultimately, this thesis has illustrated that not only 
did British economic imperialism exist in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
Colombian railway sector, it was in fact central to national political and economic life. This 
conclusion contrasts strongly with Deas’s argument that British railways were largely 
irrelevant to Colombian history, and that British economic imperialism did not exist.14 The 
Colombian political elite were quick to recognise the threat to national sovereignty these British 
interests represented, and their decision to halt these incursions, ultimately ended the expansion 
of the network. 
7.9 Business Culture 
The thesis has illustrated that British ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ initially struggled with 
Colombia’s ‘catch-as-catch-can’ business culture, representing a significant challenge to their 
early endeavours.15 However, as chapters three, four, and six illustrated, with time British 
                                                             
14  Deas, ‘Weapons of the Weak’. 
15  Safford, ‘Foreign and National Enterprise’, p. 503. 
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entrepreneurs and administrators came to adapt to (and even thrive in) this foreign business 
culture. The business culture was an important factor in the contractual and generalized 
instability the companies dealt with. Reyes’s Quinquenio was successful in attracting 
investment because his authoritarian regime could enforce the necessary stability at a national 
level. The thesis illustrates that ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ struggled in Colombia, because 
British imperialism (as defined by Cain and Hopkins) depended on a dictator such as Reyes 
(Colombia) or Díaz (Mexico) to enforce order, or else the strong national elite which ‘publicly 
defended’ British enterprise that Wright describes in pre-1914 Argentina.16 In absence of either 
of these factors, British ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ had to abandon their gentlemanly ethos in 
order to succeed. Doing so depended on strong relationships with ‘collaborating elites’, like 
the ones forged by the Jenks family. In some cases, such as the CNRC and the DRC, British 
entrepreneurs were successful in adapting to the new environment. In others, such as the 
GNCRC, they were wholly unsuccessful, which led to the ruin of the enterprise. 
7.10 Regionalism 
Many authors have argued the struggle between federalism and centrism influenced the 
economic development of Colombia.17 This thesis has shown the impact at the micro-level 
through a detailed empirical study. It has uncovered a repeating pattern of competing forces. 
Railway companies’ interests tended to converge with either the local or national political 
forces, seldom with both. This was because of the dynamics of political power in Colombia, 
which despite the centrist Regeneración, was yet to definitively consolidate under centrism or 
federalism. Local and national political actors continued to vie for power, and the railway 
companies represented an important conduit for this internal struggle. This explains the 
                                                             
16  Wright, British-Owned Railways, p. 89. 
17  Safford and Palacios, Colombia; Correa, Moneda y Nación; McGreevy, An Economic History; 
McFarlane, Colombia; McGuiness, Path of Empire. 
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differing experiences throughout the country. With reference to the CNRC, the CNoRC, and 
the GNCRC, although these railways experienced complicated interactions with local political 
actors, organised political opposition was generally national in nature. Cundinamarcan elites 
supported the CNRC, whilst santandereanos supported the GNCRC, and both regions 
competed with one another for the limited national fiscal resources. In both cases, national 
popular opposition to the projects emerged, but whilst opposition to the CNRC was largely 
organic, chapters three and four illustrate that opposition to the GNCRC was largely contrived 
by Cundinamarcan elites. Organised political opposition to the SMRC and DRC was generally 
local, although the transnational nature of the SMRC led to intense national interest. The BRPC 
is perhaps the only railway where national and local interests converged, since the railway 
serviced both the coast as well as most of the interior. As such, the BRPC experienced little of 
the organised political opposition which had befallen other British railways.  
7.11 Final Considerations 
Regional economic historiography focuses on geography, the resources lottery, and 
international trade as the primary progenitors of economic development and infrastructure 
development.18 Political factors have generally taken a less prominent role, with a few notable 
exceptions.19 Lewis and Summerhill demonstrate the indispensable role institutional support 
of railway expansion played in Argentina and Brazil.20 Bignon, Estevez, and Herranz have 
shown a strong positive correlation between international trade and infrastructure development, 
yet they were unable to explain why railway expansion in Colombia did not match the growth 
                                                             
18  Safford, and Palacios, Colombia; Safford, ‘El Problema de los Transportes’; Gallup, Gaviria, and Lora, 
Is Geography Destiny?; Vincent Bignon, Rui Esteves, and Alfonso Herranz‐Loncán, ‘Big Push or Big 
Grab? Railways, Government Activism, and Export Growth in Latin America, 1865–1913’, The 
Economic History Review, 68 (2015), 1277-305. 
19  Lewis, British Railways; Lewis, Public Policy, Deas, ‘Weapons of the Weak?’; Summerhill, Order; 
Summerhill, ‘The Development of Infrastructure’. 
20  Summerhill, Order; Lewis, British Railways; Lewis, Public Policy. 
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of the export economy.21 This thesis explains this variance: railway development did not 
expand in sync with exports because of the inhibitive effect of insecure property rights and the 
hostile political environment. As such, the empirical analysis implemented here has introduced 
a new dynamic into the historiography, explaining the Colombian experience within the 
regional context. 
Fundamentally, this thesis has demonstrated that the main impediment to railway expansion 
was national politics, and the unstable local environment. ‘Collaborating elites’ such as Pérez 
Triana (CNRC and GNCRC), Dávila (CNoRC), Gérman Ribón (DRC), or Koppel (BRPC) 
successfully co-opted foreign investment when it served their interests, and they agitated 
politically for an end to expansion when it did not. As such, whilst the ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ 
provided most of the capital, the ‘collaborating elites’ were often more influential in the 
success, or otherwise, of the enterprise. This illustrates that just as Cain and Hopkins argue, in 
the informal empire, British economic imperialism depended on the consent of the host society 
(at the elite level). When consent was revoked, capital migration and expansion of British 
companies quickly ended. The brief period of a receptive and stable political economy under 
the Quinquenio (1904-09) saw expansion of British capital and in the railway sector. But once 
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